

THE BALTIC COUNTRIES

Population, family and
family policy

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

THE BALTIC COUNTRIES:

**Population, family and
family policy**

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THE BALTIC COUNTRIES: POPULATION, FAMILY AND FAMILY POLICY

Vlada Stankūnienė
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Editors

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PREFACE

This volume presents a study in the framework of the international project “Comparative analysis on the effectiveness of the population policy in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia within the EU context” (GYVPOLBALT) funded by the Lithuanian State Science and Studies Foundation. The Lithuanian State Science and Studies Foundation have a sustained interest in demographic issues in Lithuania and the other two Baltic countries. In 1998, the foundation was one of the sponsors of the international conference “Regularities and inconsistencies of demographic development in the Baltic Countries”, which was organized by the Department of Demography of the Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy in Vilnius, Lithuania. On the basis of the papers presented at the conference, two volumes on demographic trends and population policies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been published. Along with the proceedings of a similar conference called “Demographic development in the Baltic Countries” and held in Tallinn (Estonia) in 1997, these two volumes (special issues of the journal *Revue Baltic*) *Demographic development in the countries of transition*, and *Mortality in the Baltic countries at the end of the 20th century* were some of the most systematic comparative publications on the demographic issues in the Baltic countries. The present volume builds on previous experience, with a focus on the most recent demographic, family, and fertility trends and family policy responses. It is expected that policymakers of the three countries will be an important audience of this book, which is the result of the continuous collective efforts of colleagues working in scientific institutions in four countries: Luule Sakkeus, Allan Puur, and Asta Põldma (Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre, Tallinn University, Estonia); Mare Ainsaar (Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Tartu, Estonia); Pārsla Eglīte (Institute of Economics, Latvian Academy of Sciences, Latvia), Iveta Pavlina (Latvian University and Institute of Economics, Latvian Academy of Sciences, Latvia); Aiva Jasilionienė and Domantas Jasilionis (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Germany); Raimonda Juknienė, Aušra Maslauskaitė, Audra Sipavičienė, and Vlada Stankūnienė (Demographic Research Centre, Institute for Social Research, Lithuania).

The volume is organized into five parts. The first part presents a comparative overview of demographic trends in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the context of the EU 27 countries. The second part deals with demographic changes and the current situation in each country. The third part discusses the development and effectiveness of family policies in 1989–2008. The fourth part, based on case studies in each country, addresses the the interplay between family changes and family policies. Finally, the fifth part demonstrates the possibilities of using population census data to analyze family, fertility and household structure.

The authors wish to thank the Lithuanian State Science and Studies Foundation for supporting their work and the publication of this book. We are especially grateful to Statistics Lithuania and its deputy general director Dalia Ambrozaitienė for consultations and support. We also extend our thanks to Alain Blum from the Centre for Russian, Caucasian and Central European Studies (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris, France) and the Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques (Paris, France), and Sergei Zakharov from the Institute of Demography, State University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia) for their useful comments and suggestions on the publication and also to Zaiga Krišjāne from the Faculty of Geography and Earth Sciences, Latvian University (Riga, Latvia) for the supply of demographic data about Latvia for chapter 2 of this volume.

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1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES: AN OVERVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EU COUNTRIES

INTRODUCTION


Population is a result of changes in the three demographic dimensions: fertility, mortality, and migration. The crude rate of natural population increase depends on the balance between fertility and mortality rates. Positive rates contribute to an increase in the population, whereas negative rates (resulting from higher death rates) contribute to a decline in the population. Population change also depends on net migration, which has been playing an increasingly important role in many developed countries. This chapter gives an overview of recent trends in overall and natural changes in population as well as in the main indicators of fertility and mortality in the three Baltic countries. Recent demographic changes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are discussed in the context of other (“new” and “old”) European Union member countries.

1.1 POPULATION SIZE AND PROPORTION OF OLDER POPULATION

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are among the smallest European Union countries. In the beginning of 2008, the populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were 1.34 million, 2.27 million, and 3.37 million, respectively. In terms of the proportions from the total population of the European Union, the three countries made negligible shares (0.3% for Estonia, 0.5% for Latvia, 0.7% for Lithuania, and 1.5% for the three Baltic countries combined).

According to data for 1990, the three countries, like the other “new” EU member countries, had considerably smaller proportions of older people than the majority of Western countries (Fig. 1.1). Due to a notable decrease in fertility and emigration in the 1990s, the Baltic countries almost caught up with the “older” Western populations. It should be noted that increases in the share of older people in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were one of the fastest among the “new” EU member states. According to data for 2008, the shares of the population above 65 years of age in Estonia and Latvia were above the EU 27 average (Fig. 1.1). Together with Bulgaria, these countries had the biggest proportions of older people in the “new” EU member countries. At the same time, Lithuania showed slightly lower figures and was among the 10 countries with the lowest proportion of elderly people in the European Union. The share of the elderly in Lithuania was well above the level in Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Ireland, however.

Figure 1.1. Proportion of people above the age of 65 in the three Baltic countries, the nine other “new” EU member countries, and the fifteen “old” EU member countries in 1990 and 2007




Source: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

1.2. POPULATION GROWTH AND ITS COMPONENTS

The three Baltic countries have not only some of the smallest populations in the European Union, but they also showed the most rapid population declines throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The three countries were among the five countries (the two other countries were Bulgaria and Romania) showing the most significant decreases in population between 1990 and 2007. The “leaders” in population decrease are Estonia and Latvia (almost 15% decline over the period). Lithuania, with an almost 9% decline, is in a better situation than the other two Baltic countries and Bulgaria.

Figure 1.2. Total population change over the period 1990–2007 (1990=100%) in the three Baltic countries, nine other “new” EU member countries, and fifteen “old” EU member countries




Source: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

Figure 1.3 sheds more light on the components of population decrease in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania between 1990 and 2007. It can be seen that in the first half of the 1990s, the population declines in all three countries were exclusively driven by high emigration rates. The striking peaks of emigration were especially pronounced in Estonia and Latvia in 1992–1994. At the same time, Lithuania saw moderate and stable negative net migration throughout the 1990s. It is important to note that since the middle of the 1990s, negative rates of natural increase became the biggest contributors to population declines in Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuania, high emigration rates remained the most important component of population decline up to the end of the 1990s.

Figure 1.3 also points to important differences between the three countries in the trends of natural increase in the 2000s. For example, Lithuania, demonstrating a much better situation in the 1990s, experienced a notable worsening throughout the 2000s. On the contrary, Estonia showed remarkable improvements, especially in 2003–2007. In Latvia, the negative rate of natural increase remained unchanged until 2007. In the 2000s, notable emigration continued making an important contribution to population decline in Lithuania, whereas it became much less important for Estonia and Latvia. However, it should be noted that net migration figures (even with the adjustments by EUROSTAT) do not fully account for unregistered (undeclared) migration. In Lithuania and Latvia such undeclared emigration may constitute a substantial share of the total net migration. For example, a study by Statistics Lithuania has shown that 48–68% of emigrants leave the country without declaring their departure (Statistics Lithuania, 2008).

Figure 1.3. Crude rates of natural population increase and net migration in the three Baltic countries, 1990–2007



Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

Table 1.1 shows that Lithuania and Latvia have become laggard countries in the EU in terms of rates of population increase (Table 1.1). With the lowest rate of total population increase (-5.5 per 1000 of population) and the highest negative net migration, Lithuania demonstrates the worst situation in all 27 countries. The similar position of Latvia is caused by a very low rate of natural increase, whereas the official net migration figure is less unfavourable than in Lithuania. A considerably better situation can be observed in Estonia. The better ranking of this country can be explained by its smaller (albeit still negative) rate of natural increase and small positive impact of reported net migration. Despite some differences between the three countries, however, the situation in the Baltic countries clearly contrasts with that observed in the majority of other EU countries (including some successful “new” EU countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia) showing positive population growth.


Table 1.1. Crude rates of population increase in the three Baltic countries, nine other “new” EU member countries, and fifteen “old” EU member countries in 2007

Country	Rate of natural increase	Rate of net migration	Rate of total population increase
Lithuania	-3.93	-1.55	-5.49
Bulgaria	-4.92	-0.18	-5.10
Latvia	-4.29	-0.28	-4.57
Hungary	-3.51	1.45	-2.06
Romania	-1.73	0.04	-1.69
Germany	-1.73	0.55	-1.18
Estonia	-1.22	0.12	-1.10
Poland	0.28	-0.54	-0.26
Slovak R.	0.11	1.26	1.36
Portugal	-0.10	1.84	1.74
Austria	0.20	2.17	2.37
Netherlands	2.95	-0.06	2.89
Greece	0.18	3.58	3.76
Finland	1.83	2.62	4.45
Denmark	1.55	3.03	4.58
<i>EU 27</i>	<i>0.97</i>	<i>4.23</i>	<i>5.21</i>
Malta	1.86	4.21	6.06
United Kingdom	3.24	2.94	6.18
Sweden	1.72	5.90	7.62
Slovenia	0.61	7.06	7.68
Belgium	1.88	5.87	7.75
Italy	-0.15	8.37	8.22
Czech R.	0.97	8.12	9.09
France	4.53	4.75	9.28
Cyprus	4.06	9.44	13.50
Luxembourg	3.36	12.50	15.86
Spain	2.42	15.60	18.02
Ireland	9.77	10.61	20.38

Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

The threats of further depopulation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania also involve very low net-reproduction rates. The period net-reproduction rate can be interpreted as the average number of daughters that a synthetic cohort of woman would bear if they survived throughout their reproductive life span and experienced at each age fertility and mortality rates of a given year (EUROSTAT, 2009). In order to achieve the level of reproduction ensuring that each generation of mothers is having exactly enough daughters to replace themselves in the population, the net-reproduction rate should be equal to 1. Figure 1.4 shows that the net-reproduction rate in all three countries was well below 1 in 2006. However, the net reproduction of the population in Estonia was almost identical to the EU average. In this respect, Estonia was the best performing country among the “new” EU members, whereas Lithuania was among the three countries with the lowest net-reproduction rates. Being below the EU 27 average, Latvia showed slightly better results than some other “new” EU member countries and Germany.

Figure 1.4. Net-reproduction rates in the three Baltic countries, eight¹ other “new” EU member countries, and fifteen “old” EU member countries in 2006




Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

¹Data for Malta were not available.

1.3. FERTILITY AND FAMILY

In the beginning of the 1990s, swift fertility changes were observed in the three Baltic States as well as in other former communist and even Western countries (Fig. 1.5). Despite some fluctuations or short-term decreases, some countries, including Ireland, France, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries, managed to maintain high fertility levels throughout the 1990s.

Figure 1.5. Trends of total fertility rates in the three Baltic countries, other “new” EU member countries, and “old” EU member countries, 1990–2007




Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

The total fertility rates in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which for quite some time had been above or very close to the replacement level, decreased to unprecedented lows. In Estonia and Latvia, the lowest point of fertility decline was reached in 1998: the TFR fell to 1.28 in Estonia and 1.12 in Latvia. In Lithuania, the bottom was hit in 2002, when the TFR dropped to 1.24. These years marked the breaking points in the fertility trends in the Baltic States—a turnaround took place soon after. It can be seen, however, that in the 2000s, fertility has been recovering faster in Estonia, whereas in Latvia and Lithuania positive changes were much less pronounced. According to statistics of 2007, the TFR was 1.64 in Estonia, 1.41 in Latvia, and 1.35 in Lithuania.

Despite the recent improvements, the period fertility levels in the majority of EU countries remain below the threshold ensuring the replacement of generations (2.1) (Fig. 1.6). The TFRs in Lithuania and Latvia are below the average of the EU 27 countries remain below the threshold ensuring the replacement of generations (2.1) (Fig. 1.6). The TFRs in Lithuania and Latvia are below the average of the EU 27 countries. These two countries stand in line with the low fertility countries of Southern

Europe as well as other “new” EU member countries (Fig. 1.6). Estonia reports a TFR which is higher than the EU 27 average and thus is close to the group of countries with the highest fertility levels in Europe.

Figure 1.6. Total fertility rate in the three Baltic countries, nine other “new” EU member countries, and fifteen “old” EU member countries in 2007



Note: Data for the EU 27, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are for 2006.


Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

The profound fertility declines in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the 1990s coincided with notable transformation in family patterns. In all three countries, these changes included rapid decreases and ageing of marriage and fertility, the spread of cohabitation, and an increase in births outside of marriage (Stankūnienė, Eidukienė, 1999). The transition to a new family pattern is taking place more slowly in Lithuania than it is in Estonia and Latvia (Stankūnienė et al, 2007).

Figure 1.7 shows annual trends in the proportion of births out of wedlock in the three Baltic countries and selected “new” EU member states between 1990 and 2007. It can be seen that already in the early nineties Estonia and Latvia had much higher shares

of non-marital births than the majority of the former communist countries. Despite the recent slowdown in the growth of this indicator, Estonia maintained the highest level of non-marital births up to the end of the period covered. Latvia, showing some decrease in the most recent years, remains close to the countries with a very high proportion of non-marital births. In the early 1990s, Lithuania, together with Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic belonged to the group of countries with the lowest levels of non-marital births. The situation radically changed during the 1990s—the proportion of non-marital births in Lithuania almost tripled in 10 years. Since 2003, the share of non-marital births has stabilized at the level of about 29%.

Figure 1.7. Trends of non-marital births in the three Baltic countries, other “new” EU member countries, and “old” EU member countries, 1990–2007



Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.


1.4. MORTALITY

The most widely used indicator of mortality is life expectancy at birth. The biggest advantage of life expectancy is that this measure reflects mortality experiences (of a so called synthetic cohort) across the whole age range. Life expectancy refers to average length of life and reveals the prematurity of death in a population.

Figure 1.8 shows that in 1990, male and female life expectancy at birth in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was somewhat close to the figures observed in other “new” EU member countries. However, the situation changed in the early and mid 1990s due to a deep mortality crisis in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The worsening in health was

not observed in other countries; on the contrary, some successful countries such as the Czech Republic or Poland showed remarkable improvements in life expectancy and convergence towards Western levels.

Figure 1.8. Trends in male and female life expectancy at birth in the three Baltic countries, other “new” EU member countries, and “old” EU member countries, 1990–2007



Note: Data for the EU 27, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are for 2006.
 Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; The Human Mortality Database, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

It was expected that the very notable recovery in life expectancy during the second half of the 1990s was a sign that the three Baltic countries would follow the path of successful central European countries. The trends observed in the 2000s, however, suggest a slowdown in the recovery or even a reversal in trends. Lithuanian males demonstrated the most striking trends as life expectancy at birth was either stagnating or decreasing. In Latvia, such negative changes were less pronounced. Contrary to Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia showed very consistent improvements throughout the


2000s (Fig. 1.8). Changes in female life expectancy in Lithuania and Latvia have been unfavourable but less dramatic. In Lithuania, life expectancy at birth was stagnating in 2000–2004 and slightly decreasing in 2005–2006. Similar stagnation was observed in Latvia in 2000–2003, but it was followed by substantial improvements during the two subsequent years (2004–2005). Again, Estonia showed notable progress in the growth of female life expectancy throughout the 2000s. As a result of such opposite trends, Latvia and Estonia, with initially lower levels of life expectancy, caught up and even surpassed Lithuania.

Figure 1.9 discloses a persistent, very unfavourable situation with male life expectancy in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2007. The three countries are classified as the three worst countries according to this criterion. Estonia, showing the highest male life expectancy among the Baltic countries, is still by 8.6 years behind the EU average. The corresponding disadvantage of Latvia and Lithuania is 10.1 and 11.0 years, respectively. As for females, the situation is slightly better, with the exception of Latvia (ranked as the worst country in the classification). Lithuanian females are ranked in the 24th position, whereas Estonia, leaving behind such countries as Hungary and the Slovak Republic stands in the 21th position among the 27 EU countries. Compared to the EU 27 average, the female life expectancy disadvantage ranges from a high of 5.6 years in Latvia to a low of 3.2 years in Estonia. Showing 4.8 years shorter life expectancy, Lithuania is in between the two extremes.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This brief overview has revealed that all three Baltic countries still face substantial demographic challenges. The demographic trends seem to be improving faster in Estonia, whereas there is a lack of progress (or even worsening in the situation) in Lithuania, and, to a lesser extent, in Latvia. A negative rate of natural increase, which is caused by low fertility and unacceptably high mortality levels, has been contributing to population declines in all three countries. In Latvia and, in particular, in Lithuania, the latter negative tendency has been reinforced by growth in emigration over the past several years. Latvia and Lithuania are among the countries with the lowest fertility in the European Union. Due to more significant improvements in fertility over recent years, Estonia's situation is better, but there is still a need for further progress. In the context of other European Union countries, all three countries show very low male life expectancy, which originates from a persisting significant burden of elevated premature mortality.

Figure 1.9. Male and female life expectancy at birth in the three Baltic countries, nine other “new” EU member countries, and fifteen “old” EU member countries in 2007



Note: Data for the EU 27, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are for 2006.

Sources: EUROSTAT, 2009; The Human Mortality Database, 2009; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND CURRENT SITUATION IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES 1989–2008

2.1. LITHUANIA

2.1.1. AN OUTLINE OF CONTEMPORARY DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT

An outline of contemporary demographic development. Since the early 1990s, extensive, dynamic and controversial changes, mostly negative in character, have been taking place in Lithuania, as in all Eastern and Central European countries. Although some of them, (e.g. family, fertility) are rather similar to those of Western countries, the changes and abrupt turns in their development in Lithuania actually have their own specific features. It is to be noted that certain changes of demographic processes are really enormous and highly specific, whereas the others are moderate and not unlike the overall demographic dynamics of developed countries.

To shortly characterise the nearly 20-year-long turn of events, one could maintain that the onset of political, economic and social transformations in Lithuania triggered essential changes in demographic development:


- ✓ The trends, flows, types and structure of *migration* have changed. Following the stormy circumstances of the restoration of independence, the migration flows of the first transformation years shifted and re-formed and changed trends. During the years of striving for independence and following its proclamation, official migration flows with the former USSR suddenly dropped drastically, and the wave of re-emigration which had risen immediately after the restoration of independence both to the east (residents of Slavic background to the former USSR) and the west (Jewish emigration) also ebbed 4 or 5 years later. From the middle of the past decade, the flows of official, legal and permanent emigration (leaving to permanently reside in other countries, mostly in the former USSR) were rapidly replaced by a different, rather more sizeable type (short-time, illegal, non-declared) moves/migration to the west. Rapid changes in migration and the huge scope of different types of migration set in. The migration ceased conforming to the classical notion of migration, i.e. moving for permanent residence to a different location, and became an amorphous and hardly recordable synthesis of the migration/mobility phenomena.
- ✓ The extremely rapid and large-scale drop in *fertility* reached a particularly low level which was far below the level assuring a replacement of generations.
- ✓ *Family* transformation has been taking place: traditional family features have been dwindling away and new features typical of a modern family are becoming stronger. Young people more frequently prefer the modern type of family and the new strategy of family-building: formation of the family is less frequently related to

marriage, people marry at an older age, inner family relations are getting weaker, and the autonomy of the partners and family instability is growing.

- ✓ The *mortality* rate remains, with certain fluctuations, at a relatively high level and has been even increasing in certain sub-populations (e.g. rural males). This is not typical for industrial countries at a similar level of development. The present level of male mortality in Lithuania is even higher than it was four decades ago, is significantly higher than in the “old” EU countries, and it exceeds the level of the new EU countries. The socio-demographic differentiation of mortality is enormous. (Jasilionis et al, 2006).


Dimensions of demographic development. A decreasing Lithuanian population, lost demographic balance, fast depopulation, and rapid ageing of the population are among the direct outcomes of the changes in the trends of demographic processes:

Figure 2.1.1. Population of Lithuania, 1975–2008, beginning of the year (in m.)



Source: Demografijos, 2008.

Figure 2.1.2. Net-reproduction rate of Lithuania, 1975–2007



Source: Demografijos, 2008.

- ✓ The population has been decreasing since 1992. (Fig. 2.1.1) Over the past 15 years the Lithuanian population has decreased by nearly 321 thousands (~9%). According to official statistics, in early 2008 the population of Lithuania amounted to 3.366 million (Demografijos, 2008).

- ✓ Rapid depopulation is taking place. The net-reproduction rate has lowered significantly (Fig. 2.1.2.), amounting to a mere 0.651 in 2007 (in 1990—0.968, and the lowest, at 0.568—in 2002), i.e. the parent generation has been replaced by the nearly half-shrunk children generation (to have full replacement of generations, the indicator should be at least 1).

- ✓ Over the past 17 years, the population has been ageing fast: the percentage of people aged 60 and more in the overall population has risen from 16% in 1990 to 20.4% in 2007 and has outnumbered the proportion of children under 14, which has correspondingly fallen from 23% to 15.9% (Lietuvos, 1992; Lietuvos, 2007).

- ✓ The population has been decreasing both due to emigration and to the natural

decrease of the population (deaths exceeding births). According to the Department of Statistics, in 1990–2006 Lithuania lost, through migration, 360 thousand persons¹

¹ The figures include both declared and non-declared migration, but the information about non-declared migration is approximate.

(Lietuvos gyventojų, 2007), and the other almost full 50 thousands through the natural decrease in the population (Demografijos, 2007).

2.1.2. FAMILY TRANSFORMATION AND FERTILITY


Key dimensions of family transformation and changes in fertility

Trend of change, current situation. Since the early 1990s in Lithuania, as in other Eastern and Central European countries, fertility has been rapidly and markedly decreasing and the family changing. The traditional family formation strategy in which the family is made through marriage is falling out of use. Young people more frequently postpone family formation for a later age and start partnership through cohabitation. The first childbirth is put off for a later period, and in most cases only one child is brought up. More and more children are born out of wedlock, and the number of single-parent families, as well as single people, is rising. A destabilisation of the family is taking place, family bonds are weakening, and cohabiting couples are becoming an accepted practice. This is illustrated by demographic statistics and by the findings of numerous family and fertility surveys.

Fertility: long-term changes and current situation

Long-term changes in fertility. As demonstrated by the dynamic of the total fertility rate, a trend towards decline has actually been typical for Lithuania throughout the whole post-war period (Fig. 2.1.3). The increases in the fertility rate observed in the late 1960s, early 1970s, and mid 1990s were rather inconspicuous and too weak to reverse the overall downward trend of fertility.

Figure 2.1.3. Period total fertility rate, 1960–2007



Sources: Demografijos, 2008; Statistics Lithuania, 2009.

The change in the model of demographic development occurred in the post-war years while Lithuania was turning into an industrial country and included, as a component, a shift of fertility from the high level typical of an agrarian society to the level sufficient to ensure a normal replacement of the generations (where total fertility rate is close to 2). Since 1990 however, fertility in Lithuania has been decreasing.

Recent fertility changes: 1990–2007. The main indicators of demographic statistics illustrating the decrease in fertility in Lithuania reveal the really high speed and scope of the ongoing changes.

The absolute number of children born decreased from 56.9 thousands in 1990 to 30 thousands in 2002 (the lowest value of the indicator). In later years, births advanced slightly. In 2007, 32.3 thousand children were born.

Prior to 1990, the total fertility rate was close to 2 or above. Later it started decreasing rapidly, and over the years 2002–2005 it dropped below 1.3 (1.24–1.27), i.e. during a single decade fertility fell from a level ensuring the replacement of the population to low fertility predetermining very rapid depopulation. To restore the demographic balance and have a generation replaced by a generation, the total fertility rate should be higher by a factor close to one.

Although in 2006–2007 the total fertility rate was slightly higher than 1.3 (in 2007—1.35) (Fig. 2.1.3), it is likely that this insignificant increase in fertility is primarily related to the compensation effect which cropped up following a more than 10-year-long postponement, for a later age, of first marriage and first childbirth.

Parity of birth. As in the period prior to the decline of fertility, the first-borns of 1990–2007 amounted to nearly a half of all childbirths for the respective year in the country (47–53%) (Table 2.1.1), second-borns made up about one-third (33–36%), and third-borns were about one tenth (9–12%). Although the percentage of fourth-, fifth-, and later-borns was small (5–7%), a trend towards increase was observed during the period.

Table 2.1.1. Children by parity of birth, percentages

	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth+
	Total				
1990	47.9	36.2	10.8	3.0	2.1
1995	50.2	34.6	9.7	3.1	2.4
2000	46.8	34.2	11.7	4.0	3.3
2005	49.5	33.9	10.1	3.4	3.1
2007	52.6	33.2	9.2	2.8	2.2


Source: Demographic yearbooks of different years.

As seen from the absolute rates, over the period the number of first- and second-borns dropped the most. In 1990, the number of first-borns stood at 27.2 thousands, and the number of second-borns amounted to 20.6 thousands, and in 2007, these figures were correspondingly 17 thousands and 10.7 thousands, i.e. the annual number of first- and second-borns is currently around for 10 thousands lower than 17 years ago. Over this period, the annual number of third-borns dropped from 6.2 to 3 thousands, the number of fourth-borns fell from 1.7 to 0.9 thousands, and fifth- and later-borns stayed close to 1 thousand (Demografijos, 2008; Lietuvos, 1991).

Thus, over the past 15 years fertility has been decreasing mostly due to the significantly lower number of first- and second-borns. The number of fifth- and later-borns has remained practically stable, and because of the decreased overall number of births, their proportion has even risen.

Fertility by age of mother. In 1990–2005, the age-specific fertility rate of 18–35-year-old women dropped significantly and even more so for women aged 20–25 (Fig. 2.1.4). The fertility rates of women at the age of 21–22 are extremely low. The fertility rate of women in this age-group, which was at its highest prior to the onset of the recent drop in fertility (in 1990 it stood at about 180 childbirths for 1000 women of this age), has recently decreased about three times (in 2005 it was about 60). The intensity peak of childbearing behaviour has shifted from the 21–22-year-old group to the 25–27-year-old group (Fig. 2.1.4). Furthermore, since the beginning of the 21st century, the fertility rate of 26–35-year-old women has been showing a trend towards increase. This shows not only that fertility is significantly declining in the young groups of childbearing age, but also that childbirth is being postponed for an older age.

Figure 2.1.4. Age-specific fertility rates, 1990–2007



Source: Demografijos, 2008.


The same is demonstrated by the changes in the mean age of women at first childbirth. At present women at first childbirth are almost 2 years older than they were at the beginning of the past decade. In 1992 the mean age at first childbirth was 23.1, and in 2007 it was 25.4.

Both the age-specific fertility rate and mean age at first childbirth demonstrate that fertility *ageing* has been observed since 1990, i.e. children are born to women of an increasingly older age.

A conclusion could be drawn that over the past seventeen years the model of childbearing behaviour has essentially changed: not only are significantly fewer children born, but also both the first and subsequent childbirths are being postponed for an older age.

Studies reveal however, that families/individuals, in expressing their childbearing attitudes, show a preference for a two-child family; the average number of wanted children until now is close to two (in 2006—1.9) (Fig. 2.1.5).


Figure 2.1.5. Wanted number of children
(average number)



Sources: FS, 1990; FFS_Lithuania, 1994–95; GGS_Lithuania, 2006.

recent changes in the Lithuanian family testify to the high speed and scope of the change. The recent changes in the Lithuanian family first became apparent through a drop in marriage. In 1990, 36.3 thousand couples got married, and in 1991–2001 the number of marriages decreased rapidly and reached the lowest values in 2001, in which

Figure 2.1.6. Crude marriage and divorce rates, 1980–2007



Source: Demografijos, 2008.

Numerical values therefore show that the national needs for fertility rates (strategic goals to ensure the replacement of the population) and individual childbearing attitudes are actually identical. However, actual births are one child short of the number wanted individually or required for maintaining the demographic balance. Personal attitudes are not accomplished and social expectations are not satisfied.

Such a step back from childbearing attitudes shows there are factors adverse to childbearing behaviour, and these factors predetermine/are going to predetermine not only rapid depopulation but also a rapid slow-down in the growth of the working-age population, accelerated ageing of the population, and huge disproportions among the age structures of the population.


Family changes. The key parameters of demographic statistics illustrating the of demographic statistics illustrating the over 10 years the number of marriages dropped by more than half (Demografijos, 2008). A particularly steep fall was registered in 1992 and 1993. For the past five years, marriage rates have been increasing moderately: in 2007 21.2 thousand couples got married. Crude marriage rates have been changing correspondingly (Fig. 2.1.6).

Divorce rates remain high as before, but rather stable: each year about 11 thousand couples get divorced and for the past 17 years the crude divorce rate has been fluctuating on a rather small scale (Fig. 2.1.6).

Although another parameter of divorce—the ratio between marriage and divorce—has risen significantly (in 1990 for 100 marriages there were 35 divorces and in 2007 there were 49 (Demografijos, 2008)), this is related, nevertheless, not to the increase in divorces but to the greatly lowered number of marriages.

Marriage by age. In the 1990s, both male and female marriage rates dropped in all age groups, but the decline was most pronounced at the youngest marriageable age, and particularly, at the age of 20–24 years, i.e. in the young age group which, before the recent changes, used to marry most frequently (Fig. 2.1.7). Age-specific marriage rates for men at the age of 20–24 years dropped from 124 in 1990 to 52 in 2000, and for females correspondingly from 116 to 62 (Fig. 2.7).

Figure 2.1.7. Age-specific marriage rates, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007




Source: Demografijos, 2008.

Since the beginning of the current decade, age-specific marriage rates have been either stable or rising slightly. In 2004–2006 the most apparent increase in age-specific marriage rates was observed among 25–34-year-old males and 25–29-year-old females. The marriage rates of males aged 25–29 rose from 40 in 2000 to 63 in 2006, and those of females advanced from 28 to 52. The intensity peak of male marriage moved from the age of 20–24 years to 25–29 years, and for females it still remains at 20–24 years, but over the past 16 years it has nearly halved and widened to include, at the moment, the 25–29 age group (Fig. 2.1.7) too. Thus females usually get married at the age of 20–29 and males at the age of 25–29.

Since the early 1990s, the mean age at first marriage has been constantly growing both among males and females. The mean age of men at first marriage was 23.8 in 1992 and 27.7 in 2007, and for women correspondingly grew from 22.1 to 25.5 years (Demografijos, 2008). For more than ten years now, families have been built by increasingly older people. In interwar Lithuania, age-specific marriage was listed in the so-called “European marriage” pattern area (Hajnal, 1965). At that time, late marriages were prevalent in Lithuania (Stankūnienė, 2001). After WWII and throughout the Soviet period, marriage in Lithuania was “rejuvenating”. But from the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, the family formation pattern started changing and marriage began “ageing” again (every subsequent generation enters into marriages at an increasingly older age).


Since the early 1990s, the number of cohabiting couples (non-registered marriages) has been rising. This is demonstrated by one of the indicators of the vital demographic statistics illustrating the process—the rate of extra-marital births. This indicator rose from 7% in 1990 to nearly 30% (in 2007—29.2%) (Fig. 2.1.8) and was pushed upwards the most specifically by the rapidly growing portion of children born to cohabiting couples (children registered at the application of both parents), which rose from 2% in 1990 to 20.6% in 2007 (Demografijos, 2006; Demografijos, 2008). Over the period, the percentage of children born to single mothers (children registered at the application of the mother) increased from 4.6% to 8.4% (Demografijos, 2008).

Figure 2.1.8. Extra-marital births, 1980-2007, percentages



Sources: Demographic yearbooks of different years.

Figure 2.1.9. Males and females by marital status, 15 years and older, 1989 and 2001 population census data, percentages



Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

Population by marital status.

Over the last decade of the 20th century as the number of marriages was decreasing, marriage was being postponed for an increasingly older age, and the rate of divorce remained at a high level, the proportion of married people decreased considerably and the proportion of never-married and divorced people increased. The percentage of widowed people was also rising (Fig. 2.1.9). This was influenced by the population ageing and the correspondingly increasing proportion of old people, among which widows were quite numerous. Such a situation was also caused by the rather high mortality of males, which exceeds that of females.

Although between the 1989 and 2001 censuses the trend in the change in male and female marital status was similar, the compositions by marital status were quite different. In the male population, the share of married and never married is much higher than in the female component, the share of divorced is lower, and the share of widowed is significantly lower (Fig. 2.1.9). However, the indicators in figure 2.1.9 cover all the population over 15 years of age.

During the inter-census period above, the most significant changes could be observed in the marital status of the young male and female segments. According to the 1989 census, among males aged 20–24, married men accounted for one-third (32.8%), and according to the 2001 census, their share had fallen by half to only one in six (16.5%). The proportion of married women this age correspondingly fell from 55.5% to 32.5% (Table 2.1.2). The proportions of married 25–29-year-old males and females were also much lower. Although in older age groups the change was not so pronounced, it was still quite perceptible until the age of 50 (Table 2.1.2).

Table 2.1.2. *Proportion of people married, never married, divorced, and widowed by age, 1989 and 2001 population census data, percentages*

Age	Married		Never married		Divorced		Widowed	
	1989	2001	1989	2001	1989	2001	1989	2001
<i>Males</i>								
20–24	32.8	16.5	65.8	82.4	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.0
25–29	74.4	52.8	22.2	42.0	3.0	4.9	0.1	0.1
30–34	82.9	70.5	11.5	19.5	5.2	9.7	0.3	0.2
35–39	83.6	75.8	8.5	11.8	7.3	11.8	0.5	0.5
40–44	84.1	77.8	6.6	8.6	8.2	12.6	1.0	0.9
45–49	84.6	76.7	5.6	7.8	8.1	13.9	1.6	1.6
<i>Females</i>								
20–24	55.5	32.5	41.8	65.0	2.2	2.1	0.2	0.2
25–29	78.5	63.8	15.3	26.1	5.5	9.1	0.6	0.9
30–34	81.3	71.2	9.0	13.1	8.3	13.8	1.3	1.9
35–39	80.3	72.2	6.3	9.0	10.9	15.6	2.5	3.1
40–44	78.2	71.1	5.3	7.3	12.0	16.7	4.4	4.8
45–49	75.7	68.2	5.1	6.3	11.7	17.6	7.5	7.9

Sources: Pagrindiniai, 1990; Gyventojai, 2003.

In the past decade, a significant decrease in the share of married people under the age of 30 has evidently taken place due to the decrease in marriage and the postponement of it to a later age. In this age group, the proportion of people who have never married increased accordingly. Given the high divorce rates which have persisted from the 1970s, the share of divorced people has increased even in the youngest age groups, which has pulled down the percentage of the married. The proportion of married women in the young age group has been affected by the increasing mortality rate among young and middle-aged males, which emerged in the mid 1960s and intensified in the 1990s, particularly in the middle of the decade (Table 2.1.2).

Factors of family transformation and low fertility

Specifics of family transformation and low fertility. Extremely rapid family changes and the decline of fertility observed in Lithuania since the beginning of the 1990s have been predetermined, as in other Central and Eastern European countries, by a great variety of different factors that have manifested themselves at different times, sequences, and scopes and with varying effects on the change in matrimonial and childbearing behaviour. These include the factors that were the most responsible for the transformation of the family and drop in fertility to a low level and that were identified in the Western countries as the factors of the second demographic transition (van de Kaa 1987 et al). Among the factors are the specific elements that are typical only for the post-communist countries in transition to a market economy and acquiring the features of the democratic societies, and the factors at the national level that are at work during periods of intensive societal transformations and have specific features.

All the factors reflect the impact of old and new circumstances on demographic behaviour, specifically matrimony and childbearing. During the recent transformations, all spheres of private and public life were subjected to deep and rapid changes. The changes were predetermined by factors at different levels that affected matrimonial and childbearing behaviour and encouraged the design of a new family model.

The variety of factors is great, and they are closely interrelated, whereas exposure to them has still been rather short-lived. The assessment of the strength of their effect on family and fertility changes is therefore a highly complicated task. The available theoretical and practical information enables the factors to be structured and the main groups of factors to be selected, however:

- ✓ *Economic factors of the transformation period* (economic transformations, economic crises, unemployment, low income, poverty, etc.);
- ✓ *Factors of the negative effects of the transformations* (deprivation, anomie, etc.; Philipov, 2001, 2002);
- ✓ *Factors inherited from the Soviet system* (shortage of housing, orientation to paternalistic state policy, etc.);
- ✓ *Demographic factors* (intensive migration of youth and high mortality rate of young and middle-aged males);
- ✓ *Factors of values, of changing lifestyles, and of new technologies (in demographic theories defined as factors of the second demographic transition), manifesting specific features in the transforming post-Soviet environment* (individualisation, emancipation, freedom of choice, secularisation, modern contraceptives, etc.; van de Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe, 1995; Surkyn, Lesthaeghe et al, 2004);
- ✓ *Political factors* (social policy, population policy, and family support policy).

The influence of *economic factors* on family and fertility changes in Lithuania was unmistakably strong at the beginning of the transformation period and during the crises (a sharp drop in living standards, a sudden decrease of employment opportunities, etc.), notably in 1990–1995. At that time, these specifically had the strongest influence on family changes (not marrying, postponing marriage, not assuming long-term marital obligations, etc.) and the drop in fertility (postponement of childbirth or settling for a smaller number of children).

At present economic factors are important, too, but they are selective. The segregation of the population (on territorial/regional, social, demographic planes) according to the potential to satisfy essential needs has been pushing some segments of the public (e. g. rural residents and employees of some underpaid professions) to the periphery of economic welfare (in terms of income, housing, upbringing of children, etc.). The huge gap between needs and chances to satisfy needs has forced significant numbers of people to change matrimonial and childbearing intentions.

Some members of the public (those who are more passive) are under the influence of factors that restrict matrimonial and childbearing behaviour and that are identified as persisting *effects of transformations* manifested through deprivation or anomie (Philipov, 2001, 2002; Philipov, Dorbritz, 2003), i.e. the loss of some former social guarantees (e.g. the guarantee of employment, education, etc.) and the inability to adjust to the conditions of the market economy and new values and norms.

Highly important are the economic, structural and cultural *factors that are inherited* from the Soviet system and curb matrimonial and childbearing behaviour: the huge shortage of dwellings has inflated prices and restricted the opportunities to acquire a dwelling; in the society (or at least in certain segments) the perpetuating orientation towards the paternalistic social policy of the state still has a restraining effect on the activity of individuals/families in tackling problems; the conflict between traditional/patriarchal attitudes (in public and private spheres) and the emancipation of women; etc.

A crucial demographic factor which adjusts matrimonial and childbearing behaviour is the high migration of the youth (large migration flows of different types: short-time, non-declared, circular migration, etc.). The ongoing transformation of the family (postponement of marriage and childbirth for an older age, the spread of cohabitation, etc.) is in its own way an important demographic factor with a negative effect on fertility. Furthermore, marriage and fertility rates are considerably influenced by the much higher mortality of young males than young females.

The above factors are highly significant for Lithuania. Nevertheless, at the moment these are only complementary factors which increase the transformation rate of the family and predetermine an extremely low fertility level. At present, family changes in Lithuania are affected the most by *cultural factors (changing values) and new technologies (modern contraceptives)*, which have been identified, in the theory of the Second Demographic Transition, as the key factors predetermining family changes (van de Kaa, 1987). These include the increasing individualisation of society, emancipation, liberalising attitudes and standards of behaviour, and modern contraceptives (van de Kaa, 1987). Four decades ago these factors gave rise to family transformation in the Western countries (first in Northern Europe, followed by Western Europe, and later Southern Europe), and in the last decade of the 20th century they became visible in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, these factors are clearly manifesting themselves in Lithuania. The consolidating market relations resulted in a more individualistic society, the democratisation of the society is accompanied by increasing opportunities for self-expression and choice, multiplying living styles, and consolidating modern value and standards of behaviour. Contraceptive behaviour, which modifies the family formation strategy and relations with the partner, is itself experiencing essential changes.

In Lithuania, the state-run *family policy*, which, given a relevant set of means and priorities could become an important factor for positive changes in family and fertility processes, has not yet played a positive role in changes in matrimonial and childbearing behaviour due to inconsistency, fragmentation, and priorities inadequate to the situation.

Subjective evaluation of family transformation and low fertility factors. The indicators of fertility changes (statistical data) and childbearing attitudes (findings of surveys) show that the problem of incompatibility of societal expectations, individual intentions, and possibilities emerges in the realisation of childbearing attitudes: although the society is still oriented towards a two-child family model, macro- (economic constraints, changing values, etc.) and micro-level (preserving traditional norms in the division of household chores among the partners, etc.) factors strongly affect childbearing intentions, and families therefore have considerably fewer children (nearly by one child). Nevertheless, the society is greatly worried about the low fertility. The findings of surveys show that the majority of respondents opt for the “bad/very bad” answer: such responses reached 92% in 2001 and 82% in 2005².

The rates of family transformations have been expedited by the fact that non-registered families have been gaining social acceptance: the spread of co-habitation is being treated with more tolerance and even approval. In 2001 and 2005, nearly half of the respondents gave “neither good nor bad” evaluations to co-habiting couples, and almost one sixth thought that they were “good” or even “very good”.³ The younger the generation, the more favourable evaluation it makes. According to 2005 survey data, among the youngest respondents (18–24 years) such evaluations were correspondingly made by more than half and a quarter of the respondents (Stankūnienė et al, 2005:236–237). In this age group, about one in five considers families built through marriage to be outdated (2005 and 2006⁴ survey data).

Although among the reasons which are responsible for non-marrying or for postponement of marriage for a later age economic considerations are commonly pointed out (“difficulty acquiring a dwelling”, “income too small for family needs”, “young people have difficulty finding a job”: in 2001 and 2005 this was “important” and “very important” for about 90% of respondents), increasingly frequent become such reasons which indicate a shift in values (in 2001 55–60% and in 2005 60–70% stated that “importance of marriage as value is decreasing”, “responsibilities are being avoided”, “young people want to be independent, autonomous”).

The intention to build a family without marriage is not only given an increasingly favourable evaluation, but also voiced more frequently (more frequently in each younger generation). Such an attitude is supported by nearly two-thirds of males aged 18–24 years (59%: 51% of these intend to marry later and 8% do not) and almost half of females this age (47%: 29% intend to marry later and 18% do not) (2005 survey data).

² The surveys were conducted by the Demographic Research Centre: in 2001 – N=1400, 2005 – N=933 (respondents aged 18–75 years).

³ See more in: Stankūnienė et al, 2003, Stankūnienė et al, 2005.

⁴ Survey “Parents and children, men and women in family and society” conducted by the Demographic Research Centre at the Institute for Social Research in 2006. N=10,036, respondents aged 18–79 years.

Given the increasingly more favourable evaluations of cohabitation and the younger generations' articulation of positive attitudes towards non-registered families, it could be forecasted that the number of cohabiting couples will eventually increase and the phenomenon will gradually gain social acceptance. Based on the findings of the above surveys, the theories on family transformations, and the experience of other countries, it could be maintained that the public of Lithuania, which has just recently started reconciling to the proliferation of cohabitating couples and which mostly justifies this type of family merely as a prelude to marriage, is certainly moving to another stage in which such forms of partnership will become an alternative to a family formed through marriage or even become a norm.

2.1.3. MORTALITY


The most recent data show that the majority of health and mortality indicators look better than they did in the mid 1990s. However, in the international (European Union) context, the mortality of the Lithuanian population remains high. Moreover, in some areas of public health, the situation is alarmingly deteriorating further. According to EU health policy documents, Lithuania is assigned to the group of laggard countries showing the lowest life expectancy in the European Union. The aim of this chapter is to make a short summary of the most recent trends in life expectancy at birth and cause-specific mortality and to discuss briefly possible determinants behind the unfavourable mortality situation in Lithuania.

Life expectancy at birth: trends and current situation

The most recent life expectancy figures for Lithuania point to an adverse situation when compared to other countries or looking at long-term trends. The most recent international data suggest that Lithuanian males have the shortest life expectancy at birth in the 27 EU member states (WHO Health for All Database, 2008). According to data for 2007, male life expectancy at birth was only 64.9 years, whereas the corresponding figure for females was 77.2 years. These data suggest that Lithuanian male life expectancy is more than 10 years shorter than it is in the 15 "old" EU member countries, whereas the disadvantage of females is about two times smaller (about 5 years) (Fig. 2.1.10A).

The recent changes in male and female life expectancy remain worrying. The strong and consistent improvement in longevity observed in the second part of the 1990s was replaced by fluttering, fluctuating, and even deteriorating trends after 2001 (Fig. 2.1.10A). From 2000 to 2007, male life expectancy at birth decreased 1.9 years (from 66.8 years to 64.9 years), whereas female life expectancy remained almost at the same level (77.5 years and 77.2 years respectively).

Figure 2.1.10. Trends in male and female life expectancy at birth in Lithuania, 12 “new” EU member countries, 15 “old” EU member countries (A), and selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 1959–2007




Sources: WHO Health for All Database, 2008; Human Mortality Database, 2008; Statistics Lithuania, 2008.

The current life expectancy and mortality situation looks unfavourable in a historical perspective (Fig. 2.1.10A). In 2007, male life expectancy at birth was even shorter than it was in the middle of the 1960s (68.6 years in 1965 vs. 64.9 years in 2007).

Compared to other new EU member states, the most recent stagnation and even decrease in the life expectancy of Lithuanian males contradicts notable improvements in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary (Fig. 2.1.10B). Despite the recent slowdown in life expectancy improvement, Lithuanian females show a relatively small disadvantage against the aforementioned countries (Fig. 2.1.10B).

Figure 2.1.11. Age-specific ratios between death rates in Lithuania and Western countries (average of 15 countries), 2000–2004



Sources: Human Mortality Database, 2008.


Unfavourable life expectancy levels in contemporary Lithuania can be partly explained by the striking excess in premature mortality among males and females at working-ages (Stankūnienė, 1995; Jasilionis, 2003). This distorted pattern of age-specific mortality has been inherited from the period of Soviet rule. Similar strikingly high premature mortality is also found in other countries of the former USSR such as Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia (Meslé, 2004). In the 30–50 age group, Lithuanian males show 3–4 times higher mortality than that in the 15 western countries (Fig. 2.1.11). Under such conditions of elevated premature mortality, only 59% of Lithuanian male newborns may expect to survive until age 65. The corresponding proportion in Western countries is above 80%.

Mortality by the major causes of death

A very high level of premature mortality is attributable to elevated mortality due to cardiovascular system diseases and external causes of death at adult working ages. According to the most recent data, male and female standardized death rates for cardiovascular diseases are 2.5 times higher than they are in the 15 “old” EU member states (Fig. 2.1.12A). Lithuania (like the other two Baltic countries) also shows record levels of mortality due to external causes of death: standardized death rates due to this group of causes of death are about five times higher than they are in the 15 “old” EU member countries and two times higher than they are in the 12 “new” EU member countries.

Although the mortality of Lithuanian males and females due to all neoplasms still looks more favourable than the average of the 12 “new” EU member countries, the adult mortality situation due to breast cancer, cancer of the cervix uteri, and malignant neoplasms of some other area is worse in Lithuania (WHO Health For All, 2008).

Figure 2.1.12. Trends in male and female standardized death rates for diseases of the cardiovascular system and external causes of death, 12 "new" and 15 "old" EU member countries 1985–2006




Source: WHO Health for All Database, 2008.

Socio-demographic mortality differentials

Low life expectancy and relatively high mortality of entire population is associated with striking differences in mortality by education, marital status, ethnicity, and urban-rural residence (Jasilionis, Stankūnienė, Shkolnikov, 2006; Jasilionis et al, 2007). Census-linked data suggest that life expectancy at age 30 among males and females with high education is about 11 and 7 years higher than it is among lower educated males and females (Fig. 2.1.13). Because the share of lower educated males and females is very significant (about 30% of the total population), strikingly high mortality in this groups pushes down the overall life expectancy of the entire population. Research also shows that married 30-year-old males have an 11–12-year life expectancy advantage against never married, divorced, and widowed males, whereas differences in marital status are much less important for females (Jasilionis, Stankūnienė, Shkolnikov, 2006). Differences in life expectancy by ethnic group are less pronounced: the maximal gap exists between Lithuanian (39.0 years) and Polish males (35.9 years) (Jasilionis et al, 2007). According to data from Statistics Lithuania for 2007, life expectancy at birth of rural males was 3.2 years lower than it is among urban males, whereas the corresponding disadvantage of rural females was 1.8 years.

Figure 2.1.13. Male and female life expectancy at age 30 by education, Lithuania, 2001–2004



Source: Jasilionis, Stankūnienė, Shkolnikov, 2006 (based on the census-linked data by Statistics Lithuania).


Possible determinants for unfavourable mortality situation

A) Individual (micro) level: possible impact of health-related behaviour

Compared to other European Union countries, Lithuania shows a quite *specific pattern of the distribution of health risk factors*. At the individual (micro) level, such risk factors refer to health-related behaviours and other characteristics of individual life style (Cockerham, 2007).

One of the main characteristics of a healthy society is the low prevalence of unhealthy behaviours such as excessive alcohol consumption or smoking. Epidemiological surveys on the adult population in Lithuania suggest unfavourable levels of alcohol consumption, high prevalence of smoking, poor dietary habits, and low

Figure 2.1.14. Standardized male death rates for alcohol-related deaths in Lithuania, 15 "old" EU member countries, and 12 "new" EU member countries, 1985–2005



Source: WHO Health for All Database, 2008.

physical activity (Grabauskas et al, 2005). According to the most recent data, Lithuania shows one of the highest levels of both alcohol consumption and alcohol-related mortality in the European Union (Fig. 2.1.14).

The most hazardous form of alcohol consumption is binge drinking (when alcohol is consumed in "single drinking sessions leading to intoxication") (Gmel, Rehm, Kuntsche, 2003). Other authors define binge drinking as "heavy episodic drinking, risky single-occasion drinking, heavy sessional drinking and simply heavy drinking" (Herring, Berridge, Thom, 2007). Binge drinking is directly linked to deaths due to alcohol poisoning and violent deaths (Graham, 2003; Pridemore, 2004). Some research also suggests that those involved in binge drink have a higher risk of ischemic heart disease (Britton & McKee, 2000). It is known that such a hazardous pattern of alcohol consumption

is prevalent in Lithuania (Chenet, Britton, Kalediene, Petrauskiene, 2001; Jasilionis, 2003). In addition, although overall alcohol consumption in Lithuania is less prevalent than in Latvia and Estonia, Lithuanians consume much higher quantities of alcohol during one occasion (Brunovskis & Ugland, 2002). One of the most worrying trends concerns increasing alcohol consumption among younger people and adolescents: for example, more than 70% of schoolchildren at age 15–16 reported that they have been drunk (at least once) (Davidavičienė, 1999).

One of the most important determinants of mortality is *smoking*. Smoking is directly linked to mortality due to lung cancer and other chronic non-infectious diseases (Bobak, Marmot, 1996). According to the Kaunas-Rotterdam epidemiologic study, smoking is one of the key factors of myocardial infarction among 45–59-year-old Lithuanian males (Goštautas, Perminas, 2004). The proportion of daily smokers among Lithuanian males is one of the highest in the 27 European Union countries (WHO Health for All Database, 2008). According to data for 2004, 39.4% of adult males and 14.2% of adult females smoked on a daily basis (Grabauskas et al, 2005). Although the proportion of females smoking daily is still relatively low, the trends are worrying: from 1994 to 2004 the share of females smoking daily jumped by almost 2.5 times (Grabauskas et al, 2005).

Mortality due to diseases of the cardiovascular system (which dominate the modern structure of causes of death) is related to the *dietary habits* and *physical activity* of population. It is known that they influence the prevalence of excess weight, obesity, and hypertension that are known risk factors of cardiovascular system diseases.

Epidemiological studies suggest that there have been substantial changes in the dietary habits of the population of Lithuania. Over a period of 10 years (1994-2004), animal fats (for cooking) have been replaced by vegetable oil, fruits and vegetables began to be used more frequently, and proportion of people using butter on bread has been decreasing (Grabauskas et al, 2005). However, these changes have been very selective and mostly concerned people with higher education, higher income groups, and urban residents (Grabauskas et al, 2005).

According to comparative international studies of health behaviour, people in Lithuania and other Baltic countries show very low levels of *physical activity* (Grabauskas, Petkevičienė, Klumbienė, Vaisvalavičius, 2003). The changes in the indicators of physical activity are contradictory. Although the proportion of males and females who exercise regularly increased, the share of males reaching their working place on foot decreased more than 1.5 times (Grabauskas et al, 2005).

One of the most worrying and unfavourable situations concerns the very high prevalence of overweight and obesity. According to the FINBALT HEALTH MONITOR Health Behaviour survey, 53% of males and 46% of females were overweight in 2004. The corresponding figures for obesity were 14% and 17% (Grabauskas et al, 2005). These figures are some of the highest in Europe.

An unhealthy diet, little physical activity, and a high prevalence of overweight and obesity lead to high prevalence of arterial hypertension and hypercholesterolemia. According to MONICA data for 2002, about 50% of adult males and 40% of adult females in Kaunas were suffering from arterial hypertension (Klumbienė, Domarkienė, 2004).

Poor *mental health* is another of the key factors causing unfavourable mortality trends in Lithuania. First of all, the high prevalence of psychosocial problems leads to the striking suicide rates that are the highest in the European region. Second, psychosocial stress is also associated with a higher risk of cardiovascular diseases. An epidemiological study of adult females in Kaunas has shown that females experiencing psychological stress have a six times higher risk of myocardial infarction than those living in normal mental health (Gražulevičienė et al, 2002). Kristenson et al (2001) suggest that compared to Swedish adult males from Linköping, Lithuanians in Vilnius more frequently suffer from stress, job strain, persisting physical fatigue, and social exclusion.

B) Macro-level: socio-economic, socio-cultural, psychosocial, and political determinants

The unfavourable situation in health and mortality and specific patterns of distribution of risk factors suggest that both society and the health care system are still facing substantial difficulties solving modern public health challenges. One of the most important components of public health, the spread of healthy life styles, is still very restricted by constraints in the socio-economic, socio-cultural, psycho-social, health care, and political domains.

The spread of healthier life styles depends on *socio-economic determinants*. The majority of people are still economically incapable of implementing the principles of healthy life styles (such as a healthy diet) in practice. Furthermore, due to the dramatic increase in socio-economic inequality, some segments of the society live in conditions of social exclusion. Lithuania shows one of the highest levels of the spread of poverty in the EU. According to the data for 2005, the percentage of people living in poverty the level of

poverty was 20.5%, whereas for rural areas this figure was even about 30% (Statistikos, 2007). One of the consequences of such socio-economic constraints concerns choosing a healthy diet. The major criterion of selecting dietary products for daily nutrition in Lithuania is the price, whereas their quality and health benefits remain of secondary importance (Pomerleau et al, 1999). So far, healthy products and health-related services have never received adequate economic support from the state. On the contrary, prices for alcohol and tobacco remain relatively low and easily accessible to very large segments of the society (even for the poor).

The *socio-cultural situation* is also not very encouraging for the spread of healthy life styles in the society. On the one hand, health, education, and scientific institutions actively promote the advantages of healthy lifestyles and implement preventive programs combating the spread of unhealthy behaviours such as smoking, alcoholism, and drug abuse. On the other hand, despite the most recent governmental initiatives, the situation in the consumer protection area remains quite unfavourable (Leonavičius, Jasilionis, 2003). Due to the lack of effective control of the advertisement of cigarettes and alcohol and inadequate consumer protection measures, Lithuania's progress in reducing access to tobacco and alcohol products remain unsatisfactory.

The highest suicide rates in Europe suggest the importance of *psychosocial factors*. Very striking suicide mortality differences by education, marital status, and urban-rural place of residence indicate that some segments of society in Lithuania suffer strongly from psychosocial stress, which in turn causes the spread of both the suicidal disposition and aggression. In addition, very common attitudes of passiveness and weakness predetermine the lack of responsibility for one's own health in the society (Gailienė, 2005). The changing society is also experiencing the lack of mechanisms of social support; very often the only remaining source of such support is family.

The *Lithuanian health care system* is still facing difficulties transforming from a model that is centralized and based on curative medical services into a health care model that is modern and based on preventive medicine, modern technologies, and scientific evidence (Pūras et al, 2004). The European Union acknowledges common problems that can be found in all new member countries: inadequate infrastructure, lack of resources, and out-dated systems of governance (Dubois, McKee, 2004; European Commission, 2003). In addition, Lithuania, Hungary, Cyprus, and Poland suffer from inadequate coverage of health insurance systems, which leads to the failure to ensure equality of access to health care for all people in these countries (Dubois, McKee, 2004; European Commission, 2003).

The Lithuanian health care system also suffers from inadequate administrative skills, lack of political will, and lack of consistency in implementing health care reforms. So far, the health domain has been attracting much less attention than other areas such as economy or defence. The biggest priority and support in financing health care is still given to curative medicine and drugs (SAM, 2005). WHO has particularly criticized this model of financing health care: according to the adequacy of financing its health care system, Lithuania is part of the worst group in the world (NST, 2005a).

Although some positive changes in understanding and recognizing the true scale of public health problems in Lithuania have taken place at the *political level*, the

implementation of health-related policies in reality is still far from successful. It has been recognized that numerous health policies failed to reach their goals and achieve substantial improvements in solving the most important public health problems in the country (SAM, 2005).

One of the most recognized problems related to the implementation of public health programs concerns the lack of adequate administrative and financial support. This is evident from the huge differences between financing that is planned and that which is actually received, as well as from the lack of consistency and continuity in implementing public health programs (NST, 2005b). The low efficiency of health policies is also attributable to the lack of control and monitoring mechanisms needed to ensure full implementation of different programs and preventive measures. The involvement of NGOs and patient and community organizations in planning and implementing health policies remains very formal and fragmentary (Pūras et al, 2004).

Lithuania is still struggling to implement national and international policies devoted to reducing social and health inequalities. Despite the numerous policies adopted by Lithuania, mortality differences by education and marital status are increasing (Kalediene, Petrauskiene, 2005; Kalediene, Petrauskiene, Starkuviene, 2007). Although there are some social and public health programs devoted to some marginal groups (drug abusers, AIDS patients, prostitutes), there is an urgent need for much wider inter-sectorial policies which would cover much larger segments of the society such as the rural population, lower educated people, and non-married males.

2.1.4. EMIGRATION

As in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the ongoing political, social and economic development in Lithuania has made a considerable impact on the process of international migration. Continuous population growth caused by immigration from the former USSR (on an average of 6,000–8,000 persons annually) has been replaced by massive emigration. The first years in the European Union showed that the scope of emigration not only did not drop, but on the contrary increased. Radical measures must be introduced; otherwise, the population of Lithuania will continue to dramatically drop. The deformed/specific structure of the migration outflows has caused a structural shift in the population and labour force, which indirectly increases the negative impact of emigration.

“The last Lithuanian to leave the country, do not forget to turn off the lights!” This well known saying correctly illustrates the prevailing spirit amongst the public and the public opinion regarding the response of the Lithuanian government.

Although the Lithuanian government has expressed its concern regarding the current situation, and emigration has been portrayed as one of the threats to Lithuanian national security, there have been no tangible measures adopted to change the situation. Separate measures carried out by various individual authorities essentially do not change the situation.

Changes in migration and current situation

Migratory situation

Scope of migration. Due to annulment of administrative restrictions on emigration from Lithuania and increasing number of countries opening their frontiers, emigration from Lithuania has increased remarkably. According to the official statistics alone (produced based on data gathered during the census and a special survey¹ of the Department of Statistics), over 17 years of independence (1990–2006) 447,000 persons emigrated from Lithuania (approximately 20 percent of the working-age population) (Lietuvos, 2007: 9), or on average 26,000 persons annually (Table 2.1.3).

Table 2.1.3. *International migration in Lithuania*

Year	Population, thou (at the beginning of the year)	Total population growth (per 1000 people)	International Migration		
			Immigration	Emigration	Total population growth (per 1000 people)
1990	3693.7	2.2	14744	23592	-2.4
1991	3702	1.1	11828	22703	-2.9
1992	3706.3	-3.4	6640	31172	-6.6
1993	3693.9	-6.5	2850	26103	-6.9
1994	3671.3	-7.8	1664	26315	-6.7
1995	3643	-7.7	2020	25673	-6.6
1996	3615.2	-7.6	3025	26497	-6.5
1997	3588	-7.2	2536	24957	-6.3
1998	3562.3	-7	2706	25860	-6.5
1999	3536.4	-6.8	2679	23418	-5.8
2000	3512.1	-7.1	1510	21816	-5.8
2001*	3487.0**	-3.3	4694	7253	-0.8
2002*	3475.6	-3.8	5110	7086	-0.6
2003*	3462.6	-4.8	4728	11032	-1.8
2004	3445.9	-6	5553	15165	-2.8
2005	3425.3	-6.5	6789	15571	-2.6
2006	3403.3	-5.4	7745	12602	-1.4
2007	3384.9	-5.5	8609	13853	-1.5
2008	3366.4	-4.9	9297	17015	-1.3

* As of 2001 foreigners who arrived to Lithuania and are staying here for one year or more are included in the number of immigrants.

** Data of the census.

Immigration is much lower, however: within the same period of time only 87,000 persons immigrated to Lithuania (on an average of 5,000–8,000 persons annually). What is more, in recent years most immigration has consisted of Lithuanians returning to their country. In 2007 they accounted for over 70 per cent of the total number of immigrants (Table 2.1.4). This could be regarded as the first signs of return migration, but the flows

still are too low to compensate the damage caused by emigration. Thus, the net migration rate remains negative and one of the highest in Europe.

Types of migration. According to present data (gathered through the census), in the last decade of the 20th century, the majority of Lithuanian emigration consisted of undeclared departures (approximately 60 percent). Projections suggested by certain politicians that when Lithuania joined the EU and more and more countries opened their labour markets to Lithuanian citizens the scope of undeclared emigration would drop did not come true. As a special survey carried out by the Department of Statistics on undeclared migration shows, undeclared departures continue to account for almost 60 percent of total emigration (Table 2.1.5).

Table 2.1.4. Immigration to Lithuania

Year	Number of immigrants	From them Lithuanian citizens, percentage
2000	1510	
2001	4694	15
2002	5110	16
2003	4728	38
2004	5553	61
2005	6789	69
2006	7745	71
2007	8609	71
2008	9297	68

Table 2.1.5. Declared and undeclared emigration from Lithuania, thousand people

Year	Declared and undeclared emigration	Persons who have declared their departure	Persons who have not declared their departure	Percentage of undeclared cases of emigration
1990–2000	277.9	109.7	168.2	60.0
2001	23.1	7.3	15.8	68.4
2002	14.5	7.1	7.4	51.0
2003	22.7	11.0	11.7	51.5
2004	32.5	15.2	17.3	53.2
2005	48.1	15.6	32.5	67.6
2006	27.8	12.6	15.2	54.7
2007	26,5	13,8	12,7	47,9
2001–2007	195.2	82.6	112.6	57.7

Duration of migration. According to the results of the survey, during the initial period, i.e. at the beginning of the last decade of 20th century, short-term exploratory return trips abroad for commercial and business purposes, as well as participation in student/cultural exchange programmes, were dominant (1–2 week trips accounted for 90 percent of all trips abroad) (International, 1997). The duration of migration gradually became longer, while the purposes changed too. More and more short-term undeclared departures have shifted into long-term stays and emigration (in many cases such is the true purpose of departures).

Countries of destination of emigrants. During the last decade of the 20th century, the majority of emigrants headed towards the former Soviet republics, mostly Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, whereas since 2000 the trend has shifted towards the West, in particular to the old members of the European Union: the United Kingdom (3,200 persons emigrated in 2006), Ireland (1,300 persons), Germany (1,100 persons), Spain

(800 persons). Traditionally, one of the major countries of destination remains the U.S.A. According to official statistical data alone, 1,800 Lithuanian citizens emigrated to this country in 2006 (Lietuvos, 2007).

Factors of migration

There are various factors influencing the processes of migration at different levels: international, national, the level of settlement/community, and the level of family/household.

Many factors account for the present migration situation in Lithuania, namely, social and economic developments taking place in Lithuania (e.g. inflation, low salaries, asymmetries in wages and prices, etc.), which usually act as expressed “push” factors stimulating emigration, as well as “pull” factors making countries of destination attractive, such as lack of balance between demand and supply of labourers, i.e. a constant demand for immigrant labour (a characteristic structural feature of developed economies), which is becoming peculiar to Lithuania as well. Therefore, by giving away its labour force, Lithuania itself is becoming a more attractive place for labour migrants from third countries.

According to the most recent surveys, emigration from Lithuania is especially stimulated by the so-called social serfdom factor (Maslauskaitė et al, 2007). The absence of the protection of workers’ rights in Lithuania, as well as the criminal situation, social vulnerability of humans, and asymmetry in social relations in both the work place and other spheres of life, acts as a strong ejecting factor. On the other hand, more career opportunities abroad (including in EU institutions) in the sphere of professional development and self-realisation and more “humane” work relations act in the opposite direction and become an important factor making certain countries very attractive and encouraging people to emigrate, especially professionals and highly qualified workers.

With the unstable situation in the labour market and an insufficiently developed system of social security, the migration is also prompted by a wish to reduce social risk (in families), since it provides access to alternative sources of income that are independent of the fluctuations in the economic situation in Lithuania.

Family circumstances—joining family members who have emigrated earlier—are more and more often becoming yet another reason for emigration. As experience shows, the reunion of family members while living as emigrants means irreversible developments. On the other hand, a survey about families separated through migration shows that only approximately 7 percent of all emigrants are planning to stay abroad, while the rest would like to return to their homeland (Maslauskaitė et al, 2007). One of the key objectives of migration policy is to attract those migrants who have not completely integrated into the country of destination.

According to surveys, a well-developed infrastructure of migration, even if operating in the shadow economy through informal network or based on friendship/family relationships, facilitates the realisation of migration intentions or becomes a factor of migration itself, as it is often the case. As the most recent surveys indicate, over 70 percent of people travelling abroad for the first time already have friends or family members working abroad; and as many as 75 percent of migrants find work abroad through informal networks. As migration turns into a kind of business, the initial factors lose their

significance whatsoever. Since such a business can be a lucrative one, certain actions/measures of mobilisation may even take on a criminal nature. On the other hand, various humanitarian institutions or private enterprises, established with the aim of aiding vulnerable migrants, many times serve as a channel of economic migration.


Migration in Lithuania is already effected by the Eurointegration and the joining of the Schengen area. In the future such developments will have an even stronger impact.

Besides objective factors, migration is also influenced by various reiterated advantages of foreign countries and myths that “migration will solve all problems”. Hence, public opinion, which is often based on emotions and rumours rather than on the analysis of situations and factors, may also make a considerable impact on the formation of migration flows and on political decisions.

Emigration: reiterating the problems

Such intense emigration, even if one takes into consideration solely the quantitative aspect of the process, has had a big impact on the changes in the Lithuanian population. In 1990–2006 the population of Lithuania dropped by 360,000 persons due to migration. Up until 1994 natural population growth completely or partly compensated for the damage incurred by migration. However, since 1995 the population has been dropping due to the impact of both components (Fig.2.1.15). The influence of migration on the shrinking population amounted to over 90 percent in 1994–2006. It is this particular aspect – the shrinking population – that has become most obvious and has been portrayed as the major problem of emigration. This is particularly urgent taking into consideration that according to UN projections Lithuania is one of those countries that will undergo the highest rate of shrinking population by 2050 (World, 2004).


Figure 2.1.15. Impact of migration on changes in population growth



Due to lack of data, the structure of the age of emigrants is unknown. Taking into consideration statistical data of legal emigration (80 percent accounts for population of working age, more than half of which are young people 20–35 years of age) and by

analogy compared with the existing migratory potential (50–70 per cent of young people 30 years of age or younger), also taking into consideration opinions of experts, Lithuania is first and foremost suffering from the loss of young people. In the future this will therefore effect other demographic developments (marriage, birth rate, family) and

Figure 2.1.16. Employment of foreigners in Lithuania



labour resources, which will have to be imported from other countries. So far there is no clear concept in Lithuania about how to tackle the current situation. The number of foreigners working in Lithuania is growing fast, however. Data from the Lithuanian Labour Exchange alone show that between 2001 and 2006 the employment of foreigners in Lithuania increased more than four times (Fig.2.1.16). Moreover, various informal schemes concerned with bringing in labourers from non-EU countries have been developed (Sipavičienė, 2007).

A frequently emphasised problem is the threat to a national identity: as many Lithuanians emigrate and people

of other nationalities arrive, Lithuania is thus gradually losing its national identity. According to statistical data however, despite intense migration, the portion of ethnic Lithuanians in the population is growing: Lithuanians accounted for 83.5 percent of the population in 2001 and 84.6 percent in 2007 (Table 2.1.6). On the other hand, the portion of representatives of traditional ethnic minorities, such as Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles and Jews is decreasing, and this is mainly attributed to emigration/repatriation (irreversible changes). Moreover, immigration is bringing to Lithuania new and unconventional ethnic minorities which have different worldviews, religions and norms of behaviour. There is a growing risk of ethnic conflicts if special integration programmes are not introduced. (Sipavičienė, 2006)

Many migrants seeking economic benefits do not consider (or do not have capacity to consider) the social consequences of such migration, especially for family/children. Many times one or both parents go away, leaving their children for long periods of time in the custody of relatives or even strangers. Sometimes these migrants leave their children without any custody whatsoever. It is still hard to estimate precisely to what extent this phenomenon has spread and what the true consequences for family/children are now and will be in the future. According to research data, there may be as many as 10 percent or more of families separated through migration in Lithuania (Maslauskaitė et al, 2007). Although such emigration may solve economic problems for a family, its social consequences, especially those suffered by children, are often negative. Approximately 40 percent of all children left by their parents suffer from various behavioural disorders. The long-term consequences of such emigration are unpredictable (Maslauskaitė et al, 2007).

Table 2.1.6. Ethnic composition of Lithuanian population

Nationality	1923	1959	1970	1979*	1989	1997	2001*	2007**	2008**
Lithuanians	69.2	79.3	80.1	80.0	79.6	81.6	83.5	84.6	84.3
Russians	2.5	8.5	8.6	8.9	9.4	8.2	6.3	5.1	5.0
Belarusians	0.4	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.1
Ukrainians	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.6
Poles	15.3	8.5	7.7	7.3	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.3	6.2
Jews	8.3	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Germans	3.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Other	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.5	2.1	2.6

Source: Lietuvos, 2007; Demographic, 2008.

* Population censuses data.

** Estimations carried out based on the data of the central database of the Residents' Register, as of 1 January.

One of the most disturbing aspects is the brain drain, i.e. the loss of highly qualified workers, which leads to shrinking economic/innovative/competitive potential of the country. There are no detailed data that would actually explain this process, and there have not been any thorough and representative surveys carried out in recent years either (surveys conducted in 1994 cannot reflect the current situation). Nevertheless, assessments offered by experts allow us to conclude that due to migration Lithuania is losing many of its most highly qualified specialists and scientists. The lack of specialists with high degrees of professional integrity can already be traced in many spheres of the economy (science, medicine, engineering, computer science, etc.). On the other hand, if the curricula of universities are not oriented towards the demands of the Lithuanian labour market, the brain drain will become an inevitable phenomenon, especially amongst young people. Since Lithuania has become a member of the EU and the labour markets of many countries are opening, all obstacles preventing this particular category of people from finding a job in other countries is removed. Although the brain drain has caused much concern, there are no actual measures attempting to bring back specialists or involve/use them to solve urgent problems for Lithuania. Attempts to keep in touch with departed scientists via the virtual environment or single scholarships offered to scientists who return have more of a symbolic meaning rather than importance in practical terms.

Aside from economic migration, trafficking in human beings, especially in women, is another major concern. According to various estimates, every year as many as 1000–1500 Lithuanian women and girls are taken to brothels abroad (Teisėsaugos, 2005). According to indirect estimates, the scope of trafficking in women in Lithuania may be even larger. Cases of trafficking in human beings for purposes of “forced, slave labour” have also been noticed. There are several major factors accounting for the spread of this phenomenon, namely, material deprivation, unemployment, flaws in the system of social security, etc. on one hand, and, on the other hand, a lack of information about this problem disseminated amongst the public and especially amongst groups socially at risk. The impunity of traffickers in human beings encourages the interests of the criminal world in this sphere. Thus, despite attempts introduced by the government and other organisations, the scope of the trafficking is not shrinking. Since the

population finds migration quite attractive and the economic situation remains problematic in the country, it is expected that the problem of trafficking in human beings will remain urgent in Lithuania in the nearest future.

The intense emigration of Lithuanians also has a few positive consequences, which, however, are hardly noticed and thus are not used to a full extent. Aside from the cultural exchange and experience gained abroad, migration also offers economic benefits: it reduces social tension in the labour market and amongst the public, and solves economic problems for many families. It is not clear yet how much money migrants bring/send from abroad every year (due to the lack of accounting and surveys). According to data presented by analysts of SEB Vilnius Bank, migrant remittances from abroad have a clear tendency to increase, even if with certain fluctuations, and in 2006 they accounted for 2120 million litas. On the other hand, it is not clear where and how the money of migrants is being used. There are no programmes to encourage/facilitate purposeful utilisation/investments of the so-called migratory money. Therefore, the positive outcome of migration is far from being used to a full extent. Monetary remittances from migrants into Lithuania are costly, and there are no programmes encouraging purposeful utilisation of the money of migrants.

Emigration potential and future prospects

Various surveys show that even though emigration potential in Lithuania has dropped, it still remains considerably high: 15–20 percent of Lithuanians are planning to leave and work/live abroad in the nearest future. Especially high potential is noticed amongst pupils and students; as many as two out of three students are planning to leave Lithuania (Potencialaus, 2001; Ketinimai, 2005). A majority of those planning to leave would like to go for a short period of time, on the average from 3 months to 2 years. A turnover of migrants that would not allow labour resources in Lithuania to be completely exhausted is therefore expected. The opposite tendency has, however, also been noticed, i.e. those who planned to leave for a short period of time established themselves in the country of destination and do not return to Lithuania. According to surveys, there is a correlation between the wish and possibility to return to Lithuania and the degree of integration in the country of destination. On the other hand, the number of people willing to return is increasing, but the process of remigration is not that simple: Lithuanian emigrants feel there is a lack of information about the changes in working and living conditions in Lithuania. There are still no comprehensive programmes facilitating the return, either. The realisation of the potential to migrate again is often prevented by existing barriers, as well as a lack of information and practical aid.

Lithuanian emigration in an international context

In terms of migration, Lithuania is presently comparable with the countries of Eastern Europe, which also have clear trends of emigration of labour and people. This is not the case in the majority of EU countries, however. On the contrary, in 2006 only five EU member states (Estonia, Latvia, Poland, the Netherlands and Lithuania) experienced negative net migration. Although in terms of absolute figures Poland is in the “leading

position”, in terms of emigration per 1000 inhabitants Lithuania was the absolute “leader” for a long time and only recently lost its lead to the Netherlands and Estonia (Lietuvos, 2007).

However, it is the EU countries (and the U.S.A.) that are major countries of attraction for Lithuanian migrants. Key factors accounting for migration to these countries are high standard of living and much higher wages. At the beginning of 2005, minimum and average wages in Lithuania were more than eight times lower than those in the main destinations of migrants (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Ireland). It would therefore be unwise to expect that in the near future this factor will cease to affect migration. As the results of an online opinion poll of Lithuanians living abroad indicate, only 10 percent of emigrants decide to emigrate regardless of wages. Ninety percent of the respondents indicated that if there had been an opportunity to make their living in Lithuania, they would not have emigrated. However the sums of money that would satisfy them are much higher than averages wages in Lithuania, as many as 40 percent of respondents indicated monthly salaries two, three, or four times higher than the average for Lithuania (www.lietuvauzsienyje.com).

Migration is particularly influenced by the ongoing Eurointegration. All EU policies on migration (the principle of free movement of labour, recommendations of the European Commission in the sphere of migration and development, Hague programme (Hague, 2005), the announcement of the year 2006 as the year of workers’ mobility, etc.) encourage the mobility of workers. The Lisbon Strategy aiming at “becoming the most competitive and knowledge-based economy in the world” presupposes the desirability of migration (Lesaar, 2005) by attracting specialists from non-EU countries. As the migration developments amongst the Lithuanian population repeat the trends of third countries, it is believed that EU policies are influencing and will continue to influence Lithuania from within. By giving away its labour force and specialists, however, Lithuania is facing similar problems as the old member states of the EU. Therefore, not only a way to reduce the scope of emigration, but also special immigration programmes should be considered.

On the other hand, EU recommendations in the sphere of migration and development include a number of measures helping to mitigate the negative impact of emigration on the country of origin. And even though these recommendations focus on aiding non-EU countries, Lithuania, as a provider of workers, should try to make use of these recommendations and address governments of destination countries to jointly solve the consequences of emigration in Lithuania. More so that many EU documents stress the importance of cooperation in the sphere of migration, cooperation between sending and receiving countries.

2.2. LATVIA

2.2.1. POPULATION SIZE/CHANGES

At the end of the period of Soviet rule, the total population in Latvia reached its highest point ever, constituting 2,668,100 people in 1990 (Demography, 2008). This figure is almost 1.4 times higher than that for the years just before the WWII. It should be noted that the population losses caused by the war, Stalin's repression, and the mass emigration of refugees to the West at the end of WWII were compensated by massive immigration flows from Russia and other former Soviet republics.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the population has been gradually decreasing. At the beginning of 2007, the number of permanent residents in Latvia reached a low of 2,270,894 people. However, this figure is still 1.2 times higher than that before the occupation of Latvia in 1940 (Results, 2002: 30).

Current population losses are taking place due to both natural decrease and international migration. The latter was the major cause of the total population decrease at the first stage of the transition, when the out-migration of the foreign-born immigrant population started. The highest figure of emigrants was registered in 1992, when 2.02% of all the country's inhabitants left the country. After the departure of the Soviet army in 1994, the exodus of these out-migrants returning to Russia and other former Soviet republics decreased. Since 1995, the population losses due to net-migration have become smaller than those due to natural decrease. The maximal natural decrease reached the peak in 1994 (-0.69%). Since then, losses due to both natural decrease and net-migration decreased -0.47% and -0.11% respectively. In reality the latter is larger because the official statistical data do not include undeclared emigration to Western countries.

The natural increase in population observed during the post-war decades was replaced by natural decrease in 1991. The major causes of this reversal were rapidly decreasing fertility and, as a consequence, a drop in net reproduction rates. During the period from 1983 to 1988, the net reproduction rate remained at a level exceeding 1. By 1998, the rate decreased almost two times, reaching a low of 0.53. In subsequent years, there was a small recovery in the net-reproduction rate (up to 0.68 in 2007). Unfortunately, such a low net reproduction rate does not allow avoiding further depopulation in the country.

2.2.2. COMPOSITION OF POPULATION

The *age composition* of the population in Latvia by 5-year cohorts is quite irregular due to losses of population during certain historical periods. The largest losses in the youngest generations are caused by the decrease in the birth rate during the transition period, especially in the 1990s. For that reason, the share of population under

working age has permanently decreased by one-third since 1989 (from 21.4 to 13.8 % at the beginning of 2007).

This was the main reason for the ageing of the population; the proportion of people above 64 years of age increased from 11.8% to 17.1%, respectively.

The share of people of working age also slightly increased from 66.8% in January 1989 to 70.2% in 2007. Compared to the situation in 1985 however, the total number of working age population decreased 13.2% (from 1,780,800 in 1985 to 1,572,900 in 2007). The decreases in births and share of the youngest age group make further ageing and decrease in the working age population inevitable.

The same is to be concluded regarding the number of women at reproductive age. Although the share of women at reproductive age has remained at about the same level, the absolute number decreased 16.7% in 1985–2007. At the same time, the number of females aged 20–29 diminished 13.2% (this can be attributed to the relatively large cohorts born in the 1980s). This makes possible a certain increase in absolute numbers of births in some forthcoming years and a corresponding inevitable decrease afterwards due to smaller cohorts born in the 1990s.

The age composition of the population causes rather unfavourable changes in the demographic burden. Although the total age dependency ratio decreased from 496 in 1989 to 451 in 2006 and 2007, this “favourable” change should be attributed to a rapid decline in the share of children younger than 16. In this period, the child dependency ratio decreased from 320 to 203, and the elderly dependency ratio increased from 176 to 248. This suggests that further ageing of the population will lead to an increasing demographic burden as well.

Composition of the population by sex differs in young and old ages. As everywhere, among newborns the share of boys is higher than girls. The male advantage reduces with age and disappears at 35 years of age both in 1989 and 2006–2007. In the working age group, there are 103–104 women per 100 men. Among the elderly (65 years and older), the sex ratio has been changing slightly. In 1989, there were 220 females per 100 males, whereas the corresponding figure for 2006 was 206 females per 100 males. The high level of sex ratios at older ages predetermines the prevalence of females in the entire population: 115 in 1989–1990 and 117 in 2006–2007. This can be explained by the high level of premature deaths of males and, as a consequence, the very large differences in life expectancy according to sex.

2.2.3. FAMILY AND FERTILITY


Marriage and divorce

The familial status and marital behaviour of people in Latvia has changed radically during the transition period.

In 1989, there were 9.2 *marriages per 1000 inhabitants*. This figure dropped to a low of 3.9 at the end of the 1990s. The 2000s saw some recovery in the crude marriage rates, which reached a high of 6.8 in 2007 (Fig. 2.2.1).

The latter increase in crude marriage rates could be at least partly caused by some changes in age composition. The number of people in the age group most active in

Figure 2.2.1. Crude marriage and divorce rates, 1990–2007



Source: Demography 2008.

family formation increased almost 4% in the first years of the 21st century. Another reason could be related to the trend to marry—if at all—only after several years of cohabiting and especially after the first offspring is born. In 1990 the mean age at first marriage was 24.5 for men and 22.7 for women. Since the beginning of the 1990s, this indicator has been increasing, reaching 28.5 and 26.4 years among males and females, respectively. In 2007, the female mean age at first marriage exceeded the corresponding female age at birth of the first child (25.4 years) by 1 year. The difference between the two indicators is increasing (in 1990, it was 0.5 year)

Age specific marriage rates have shifted significantly to older age groups. From 1990 to 2007, the male marriage rates in the age groups 15–19 and 20–24 dropped from 18.6 to 1.8 and from 110.1 to 32.6, respectively. At the same time, they increased in the age groups 25–29, 30–34, and 35–39 (from 42.6 to 55.7, from 22.3 to 35.7, and from 14.6 to 20.3, respectively). From 1990 to the middle of the 1990s, the male marriage rates at ages above 25 fell almost two times. However, male marriages showed a strong recovery during the most recent years (Fig. 2.2.2). This could be evidence for the marriage postponement effect.


Among women, the same dynamics of age-specific marriage rates may be observed. The only difference is that at younger ages the marriage rates are higher, whereas after the age of 25 they become lower than those for males. In 1990, the highest marriage rates among women were observed at ages 20–24 (97.4 per 1000), whereas both age groups 20–24 and 25–29 showed the highest and almost the same level of rates in 2007 (51.5 and 52.7 per 1000, respectively) (Fig. 2.2.2). Only for the first marriage, the most common age group remained unchanged (20–24 years).

The frequency of divorces and the most common age at which they occur have also changed. From 1989 to 2003 the *crude divorce rate* decreased almost two times (from 4.2 to 2.1). The rate again increased to 3.3 in 2007, however (Fig. 2.2.1). Most of the divorced couples had children: 61.8% in 1990 and 58.2% in 2007; those with only one child amounted to 39.2% and 42.1%, respectively.

The average *duration of marriage at divorce* has also changed: it gradually increased from 8.7 to 14.1 years. The largest proportions of divorces occurred after less than 5 years of marriage (34% of divorces), then after 10–14 and 5–9 years of marriage. The increasing average duration of marriage at divorce is a result of the general decline in marriage. Fewer marriages take place presently and thus most divorces occur among

those who married some time ago. There is no doubt that non-marital cohabitation, which is currently increasing in popularity, is also subject to the risk of dissolution, and this may happen at a rather early stage of the partnership.

Figure 2.2.2. Age-specific marriage rates in Latvia, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2007



Source: Demography, 2008.

New trends in family formation caused certain changes in the structure of population by *marital status*. In 1989–2007, the proportion of officially single persons increased from 37.3% to 47.1% among men above 15 years of age and from 28.5% to 37.6% among women, while the proportion of married men and women decreased from 48.8% to 40.6% and from 41.5% to 35.6%, respectively. Due to the fall in marriage rates, the proportion of divorced and widowed men and women also decreased: divorced men from 10.6% to 9.6%, divorced women from 14.4% to 13.3%, widowed men from 3.3% to 2.7%, and widowed women from 15.5% to 13.5% (1989, 1999: 141; Demography, 2008: 31-32).

These changes have mainly occurred in the younger ages (Table 2.2.1). They happened due to later marriages and especially due to the increasing preference for non-marital cohabitation.

In reality, the marital status of a great share of people differs from the official one because non-marital cohabitation is practiced not only by young people but also by post-divorcees and widowed people. For this reason, it would be useful if the coming census included a question not only about official but also about actual marital status. Statistical evidence of this new situation is available in data on type of family from the 2000 Census (Table 2.2.2).

Changes in marital behaviour had no effect on the number of people living alone in a household: both in 1989 and 2000, 9.4% of the population lived in a one-person household.

Table 2.2.1. Marital status of males and females by age and sex in Latvia, 1989 and 2007, percentage in the group

Age	Single		Married		Divorced		Widowed	
	1989	2007	1989	2007	1989	2007	1989	2007
<i>Males 15+</i>	37.3	47.1	48.8	40.6	10.6	9.6	3.3	2.7
15–19	96.2	99.8	3.3	0.2	-	-	-	-
20–24	61.1	91.7	37.0	8.0	1.4	0.3	-	0.0
25–29	22.2	67.8	72.9	29.3	4.5	2.9	0.1	0.0
30–34	12.2	47.3	79.8	44.2	7.5	8.4	0.3	0.1
35–39	9.2	28.9	79.6	54.5	10.5	16.3	0.5	0.3
40–44	7.6	16.8	78.7	62.4	12.5	20.1	1.0	0.7
45–49	6.6	11.7	78.7	66.3	12.9	20.6	1.6	1.4
50–54	4.9	9.2	80.2	68.7	12.0	19.1	2.6	2.2
55–59	4.0	8.3	82.0	69.1	9.7	18.7	4.0	3.9
60–64	3.2	7.7	82.5	70.3	7.5	16.4	6.5	5.6
65–69	3.3	6.6	81.2	71.6	5.0	13.4	3.4	8.4
<i>Females 15+</i>	28.5	37.6	41.5	35.6	14.4	13.3	15.5	13.5
15–19	89.3	98.7	10.0	1.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	-
20–24	38.3	83.0	57.9	16.1	3.3	0.9	0.2	0.0
25–29	15.2	55.8	73.0	39.3	7.9	4.6	0.6	0.3
30–34	9.4	36.3	77.7	51.5	11.5	11.3	1.2	0.9
35–39	6.9	20.6	75.6	57.7	15.3	19.5	2.1	2.2
40–44	5.6	13.1	72.6	60.4	17.6	22.6	4.0	3.9
45–49	5.2	10.3	60.7	60.0	18.2	23.6	6.8	6.1
50–54	5.2	9.1	66.9	57.6	16.7	24.1	11.0	9.2
55–59	6.0	7.8	61.1	53.5	14.4	24.4	13.3	14.3
60–64	6.7	7.4	52.2	48.7	11.9	22.6	28.9	21.3
65–69	7.6	7.2	40.8	42.7	8.7	0.5	42.6	29.4

Source: Demography, 2008.

Table 2.2.2. Families in private households by type and number of children in Latvia, 2000, percentage


Type of family	Distribution		Families with number of children					Average size, members
	of families	number of population	0	1	2	3	4+	
<i>All families</i>	100.0	100.0	24.4	44.7	23.5	5.4	2.0	2.8
of which:								
married couple	62.2	67.6	35.4	31.5	25.0	6.0	2.1	3.1
cohabiting couple	5.4	5.6	44.9	28.5	17.1	6.0	3.5	3.0
father with child	3.3	2.6	-	79.8	16.8	2.6	0.8	2.2
mother with child	29.0	24.2	-	71.9	22.3	4.3	1.5	2.4

Source: Results, 2002: 207–208.

Fertility

Fertility changes. Fertility decreased dramatically during the transitional period of the 1990s. The total number of live births in 1989 was 38,900, or 14.6 births per 1000 population and 59.55 births per 1000 women aged 15–49. In 1998, fertility went down to as low as 18,400, or 7.6 births per 1000 population and 30.97 births per 1000 women of reproductive age. In the following years, upward trends were observed in fertility in Latvia. Nevertheless, in 2007 the total number of live births was as low as 23,273, or 10.2 per 1000 inhabitants and 39.79 per 1000 women of reproductive age. The dynamics of the total fertility rate were the same as that of the birth rate: the rate decreased from 2.039 to 1.114 in 1989–1998 and then increased to 1.412 in 2007 (Fig. 2.2.3; Annex 2.2.1).

Figure 2.2.3. Total fertility rate in Latvia, 1970–2007




Source: Demography, 2008.

The changes in fertility varied by age. A drastic fertility decrease was observed among those under 30 years of age. In the period being studied, age-specific fertility rates decreased from 44.73 to 17.89 at ages 15–19, from 167.93 to 67.84 at ages 20–24, and from 107.54 to 90.39 at ages 25–29. Although women aged 20–29 continue to show the highest fertility, the decrease in fertility rates in this age group was the most pronounced and thus was the major cause of the decrease in the total fertility rate. At the same time, fertility rates slightly increased in the older age groups: from 58.90 to 65.44 at ages 30–34, from 23.77 to 33.02 at ages 35–39, and from 5.58 to 7.44 at ages 40–44. As fertility in these older age groups was smaller than among women in their 20s, the increase in fertility observed among women over 30 years of age could not compensate for the scarcity of births in the younger age groups (Fig. 2.2.4; Annex 2.2.2).

Due to the shift in childbearing towards older ages, the mean age of mothers at birth increased from 26.1 in 1989 to 28.2 in 2007. Correspondingly, the mean age at first birth increased from 23.4 to 25.4, from 27.1 to 30.1 at the second birth, and from

30.8 to 33.0 at the third and higher order birth. The more mature age of mothers could mean that births are planned and that children are born at a time when education is completed and a professional position ensures a stable income. The latter would also determine the rather good health of children.

Figure 2.2.4. Age-specific fertility rates in Latvia, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007



Source: Demography 2008.

Order of births. Certain changes can also be observed in the *order of births*. The number of first births in 1998 was only 50.9% of their number in 1989, while the number of second births dropped to 42.9% and the number of third births fell to 41.2%, which is the most significant fall. Later, the largest increase was observed in the number of first and second births, while the number of fifth and higher order births continued to decrease. This consequently lead to the transformed distribution of births by order: the share of first births increased from 46.8% in 1989 to 52.2% in 2007, the share of second births decreased from 34.4% to 32.8%, the share of third births dropped from 12.2% to 10.1%, and the share of higher order births changed from 6.0% to 4.9%.

A positive trend may be observed in the dynamics of second births. Their share decreased rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, but since then it has been continuously increasing. Thus, it is possible that there will be more families with three children as well.

Non-marital births. The growing proportion of *extramarital births* is another trend that became manifest after 1990. The proportion of extramarital births increased from 15.9% in 1989 to 45.3% in 2004 and experienced only a slight decrease to 43.4% in 2006. The observed trend reflects changes in marital behaviour: the decline in marriage and increasing popularity of non-marital cohabitation. Additional tabulation of birth register data for 1990–2000 show that during those years, the decrease in the number of marital births was more significant than in the total number of births; that figure decreased 38.3% compared to 1990. In the meantime, the number of extramarital births increased 82.9%, although those born to single mothers decreased almost 25%. At the same time, the proportion of births with recognized paternity increased among all extramarital births from 48.5% in 1990 to 69.7% in 2000, and the share of those with an officially unknown father decreased respectively (Eglite, 2002).

Single mothers are younger than other mothers. Married mothers are at least a year older than those in a non-marital partnership. Accordingly, the share of first children among all marital births is less than half and decreased from 47.5% in 1995 to 42.9% in 2000. Among extramarital births with recognized paternity, the share of first births is almost 60% and for single mothers the proportion of first child is between 63% and 70%. The decrease in the share of first children among marital births may be at least partly explained by marriages of cohabiting couples just before or after the birth of their second or third child.

Cumulative fertility. Age-specific changes in fertility and the recent shift in childbearing to older age groups had an impact on *cumulative fertility*.

A comparison of data from the censuses conducted in 1989 and in 2000 shows that the share of women with at least one child significantly dropped in younger age groups (Table 2.2.3).

Table 2.2.3. Females by age and children born alive in Latvia

Age	No children, % of age group		Total number per one woman at age		Average number per one mother	
	1989	2000*	1989	2000	1989	2000
All 15+	24.5	32.8	1.47	1.32	1.95	1.96
15–19	95.0	96.6	0.05	0.04	1.00	1.00
20–24	53.6	70.0	0.64	0.37	1.38	1.23
25–29	21.0	37.7	1.15	0.92	1.46	1.48
30–34	12.9	22.3	1.64	1.36	1.88	1.75
35–39	11.0	18.1	1.73	1.63	1.94	1.99
40–44	15.2	17.1	1.70	1.70	2.00	2.05
45–49	11.7	17.7	1.66	1.64	1.88	1.99
50–54	13.1	13.7	1.65	1.58	1.90	1.83
55–59	15.4	17.4	1.63	1.58	1.93	1.91
60–64	18.3	17.7	1.62	1.55	1.98	1.88
65–69	19.9	19.0	1.74	1.55	2.17	1.91

* including those who not answered to the question

Sources: 1989, 1990: 166; Results, 2002: 168.

The average number of children born to one women and one mother under 35 years of age decreased as well (Table 2.2.3). Although, because of the rather great proportion of older generations the average number of children per mother did not decrease until 2000, it is doubtful whether the difference in the number of children born to women up to age 35–39 will grow at a more mature age.

This means that the ageing of the population and depopulation will inevitably continue for at least another few decades.

Determinants of fertility changes and influences on family policy

Fertility determinants. Since the collapse of the Soviet regime, different contraceptives have become widely available, and, birth control was therefore possible not only by abortions. As a consequence, the number of abortions has diminished significantly. Another new trend, the rising proportion of extramarital births, may partly be following the

Western mode or may be because marriage does not guarantee either the stability of a partnership or any social benefits. Instead, the couple needs to spend some money for a wedding, and not all were able to afford it in difficult periods of transformations.

The drastic decrease in fertility in the 1990s was caused by factors relevant to all “post-socialist” countries – the collapse of centrally planned economic systems based on full employment and prices regulated by the state. The subsequent bankruptcy of huge enterprises that were highly dependent on the resources of and trading with the former Soviet republics led to high unemployment and poverty. In particular, families with several children were among those most severely hit.

An additional reason for the decrease in fertility in Latvia was the specific ethnic composition of the population. From 1959 to 1989, the share of ethnic Latvians in the total population decreased to 52%. This drop can be explained by massive immigration from Russia and other Soviet republics during the post-war decades. Meanwhile, the fertility of immigrants during that time was lower than that of the native people. This difference was influenced by several factors, one of them being the migrants’ value system in which aspiration for a better life, higher income, etc. took precedence over rearing offspring. Another leading factor was poor housing, especially during the first 10 years after arrival to Latvia.

Just after the dissolution of the USSR, about 15% of the foreign-born population and their descendents left the country. Uncertainty about the future (whether they would also have to leave the country) may also have played a role in the faster fertility decline of the immigrant population. Therefore, the share of Latvians in both the total population and among children born to mothers increased during the period (Annex 2.2.1).

Due to such a large share of immigrants in Latvia (in the capital city and some towns they even exceeded the proportion of Latvians), the citizenship of Latvia was granted only to pre-war citizens and their descendants regardless of ethnicity. The immigrants who came to Latvia during the period of Soviet rule have the possibility to get citizenship on the condition they pass a Latvian language exam. By 2006, only about one-fourth of the immigrant population had obtained Latvian citizenship. Nevertheless, all residents settled in Latvia at least 6 months were entitled to all social guaranties. Their fears dissipated and the difference in fertility stopped increasing.

In the most recent years, the number of births and fertility in Latvia stopped decreasing. This can be explained by the effects of the family policy measures introduced in the 1990s. However, it would be too early to announce that this increase signifies a new trend.

In the 2000s, the fertility rates in the two youngest age groups continued to decrease. At the age of 25 years and over, fertility started increasing, however. It is clear that births are postponed to the moment when schooling is completed and a job with steady income and housing are acquired. Among those 30 and older, the fertility rate even exceeded that at the end of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s.

Starting in 2000, the birth rate in the age group 25–29 exceeded that of the 20–24-year-old group (Annex 2.2.2). Fertility at this age is still twice as low as the maximum level in the age group 20–24 in the 1980s, however. This raises concerns that significant postponement of first births may cause decreases in second and third births due to time constraints.


This means that despite aforementioned improvements in fertility at some ages there is still a lot to be done in the state's support to families with children.

2.2.4. MORTALITY

Mortality dynamics. The number of deaths in Latvia increased enormously (by 28.2%) between 1989 and 1994. In subsequent years, there was an improvement in mortality which also led to a decrease in numbers of total deaths.

The dynamics of *life expectancy at birth* in Latvia has been showing contradictory trends. At the end of the Soviet period, life expectancy at birth was considerably lower than in the majority of European countries outside the former USSR. A peculiarity of the Soviet heritage was the enormous sex gap: for example, in 1989, life expectancy at birth was 65.25 years for men and 75.16 for women. In the first half of the 1990s, life expectancy at birth deteriorated further, reaching the lowest level in 1994 (66.38 years for both sexes, 60.72 years for men, and 72.87 years for women). Since the middle of 1990s, life expectancy indicators have been improving (Fig. 2.2.5). They even exceeded those at the end of the 1980s. In 2004, life expectancy at birth was 72.14 years for both sexes, 67.07 for men and 77.20 for women. These are the highest figures since the mid 1960s. In the most recent years, life expectancy at birth has been decreasing again. The deterioration has been more pronounced among males (life expectancy dropped from 67.07 in 2004 to 65.76 in 2007).

Figure 2.2.5. Male and female life expectancy at birth in Latvia, 1961–2007




Source: Demography, 2008.

During the period covered, the infant mortality rate showed trends similar to overall mortality. First, there was an increase in infant mortality at the beginning of the 1990s that reached its highest level in 1995 (18.8%). It should be noted that a part of this sudden increase can be explained by the introduction of international (WHO) definitions of infant death and live birth, which replaced the previously used narrow Soviet concept. Since the mid-1990s, infant mortality has been decreasing. In 2007, infant mortality rate reached a low of 8.7%.

Causes of death. Fluctuations in life expectancy can be explained by the changes in mortality by *main causes of death*. The predominant cause of death has been diseases of the circulatory system (Fig. 2.2.6). One can observe that circulatory mortality shows notable fluctuations in the middle of the 1990s. Mortality due to this cause reached its

peak in 1994 (932.0 for males and 922.4 for females). During the following 2–3 years there was a substantial recovery in circulatory mortality (Fig. 2.2.6). These radical improvements were quite short-lived, however. Since the end of the 1990s, circulatory mortality has been stagnating or even slightly increasing among males, whereas females show a slight improvement (except for the past 2 years) (Fig. 2.2.6).

Figure 2.2.6. Mortality due to the major causes of death in Latvia, 1970–2007



Source: Demography, 2008.

Neoplasms are the second most prominent cause of death (Fig. 2.2.6). Between 1989 and 2007, mortality due to neoplasms has been steadily increasing (from 245.4 to 304.7 among males and from 179.7 to 228.3 among females, respectively).

Throughout the whole period covered, mortality due to external causes has been showing very striking sex differentials. Between 1989 and 1994, mortality due to this cause almost doubled among males (from 204.4 to 398.1) and increased by 1.5 times among females (from 67.0 to 101.2). Thus, male mortality rates exceed those of females about four times. As in the case of diseases of the circulatory system, mortality due to external causes of death decreased rapidly in the second half of the 1990s. However, this progress slowed in the 2000s. This cause of death remains the major cause of strikingly high premature mortality among Latvian males. In addition, high adult mortality due to external causes of death makes a major contribution to a very notable sex gap between male and female life expectancy at birth.

2.2.5. MIGRATION

Compared to the period of Soviet rule, the directions of international migration and the size of migration flows have changed substantially.

In the first half of the 1990s, massive immigration from other Soviet republics was replaced by the opposite trend. From 1990 to 1995, the outflow of migrants caused larger losses in the number of residents than natural decrease. Altogether some 140,000 people, approximately 15% of the immigrant population who settled in the country during the post-war period (including their descendants), left the country. Since the middle of the 1990s, officially declared net-migration decreased from several thousand to 500–2000 persons per year. This is several times less than the losses resulting from natural decrease.

According to official data, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have been the most frequent destinations for emigration. In addition, the countries of the European Union especially Germany, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, as well as U.S.A., have become more frequent destinations since the second half of the 1990s. At the same time, emigration to Israel has decreased as well. A new trend in the past few years is net-immigration of children. These could be the children of Latvians who are living abroad and sending their offspring born abroad to be brought up by grandparents in Latvia while the parents are attending Western universities, are still working to earn a certain amount of money, or have simply not yet decided about repatriation.

In addition to the aforementioned emigration, there has been rather massive undeclared migration to Western countries. The precise numbers of such migrants can be estimated only approximately from labour registers in certain countries and some survey data about members of family abroad (Darbaspēka, 2007) Such calculations cannot be precise because many of these migrants return after some months of residing abroad. According to some estimates, the number of residents working or studying abroad has amounted to about 50,000. Among the migrants, the share of males exceeds that of females. The most popular destinations remain English or German speaking countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, the U.S.A., and Norway.

Those temporary and permanent emigrants are mostly people in their 20s, and this may have some impact on the age composition and birth rate of the population in country of origin, with all the economic and demographic consequences from the loss of young people who grew up and were educated here. To stop this trend, certain political decisions ought to be carried out.

2.3. ESTONIA

2.3.1. POPULATION CHANGE AND COMPOSITION


The patterns of population change and composition that Estonia features today, at the beginning of the 21st century, constitute an outcome of demographic trends over a relatively long run. In the Baltoscandian region, Estonia belonged to the forerunners of demographic transition, and in several ways, the timing of demographic transition provides a key to the understanding of contemporary demographic patterns. To start with, population ageing got underway early in the second half of the 19th century, and more than a century later, in the 1990s, Estonia featured one of the highest growth rates in the share of elderly population in Europe (Katus et al, 2003). Furthermore, the emergence of below-replacement fertility and slow alteration of generations in the 1920s (Katus, 1994) brought about a population structure that did not support the extensive growth of the domestic labour force in the post-war decades. Following the incorporation of the country into the Soviet Union in the 1940s, such a demographic profile, combined with the aims to cement the geopolitical change, gave rise to large-scale migration flows. By the 1980s, these flows had resulted in the largest proportion of foreign-born population in the Baltic countries (Sakkeus, 1994). Finally, the prolonged stagnation in mortality since the early 1960s has also exerted its long-term impact. All these aforementioned demographic processes have brought about the changes in the composition and size of the population, to a great extent explaining current developments in Estonia.

In terms of population size, Estonia is the smallest of the Baltic countries. From the post-war decades until the turn of the 1990s, population growth was very intensive, supported by the direct and indirect effects of positive net migration (Fig. 2.3.1). Thus, between the first post-war census of 1959 and the census of 1989, the population increased from 1.196 million to 1.566 million, i.e. by 31%. This growth came to an end at the beginning of the 1990s, due to two phenomena. Firstly, starting from late 1980s migration flows entered a rapid decline and after the turn of the 1990s the previous large-scale migration between Estonia and the former Soviet Union came to an end. As a result, the main factor that had sustained the post-war population growth ceased to exist, and moreover, upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, part of the immigrant population decided to leave the country.

Secondly, the new fertility pattern set in, implying a steep decrease in the number of births in the early 1990s. In addition, at about the same time there was a parallel increase in mortality that peaked around 1994 and considerably raised the number of deaths. Reflecting the combination of the advanced demographic ageing of the native population and the entry into old age of large cohorts of immigrants who had arrived in the country in the late 1940s and 1950s, the change in fertility and mortality immediately translated into a negative natural increase in the population. In other words, the changes

in migration flows and the balance between births and deaths worked in the same direction and strengthened each other, resulting in one of the most rapid population declines in Europe in the 1990s. Between the censuses of 1989 and 2000 framing the decade, the population declined from 1.566 million to 1.372 million, by 12.4%.

Figure 2.3.1. Size of population⁵ in Estonia 1923–2008



Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

To this end, it should also be noted that the population estimates have been affected by the incapacity of the registration system to document the migration of the people, both within and outside the country. The societal transformation eliminated previous administrative mechanisms of housing allocation and replaced them with market regulation. Concurrently, social mobility in its various forms increased, along with the choices open to individuals. These developments contributed to the rise in spatial mobility and shifts in the types and forms of migration compared to the previous decades. However, an appropriate system that would account for these changes and supply information on the number and types of moves was not developed. This resulted in serious under-registration of migration in the 1990s and the decision to stop the publication of migration statistics in the early 2000s and present intercensus estimates without considering the component of migration (Herm et al, 1999; ESA 2001).


Another uncertainty in the population estimates for the 1990s dates back to the withdrawal of the Soviet military and related civil personnel from Estonia. In documenting these moves, there is controversy about what proportion of these people

⁵ The data underlying the graphs in this chapter come mainly from two sources. For the period up to 1989, the data are extracted from the Estonian Population Databank, developed by the Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre. The data for the period since 1990 are from the Statistical Office of Estonia.

came from territory under the jurisdiction of Estonian authorities and which part left the army bases (Sakkeus, 1996). The inclusion of the latter part in migration statistics is not justified since it was not included in population stock. The census in 2000 did not bring the uncertainty to an end since it suffered from severe undercount in certain age groups (Herm 2004). Thus, despite the small size of the population, the official estimates have to be treated with certain caution. An alternative estimate using different assumptions about migration has yielded a larger population figure, with a relative difference of around 5% (Herm et al, 1999; Herm, 2004).

In the following section, we will briefly address the dynamics of the main components of population change—net migration and natural increase. Though the precise volumes of migration flows since the beginning of the 1990s cannot be followed, the general trend in net migration rates can be derived as the difference between population growth and the natural increase rate (Eurostat, 2008). As mentioned above, in the Soviet period net migration served as the main source for population increase. At the same time, however, its contribution varied (Fig. 2.3.2). In the 1960s, migration contributed more than 60% of the population growth, in the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s the contribution of net migration remained above 50%, with a gradual decrease thereafter.

Figure 2.3.2. Natural increase and estimated net migration rate Estonia 1960–2007




Source: Eurostat, 2008.

In the 1990s, the positive net migration ceased and the negative net migration became one of the main sources of the decrease in population numbers, particularly during the first half of the decade. Owing to the controversy over the documentation of the aforementioned withdrawal of the Soviet personnel from military territories in the early 1990s, the data for those particular years are not shown in the figure. Starting in the 2000s, there is some indication that Estonia again starts to slightly gain population

through migration, but the validity of this finding is not beyond doubt, as discussed further in the section about migration (see also Tammur et al, 2009).

The completeness of the registration of births and deaths, unlike that of migration, was not significantly compromised in Estonia in the 1990s, and therefore the account of population change due to natural increase appears reliable. Over the decades preceding the societal transition, the role of natural increase as a component of population change gradually increased. Starting from the second half of the 1970s, natural increase made up around 45% of the total increase in the population. In relative terms, the contribution of natural increase peaked in the late 1980s. Figure 2.3.3 reveals that the fluctuations in natural increase in the 1970s and 1980s were mainly driven by the fertility component, the crude birth rate. The other component of natural increase, the crude death rate, increased rather slowly in that period. This was due to persistent high immigration that largely outweighed the effect of demographic ageing.

Figure 2.3.3. Crude birth rate, crude death rate, and natural increase rate
Estonia 1970–2007



Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

At the turn of the 1990s, the balance of births and deaths turned negative. The major contribution to this change came from the transformation of fertility patterns, discussed in detail in the sections to follow. At the same time, however, the crude death rate also increased significantly over that period. On the one hand, this reflected acceleration in population ageing, but on the other hand, there was also a decrease in life expectancy that peaked around the middle of the decade.

As a result of the opposite movements in crude birth and death rates, the excess of deaths over births swiftly reached very high levels in Estonia. In 1991, the first year in which the negative balance emerged, deaths outnumbered births by 302. In 1993 and 1994, the difference amounted to -6033 and -8036 respectively. Altogether, a natural decrease of more than 5,000 persisted until 2003. In relative terms, Estonia annually lost

0.4–0.5% of its population due to negative natural increase in that period. With these figures, the country ranked among the highest in Europe in the 1990s (Council of Europe, 2006).

In recent years, the excess of deaths over births has gradually been decreasing in Estonia. Persistent change in this respect can be observed since 2001; between 2001 and 2007 the negative natural increase diminished from -4.3 to -1.2 per thousand for Estonia. Figure 2.3.3 reveals that the dynamics of both birth and death rates have contributed to the emergence of a new trend. The preliminary data show that the trend described continued in 2008, bringing Estonia very close to a balance between the number of births and deaths. Should it extend into 2009, it is very likely that Estonia will witness non-negative natural increase for the first time since 1990.

Turning to the spatial distribution of the population, Estonia has progressed through several stages with respect to urban growth. First, the onset of demographic transition was followed by a period of intensive urbanisation in the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Furthermore, the large-scale immigration in the post-war decades brought about a second wave of urbanisation. Unlike the former, the latter proved highly selective and was channelled to approximately one-third of urban areas, mostly in northern Estonia, including the capital region (Katus and Sakkeus, 1986). In the 1980s, a turnaround in urban-rural migration signalled the advent of a new stage in urbanisation processes (Herm et al, 1999). At the beginning, already in the 1970s, it reflected the emergence of suburbanisation, and in the 1980s the features of counter-urbanisation were added. Population growth in several remote communities started to exceed that in the regional centres which they surrounded.

The second half of the 1990s has witnessed an accelerating trend in deurbanisation. This has mainly been related to the suburbanisation process around regional centres, which in particular has diminished the proportion of the population residing in medium-sized cities, those with a population of 50,000–100,000 inhabitants (Kulu and Tammaru, 2005). For a long time Estonia was characterised by quite a stable proportion of its population in small settlements with a population less than 2,000; the decrease in this proportion indicates a trend towards the enlargement of small settlements on one hand, and the depopulation of remote areas on the other (Table 2.3.1).

Table 2.3.1. Distribution of population by settlement size, Estonia 1970–2008

Size of settlement	1970	1979	1989	1995	2000	2005	2008
100,000+	26.7	36.4	37.8	36.7	36.6	36.9	37.3
50,000–99,999	16.0	9.9	13.5	12.9	5.0	5.0	5.0
10,000–49,999	12.0	13.1	11.3	10.2	17.0	16.9	17.7
2,000–9,999	8.6	9.0	8.8	10.2	12.3	12.3	11.2
Under 2,000	36.7	31.6	28.6	30	29.1	28.9	28.8


Source: Herm et al, 1999; ESA, 2008.

With regard to age composition, the demographic transition brought about persistent and irreversible shifts in the proportions of children and working-age and elderly people. In Estonia, these changes began in the late 19th century, and by the eve

of WWII the country featured one of the oldest populations in Europe (Katus et al, 2003). In the post-war decades, massive immigration checked the further advancement of population ageing, and quite remarkably, in the 1989 census the median age of the population was lower than that observed in the 1941 census.

However, the cessation of large-scale migration flows at the turn of the 1990s brought this inhibiting influence to an end, and population ageing gained new momentum in Estonia. In addition to the cessation of immigration, the momentum was strengthened by the entry into old age of large cohorts of immigrants who had arrived in the country in the late 1940s and 1950s. As a result, the proportion of the population aged 65+ increased from 11.4% in 1989 to 17.2% by 2008 (Fig. 2.3.4). In a comparative perspective, Estonia featured one of the sharpest increases in the proportion of the elderly in Europe in the 1990s.

Figure 2.3.4. *Proportion of children and elderly, and dependency ratio, Estonia 1923–2008*



Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

The acceleration of population ageing was also driven from the bottom of the age pyramid. Following the period of relative stability that lasted nearly five decades, the proportion of children (age group 0–14) began to decline in the 1990s. This trend, resulting from the decline in fertility rates, has become more visible over the years. Thus, for the first time in Estonia, the proportion of children in 2004 fell below the proportion of the elderly, and in 2008 children accounted for less than 15% of the population. In terms of dependency ratio, the current situation resembles the 1920s, when the dependency ratio was also below 50%, but with reversed proportions of the elderly and the children.

According to the UN medium population projection (UNPD, 2008), this relatively favourable dependency ratio will prevail for about two decades in Estonia. After that, however, it will gradually rise to a level close to 70% around the middle of


the 21st century. Needless to say, this is set to establish a new demographic framework in which the social and economic development of Estonia will be taking place. Obviously, this framework calls for striving towards a labour-efficient and knowledge-based economy. If this development is delayed, the emerging demographic constellation poses serious difficulties in meeting the future increase in social expenditures. From another angle, the concurrent decrease in the proportion of the younger generations implies less support to the future elderly from their children. This underlines the need for the reconsideration of social and health policies to better address the population needs in new circumstances.

With respect to the gender composition of the population, Estonia features a large imbalance between the number of men and women in the older age groups. This disproportion results from the large excess male mortality that emerged in the 1960s and will be discussed in following sections. A deficit of men also exists in the groups around age 30, but the most rapid increase in the deficit can be observed in the age groups 65+. Among the population aged 65–69, the number of females exceeds the number of males around 1.6 times. With every age group, the disproportion increases significantly until there is only one man per four women in the oldest age group 85+. Furthermore, the imbalance in sex ratios is translated into a comparatively high proportion of widows and persons living alone among the elderly. The persistence of the gender gap in life expectancy implies that the observed imbalance between the number of men and women is not likely to disappear in the near future.

In Estonia, another salient feature of the population composition that has stretched into the 21st century is the large segment of the population with foreign origin. This is a result of the immigration from the countries of the former Soviet Union which started immediately after WWII and continued for more than four decades (Sakkeus, 1996; 2007). At the end of large-scale immigration, according to the 1989 census around 37% of the total population in Estonia was of foreign origin (Katus, Puur and Sakkeus, 2003). At that point, the first generation comprised over 60% of this population group. By the 2000 census, the percentage of the population having foreign origins had decreased due to repatriation and natural decrease, but it still accounted for 27–28% of the total figure (Fig. 2.3.5). In 1989–2000, the proportion of first generation immigrants declined to around half of this population group. At the same time, since the late 1980s Estonia has witnessed the emergence of the third generation of inhabitants having foreign origin, which grows larger with every passing year.

Reflecting the difference in the timing of demographic transition between Estonia and the regions from where the immigrants originated, the native inhabitants and those of foreign origin have exhibited more or less distinct patterns with respect to many demographic and social characteristics/processes, including age composition, spatial distribution, fertility, family formation, household structures, labour market participation, etc (Katus, Puur and Sakkeus, 2000a, 2000b, 2003; Katus, Puur and Põldma, 2002; Katus et al, 2003). As yet there seem to be no signs that these dissimilarities will disappear in the near future. It therefore has to be borne in mind that the indicators presented for the total population of Estonia constitute the weighted average of the different behaviour patterns present in the country.

Figure 2.3.5. *1st generation and 2nd generation of immigrant population, Estonia 2000*




Source: EKDK, 2008.

2.3.2. FERTILITY

In Estonia, the secular decline in fertility started early in the second half of the 19th century, which places the country among the forerunners of demographic transition (Katus, 1994). By the end of the 1920s, Estonia reached the sort of low fertility that heralds the onset of the modern regime of population reproduction. Unlike other nations that experienced underreplacement fertility in the interwar period, however, Estonia did not feature the baby boom in the aftermath of WWII. Instead, the fertility remained below replacement, being one of the lowest in the world in the 1950s and early 1960s.

In the mid 1960s a new stage, often termed the second demographic transition, began and shaped the trends in demographically advanced countries (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987). Among the multiple changes in demographic processes, interrelated in the concept of the second demographic transition and spreading from northern to western and further to southern Europe, fertility decline held a prominent place. Against that background, in Estonia fertility increased and returned to replacement level, and with some fluctuations, stayed close to replacement for almost two decades (Fig. 2.3.6). On the eve of the societal transformation, Estonia featured fairly high levels of fertility in the European context, with the total fertility rate amounting to 2.2–2.3 children per woman in the late 1980s.

As elsewhere in central and eastern Europe, the 1990s witnessed a steep downturn. In less than a decade, an almost twofold reduction in the number of births occurred in Estonia. After reaching its lowest point in 1998 with TFR between 1.2 and 1.3, period fertility began to gradually increase at the beginning of the 21st century. By 2007 the total fertility rate had reached 1.64, and preliminary data on birth registration gives reason to expect a TFR rather close to 1.7 for 2008.

Figure 2.3.6. *Observed and tempo-adjusted total fertility rate, Estonia 1960–2007*

The dynamics of the fertility level described above relate closely to changes in the timing of childbearing. In this respect, the post-war decades can be divided into two distinct periods. The beginning of the first period stretches back to the disappearance of the European marriage pattern in the aftermath of WWII; this period was characterised by a marked shift of all reproductive events; including sexual initiation, marriage, and childbearing; towards younger ages. Compared to Western nations that also experienced the European marriage pattern, the trend towards earlier entry into motherhood persisted noticeably longer in Estonia and the other Baltic countries. The decline in the age at childbearing continued until the 1980s, when the age at first birth stabilised at slightly above 23 years (Fig. 2.3.7).


The second period characterised by the postponement of motherhood began in Estonia after the turn of the 1990s. After reaching its lowest point in 1991 (22.6 years), the mean age at first birth began increasing, and over the past decade and a half, this measure has increased by almost 3 years, reaching 25.4 years in 2007. A couple of years earlier, the mean age at first birth surpassed that observed in the early 1960s, and the same is true for mean age at all births.

A complementary view of the recent change in the timing of childbearing is provided by age-curves for 1990–2007. At the turn of the 1990s, the data indeed reveal a pattern of very early childbearing, with more than two-fifths of all children born between ages 20 and 24. In the first half of the 1990s, there seem to be no clear signs of postponement yet, but a decline in fertility rates prevails in all age groups.

The effect of postponement gradually becomes apparent starting in the second half of the decade, although during that period the decrease in fertility rates in younger age groups is not yet offset by the increase in older age groups (Fig. 2.3.8). This new situation emerges from the comparison of the 2000 and 2005 age curves with the rise in childbearing after age 25 fully compensating the concurrent reduction in younger age


groups. By 2004–2005 the fertility level of the women in age groups above 30 years of age surpassed the levels observed during the peak of period fertility in the late 1980s.

Figure 2.3.7. Mean age of mother at first and at any birth, Estonia 1960–2007



Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

Figure 2.3.8. Age-specific fertility rates, Estonia 1990–2007



Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

Postponement of childbearing is also revealed by the relative contribution of different age groups to total period fertility. Thus, starting from the year 2000, women aged 25–29 outnumber the 20–24 age group in terms of their contribution. Starting from 2005, the 30–34 year-olds also feature greater input to total fertility than the 20–24 age

group. Despite these considerable changes, however, the trend towards further fertility postponement is yet far from the saturation point in Estonia. It is likely to continue for another decade or longer before it catches up with the countries in which the trend towards delayed childbearing started much earlier, in the late 1960s or early 1970s. The comparison of the age curves of 2005 and 2007 suggests that in the following years one can expect a further rise in fertility in older ages and stability, or perhaps a minor decline in younger ages.

It appears a well established demographic fact that the shift in fertility schedules towards older ages tends to depress the total period fertility rate to a lower level than it would reach in the absence of such a shift. From an analytic point of view, the parallelism of the decline in fertility and the postponement of childbearing since the early 1990s raises the question of to what extent the fall in the period TFR, discussed earlier in this section, was driven by the change in the timing and to what extent it reflected a reduction in the quantum of childbearing.

To address the issue, a series of tempo-adjusted total fertility rates have been calculated (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998). A brief glance at Figure 2.3.6 is enough to reveal that the tempo-adjusted measure provides a less dramatic account of the fertility decline than its non-adjusted counterpart. Comparison of the two measures reveals two distinct phases in the dynamics of fertility since its peak in the late 1980s. The first phase lasting 5–6 years is shaped by a sharp decrease in fertility. In that period, the adjusted total fertility rate appeared somewhat lower than the observed measure, reflecting an additional short-term rejuvenation of childbearing in 1989–1991. More importantly, however, both measures reveal a rapid decline in the quantum of childbearing, to the level of 1.6–1.7 children per woman.

A second phase in the dynamics of fertility sets in around 1993 when the two measures start to diverge. Owing to the start of visible fertility postponement, the tempo-adjusted TFR reaches the bottom slightly above 1.6, and with fluctuations characteristic of this measure⁶, it starts a slow upward trend. On the other hand, however, the observed total fertility rate continued to decrease for another 6 years. This additional decrease is attributable to fertility postponement, which is represented by the difference between the two measures. Figure 2.3.6 reveals that at the turn of the millennium the postponement effect amounted to slightly more than 0.5 children per woman. On that basis, it has been suggested that the shift towards later childbearing accounts for approximately half of the fertility decline observed in Estonia during the 1990s (Katus, Puur and Sakkeus, 2009).

From 2003 onwards, Estonia has witnessed a parallel increase in tempo-adjusted and non-adjusted period TFRs. This indicates that a gradual recovery in the quantum of fertility is probably taking place in Estonia. At the same time, it is perhaps even more interesting to note that although the difference between the two measures has decreased, there is still a relatively significant postponement effect. If this effect is taken into consideration, the fertility level of recent years, adjusted for the changes in the tempo of childbearing, does not appear significantly lower than it was in the 1970s. Furthermore, Figure 2.3.6 reveals that in recent years the tempo-adjusted fertility rates are actually higher than they were in the 1950s and the early 1960s; in the latter period and also in the 1970s,

⁶ The series of tempo-adjusted TFR presented in Figure 6 is smoothed with a moving average.

the shift towards earlier childbearing pushed the observed TFRs significantly upwards. This effect is often overlooked in the analyses of recent fertility decline. Once it is considered however, in the case of Estonia it gives post-transitional fertility a different look owing to the absence of a baby boom and very low fertility until the late 1960s.


Returning to recent years, the tempo-adjusted TFR has broken the level of 1.9 in Estonia. Even though this might be encouraging in the context of contemporary low fertility, it must be noted that the tempo-adjusted measures do not provide a straightforward prediction of fertility level in 10–15 years when the postponement of childbearing approaches its completion. The need for such reservation stems mainly from uncertainty related to the recuperation of fertility among women who are currently postponing their childbearing until ever higher ages. As anything in the future, the completeness of such recuperation cannot be taken for granted. A closer examination of this issue would require cohort analysis, but this would go beyond the scope of the present chapter.

2.3.3. UNION FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION

In Estonia, like elsewhere in the countries west of the Hajnal line, the aftermath of WWII introduced a major break in nuptiality. The disappearance of the European marriage pattern implied a shift towards earlier and more universal marriage that shaped the dynamics of nuptiality indices in the early post-war decades. The term “marriage boom” was introduced by contemporaries to emphasise the suddenness of the increase in marriage rates in that period (Hajnal, 1953).


At the beginning of the 1960s, the crude marriage rate still amounted to 10 per thousand in Estonia (Fig. 2.3.9). At least partly, such a high level represents the tail end of a temporary increase in marriage rates that followed the normalisation of societal conditions after the death of Stalin (Katus et al, 2007). In that period, a large segment of the population returned from prison camps and deportation. Many people who had been forced to postpone family formation had the opportunity to get married after their return. The crude marriage rate peaked in 1957, but understandably, such a high level (11.2 per thousand) was not sustainable over the longer run and the crude marriage rate began a decline that continued until the mid 1960s. During the next 2 decades—from 1965 to 1985—the crude marriage rate in Estonia was rather stable, with the average of 8.6 per thousand. In addition to a shift to earlier union formation, that relatively high nuptiality level was supported by large-scale immigration. Migration flows to Estonia consisted largely of young people of prime marriageable age, which made a direct contribution to marriage rates in the country.

A new turn in the trend occurred in the late 1980s. In 1989, the crude marriage rate entered a steep decline and dropped by one-third over the following 3 years, with the change being one of the most rapid among the countries experiencing societal transformation. The CMR reached the bottom at the level of 3.9 marriages per thousand in 1996, remaining at this low level for the next 3 years. With this indicator, Estonia, together with Latvia and Sweden, featured the lowest crude marriage rates in Europe for those years. The last decade has witnessed a slight recovery in crude marriage rates; during the past few years the indicator has exceeded 5 per thousand.

Figure 2.3.9. Crude marriage and divorce rates, Estonia 1960–2007

Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

The evidence based on crude rates bears the effect of the variation in the size of cohorts at marriageable ages. To overcome this limitation, the change in marriage behaviour is described by means of the total first marriage rate for females, an indicator which is widely used in analyses of nuptiality. As revealed by Figure 2.3.10, in Estonia the level of TFMR was high in the early 1960s, characteristic of the so-called “golden age of marriage”.

Figure 2.3.10. Total female first marriage rate, Estonia 1960–2007


Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

The level amounted to 1.05 at the beginning of the 1960s, followed by a slight decline that took the total first marriage rate to 0.94. In the late 1960s, the emerging downward trend was interrupted by a short-term increase that peaked in 1969, with the TFMR at the level of 1.06. In the 1970s and 1980s the decline resumed, but owing to its slow pace, the TFMR still appeared relatively high in Estonia in the late 1980s (0.86 in 1988–1989). With these levels, Estonia exemplified the pattern prevailing on the eastern side of the new divide in marriage regimes that had emerged in Europe in the late 1960s (Ni Brolchain, 1993).

Like the crude marriage rate, starting from 1990 the TFMR demonstrates a very rapid downturn. In the course of 6–7 years, the TFMR was halved: in 1996 the total first marriage rate was at the level of 0.37 in Estonia. In a comparative perspective, Estonia, together with Latvia, featured one of the steepest nuptiality declines and lowest levels of marriage rates in Europe in the late 1990s. From then on, the TFMR started a gradual recovery, and in the following years, it has gained almost 50% of its lowest value and reached a level slightly above 0.5 in 2007.

In interpreting the trends in nuptiality that occurred in the 1990s, two remarks are in order. First, it is important to note that the decline in marriage rates does not necessarily mean a reduced propensity to start conjugal unions among the population. In fact, the decrease in marriage rates has been to an important extent offset by the concurrent spread of non-marital cohabitation and new patterns of forming unions. This development is not captured in statistics based on marriage registration but it can be revealed by demographic surveys. The evidence from the FFS and GGS shows that in Estonia pre-marital cohabitation was already on the rise starting in the 1960s. In the cohorts born in the late 1940s and 1950s, pre-marital cohabitation became the mainstream route to family building, although the unions that started as cohabitation were converted rapidly into marriage and were often followed soon by childbirth until the 1990s (Katus, Puur and Põldma, 2002; 2008). A more detailed discussion on the change in the pathways to union formation is available in the GGS chapter in this volume.

Another salient development that influenced the dynamics of nuptiality rates is related to the timing of marriage. Figure 2.3.11 reveals that in the 1960s and 1970s there was a rapid decrease in the mean age of marriage in Estonia, a trend that had evidently started earlier. In the 2 decades between 1960 and 1980, the MAFM for females decreased from 25.0 years to 22.6 years. In that period, the shift towards earlier marriage played an important role in sustaining the marriage rates at a relatively high level and stemming the decline in nuptiality level. In the 1980s, the rejuvenation ceased and for most of the decade, the MAFM fluctuated in a narrow range of 22.8–23.0 years. As shown above for entry into motherhood, at the turn of the 1990s Estonia experienced a further decline in the mean age of marriage; it started in 1988 and reached the bottom in 1992, with the MAFM being 22.3 years. The following years witnessed a rapid postponement of marriage, by 2007 the mean age at first marriage reached 27 years. As in the case of childbearing, the shift towards later marriage tends to depress the observed nuptiality rates in the same way as demonstrated in the preceding section for childbearing. The timing of the switch to postponement suggests that the change is plausibly related to the disappearance of institutional mechanisms that upheld the pattern of early family formation under state socialism.

Figure 2.3.11. Mean age at first marriage and first birth, Estonia 1960–2007


A comparison of the trends in the mean age at first marriage and first birth sheds some additional light on the recent change in the pattern of family formation (Fig. 2.3.11). In the 1960s and 1970s, both measures decreased in parallel, until stabilisation in the 1980s at a remarkably low level. Throughout the period of prolonged rejuvenation of family formation, on average marriage preceded entry into motherhood. The switch to postponement of both processes, however, altered the sequence of the two events. The age at marriage was on a steeper rise, and already in 1993 the lines of the two measures intersected. This new sequence of events relates to the acceptance and popularity of non-marital cohabitation, with increasing proportions of young people starting their families outside marriage. Some of these unions are converted into marriage, particularly when couples have a child, while others may split up or continue for an extended period. The growing difference between the two measures—in 2007 it amounted to 1.6 years—suggests that childbearing is to a considerable extent disconnected from registered marriage.

From a complementary angle, the advanced disconnection of family formation from marriage is demonstrated by the proportion of non-marital births. Figure 2.3.12 reveals that in Estonia the comparatively high incidence of non-marital childbearing is not a new phenomenon that emerged during the recent societal transition. Already in the 1960s, non-marital births amounted to around 14% of all births, and according to that figure, Estonia ranked second in Europe, following Iceland (Council of Europe, 2006). Starting in the 1970s, the proportion of non-marital births began to increase and by 1980, the corresponding figure had reached 18%. A moderate rise continued over the following decade, and by 1990 non-marital births comprised over 27% of the total⁷

⁷ In the 1970s and 1980s, the rise of non-marital fertility was limited to the native population. Inhabitants of foreign origin started to adopt the new pattern of family formation mainly in the 1990s.

However, as the rise in the incidence of non-marital childbearing was faster in many countries of northern and western Europe in that period, Estonia fell in the international ranking in that period.

Figure 2.3.12. *Proportion of non-marital births, Estonia 1960–2007*



Source: EKDK, 2008; ESA, 2008.

The 1990s witnessed a significant acceleration in the spread of non-marital childbearing. Since 1997 non-marital births have outnumbered marital births, and since 2003 births to unwed mothers have constituted 58% of all births in Estonia. With such a proportion, Estonia again ranks second in Europe, yet again next to Iceland. As discussed in the GGS chapter in this volume, this shift mainly stems from the increase in childbearing among cohabiting couples who have become less and less inclined to convert their partnership into marriage upon the arrival of a child. The dynamics of non-marital childbearing corroborates the assertion that the onset of changes in the pattern of family formation characteristic of the period of the second demographic transition can be traced back several decades.


Turning to union dissolution, the central development that has shaped the demographic scene in post-war decades is the rise in divorce. In Estonia, the crude divorce rate was already relatively high in the early 1960s (Fig. 2.3.9). At the end of 1965, a less complicated legal procedure that resulted in a marked rise in the divorce rate the next year was introduced. After this upsurge and the period of relative stability that followed, a new increase occurred in the second half of the 1970s. In the early 1980s, the CDR reached about 4 per thousand. In a comparative perspective, the Estonian divorce rates were among the highest in Europe (Council of Europe, 2006).

The onset of societal transformation did not introduce a major change in marital dissolution unlike it did for fertility and family formation. In Estonia, the crude divorce rate featured a gradual decline that had already started in 1983–1984. This decline was

interrupted by two short-term fluctuations in the first half of the 1990s. The particularly large upsurge in 1995—the CDR peaked at 5.2 per thousand and turned the balance between registered marriages and divorces temporarily negative—was related to a change in registration procedures. Leaving these fluctuations aside, however, the decline has brought the CDR back to the levels observed in the 1960s. In 2007, the crude divorce rate comprised 2.84 per thousand.

To overcome the limitations of the crude rate as a measurement instrument, the findings described above are complemented with the observation based on the total divorce rate (Fig. 2.3.13). Most importantly, the TDR reveals the stability of the divorce rate in Estonia since the 1980s, although it was interrupted by short-term fluctuations in the recent decade. If one leaves these fluctuations aside, it becomes evident that the period of societal transition has not brought any significant change to the frequency of divorce in Estonia. As the 2 decades earlier, in recent years the total divorce rate has remained close to 0.50, among the highest in Europe.

Figure 2.3.13. Total divorce rate, Estonia 1970–2007




Source: ESA, 2008.

A final note relates to the spread of new family forms. As with the entry into consensual unions, the break-up of such unions is not reflected in the statistics based on legal registration. The higher the prevalence of consensual unions, the larger the proportion of *de facto* union dissolution omitted from divorce statistics is. With respect to Estonia, such omission has obviously grown larger over time. Moreover, due to the greater risk of union dissolution characteristic of non-married cohabitation, divorce statistics underestimate rather than overstate the rate of *de facto* union dissolution. Taking all this into account, it comes as no surprise in the GGS chapter that the latter has continued to increase in Estonia.

2.3.4. POPULATION HEALTH AND MORTALITY

Within the demographic domain, in Estonia the period of Soviet rule exerted perhaps the most persistent impact on the health of the population. Historically, the country entered the health transition—or “epidemiological transition” as termed by Omran (1971)—in the late 19th century. A continuous rise in life expectancy could be followed until the end of the 1950s: life expectancy at birth had reached 64.3 years for males and 71.3 for females by 1959 (Fig. 2.3.14). Compared to eastern and southern European countries, Estonia featured one of the highest levels of life expectancy in that period.

Figure 2.3.14. Life expectancy at birth, Estonia 1923–2007



Source: Katus and Puur, 1992; Katus, 2009; ESA, 2008.

Starting in the 1960s, the increase in life expectancy ceased and Estonia entered a period of prolonged stagnation in mortality and health development (Katus and Puur, 1992; 1997). If judged by the net gains over a decade, life expectancy even decreased in the 1970s. Apart from the experience of most countries which underwent such a phase (Caselli, 1995), in Estonia the stagnation in life expectancy was not limited to men but affected both sexes: in 1975–1981 for instance, men lost 1.5 years and women 1.0 year in life expectancy.


The 1980s brought life expectancy back to the level of the 1960s, with changes concentrated in the first half of the decade. Although in 1988 men reached the highest level of 66.3 years, plausibly due to the anti-alcohol campaign, the total gain for the decade was almost nil. The life expectancy of the female population peaked in 1986 at 74.9 years, followed by a slight decrease. To sum up these trends, by 1990 males had gained virtually nothing, whereas females had gained 2 years in life expectancy over the preceding 30 years. As a result, the gender gap in life expectancy expanded from 8 to around 10 years over the same period, reaching a very high level by international standards.

As mentioned above, in the late 1980s there was a slight deterioration in mortality indicators. This deterioration accelerated at the turn of the 1990s and culminated in 1994. For females, the reduction in life expectancy was relatively small and amounted to “only” 1.5 years. Among males the decrease was much larger and brought life expectancy down by almost 5 years to the level of 61.2 years in 1994 (Katus, 2009). Due to this contrasting experience, the gender gap increased further and exceeded 12 years in the mid 1990s. With respect to age groups, the deterioration primarily affects middle-aged population, with children and the elderly less affected.

Since then life expectancy has recovered, but the time spent on attaining the previous levels proved markedly different for males and females. Among females, the previous maximum was already exceeded in 1996, but for men it took an additional 7 years (until 2003) to reach the same point. The magnitude of mortality increase in the early 1990s and the time required for recovery renders a different overall health record during the period of societal transition. Since 1996 women have added 3 years and their life expectancy at birth has reached 78.7 years according to the most recent estimates. Among the male population, progress has been more modest, although life expectancy has broken the previous record and has exceeded 67 for the past several years. By the same token, the gender difference still amounts to more than 11 years, which clearly exceeds that observed in the 1980s, not to mention the levels before the onset of mortality stagnation.

Among the health indicators, infant mortality rate is usually given special attention because of its sensitivity to changes in social conditions. Figure 2.3.15 reveals that the IMR continued to decrease until the late 1960s, with a somewhat later onset of mortality stagnation compared to life expectancy. In the 1970s and for most of the 1980s, infant mortality showed no further improvement, with the measure fluctuating at the level of 15–17 deaths per 1,000 live births.

Figure 2.3.15. Infant mortality rate, Estonia 1960–2007



Source: Katus and Puur, 1992; ESA, 2008.

Turning to the 1990s, the introduction of the internationally comparable definition of live births in 1992 brought about an upward correction of the IMR by 17% (EKDK, 1994). This discontinuity in the time series, however, does not mask the significant progress in infant mortality in the 1990s; despite the upward correction at the beginning of the decade, by 2000 the IMR had decreased almost one-third from its 1990 level. The downward trend persisted in the first half of the 2000s and brought the IMR to relatively low levels at 4–5 deaths per 1,000 live births. Since 2005 the decrease seems to have decelerated, and elaborating on this, the recent comparative report on perinatal health in Europe points to several issues which have to be addressed in a more systematic manner in order to achieve further progress in the field and approach the countries of northern Europe in perinatal health (Euro-Peristat, 2008). At the same time, it should be noted that the impact of further declines in infant mortality on the general mortality indicators appears rather limited.


Further insight into the potential for mortality reduction can be obtained from an examination of causes of death. In Estonia, three major groups of causes—diseases of the circulatory system, malignant neoplasms and external causes—account for more than 80% of all deaths. On the positive side, the recent decade has witnessed a noticeable decrease in mortality due to diseases of the circulatory system (I00–I99). The decrease of standardised mortality rates from a peak in 1994 amounts to nearly one-third among males and nearly two-fifths among females (Fig. 2.3.16). In a broader framework, these shifts may indicate a turning point in the patterns of health behaviour among the Estonian population with the potential for further decline in mortality in the future. In the countries of northern and western Europe, a similar trend—termed cardiovascular revolution—started in the 1970s and has been considered a major factor underlying the gains in life expectancy (Vallin and Mesle, 2005). Despite some progress, Estonia still appears at an early stage of this development, with standardised mortality rates due to circulatory diseases exceeding the European average more than twice.

Apart from circulatory diseases, standardised mortality rates due to malignant neoplasms (C00–C99) have not revealed systematic progress since 1994. Male mortality due to malignant neoplasms has even undergone a slight increase over the past 3 years. Among females, cancer mortality showed a noticeable reduction in the early 2000s, but this trend has also come to a halt in the past few years. With respect to cancer mortality, Estonian males exceed the European average more than 40%. For females, the difference is only around 10% (Sakkeus, 2009). These differences are related to specific sites of cancer that require greater attention. In Europe the decrease in cancer mortality among males has been driven by significant reductions in mortality due to cancers of the respiratory tract and by the reduction in the rates of breast cancer among females (Caselli, 1995). In Estonia, neoplasms of the respiratory tract still account for more than 30% of deaths due to cancer among males, and among females breast cancer is responsible for 14% of deaths caused by cancer.

External causes (V01–Y89) have constituted the third major cause of deaths in Estonia for several decades. External causes were also one of the main factors underlying the increase in mortality observed in the early 1990s. Remarkably, in 1994–1995 mortality due to external causes even exceeded cancer mortality, reflecting the joint effect of the MS Estonia shipwreck, rapidly growing automobile ownership,

peaking crime rates, etc. (Katus and Puur, 1997). Since 1996 mortality due to external causes has been decreasing, although not giving up its third position among the major causes of death. In a comparative perspective, mortality due to external causes continues to be extremely high in Estonia: Estonian males exceed the EU-15 average four times; among females the corresponding difference is twofold. In this view, behavioural patterns related to external causes form a key area in which gains in life expectancy should be sought.

Figure 2.3.16. Standardised mortality rate by main causes of death, Estonia 1994–2006



Source: Eurostat, 2008.

To sum up mortality development since the 1990s, it seems that the prolonged delay in the health transition is lagging behind in Estonia. Recent trends indicate the onset of a new stage of development that reveals the positive impact of the societal transformation in the main domains of public health.⁸ The main features of such a change might be inhabitants assuming more conscious and active responsibility for their health on one hand, and the reformed health care system addressing prevention programmes and dealing with chronic diseases in a more systematic way, on the other hand (Jesse et al, 2004). At the same time, it still remains unclear whether the positive trends have gained enough momentum to offset the adverse effects of the emerging economic recession.

2.3.5. INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL MIGRATION

In the post-war decades Estonia, like other countries at the same stage of demographic development, transformed from an emigration into an immigration country. Because of the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union, large-scale immigration started immediately after the end of WWII and persisted until the late 1980s. The immigration left Estonia with very large foreign origin population, discussed in the previous sections.


Societal changes in the 1990s introduced major change in the volume, direction and composition of migration in Estonia (Fig. 2.3.17). First of all, around the turn of the 1990s the massive inflow from other parts of the former Soviet Union ceased. Following the restoration of Estonian independence and dismantling of Soviet military and civil institutions, much of the personnel left the country together with their family members. These people constituted the bulk of emigrants leaving Estonia in 1991–1994. As mentioned earlier, there is an unresolved controversy over which proportion of these return migrants originated from the territory under the jurisdiction of Estonian authorities and which part resided in army bases. The inclusion of the latter part among emigrants is not fully justified since upon arrival in Estonia, they were not included in the population stock statistics. There has been no attempt to address this controversy in a systematic manner, and hence it is likely that the data underlying Figure 2.3.17 rates overstate the rate of emigration in the early 1990s.

It is well established in migration studies that ethnic networks play a salient role in mediating international flows (Zimmermann, 1995, Hedberg and Kepsu, 2003). Further, it is assumed that during societal transformations, ethnic migration tends to intensify (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997; Iglicka, 1998); Estonia in the early 1990s seems to confirm this assertion. In the Soviet period, Estonia was regarded a transit area for those few ethnic groups which exercised the limited freedom of emigration (repatriation) from the USSR. In particular, this pertains to Jews and Germans, who obtained permits for emigration somewhat more easily in Estonia than in Moscow. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, Jews and Germans who had arrived in Estonia with an intention to emigrate seized the opportunity and left. Another example of ethnic

⁸ The preliminary figures suggest that mortality decrease continued well into 2008 in Estonia. For instance, the number of deaths due to traffic accidents reportedly reached the lowest point since the early 1950s.

migration relates to Ingrian Finns, who were expelled from their historical homeland in the course of WWII, and of whom a large proportion settled in Estonia (Katus, Puur and Sakkeus, 2000a). In 1990, President Koivisto granted Ingrians a status of return migrant and citizenship, upon which a sizeable proportion of them moved to Finland. All these ethnic groups added to the emigration that occurred in the early 1990s.

Figure 2.3.17. Crude in-migration and out-migration rate, Estonia 1990–2007



Source: Tammur et al, 2009.

On the other hand, the 1990s also witnessed an ethnic return migration to Estonia. It consisted of ethnic Estonians who settled in their homeland after the restoration of independence, either from the exile in the West or from areas in the former Soviet Union. Based on data from the population register, Kulu and Tammaru (2000) assessed the return migration of ethnic Estonians as rather low and mainly pertaining to older cohorts. By the same token, overall immigration to Estonia seems rather low in the 1990s. According to the 2000 census, the total number of immigrants between 1990 and 2000⁹ was 8,257, which amounts to only 3% of all immigrants in the post-war decades (Sakkeus, 2007). This translates into an average annual inflow of about 800 new entrants during the 1990s, but the census reveals a considerable variation across individual years. The largest inflow was observed in 1990, with slightly more than 1,600 immigrants entering Estonia; more than 1,000 entrants also arrived in 1991 and 1992. Then the number dropped significantly, reaching a minimum (495 entrants) in 1994. In the second half of the 1990s, the numbers gradually increased to 727 in 1999. In the pool of immigrants from 1990 to 2000, ethnic Estonians comprised 18.7% or

⁹ These estimates are based on the year of arrival in Estonia and pertain to immigrants resident in Estonia during the 2000 census. Those immigrants who left before the census are not reflected in the data. As the census was taken at the end of March, only the first 3 months of 2000 are considered.

1,540 persons in absolute terms.¹⁰ This number is no higher than the number of immigrants with ethnic Estonian background in the 1970s and 1980s; it corroborates the earlier findings of Tammaru and Kulu that there was no significant ethnic return migration to Estonia in the 1990s.

Besides classical irreversible migration for permanent residence, the 2000s have witnessed an increase in new forms of migration that were not feasible during the state socialist regime. These new forms consist of temporary or fixed-term moves related to studies, contract work, family reasons, etc; these moves often involve multiple residences, i.e. living part of the year in one country, and part in another country, etc. The bulk of these moves remain undocumented in the conventional migration statistics, which is geared towards the registration of permanent migration. For the latter reason, it is very difficult to assess the true volume and dynamics of cross-border population mobility, particularly within the European Union. Nonetheless, recent estimates made by the Statistical Office reveal that in the last years the bulk of migration both in and out of the country is comprised of Estonian citizens, which lends support to the above assertion concerning the transforming profile of international migration. Emigration is increasingly transformed from an irreversible, lifetime experience into a reversible, short-term episode, which typically includes a few years of contract work or studies in a foreign country followed by return to one's home country.

Regarding the geography of international migration, the major partners in the exchange are the neighbouring countries of Estonia. It is interesting to note that in the past 2 years, the number of entrants from Finland has surpassed that from Russia, with other major senders being Ukraine, Sweden and Latvia. Among the destinations, Finland strongly dominates, surpassing the runners-up Russia, Great Britain and Germany by almost tenfold. Evidently, the very high prevalence of Finland in both directions can be explained by the regular exchange of personalised migration records between the population registers of Estonia and Finland that was instituted at the beginning of 2007. From the viewpoint of the quality of migration statistics, this exchange has allowed the achievement of much more complete statistics on emigration, using the information on arrivals in a destination country. As there is not yet a similar exchange of personalised migration records instituted with other countries, migration in these directions may be significantly underestimated.

An additional insight into the contemporary migration exchange of Estonia could be obtained from the citizenship of international migrants. Leaving aside the moves of Estonian citizens¹¹, the data available from 2004–2007 demonstrate higher immigration rates by all major groups of foreign citizens. It becomes evident that citizens of Finland, Russia, and all other countries demonstrate positive net migration to Estonia (Tammur et al, 2009). Although the mechanisms for counting the resident population, in particular those originating from European Union countries, are not yet well developed in Estonia,

¹⁰ This figure pertains to ethnic Estonians born abroad. The 2000 census did not allow the number of Estonian-born Estonians who returned to this country to be estimated. Seventy-two percent of the 1,540 persons referred to were born in different parts of the former Soviet Union, and 28% were born in other countries.

¹¹ The net migration of Estonian citizens is negative; the large proportion of Estonian nationals emigrating and immigrating translates into an overall negative migration balance in the country.

the positive net migration observed for Finnish citizens (for whom the data are fairly reliable) lends support to the notion that the same may be true for other countries as well.

Regarding internal migration, the patterns outlined in the introductory section are confirmed in the new estimates (Tammur et al, 2009). The urban-rural direction is becoming dominant in the migration system within Estonia. As mentioned above, the phenomenon relates to suburbanisation and spatial redistribution of the population to the outskirts of urban centres. One of the conspicuous outcomes of these trends is the increasing intensity of commuting and widening distances between the places of work/study and residence. Commuting between work and home may imply a rise in the incidence of multiple residences, with people living close to their workplace during weekdays and returning to the family during the weekend. Recent studies using evidence from mobile positioning indicate that many areas around the capital are functioning increasingly as sleeping areas (Ahas et al, 2006, Tammaru et al, 2009).

2.3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As in other countries east of the former iron curtain, Estonia has experienced dynamic and complex demographic changes since the turn of the 1990s. These changes have occurred in parallel with the transition to democratic governance and the market economy that profoundly reshaped the institutional framework of society and the opportunities and constraints faced by individuals. In the sections above, we have seen that the period since 1990 brought to the surface several new phenomena in the demographic arena. But at the same time, the results point out that frequently these new phenomena are rooted in longer trends of population development, but remained hidden and/or suppressed during the state socialist regime.

This catalytic role of the societal transformation is perhaps best exemplified by the trend of population ageing that underwent considerable acceleration in the 1990s. For over four decades, demographic ageing in Estonia was strongly checked by a persistent inflow of young immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The cessation of this flow upon the disintegration of the USSR brought this inhibiting influence to an abrupt end, and combined with the arrival of early post-war immigrant cohorts into retirement and a sharp fertility decline, triggered a steep rise in the proportion of the elderly.

Consideration of longer trends revealed that for several reasons the scale of the recent fertility decline tends to be overstated in Estonia. First, in the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s, the country featured relatively stable and high fertility in the European context. In a comparative perspective, it was the high fertility level in the preceding decades rather than the low level in the 1990s that swelled the scale of fertility decline in the country. Second, the analysis pointed out a salient role of the “postponement transition” that started in the early 1990s. On the one hand, it depresses the contemporary fertility rates to lower levels than they would reach in the absence of such shift. On the other hand, and this has frequently been overlooked, in the preceding decades the advancement of childbearing pushed the fertility level systematically upwards, thus further strengthening the contrast. In this context, the role of societal transition boils down to the lifting of the mechanisms that sustained early childbearing at the later stages of state socialism.

Family formation offers a largely similar account with the decrease in marriage rates being strengthened by a considerable postponement effect. This has been seconded by the extensive transformation of pathways towards family formation, in particular the spread of non-marital cohabitation and the rise of childbearing in consensual unions. At the same time, however, the chapter basically repeats earlier findings according to which among the native population of Estonia these behavioural patterns are not something completely novel that came into being in the 1990s. As outlined in the sections above, the gradual emergence of these patterns can be traced back to the 1960s, although the institutional framework held back their full-scale manifestation until the early 1990s. With respect to divorce, the effect of societal transition can hardly be discerned in Estonia.

Regarding the health of the population, in Estonia the early phase of societal transition was characterised by a significant upsurge of mortality, particularly among males. The influence of sharply decreasing living standards, mounting uncertainty, and adjustment pressures can hardly be denied, but at the same time the consideration of longer trends points out that the grounds for such a response were plausibly laid during the mortality stagnation that had set in three decades earlier.

Looking ahead, there seems to be reason for cautious optimism concerning the trends in the principal components of population change. Fertility has been rising for several years and the consideration of tempo-effects suggests that fertility might eventually return to levels around 1.8–1.9 once the shift towards later childbearing approaches its end. There are also indications from the exploration of cohort trends that the recuperation of postponed childbearing may be rather extensive in Estonia, extending to second and third births. The resumption of growth in life expectancy in the second half of the 1990s and breach of previous ceilings, first for females and later also for males, might indicate the end of the prolonged mortality stagnation. These trends are corroborated by a noticeable decrease in mortality due to cardiovascular diseases and external causes of deaths.

As a result of these developments in fertility and mortality, the population loss due to negative natural increase has become relatively small in Estonia. It is likely that among the native population, the year 2008 may witness a marginally positive balance between births and deaths. Although migration statistics are seriously crippled, the available evidence does not suggest a large-scale exodus through permanent emigration, although temporary migration may be rather intensive.

As with anything in the future, the persistence of the emerging positive shifts should not be taken for granted. On the one hand, it rests on the population, in particular the younger generations born in the late 1970s and 1980s. These generations started their independent life in transformed societal conditions and their behaviour will shape the hardly predictable trend in fertility in the coming decade. On the other hand, the outcome depends on the response of societal institutions. In the short term, the immediate challenge evidently relates to the emerging economic recession, the depth and duration of which is yet to be seen. The ability of the government to cushion the vulnerable groups from the adverse effects of the necessary restructuring and at the same time forge the future growth is important in shaping the demographic balance sheet for the next few years. Over the longer run, the challenges include further progression of

demographic ageing and the arrival of the small birth cohorts of the 1990s at prime childbearing age around 2020. These new constellations will affect virtually all areas of social and economic life and require a considerable degree of foresight and statesmanship in order to be managed successfully.

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3. FAMILY POLICIES IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES: 1989–2008

3.1. LITHUANIA

INTRODUCTION

In Lithuania, the formation of national family policy actually began only at the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s, i.e. from the onset of basic and cardinal political and socio-economic transformations in the country, when the country entered a new stage of its historic development – when independence was regained and the country stepped onto the path of a market economy and democratisation. At the beginning of the 1990s, the demographic situation in the country started to decline, first of all due to a rapid decline in fertility. Thus, the changes in the economy, social structures, and demographic development necessitated the implementation of a new system of support for families. However, the activities of the government in this field were inconsistent from the very beginning, and not infrequently measures were adopted and implemented in the absence of a strategy and of clearly defined goals. In spite of all the shifts of family policy, even of the motives of family policy, its general goals with a certain degree of stability could be defined in the following terms: to improve the economic situation of families, to provide opportunities for families to realise their functions, to seek the responsibility of families for the performance of their functions, and to aim for a state in which the replacement of generations is ensured.

In essence, social goals were dominating Lithuanian family policy until the beginning of the 21st century. Until recently the reactions to the negative demographic processes have not been voiced explicitly, although the goals of the family policy have slightly been demographically coloured. Only over the past 4–5 years when fertility declined to its lowest low level (total fertility rate lower than 1.3) have the pronatalist goals of family policy been explicitly declared.

Over the past 20 years, family policy in Lithuania has been shifting between its opposite types: direct or indirect; explicit or implicit, active or non-active, harmonised or non-harmonised, etc. Besides, throughout the period, Lithuania had no definite long-term goals of family policy, and upon a change in the ruling parties (parties with conservative, liberal, democratic, and social democratic orientations), the motives and priorities of family policy changed as well.

3.1.1. SOVIET ERA ACTIONS RELEVANT TO FAMILY POLICY

Before Lithuania regained its independence, state assistance to the family was a low-priority issue. In Soviet times, only a few of the tools in question were used, and they were also aimed at specific goals. One of these was to ensure the full employment of women in the public sector. The bulk of the assistance towards families with children was concentrated on developing daycare institutions for children and providing guarantees of employment for women with young children.

For the long time, financial support was limited to insignificant benefits for families with many children and a paid pregnancy and maternity leave (16 weeks) for the mother. A negligible benefit was paid for the children up to 5 years of age from large families. In the mid-1970s, a benefit for the children up to 8 years old from poor families was introduced, but it was also very scarce. The system of public daycare institutions for children did not meet the family needs either in quality or quantity terms.

More significant measures of family assistance were adopted in the former USSR only at the beginning of the 1980s, the main declared aims of which were to expand support to families and employed mothers (Zakharov, 2006: 33). In Lithuania, the implementation of the measures started in 1982. These measures allowed a mother to raise a child at home until the child was 1.5 years old without interruption in the total work record. Families began getting more family assistance: paid childcare leave was foreseen for the mother until a child was 1 year old (the size of the benefit amounted to approximately 50% of minimum monthly salary), a birth grant was introduced (50 rubles for the first and 100 rubles for the second and next child), the right to get paid leave to care for a sick child was extended to 14 days, and the single-mother allowance was increased and paid until the child reached 16 (18, if a student).

3.1.2. SIGNS OF NATIONAL FAMILY POLICY FORMATION

At the end of the 1980s, with the emerging national revival, and at the beginning of the 1990s, just after independence was regained, family and children as the key national values and a guarantee of the survival of nation were elevated against the background of national euphoria. Turbulent changes in all spheres of social development and the national revival also stressing the importance of the demographic factor for the nation's survival, as treating the family and children as values, stimulated the development of the concept of family policy from the very outset, even from 1988. Although Lithuania was part of the USSR at that time, new conditions of a democratising society allowed the adoption of new decree for family assistance on the national level already in 1989. All this encouraged efforts towards the development of measures for family support. As early as 1989, in the absence of a strategic vision for the development of family policy, the government adopted a decision to extend the partly paid childcare leave until the child reached 18 months of age, and the unpaid childcare leave with full social guarantees (preservation of workplace and unbroken term of service) until the child reached the age of 3. This decision also allowed a mother to stay at home to care for a child until that child reached 8 years of age and preserve her total

work record. Simultaneously, in 1989, a development of the conceptual basis for family policy was initiated. The government assigned a group of researchers and policymakers to develop the *Population Programme of Lithuania*, three sub-programmes of which – *fertility and family*, *occupational and home conditions of women*, and *social care and provision for the elderly and disabled* – addressed family policy.

3.1.3. CHANGES IN FAMILY POLICY DURING THE TRANSFORMATIONS: SHIFT IN IDEAS AND PRACTICE

After the recovery of Lithuania's independence in 1990, the conditions for the formation of family policy became more favourable. In 1990, the *Population Programme of Lithuania*, in which the basic ideas concerning the development of family policy were to assist families with children (with the objective of extending the possibilities for parents to reconcile parental duties with professional activities) and to provide the opportunity to choose between different types of care for small children (at home or in daycare institutions), was worked out and submitted to the government. However, the programme was never implemented. As early as 1990, at the initiative of the ruling Conservative Party, family policy took a different turn. In pursuing the patriarchal ideology of preserving the traditional family, the policy of granting different benefits to families was launched with to the goal of encouraging mothers to stay at home with the children. In parallel to that, quite a lot of pre-school institutions were closed down. In the years 1990–1992, various low-level benefits were provided and received by numerous families, and considerable financing was allocated for the purpose (Stankūnienė, 2001). Moreover, quite a number of additional measures to assist of families were adopted in 1990–1992**.

In 1993, with the coming to power of the Social Democratic Party, the priorities for family policy were changed. The government's standpoint towards the development of daycare institutions started changing and the renaissance of those institutions began. The number of children attending daycare institutions started growing (Annex 3.1.1) and daycare institution began providing more flexible services. However, development of flexible forms of employment was the weakest spot in family assistance. In this, however, the actual conditions of the time, e.g. the reformation of the economy, huge decline in the economy, and unemployment were significantly responsible.

In 1994, the benefit system for families was considerably rationalised, and multiple small benefits were forsaken. In 1994, national and international initiatives (International Year of the Family, Action Programme of the International Conference of Population and Development in Cairo, etc.) gave rise to a new stage in the development of Lithuanian family policy. The elaboration of the *Concept of Family Policy* began and was approved by the government in 1996. The main ideas of the concept were close to the family policy of the social democratic welfare states (Family, 1996).

The concept stressed the necessity to improve conditions for the reconciliation of parental work and family. The family policy also envisaged actions towards the consolidation of equal rights for men and women, the development of daycare

facilities for young children, family planning, maternal and infant health, child protection, the welfare of the elderly, and the integration of the disabled into society (Family, 1996; Children, 1998).

The main objectives articulated in the *Concept of Family Policy* in the first place responded to the social demands of families for increased well-being and were only slightly coloured by demographic goals.

The main objectives of the *Concept of Family Policy* in Lithuania were:

- ✓ to promote the establishment of a democratic and autonomous family based on the mutual care and responsibility of family members and ensuring the replacement of generations;
- ✓ to assist families in the fulfilment of their functions, to provide conditions which strengthen families, and to assure the comprehensive functioning of families;
- ✓ to stimulate families to perform the functions which are required for the smooth functioning of family and society (Family, 1996).

In autumn 1996, the Conservative Party came to the power in Lithuania and formed a new government. The *Concept of Family Policy*, which was closer to social democratic ideals, no longer served as the basis for the subsequent decisions on family policy. No new strategy of family policy was adopted either. The development of family policy became inconsistent and slack. Furthermore, its development was mostly oriented towards the expansion of the benefit system (for example, the inadequate benefit for families fostering children was introduced), while other schemes of family policy were given insufficient treatment.

Before the new parliamentary elections of 2000, the development of family policy was reinvigorated: a working group for the preparation of the *Programme of Support to Families with Children* was established. The programme was drawn up and submitted to the government, but the Conservative Party lost the elections, and no consistent implementation of the programme followed.

It is quite evident that during the period of transformation to a market economy, alterations in social conditions, and frequent changes in government and in the political parties in power, which usually use their strength for the formation of family policy (Gauthier, 2002), predetermined the changeability of family policy, from the origination of ideas and motives to the adoption and implementation of certain measures.

3.1.4. EXTENSION OF FAMILY POLICY IN THE FIRST YEARS OF 21ST CENTURY

Main actions in the extension of family policy

In 2001 a new government was formed from the parties advocating social democratic ideas. During the first years of rule, it didn't make any radical corrections in the development or conceptualisation of family policy and continued, in fact, the former policy until 2003. However, the need for family policy strategy became more and more imperative. In 2003–2005, improvement of the conceptual basis and measures of family policy in Lithuania intensified:

- ✓ The government decided to develop a national population policy strategy, with family policy as a component of the strategy, in 2003. In 2004, by resolution of the government of the Republic of Lithuania the *Strategy for the National Population Policy* was approved (Nacionalinė demografinė, 2004).
- ✓ In addition to the development of this main strategy for family policy in Lithuania, several relevant conceptual and direct actions have been introduced:
- ✓ In 2003, the *Concept of the State Child Welfare Policy* was drafted and approved by a resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (Vaiko, 2003);
- ✓ Implementing the United Nations' Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing 2002 and the Regional Implementation Strategy for the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing (Berlin), in 2004 the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania approved the *National Strategy for Overcoming the Outcomes of Population Ageing* (Nacionalinė gyventojų, 2004);
- ✓ In 2004, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania passed the *Law on Benefits to Children of the Republic of Lithuania* (Valstybinis, 2004). This new law introduced child benefits in Lithuania.
- ✓ In a response to the national challenges, the main principles and ideas introduced in the documents have responded to the international documents and have absorbed the experiences of other countries in the field.

Structure and main ideas expressed in the documents adopted

The *Strategy for the National Population Policy* comprises *Family well-being policy*, *Public health policy* and *Migration policy*. The objectives and actions of the *Family well-being policy* were formulated following this structure:

- ✓ Family stability;
- ✓ Family, work, and equal opportunities;
- ✓ Child protection;
- ✓ Solidarity of generations;
- ✓ Family and education;
- ✓ Family planning and reproductive health;
- ✓ Housing;
- ✓ Benefits to families with children.

The main objective of the *Family well-being policy* is promoting the establishment of autonomous and viable families based on the mutual care and responsibility of family members, ensuring the replacement of generations, and creating the legal, social and economic conditions for strengthening the family and ensuring its functioning (Nacionalinė demografinė, 2004).

In the *Concept of the State Child Welfare Policy*, it was stated that the main principles of child welfare were going to be realized through organizing interinstitutional collaboration, expanding the services for children and family, consolidating the defence of children's rights, and improving the qualification of workers in the field of family law, psychology and administration. It is also stated that the priority of state policy is ensuring the welfare of children (Vaiko, 2003).

The *National Strategy for Overcoming the Outcomes of Population Ageing* provides actions for solving population ageing problems in the several fields: 1) income and income guarantees; 2) employment; 3) health and social services; 4) life opportunities: education and integration into the information society, housing and adaptation of the environment, access to cultural life, transport, and personal protection; 5) participation and forming a positive image of elderly people (Nacionalinė gyventojų, 2004).

The new *Law on Benefits for Children of the Republic of Lithuania* established (or replaced) the following state benefits:

- ✓ extraordinary childbirth grant;
- ✓ child benefit;
- ✓ benefit for the children of men in compulsory military service;
- ✓ foster child benefits (custody benefit; settlement grant for foster children at the end of custody);
- ✓ lump-sum benefit for pregnant woman.

Nevertheless, inconsistencies and the lack of joint action remain. Most of the strategic ideas of the documents have not crystallized into action, and an integral system of family policy has not been created.

3.1.5. RECENT TRENDS IN FAMILY POLICY: INNOVATIONS OR DEFORMATIONS?

Over the past 3–4 years, the different conceptual and practical actions of family policy have been introduced and redesigned. Pronatalist and profamily aims have been accentuated in the documents. The number of new activities and measures is quite unique and has no analogues in other countries.

Development of conceptual ideas of family policy

In recent years, the *Concept of the State Family Policy* was approved and a number of measures stimulating the care of children at home and increasing financial support for families were adopted.

The *Concept of the State Family Policy*. In 2005, the Commission on Family and Child Affairs of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania started to work on the *Concept of the State Family Policy*, which was approved in 2008 (Valstybinė, 2008). One of the goals of this concept is to provide the legal status for family policy and ensure its stability and succession independent of changes in governments. The purpose of the *Concept of the State Family Policy* is to justify the necessity of family policy, realizing the constitutional statement that family is the basis of the state and society – the basis in which the essential ethic and cultural values are formed that ensure the well-being of every person and the historical survival of the state. The aims of the *Concept of the State Family Policy* are the following:

- ✓ To disclose the exclusive value of family in the life of a person and society;
- ✓ To determine the functions of a family that are important for the satisfaction of the needs of a person and society;

- ✓ To define the problems of family development and family life conditions in Lithuania;
- ✓ To determine the aims and principles of state family policy;
- ✓ To project activity directions in state family policy.

The concept is, however, more oriented to defining the essence and functions of family and does not propose a concerted system of ideas and actions of state family policy. Moreover, the concept formulates the definition of family, which is understandable only as legally registered union.

Recently introduced measures of family policy

In recent years, some components of family policy were greatly changed, especially those which are related to the financial support of families and the conditions of child care at home. Among the main measures that have been adopted recently with the aim of supporting families with children are the following:

- ✓ Since 2004 the *Law on Child Benefits* has been changed several times. In 2004, the lump sum childbirth benefit was equal six times the MSL. According to the changes, beginning 1 June 2006 every child born is paid a lump-sum childbirth benefit equal to eight times the MSL. For every adopted child, a lump-sum benefit equal to eight times the MSL is paid independently of the lump-sum childbirth benefit paid. In 2008 the *Law on Child Benefits* was changed again. According to these changes, beginning 1 January 2009 every child born is paid a lump-sum childbirth benefit equal to eleven basic social benefits (basic social benefit – a rate to define and calculate social security benefits, the value of which is confirmed by the government of the Republic of Lithuania), and for every adopted child a lump-sum benefit equal to eleven basic social benefits is paid independently of the lump sum childbirth benefit paid. Seeking to ensure social security for families raising children, a child benefit is paid to every child until 18 (or older if studying full-time in comprehensive school, vocational school, senior high school, or an institution of higher education) independent of family income or whether or not a person is insured by state social insurance. Beginning in 2008 a family raising one or two children is paid a benefit equal to 0.75 times the MSL per month for every child from his birth till 3 years old. A family raising one or two children from 3 to 18 years old (or older if studying full-time in a comprehensive school, vocational school, or institution of higher education), but not longer than until they are 24 years old, is paid a benefit equal to 0.4 times the MSL per month for every child. Children of men in compulsory military service are paid a monthly benefit equal to 1.5 times the MSL.
- ✓ In 2006–2007 changes in the *Social Law on Illness and Maternity of the Republic of Lithuania* (LR Ligos, 2006, 2007) were made. These changes were unique internationally. According to them maternity and parental benefits were increased and other social guarantees were assured. Beginning 1 January 2008, the parental benefit is equal to 100% of the compensatory wage of the parent

who stays at home with a child until he is 1 year old, and 85% of the compensatory wage of the parent who stays at home with a child from 1 to 2 years of age. If a second child is born in the family at the time of parental leave, the parental benefit increases according to the number of children.

- ✓ On 1 July 2006 a paternity benefit was legitimated. This benefit is paid for a father from the birth of a child until the child is 1 month old. The paternity benefit is equal to 100% of the father's earnings, but not less than 1/3 of the average insured income of the current year.
- ✓ The *Law on Social Support for Schoolchildren* was passed, and it came into force on 1 June 2007. According to the law, social support is dedicated to children from low-income families in order to help children from socially supported families get ready for school. This law includes not only financing of resources for learning, but also complete meals at schools. An addition to the *Law on Social Support to Schoolchildren* issued on 15 May 2008 sanctioned the provision free meals for children attending preschool and primary education institutions. The aim of this addition was to reduce the social exclusion of families (Socialinės, 2006).
- ✓ The *Law on the Income Tax of Residents* of the Republic of Lithuania (LR Gyventojų, 2002) has also been changed. According to the changes, families with one or two children under the age of 18, or older if studying full time in a comprehensive education institution, are paid an additional sum, which is equal to 0.1% of tax-free income value. In 2007, the tax-free income value (LTL 290) was increased to LTL 320. Those persons who have three or more children under the age of 18, or older if studying full time in comprehensive schools, an individual tax-free income value is applied (LR Gyventojų, 2006). On 1 January 2007, the individual tax-free income value was set at LTL 475 per month. Moreover, for every successive child, this tax-free value is increased by LTL 50. The tax-free income value is therefore adjusted according to the family situation.

A mother or a father raising children under 18, or older if studying full time in a comprehensive education institution, tax-free income value for one child is LTL 370, and for a second child and for every successive child tax-free income is doubled.

From 1 January 2009 permanent residents of Lithuania raising children under 18, or not older than 24 if studying full-time in a comprehensive school, vocational school, or institution of higher education (including the period of academic holidays), receive an additional tax-free income value for every child:

- ✓ for the first child – 20% of the main tax-free income value;
- ✓ for a second child – 50% of the main tax-free income value;
- ✓ for a third and every successive child – 100% of the main tax-free income value.

Also from 1 January 2009, a full tax-free income value was applied for a resident raising children alone (LR Gyventojų, 2008).

On the contrary to the marked extension of benefit and leave systems, the development of other components of family policy (such as the development of a child daycare system, introduction of different forms of flexible employment, etc.) that are

widely confirmed by the experience of other countries and recognized by international documents and different theories as important and efficient (Gauthier, 2002, 2005; Neyer, 2005; MacDonald, 2000, 2002, 2006) has practically not taken place in Lithuania in this period.

CONCLUSIONS

In summing up a short review of the family policy in Lithuania over the past 20 years, several conclusions could be made: on one hand, the enlargement of family policy has been great and sometimes very impressive; on the other hand, family policy has been rather controversial and unstable. Attention has periodically been given to the development of a conceptual and strategic document of family policy in this period. Consistent implementation of the conceptual basics of family policy has never been fully implemented, however. In addition, the essence of family policy was not always grasped and defined in the conceptual documents and measures. Besides, throughout the period, dialog between the demographers working out the conceptual basics of family policy and the decision-makers was rather unstable and sporadic. It should be mentioned, however, that such inconsistencies of the development of Lithuanian family policy is not unique. Poldma (1997) has observed that the instability of family support schemes is a problem for all the Baltic countries. Insufficient implementation of the conceptual basics of family policy has also been stressed when evaluating the situation in neighbouring Latvia (Eglite, 1999).

The ideas and motives which dominated in family policy in Lithuania frequently changed during the period since the beginning of 1990s. Depending on the ruling party (and with frequent changes in the governing party), the motives of family policy varied from strictly conservative with an emphasis on patriarchal attitudes to social democratic ones propagating the ideas of equal gender rights and opportunities.

But regardless of the ideas prevalent in the government, policymakers have been voicing two opposite attitudes:

- ✓ the attitude of the liberal welfare state pushing the decision of family problems into the sphere of the market system. The expression of such types of the attitudes is related to financial success and has been exploited by different ruling parties over the period of transformations and during the declines in the economy. This has been even true for governments formed by parties with a social democratic orientation.
- ✓ the attitudes and measures of a paternalistic type, which sometimes have even contradicted the economic potential of the country, have been repeatedly used in pre-election debates.

Such an imbalance between the ideas and intentions of developing family policies propagated by the government and the demographic realities and economic potential has also been observed in the other Baltic countries (Berzins, Zvidrins, 2000; Katus, Sakkeus, et al, 2000).

Notes

1. Maternity allowance of 0.8 minimum subsistence level (MSL) for studying mothers and those not protected by social insurance was introduced.
2. Child care allowance for mothers not protected by social insurance and mothers who are students at 0.7 MSL during the first 18 months and 0.35 during the following 18 months was introduced.
3. Partly paid leave for childcare was extended to 3 years at a rate of one MSL during the first 18 months and 0.5 during the following months. Later, this leave was changed to a childcare allowance that was granted to either parent (or any other person taking care of the children at that time) independently of their labour activities in that period.
4. Birth grant was extended to 3 MSL.
5. Single mother benefit for each child up to the age of 16 (18 if student) was increased to 0.4 MSL.
6. Benefit for adopted children and those placed under guardianship up to their age of 16 (18 if student), equal to one MSL provided the benefits acquired under other programs do not exceed, in total, one MSL, was adopted.
7. Social benefit under the Income Guarantee Act was provided if a mother is not employed (or father, or guardian, or foster mother, under prescribed conditions) and had children up to 3 years of age.
8. Compensation to family for not placing their children in pre-school institutions at a rate equal to the average expenditure for a place in these institutions was foreseen.
9. Benefit of 12 MSL for orphans and other children without parents at the time they want to set up their own household was adopted.
10. A number of other social benefits were provided in 1990–1991:
 - ✓ for children up to 16 years old (18 if student) from poor families;
 - ✓ for students who do not get stipends;
 - ✓ for mothers raising three or more children up to 16 years old (18 if student);
 - ✓ for poorly large families;
 - ✓ for one of the unemployed parents in a family that cares for a handicapped child;
 - ✓ for unemployed handicapped parent with children up to 16 years old (18 if student);
 - ✓ temporary allowance for minor children whose parents do not pay alimony;
 - ✓ for each member of a student's family;
 - ✓ minimum grant for every child up to 16 years old (18 if student);
 - ✓ additional benefit for orphan together with a pension for the loss of the breadwinner.

3.2. LATVIA

INTRODUCTION

Population policy used to be defined as activities of ruling bodies to influence changes in the composition, reproduction and migration of residents (Multilingual, 1992: 161; Explanatory, 2001: 129). The aims of these activities are chosen according to the actual situation, expected changes in it, evaluation of the changes as propitious for the state or not, and possibilities to influence certain processes with available means.

By the 1970s, low fertility was recognized as the most dangerous feature of the demographic situation for the future of the state. Accordingly, raising the birth rate is given preference over other necessities such as the minimization of premature deaths and the limitation of emigration.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet government introduced some forms of support to families with children, and by 1982–1987 they had really resulted in a rise in the birth rate of about one-tenth. During the transition period in the 1990s, the birth rate in Latvia (as in all the other post-Soviet countries) declined once more to the lowest level ever and one of the lowest in Europe (Demographic, 2007: 67).

Children are preferably born and brought up in a nuclear family. For that reason, family policy has become the dominant part of actual population policy in Latvia and almost the only one to which the state was devoted serious efforts and expenditures. Family policy is not aimed directly at raising fertility, but primarily at ensuring the stability of family, the mutual satisfaction of all members of the family, and a sufficient standard of living to have and bring up the desired number of children. Preferably there have to be at least two children, not only for replacement of generations, but also for each child to have at least one brother or sister as potential company and friend for life. The latter could be the main reason why representatives in all groups of the Latvian population would like to have two or more children in their families (Table 3.2.1).

Table 3.2.1. Desired number of children in one's own family, average for persons of active age and certain level of education in Latvia

Education	1995		1997		2001 ³⁾	2004 ⁴⁾
	men	women	men	women	women*	women
Basic	2.00	2.10	2.16	2.16	2.54	..
Secondary	2.12	2.16	2.13	2.15	2.36	2.50
Higher	2.25	1.99	2.22	2.06	2.60	2.82

¹⁾ Zvidriņš P. (ed.), 1998:110; ²⁾ UNDP, 1997; ³⁾ Pavlina I., Eglite P., 2002: 48-71;

⁴⁾ Sebre S., Lebedeva L., Trapenciere I., 2004: 17; * women with at least one child.

The average number of children in families that had children in 2000 was scarcely above 1.5 (Results, 2002: 207). This means that some family relations or living conditions are not satisfactory. To meet the goals of population and family policy, these obstacles should be found out and eliminated or minimized as far as possible.

3.2.1. INFLUENCES ON DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY POLICY IN 1990–2006.

The necessity to compensate families for at least part of their expenditures for children as a means to avoid a dramatic decrease in fertility and depopulation was recognized by the government in the first years after the country regained independence. In 1990 a universal monthly family allowance for each child was established to compensate for the rise in the prices of goods necessary for children and no longer regulated by the state (see chapter 2.2. on the legal basis regulating population policy in Latvia).

At the very end of the same year, in addition to maternity and child-care leave kept from the Soviet period, the prolongation of child-care leave up to the child's third birthday was accepted. The choice of this kind of support for families corresponds to the appearance of unemployment in the labour market and efforts to limit its growth by excluding at least some women from the ranks of job seekers. The mass media helped these efforts by convincing the public that it was best for each child to have a mother's care as long as possible, and that things should be done the opposite way that they were under the Soviets. In accordance with this idea, many child-care centres were closed and their buildings privatized.

The child-care allowance for the first and second part of this leave was fixed and was less for the additional 1.5-year period less than it was for the first. But after the first part, mothers could receive unemployment benefits for 9 months. This allowance does not differ by the number of children being cared for.

An additional tax reduction for parents was also introduced: for each dependant no income tax needs to be paid from a fixed amount of earnings about equal to one-fourth of the minimum wage. From time to time, this fixed amount is increased as it used to happen with the minimum wage (see table in Annex 3.2.2.).

Since July 1994 mothers have been entitled to a birth grant. It is about equal to the minimum wage though the amount is doubled if the pregnancy is observed from the 12th week.

Health care for children has been kept free of charge though some payments have been introduced for adults; employed mothers may have 14 paid days for care of children in case of illness. Up to the age of 7, children may travel in public transport without a ticket, up to 12 they may travel at half price.

During the years of enormous inflation or shock therapy at the first stage of transition to a market economy, the payments for both family and child-care allowances were increased twice a year, but after the end of 1993, when the restoration of Latvia's own currency was finished and inflation was minimized, the allowances were kept stable though salaries continued to grow. The childcare allowance decreased from 80% of the minimum wage in 1998 to 29%, and the average amount of all allowances per child

decreased from 8.2% to 6.4% of the average wage (Social Report 1998: 102 and Social Report 1999: 49). In that situation, women preferred paid employment, but having neither the possibilities to use child care centres nor enough income to support children while staying at home, families were forced to limit the number of children.

In the 90s, when the most radical political and economic changes happened, the birth rate decreased almost twice and the situation aggravated a lot (Table 3.2.2). The number of births, birth rate, and total fertility rate reached a minimum in 1998, the latter being almost half of that needed for replacement of generations and the lowest ever observed in the country.

Table 3.2.2. Fertility changes in Latvia in 1989–1998

Variables	Years				
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Number of births, thou	38.9	37.9	34.6	31.6	26.8
per 1000 inhabitants	14.6	14.2	13.1	12.1	10.4
per 1000 women 15–49	59.55	58.22	53.92	50.39	43.65
TFR	2.039	1.998	1.854	1.741	1.522
Age of mother, years	26.1	25.9	25.8	25.7	25.6
Age at first birth	23.4	23.2	23.1	23.0	23.0
% of first births	46.8	47.6	49.0	49.5	50.6
% of marital births	84.1	83.1	81.6	80.4	77.0
induced abortions per 1000 women at 15–49	60	55	51
% of Latvian mothers	53.9	56.5	58.1	61.5	64.5
% of Latvians in population	52.0	52.5	53.5	54.2	54.8

Table 3.2.2. Continue

Variables	Years				
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Number of births, thou	24.2	21.6	19.8	18.8	18.4
per 1000 inhabitants	9.6	8.7	8.1	7.7	7.6
per 1000 women 15–49	40.11	35.99	33.09	31.60	30.97
TFR	1.407	1.271	1.177	1.130	1.114
Age of mother, years	26.0	26.0	26.2	26.6	26.8
Age at first birth	23.4	23.5	23.6	24.0	24.1
% of first births	50.9	52.1	51.8	51.6	50.3
% of marital births	73.6	70.1	66.9	65.2	62.9
induced abortions per 1000 women at 15–49	44	43	41	37	34
% of Latvian mothers	64.8	63.7	63.4	63.7	62.8
% of Latvians in population	55.1	54.8	55.1	55.3	55.5

Sources: Demography, 2007: 21; 65.-67.; 22; 71; Demographic Yearbook, 2001: 33.

Taking into account the eventual consequences of such a low birth rate, the government finally increased child care allowance for the first 1.5 years to 30 LVL or about 25% of the average wage in the middle of 1998. In the beginning of 1999, the monthly family allowance was increased 1.2 times for the second and 1.6 times for the third and subsequent children born in families after this date (later on also for those born

before it). In addition to the aforementioned increases in child care and family allowances at the end of the 90s, mothers on child-care leave have received payments from the government into their social insurance fund since 1997, and the birth grant was almost doubled in October 1997.

The improvements in support to families meant that the transition to a free market economy was carried out, and the well-being of most of the population started to improve. Self assessment of the living conditions of households shows that, in all types of households, the share of those dissatisfied no longer prevails (Table 3.2.3). It immediately caused certain stabilization in fertility and since the very beginning of the 21st century even a slight increase in it (Table 3.2.4).

Table 3.2.3. Self-assessment of the living conditions of households in Latvia, percentage in the group

Assessment	all	of which by type				
		one person	one adult with children under 16	couple with no children	couple with children under 16	other
1998						
Very good	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.3
Quite good	4.7	4.3	2.5	5.4	7.5	3.5
Average	47.9	41.3	42.1	52.2	58.1	47.3
Bad	34.4	37.4	38.6	32.9	26.8	35.9
Very bad	12.7	16.7	16.8	9.1	7.4	13.0
<i>Distribution by types, %</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>31.8</i>	<i>4.7</i>	<i>15.9</i>	<i>18.1</i>	<i>29.5</i>
2005						
Not rich but manage to live well	9.1	3.7	8.5	10.5	15.6	8.8
Neither rich nor poor	59.1	45.6	53.8	59.1	69.5	64.4
Not poor but on the verge of poverty	26.2	39.8	34.3	25.2	12.8	23.9
Poor	5.6	11.0	3.5	5.6	2.0	3.9
<i>Distribution by types, %</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>23.8</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>21.3</i>	<i>17.8</i>	<i>33.5</i>

Sources: Household budget in 1998, Riga, 1999: 133, 19; Household budget in 2005, Riga, 2006: 31, 16.

Table 3.2.4. Births and fertility in Latvia in 1989–2006

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Number of births, thou	18.4	19.4	20.2	19.7	20.0
per 1000 inhabitants	7.6	8.1	8.5	8.3	8.6
per 1000 women 15–49	30.97	32.67	34.20	33.29	33.90
<i>TFR</i>	<i>1.114</i>	<i>1.179</i>	<i>1.237</i>	<i>1.207</i>	<i>1.232</i>
Age of mother, years	26.8	26.9	27.3	27.4	27.6
Age of mother at first birth	24.1	24.2	24.4	24.6	24.8
<i>% of first births</i>	<i>50.3</i>	<i>50.0</i>	<i>49.6</i>	<i>50.6</i>	<i>50.2</i>
<i>% of marital births</i>	<i>62.9</i>	<i>60.9</i>	<i>59.7</i>	<i>57.9</i>	<i>56.9</i>
abortions	34	30	29	26	25
<i>% of Latvian mothers</i>	<i>62.8</i>	<i>62.7</i>	<i>63.3</i>	<i>63.5</i>	<i>63.6</i>
<i>% of Latvians in population</i>	<i>55.5</i>	<i>55.7</i>	<i>57.7*</i>	<i>57.9</i>	<i>58.2</i>

Table 3.2.4. Continue

	2003	2004	2005	2006
Number of births, thou	21.0	20.3	21.5	22.3
per 1000 inhabitants	9.0	8.8	9.3	9.7
per 1000 women 15–49	35.46	34.33	36.37	37.82
<i>TFR</i>	<i>1.286</i>	<i>1.240</i>	<i>1.309</i>	<i>1.353</i>
Age of mother, years	27.6	27.7	28.0	28.0
Age of mother at first birth	24.9	25.0	25.2	25.3
% of first births	51.4	52.6	51.2	51.7
% of marital births	55.8	54.7	55.4	56.6
abortions	24	23	22	20
% of Latvian mothers	64.9	64.4	65.4	65.9
% of Latvians in population	58.45	58.62	58.84	59.02

Sources: Demography, 2007: 21; 65.-67.; 33; 71; Demographic Yearbook 2001: 34; 55; Demographic Yearbook 2002: 49; * census data.

Nevertheless, after the increase in the child care allowance, birth grant, and monthly family allowance for the second and third child in 1998 and 1999, only 9–11% of 441 respondents who gave birth in 1999 and 2000 recognized this increase in state support as having been important for the decision to enlarge their family without hesitation (Pavlina, 2002: 60). A bit higher this proportion is among those who gave birth to their third or fourth child, but regardless of the order of birth, the most significant considerations for this decision were the desire to have a decent family (for the first child) and desire of the spouse (especially for the third child): accordingly 71% and 53% of all.

Since then much has been done to raise support just for families with children regardless of being poor or not. In recent years social transfers received by couples with children have increased more than total income. There are no doubts that it has added to optimism of couples and helped stabilize the birth rate and fertility.

In October 2004, the birth grant was raised once more by almost three times, but the possibility to double it by registering early with a gynaecologist has been eliminated. Since January 2006, there has also been an additional grant by order of birth: one-third of a birth grant for first, one-half for the second, and two-thirds for further.

At the beginning of 2001, fathers became entitled to 10 days of paternity leave, during which they also began to receive an allowance equal to 80% of their salary in 2004. Instead, from the beginning of 2003, the period of paid child-care leave and allowance was reduced from 3 to 2 years. This decision corresponds not only to the wish to economize the state's budget, but also to the new situation in the labour market—less unemployment.

Two years later the very basis of the child care allowance was cardinally changed. For the employed, it was made equal to the net wage (70% of nominal before maternity leave) and up to 2008 with limited maximum. For the unemployed, it was just introduced and fixed at level a bit less than minimal wage in 2005. The basis for the allowance was chosen as a method to preserve the same level of income as before the birth of a child. In reality the income per family member lessens because one more member has appeared and needs certain maintenance.

Regardless of employment, such amount of child-care allowance is paid only 1 year instead of previous 1.5 years and during the following 0.5 year—fixed amount equal to previously paid during first 1.5 years (four times more than up to this time at second part of child-care leave). Up to March 2006, only those employees on child-care leave were entitled to the allowance, and after that those who returned to their job could receive half of the allowance with a fixed minimum (as from minimal wage), but since March 2007 the full allowance has been paid regardless of employment. It is worth mentioning that child-care leave and the corresponding allowance can be received by either of the parents or divided between them any way they choose.

It should be stated that in the period being discussed couples with children found themselves in the most prosperous group, while one-parent families were among the poorest. That couples with children were the most highly satisfied with their well-being can be explained by differences in the average age of respondents and their prospects for the future. Among households consisting of one person or couples without children, there is large proportion of elderly, while among couples with children under 16, all except the children are at an active age. The majority of adults at fertile age are employed and thanks to that dare to be optimistic, and the average income of couples with children does not much differ from average (Table 3.2.5).

Table 3.2.5. Disposable income per household member by type

Variables, year	All	One person	One adult with children under 16	Couple with no children	Couple with children under 16	Other	
						with children	no children
LVL per month							
1998	79.18	75.99	66.63	91.19	83.21	75.20	
2005	110.30	124.55	87.82	137.79	106.30	85.19	116.39
which transfers							
1998	20.99	39.59	15.89	36.64	7.07	19.45	
2005	26.62	56.14	21.45	41.78	14.37	17.86	26.15
of them except pensions							
1998	3.69	1.78	10.02	1.69	4.60	3.46	
2005	6.52	5.23	14.65	2.67	12.58	7.43	2.37
% of these transfers in total							
1998	4.7	2.3	15.0	1.8	5.5	3.4	
2005	5.9	4.2	16.7	1.9	11.8	8.7	2.0

Sources: Household budget in 1998, Riga, 1999: 42; Household budget in 2005, Riga, 2006:40, 36.

Comparable data from the yearly household budget survey demonstrate that in households with children a rather large share of income consists of social transfers. In the critical year of 1998, this share was rather significant only in one-parent families, whose income was the smallest, and transfers were paid as social protection for vulnerable households.

The aforementioned forms of support for families with children are available to all ordinary families, but there are also additional state's allowances for those with handicapped children, adopted children, taken under guardianship, or foster children. One-parent families have been eligible for payments from the Maintenance Guaranties Fund since August 2004.

Support for any type of families hardly has any impact on fertility. More hopeful in this regard is the provision of local governments of transport to schools, cheap or free lunch for pupils, or assistance with housing, heating etc. for families or the help of social workers in case of special occasions.

In reality social protection depends on the financial possibilities of the local government and the activity of the people elected. As a result, not all families receive the help they need, and that may add to the eventual decision of residents to leave the place for the capital city or abroad, with all the sad consequences for the birth rate in the country.

3.2.3. FRAMEWORK OF CURRENT TOOLS OF FAMILY POLICY IN LATVIA (2007).

Family policy in Latvia was formed as part of social protection and social insurance. It contains means introduced in different periods and developed step-by-step according to the changing situation. Families with children are currently entitled to a large scope of support available from different sources and actors, and include diverse groups of means:

- ✓ financial benefits and reduced payments,
- ✓ reconciling work and family life,
 - a) leaves and advantageous terms at work,
 - b) child-care facilities,
- ✓ social help in case of certain crises.

Financial assistance to families in normal situation includes:

- ✓ Pregnancy and maternity allowance: 100% of net salary during the previous 6 months;
- ✓ 80% of salary during 10 days of paternity leave;
- ✓ Birth grant: 296 LVL to each mother after delivery or foster child up to 1 year of age with an additional benefit of 100 LVL for the first child, 150 LVL for the second, and 200 LVL for each further newborn;
- ✓ Monthly family allowance to each child up to 15 years of age (in case of schooling—18): 8 LVL for the first, 1.2 times more for the second, 1.6 times more for third, and 1.8 times more for the fourth and further ones;
- ✓ Child care allowance: 100% of net salary to either employed parent or 50 LVL a month to an unemployed parent during 1st year and 30 LVL per month during an additional 6 months regardless of employment status; an additional 50 LVL child-care allowance for each additional child up to 1 year in case of multiple birth and 30 LVL a month during the 2nd year;
- ✓ Income tax reduction: fixed amount of non taxable income (about half of the payer's non taxable income) for each dependant;

- ✓ Reduced prices for the travel of children on public transport: no charge at all up to 6 years (incl.) and half price up to 12 years; monthly travel cards of students and pupils also for half of full price;
- ✓ Free health care for children;
- ✓ Reduced prices for child care in municipal facilities and in some municipalities compensation for lack of places there: a fixed amount that would regularly be spent by a person for one child in such a facility;
- ✓ Free school meals for 1st grade pupils.

Leaves and advantageous terms at work available to employed parents according to the Labour Law:

- ✓ pregnancy and maternity leaves each 56 days, but in case of special health problems the figure is 70; an additional 14 days are also available after multiple birth and to those whose pregnancy is observed before it has reached 12 weeks; the working place of the mother is preserved,
- ✓ paternity leave: 10 days after delivery,
- ✓ 1.5 years of child-care leave to either parent according to their own choice, available up to the child's 8th year of age,
- ✓ 14 days paid and if necessary additional unpaid leave if an ill child (up to 14 years of age) is cared for at home or 20 days for parents taking care of a child in hospital;
- ✓ prohibition against dismissing, sending on a business trip, work overtime or on the night shift pregnant women or mothers up to the child's 1st year of age; the right of these persons to work part time if they would like to;
- ✓ the right to have two additional breaks up to 30 minutes a day for a parent of a child up to 1.5 years of age for the child's feeding or a shorter working day;
- ✓ prolongation of yearly paid vacation to employees with three children up to 16 years of age or a disabled child;
- ✓ possibility to choose a flexible form of work if it corresponds to the kind of work and the superior's confidence in the employee.

Child-care facilities are offered by several institutions:

- ✓ municipality-run full-day centres supplied according to the demand of residents with children of preschool age and possibilities to arrange the place according to all hygienic regulations and to hire personnel with tertiary pedagogic education. The most popular age of children entering these centres is 2 or 3; in groups for children who are 5 and 6 years of age, preschool training is maintained;
- ✓ municipality-run children's centres for a short stay—up to 4 hours and no sleeping room;
- ✓ children's centres at working places;
- ✓ private full-day child-care centres;
- ✓ training groups for preschool children of 5 and 6 years of age in basic schools—2 days a week during the school year; supposed to be mandatory if a child-care centre is not attended;
- ✓ day-care centres for disabled children run by some NGOs.

Social help to families in crisis can be received in various cases and differs according to its kind:

- ✓ monthly benefits of 50 LVL for a disabled child and an additional 50 LVL for parents taking care of such a child;
- ✓ fixed amount of social pension to each child in case of a provider's death;
- ✓ monthly allowance at fixed amount of 30 LVL up to the age of 7 and then 36 LVL from the maintenance foundation to children in one-parent families if a divorced or separated parent does not supply it; afterwards the guilty parent has to repay the total sum to the state;
- ✓ fixed amount of 38 LVL monthly maintenance for each foster child and 80 LVL a month compensation for foster parents regardless of the number of children being cared for;
- ✓ omitted or reduced payments for low income families for housing, heating, school meals, textbooks, etc.;
- ✓ availability for mother and/or children who have suffered from violence to receive shelter and psychological help in the state's or municipality's social care institutions or NGO-run crisis centres.

Institutions providing certain support to families specialize in certain kinds of activities.

The state is responsible for universal financial benefits and those from social insurance to the employed, as well as for allowances in irregular situations that are not means-tested.

All these and some additional tasks are divided between two ministries. All the universal and insurance benefits, except those from the Maintenance foundation and the advantages for employed parents at their working place are under the supervision of the *Ministry of Welfare*. *The state* also prepares drafts for changes in according laws and rules and makes the calculations necessary for it.

The *Ministry on Children and Family Affairs* supervises the aforementioned Maintenance Foundation, social care institutions for children, activities of orphans' (or parish) courts, prevention of violence against children, campaigning aimed to strengthen the family, fathers rising part in child care, etc.

Municipalities have to supply child-care services, financial support to families having no guaranteed level of income per household member, and all kinds of help needed in critical situations: violence; illness or death of the only remaining parent; loss of housing because of fire, debts, or other reasons; etc.

In reality, social protection received from a *municipality* depends on the financial possibilities of the *municipality* and activity of the people elected. As a result, not all families receive the help they need, and it may add to residents' eventual decision to leave the place for the capital city or abroad, with all the sad consequences for the birth rate in the country.

Companies and institutions that employ parents with children are supposed to fulfil all regulations of the Labour Law and offer possibilities for flexible work and, eventually, child-care facilities, to arrange family fests, etc.

Some NGOs offer services for disabled children or those who have suffered from violence.

3.2.4. EVALUATION OF ACTUAL FAMILY POLICY: ITS CONCEPTUAL BASIS AND IMPACT ON FAMILIES

At the first stage of the post-Soviet period, the economic situation was quite difficult for the state budget and population, and fertility decreased to an extremely low level. It determined the main goal of support to families: to raise the number of births by compensating part of the expenditures for children in families. The chosen forms of support were oriented to an out-of-date family model with one earner and one carer, though in modern times with increasing expenditures for the maintenance of children, more and more years required for their education, guaranteed by UN Declarations of human rights, including freedom of choice for both genders, the instability of marriage, the high premature mortality of males, the existing principles of social insurance and its dependence on one's earnings during paid employment, the availability of services for everyday life, the educational level of women being high enough for qualified work and leading post, etc., the traditional family model no longer works anywhere in Europe. Accordingly, the forms of financial support introduced up to now exclusively for child care at home have not resulted in an undoubted rise of fertility. Of course, a rather large share of the population is fond of a mother's long stay at home for child care, but the possibility to receive a child-care allowance no more than 1.5 years, the drastic decrease in it already after the first year, and the lack of child care facilities after that moment leads to poverty, the loss of the mother's professional qualification, and hopes for a decent salary in years to come, not to mention that it influences the eventual decision to have some more children.

Following the aforementioned concept does not help eliminate the difference in a household's income per family member by number of children in the family (Table 3.2.6). Even in households with one child, the average income including transfers is less than in those with no children, but in households with three or more children income is two times smaller.

*Table 3.2.6. Composition of disposable income per household member by number of children in 2005**

Variables	Without children	one child	two children	three and more children
Income LVL per month	125.10	105.11	91.17	61.71
<i>of which transfers except pensions</i>	2.98	9.01	12.19	12.02
Of all, %				
remuneration for work	59.6	74.9	71.5	60.2
income from entrepreneurial activity	10.1	8.9	9.7	14.4
<i>of which agriculture</i>	4.1	3.7	3.3	10.4
transfers	29.6	15.6	18.4	24.5
<i>except pensions</i>	2.4	8.6	13.4	19.4
other	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.9

Source: Household budget in 2005, Riga, 2006:42.

Though the proportion of transfers increases proportionally to the number of children in the household, it only helps to lessen the difference but is not large enough to eliminate the difference in level of well-being.

As may be observed from the composition of income, larger families use to be in rural areas, where employment and salary levels are lower. Accordingly, child-care allowances and the average amount of transfers for larger families is less in spite of the number of children and divergence of some allowances by order of birth. It follows that the equalling of child-care allowances to one's wage, especially on the condition it is paid regardless of employment, is not quite fair. It seems obvious that children of parents who are paid less need the same care as those who are paid well.

In the current and future labour market situation in Latvia, it would be useful to raise the employment level including both – elderly and also rather young women with children. This may actually happen only on the condition that there is full supply of child-care facilities for all the families that would like to use them even when the child is a rather young age.

To fulfil this task is not easy. Construction of new buildings to replace those privatized in the 90s needs financing by municipalities. In addition, in the first years of the 21st century it was determined that tutors in preschool centres must have a tertiary education in pedagogy or be a student in the field. Experienced tutors with a secondary education were dismissed but replacements for them are scarce because wages in that field are still less than they are in schools. The requirements for hygiene in day-care centres are so severe that they make it next to impossible to arrange child-care facilities for children of employees at ordinary companies, small private groups to care for neighbours' children, etc. Nevertheless, the desperately needed "care or play rooms" are arranged with hygienic conditions not worse than children have at home or at mass events for children, at shopping centres, in transport, etc. and with the qualification of personnel no less than that of paid nurse or their own parents. Some small private services remain unknown to the public and officials to avoid taxation and, correspondingly, more expenses for parents.

Having no possibilities to use child-care facilities and return to a job, parents find themselves in a trap since after a child turns 1 year of age the allowance becomes too little to ensure even the child's maintenance, not to mention that of the carer. There is not any support at the start of school years and for the great majority also in supply with textbooks.

Future parents are of course informed about the situation, and they plan the future of their family for not only 1 year. Most of them determine that the number of children should be limited at least up to the moment that state support becomes sufficient not only for the 1st year of a child's life.

Authorities also recognize that the most relevant task of providing support to families with children in Latvia is the creation of more child-care facilities, but the responsibility for this task is delegated to municipalities, which are given no state support for it. Accordingly, the most probable scenario is a rather slow rise in fertility in the nearest future.

To strengthen the recent rise in fertility, the country's family policy must be concordant with the common goals of the state's social policy and means of their


implementation. First of all, these are possibilities to start employment or return to one's job after just half a year and receive a salary that is adequate to maintain one's children and the availability to use child-care facilities as a precondition for employment and existence of two-income family. The latter as a rule has a higher income and less need for regular allowances from the state than a one-income family. Instead more support is necessary at start of each school year and free of charge out of school activities of children not mention lunch at school and text books. It would also persuade the public that the state is interested not only in bettering the actual vital statistics but also in bringing up all children as healthy and advanced personalities.

3.3. ESTONIA

INTRODUCTION

A fast decrease in fertility forced many European countries to pay more attention to family policy in the 1990s. Population forecasts show a rapid decrease in the number of young people and population ageing. Figure 3.3.1 represents the dynamics of the age structure in Estonia according to a UN population forecast. The fast decrease in the number of young people is mostly caused by low fertility, and this trend will continue. Depopulation has been the overwhelming argument for the support of family policy in public debates in Estonia. It is therefore not surprising that a remarkable majority of Estonian people support measures to increase fertility as the main tool to find solutions for the future need of employees (Testa, 2006).

*Figure 3.3.1. Forecast for size of different age groups in Estonia
(Data: UN 2006 middle)*



Discussions about the purposes and measures of family policy have lasted more than 20 years in Estonia. Over this period, Estonia has made its choices but debates over principles, purposes and implementation still continue. In light of the transformation of the policy systems of Central and Eastern European countries, some authors are seeing new emerging welfare regimes as independent new types of social policy solutions at the same time others try to fit new states into the classical divisions of countries according to welfare state groups (Esping Andersen, 1994).

This chapter provides a short overview of the family policy system in Estonia and the main factors that have shaped the development of family policy since 1990. The chapter analyses briefly the main actors in the policy processes and the environment of the policy and gives an overview of the main outcomes of the policy.

3.3.1. OBJECTIVES OF FAMILY POLICY

Family policy objectives may be worded in various ways. Often the same rhetoric can express different purposes and produce various outputs. Support for fertility can be one of the aims of family policy, but this is not the only option.

Reaction against the former Soviet system and fear about the future of the nation shaped the attitudes of family policy at the beginning of the 1990s. Up to the 1990s, mothers were expected to return quickly back to the labour market after giving birth and remain 100% employed. Fear of an increase in the immigrant population and a diminishing share of ethnic Estonians supported active fertility discussions. For example, topics such as whether only ethnic Estonians should get family benefits or whether all inhabitants of Estonia should be entitled to benefits were acute at the beginning of the 1990s. Popular were ideas about increasing the salary of working fathers and letting mothers stay home with children “because family should manage to get by normally with parents’, but most of all with father’s, salary” (Tiit, 1990b: 33). A newspaper survey with 1157 respondents (Tiit, 1990b) showed that concerning family policy measures work related actions (flexible work time, provision of holidays) instead of financial support was preferred. An important topic was also providing young families with their own living place, since the shortage of living places was very acute. For example, one-third of the survey respondents supported the idea that families must get their own apartment right at the same time when they are forming a family.

The result of the survey conducted by Katus et al (1990) also gives a typical picture of public opinion about population policy at the beginning of 1990s. If people were asked to choose between improving the situation of elderly people, supporting young families, or regulating migration, 64% believed that the main population question was the regulation of immigration, 43% supported young Estonian families, and only 1% supported elderly people. Concerning various family policy measures, priority was given to guaranteeing married couples a living place and only 15% of people supported the implementation of child benefits.

One of the first attempts to formulate Estonian family policy was an elaboration of Self-managing Estonia’s program document (Tiit, 1990a). According to the suggestions of this group, national family policy had to guarantee a minimum subsistence level for all families at least above the poverty level. Local governments were seen in the previous role of enterprises – securing services.

Different governmental work groups continued work with the principals of formulating Estonian family policy. Several attempts to legalise the concept were made in 1994, 1997, 1998 and 1999. In 1997 one of the proposals did reach to government, but it was sent back with the recommendation to harmonize the document with all ministries and expand the description of the situation. In 2001 one version of the principles was finally approved by the commission after public debate, but this document never reached the government. According to this document, Estonia’s task was to create a stable and secure environment for all children and families. The aim was to ensure the average well-being of families with children regardless of where they live or the composition of the family. The second document

was accepted by the government in 2005. This document set new aims for family policy. An achievement of fertility above the replacement rate was the main purpose of family policy according to this document.

Data from the UN population policy database (World, 2006) show that there was no country in Europe which considered its birth rate to be too high in the 21st century. Most Eastern European countries found their birth rate too low and would like to raise it. Estonia was different from the rest of its eastern and southern neighbours in that during 1999–2004 it had a neutral attitude towards direct state intervention in fertility, although fertility was very low. The objectives of Estonian family policy were worded in the family policy concept which was completed in 2000. According to this document, Estonia's task was to create a stable and secure environment for all children and families with children by ensuring average well-being regardless of where the child lived or the composition of the family. The most important milestones in achieving this aim were steps to create equal conditions for families with and without children and ensure gender equality. Official family policy thus abandoned the aim of higher fertility and set the family policy target as better well-being of families with children (Nestor, 1999; Saks, 2001) with a hope that better well-being would also lead to higher fertility.

The notion about the universalism of Estonian family policy can finally be made. Even though Estonian family policy has moved over the years more towards income-related policy, it is still very universal, and this universalism has been supported by public opinion. Public media analyses show that equality and security have been the most important public values in the public family policy process in Estonia (Ainsaar, 2002).

Bahle (2008) classified countries according to state support to the compatibility of work and family and universality principles. He found that Estonia, Latvia and Finland were the most similar to each other, while Lithuania was closer to Poland. At the same time, the group of Estonia, Latvia, and Finland can be described as countries with very universal family policy with essential efforts towards work and family compatibility.

3.3.2. ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURES

Institutional and administrative structures often reflect the importance and status of activities in a country. Before the 1990s, the Ministry of Social Insurance was responsible for child allowances, family vacations, and birth grants in Estonia. After the formation of new state structures in the 1990s, in 1993 the Ministry of Social Care, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Labour were united to form the Ministry of Social Affairs. The new ministry's tasks became the formulation of social policy, including dealing with children and family policy. Relative support for families was strong, despite generally high absolute poverty and difficult times. For example, in 1993 the relationship between family benefits and average salary was the best in the entire period of 1990–2007.

In 1994 the Social Insurance Board was established as an institution to deal with the management of family benefits. Under the influence of the year of the family, in 1995 a family office as an independent structure in the Ministry of Social Affairs

was created. Since 1996 the minister of population affairs has had the task of working more widely with population questions, including the field related to population sustainability. In 1997 the family office was replaced with a population council at the Ministry of Social Affairs. The council's tasks were to consult government and shape public opinion about family questions. In the same year (1997), a government commission was formed for the minister of population affairs to deal with the question of demography and the integration of ethnic minorities into Estonian society. In 1998 two additional workgroups and a new ministerial commission, consisting of five ministers and the state chancellery, was created. The ministerial commission had the task of working out the main principles and a development plan for population policy and examining government bills from the viewpoint of demography (Ainsaar, 2000). These three commissions were united as a one governmental child and family policy commission in 1999. The commission was led by the minister of population affairs. The post of minister of population affairs was created at the end of 1996 at the State Chancellery. The main work of the commission was to counsel the government on family policy questions, work out the main principles of population policy, and encourage cooperation between different interest groups. Since 1999 all ministers of population affairs have been actively involved in family policy processes.

In 2007 the structural configuration of family policy at the Ministry of Social Affairs was strengthened. A special family policy unit under the gender equality department was formed. Additional family policy specialists were employed in the departments of social security and in the department of data analysis.

The amendment of laws is mainly the initiative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, but cooperation between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Office of the Minister of Population Affairs is very active.


3.3.4. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND FAMILY POLICY IN 1990–1997

At the beginning of the 1990s, the network for supporting families was a mix of a historically devolved system, needs caused by poverty, and a primary new system. Generally, a family policy system in a modern sense was missing. Support for children existed, but in other forms at that time. Already before 1990, Estonia had benefits for families with four or more children and single mothers and a birth grant (see Ainsaar, 2000). It is however difficult to evaluate the whole 1980s family support policy in terms of money, because many schemes worked as indirect benefits of in-kind support (subsidies for children's goods, free or subsidised services, children's day care, ability to get an apartment).

The first steps in family policy indirectly expressed priorities and understandings on which family well-being was believed to be dependent. As a first important step in a new family policy, the equal child benefit was introduced in 1990. Birth grants were changed to be equal for all children. They stayed equal for all children until 1998, when the first child got a higher grant. It was argued that when the second and third child was born, the families already had many necessities (Figure 3.3.2). So the aim of the differentiation of birth grants was not to raise fertility but to provide more resources for those who need it most of all. Birth grants stayed differentiated until 2005, but since

then first and second parity children have received equal support. Since 2000 separate birth grants for multiple births have also existed. It is equal to birth grant of a first child and is paid to every newborn.

Figure 3.3.2. Birth grant as percentage of average salary




In 1990 child benefits were paid according to government regulation to all children up to 1.5 years old. Children 1.5–6 years old got benefits only if family income in one month was less than 140 roubles per family member and the child did not go to a kindergarten. The regulation established universal child benefits for children less than 1.5 years old and income and kindergarten attendance dependent benefits for children 1.5–6 years old. By 1990 it was possible to transfer parental leave to other working family members besides the mother and the benefit also remained if a mother was working part time (Põldma, 1998). Still, the period of paid parental leave was short. In 1990 paid parental leave lasted until the child was one year old. It was possible to get additional leave without compensation for the next half a year. One's employment record (compulsory at that time) was not interrupted while staying at home with a child up to 14 years old.

In 1992 a new child benefits law came into force. It set up very system that was similar to the present family benefits scheme. All children up to 15 years of age and all school children up to 18 years old were entitled to an equal monthly benefit. Paid parental leave was lengthened until the child's fourth birthday. In November 1992, child benefits became legally dependent on the minimum salary level (Sotsiaalministeeriumi, 1999). The years 1992–1994 are the only period in Estonia's child benefits history in which family benefits were directly connected with minimum salary. In 1994 this requirement was annulled because the connection between all social benefits made the rise in benefits impossible in real life.

Since 1994 was the international year of the family, it brought along an increase in the number of telecasts reflecting family life and more media attention. With the new child benefit law in 1994, the index of a child benefit, determined along with the state budget law, became the main yardstick of family policy. Although a new requirement was stated in the law, that index of a child benefit should be changed when the consumer price index advances more than 10% in half a year, this requirement was never implemented in reality (Kuddo et al, 2002). The child benefit was extended until the age of 16 and it became dependent on birth order. Benefits for second and third child were higher to encourage families to have more children (Figure 3.3.3). Differentiation of child benefits according to birth order has remained in force until the present. There was only short period of 2004–2005 when all children got equal benefits.

Figure 3.3.3. Share of first, second and third parity child benefits from average gross salary in Estonia



In 1994, for the first time a school year start grant and additional benefits for families with four and more children were paid. Despite of the implementation of several new benefits and the general family friendly attitude, benefits started sharply losing their real value because of inflation. Regardless of some fluctuations, the decrease continued until 1998. Only the level of the benefits for third and following children kept pace with average salaries. The other group who received higher support from government was single parents. The most severe was the drop in benefits for first children. The slight rise in 1997 did not stop the decline. Only in 2004 was an amendment of a law passed that increased the real value of first child benefits once again, but they did reach the level of 1994.

The 90-year-old widow of Estonian emigrant and art professor Aino Järvesoo took the leadership in public discussions about future of population and fertility. Her

private financial contributions and projects to subsidise artificial impregnation achieved great attention and led to later government projects. A slogan used by her, "1000 kroons for one child", was later used as a main election pledge by one of the leading parties.

The political coalition agreements that are written down during government negotiations began playing a very important role in family policy in the 1999 elections. During the parliamentary election in 1999, all parties stressed the need to support families (Ainsaar, 2001a). After the elections, a new support scheme for families with four and more children was introduced. The first poverty report published in 1999 (Kutsar and Trumm, 1999) brought poverty as a problem to public discussion. A law concerning family benefits from 2000 specified parental leave schemes for different groups. The benefit for parental leave became dependent on the caretaker (parent or other person), age of the child, and number of children.

As an election promise, the first income-related policy measure was introduced in 2001, a tax break starting from the third child. Parents whose earnings were sufficient for a benefit could get an extra tax break for every third and higher parity child. Families could benefit from this measure for the first time in 2002 because the money was returned only after completing a tax declaration. During the 1st year, only half of the three- and four-children families could benefit from this measure because their incomes were too low. In 2002 child benefits for a second child rose, although the law amendment was proposed to equalise child benefits with all birth orders.

All incremental changes in state support for families did not however cover the rise in the consumer price index. Public opinion polls (Saar, 2001) found that families with children were one of the groups most in need and should be a priority group on the list of government support. Although it was stated that parents are mainly responsible for the well-being of children, it was also found that the government should ensure that families with children can cope at least on an average level (Kandla et al, 2000, Kivirähk, 2000, Lepane, 2002). Direct child support measures were the most preferable of all family policy actions.

An essential shift in family policy took place in 2004. The most remarkable of the changes was the transformation of the first term of parental leave into "maternity salary". Analyses of parental leave showed that the fixed amount of parental leave benefit was useful but still often caused the family to drop into poverty because of one family member was no longer earning a wage. Moreover, the period when (mainly) mothers stayed at home did not belong to the pension insurance contribution period because nobody paid social contributions during that time. After 10 years, it became clear that although the freedom to stay at home was definitely welcomed by mothers, it had some consequences on gender equity and individual pension schemes later in life (Püss et al, 2001).

First it was demanded that the work of mothers should be acknowledged a job around 2000 during the period of the lowest fertility level so far in Estonia. The attempts to legalize this overall principle at the level of family policy document failed, however. Then 2003 arrived with general parliamentary elections. Almost all parties covered the topic in their election programmes. The competition to be the most fertility friendly party started, because society generally supported measures to help families with

children. A “mother’s salary” appeared in the campaign promises of several political parties. After elections the very first point in the coalition agreement was about granting an income to a mother who stays at home. Until then the parental leave period lasted 3 years with a flat parental leave benefit of 53 EUR for everybody. This benefit could also have been used by other family members or relatives if the parents wanted to return to work. Although mothers mainly used the parental leave, the extensive availability of the leave benefit for everybody allows this measure to operate more like a care benefit. The new proposal was to raise the level of leave benefits about ten times and connect it with previous income. A three-time higher minimum than the parental leave benefit was proposed even for those who did not have a previous income. The aim of the “mother’s salary” was to compensate for unearned salary or “opportunity costs” in Gary Becker’s terms. As the benefit was “salary”, leave takers also had to pay social insurance contributions from leave benefits and in that way the period of leave was entitled to pension insurance.

Hot discussion about the proposal of the bill broke down in society. Criticism from academics, family organisations, and from almost all parties rose. The most severe criticism was against the violation of the equity principle. An income-related benefit was seen as unequal treatment of children and parents who did the same job of taking care of a child. An excessively high upper ceiling was also criticised. The bill was evaluated as mainly a bill for rich people. It was argued that the injustice created by the free market would be brought with this bill to the family. Family policy had mainly followed the principles of equity in Estonia; all children were treated equally despite of the income level of their parents.

Finally 100% replacement rate of the salary during previous 11 months, but with an upper ceiling of not more than three average salaries was agreed with. In the final stage, a Swedish speeding element was also added. Namely, if the next child is born at least 2.5 years after the birth of previous child, the compensation will be calculated from the income level before the birth of a first child. Several restrictions were also added: only mothers were entitled to leave during first 6 months. This was a result of paediatricians demanding that mothers must breast feed their children during this period. The right of fathers to income-related parental leave started only after the 6th month of leave. Government compensation also became dependent on income during the leave period. If a parent on leave worked, he or she might lose some portion of the benefit. Generally all population groups gained from the proposal, however, although unequally.

Public opinion polls show general satisfaction with this measure later. It was also a very essential change in terms of the government contribution to all family policy. Together with the rise in the first child benefit that was also introduced in 2004, all contributions from GDP to family benefits rose in 2003–2004 0.4 percentage points. The share of leave benefits from all family policy also rose. In 2004 various parental leave benefits made up 35% of the entire family benefits package, whereas in 2003 it was 26%. In 2008 the initial 11-month period of income related leave was prolonged up to 1.5 years of age for a child.

Analyses (Vörk and Karu, 2006) show that “maternal salary” probably also increased the fertility of high-income mothers and that more mothers stayed at home

because of lowered incentives to work, although the barrier can also be a lack of childcare places. The expectation that more fathers could be motivated to take a leave with 100% coverage was not justified. The share of fathers taking leave is still very low—2%. The low share of fathers could be also influenced by the strong overall attitude that mothers are the best caretakers for a child in Estonia (Figure 3.3.4). Still, leave also had some gender empowerment elements. Many mothers at home found it more dignified to have their own money during the leave period than to ask for it from a working husband.

In 2004 the Office of the Minister of Population Affairs started to work out a programme for more diverse day care service providers. Until then the day care system was mainly based on kindergartens run by local municipality governments. Although the law stated that all children must have a place at a kindergarten, surveys (Ainsaar et al, 2004) revealed that about 40% of local municipalities could not fulfil the requirement, and a shortage of day care places was an urgent problem. It was hoped

to solve the problem by encouraging private day care providers to enter the market and creating a central register of day care providers. As a follow up to this initiative, in 2008 the government worked out a support programme for local governments to increase the salaries of day care teachers, build new day care centres, and boost the quality of day care. Because of time lag, the outcomes of these initiatives will be seen perhaps only in 2010, however.

In 2006 tax relief for a second child was also implemented and discussion about relief for all children arose later.

The birth rate is rising in Estonia, but because of the complexity of fertility it is difficult to evaluate the impact of wealth and family policy in that process. As a result

Figure 3.3.4. Agreement with the statement that ideally women should stay at home to take care of a child (Data: Eurobarometer 2006)




Figure 3.3.5. Poverty of 0–15-year-old children in Estonia





Figure 3.3.6. Family benefits from GDP 2005 (Data: Eurostat)



of various policy measures, child poverty has been fluctuating, but generally dropping in recent years (Figure 3.3.5). The drop in poverty seems to be mainly the result of a general rise in well-being. In 2000–2006 the importance of transfers in the elimination of poverty was diminishing (Table 3.3.1). Poverty is still the highest among single parents and families with more than three children (Table 3.3.2).

As a result of intensive contribution to parental leave schemes, Estonia was the country with the highest relative contributions to the family before the first birthday of a child in Europe in 2004 (Ainsaar and Riisalu, 2005). After the first year, the level of contributions drops. The share of resources spent to families demonstrates the general child friendliness of the country. The share of financial resources allocated to family policy is very different in Europe (Figure 3.3.6). Estonian expenditures on child and family benefits was 1.5% of GDP in 1998, which was less than those in developed European countries but more than those in many former ‘socialist’ countries and southern Europe. In 2005, after several fluctuations (Figure 3.3.7) the share of family benefits of GDP was still 1.5 and the position of Estonia was the same. Estonia was more child friendly than many eastern and southern European countries, including the other Baltic States, but it still gave less support than the majority of countries in Europe.

Table 3.3.1. Poverty of 0–15-year-old children in Estonia


	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Before transfers	36.6	33	32.1	30.8	35	33.7	30.8
Influence of transfers	15.3	14.1	14.2	11	13.5	13.9	13.4
After transfers	21.3	18.9	17.9	19.8	21.5	19.8	17.4

Source: Statistical Office of Estonia.

Table 3.3.2. Poverty in different household types

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Single parent	37.2	29.2	35.2	32.8	39.8	40.8	44.4
1-child family	13	15.6	12.7	14.9	13.2	13.5	11.5
2-child family	16.4	15.1	15.2	18.1	12.3	12	11.9
3 or more children in family	22.9	20.8	20	24.4	25.1	23.5	21.4

Source: Statistical Office of Estonia.

Figure 3.3.7. Share of family benefits from GDP in Baltic countries (Data: Eurostat)

3.3.5. FAMILY POLICY IN 2008

In 2008 the family policy system in Estonia can be divided into four subsystems: family benefits, parental leave and leave benefits, day care, tax reliefs. Family benefits in Estonia include a birth grant, school grant for schoolchildren once a year, life entrance grant for those children who graduate from institutions and start to live

independently, child allowance, single parent allowance, family allowance for families with seven or more children, child allowance for a family of a temporary military servant, and child allowance for a child in custodial care.

As in the case of other social protection schemes, all residents of Estonia are entitled to family benefits and child care services. The maternity leave allowance is however granted only to mothers who paid social tax in Estonia, because it is a health insurance-based measure.

Family benefits are financed from the general state budget. Depending on the municipality, 0–30% of the total costs of day care services for children are financed by local municipalities from local revenues (Ainsaar and Soo, 2008). Maternity leave (mothers are entitled to leave and a benefit before giving birth and after birth) belongs to the health insurance system and is therefore financed from the health insurance contributions. The replacement rate is 100% from average salary for 140 days (70 days before the estimated birth and 70 days after delivery).

The universal child allowance is paid until the child reaches the age of 16. If the child is engaged in full-time studies, the payment is extended up to the age of 19. There is not any means testing for child allowances of selectivity by age, but the system is more generous towards higher parity children. Only the period 2004–2006 was an exception when all children were entitled for equal benefits. In 2008 children of third and higher parity are entitled for three times as high a child allowance as children of second and first parity. Child benefits for a first child have the lowest replacement rate among all social benefits in Estonia, constituting about 10% of minimum wage or subsistence benefit. The allowance for the first child in the family (18 euros per month) doubled in 2004, but nevertheless the effect of the benefit on the total income of the household is almost disappearing, forming about 7% of the average net wage.

According to the law, one parent of a child can maintain a job and enjoy various parental leave schemes until the child turns 3 years of age. There are essential differences in leave financing schemes from birth until the age of 3, however. Until the age of 70 days, only the mother is entitled to the leave. The leave allowance for this period is 100% of previous salary without any limitations. For the period of 70 days until a child is 1.5 years old, the father, but only one parent at time, can also take leave. The leave allowance is 100% from the previous salary with an upper ceiling for the highest earners and a lower ceiling for a parent without previous taxable income. For children who are 1.5–3 year old, one of the parents or some other person can take a leave with a very low fixed amount of allowance. The amount of this leave allowance is fixed at 38 euros per month per a child.

Starting in 2008, father are entitled to paternal leave for 10 days before or after the birth of a child with the leave allowance equal to average salary. There are several additional measures to protect parents against possible discrimination in the labour market. Parents of children are also entitled to additional 3-day paid leaves and 14-day non-paid leaves from their jobs. Parents with children less than 17 years old have an additional personal tax relief in the amount of the basic tax-exempt income per child.

Tax relief, maternal leave, and parental leave for the parents of a child 0–1.5 years old are the only income-related measures in Estonian family policy.

As an addition to state family benefits, a majority of local municipality governments allocate local family benefits. The most popular are local birth grants and school year start grants. They are paid in more than 80% of local municipality governments. The generosity of local family benefits depends on the resources of the local government on the one hand and local needs on the other hand, namely the wealthier municipalities tend to be more child friendly. On the other hand, municipalities with higher poverty also tend to allocate more additional benefits to families (Ainsaar and Soo, 2008).

The provision of education-related childcare for every child from age 1 to 7 is the responsibility of local municipality governments. The latest survey (Ainsaar and Soo, 2008) reveals, however, that only 60% of local governments can fulfil the requirement without delay. The rest of the municipality governments have waiting lists for places. About 70% of 1–6-year-old children were enrolled to day care activities in Estonia in 2007. The upper price for a child day care service is fixed by the law and is 20% of minimum salary, excluding the price for meals. The child day care provision is financed mainly from the resources of local municipalities (70–100% of total costs) and the contributions of parents. In 2008, the Estonian government allocated a special programme for municipalities to renovate and build additional day care places. Part of the programme resources goes directly to local governments to raise the salary of day care teachers and the quality of the day care environment.

CONCLUSIONS

Family policy has moved from the initial birth stage towards more mature and stratified solutions over the past 18 years in Estonia. While most eastern European countries stress higher fertility as the main aim of family policy (Ainsaar, 2002), Estonia adopted family welfare and the gender equality approach in 1999–2004. From 2004 however the pronatalist direction was adopted once again.

Neighbourhood and frequent contact with Scandinavian countries were essential factors in setting up the family policy system in Estonia. The current legislative framework of family policy consequently includes many principles from the Nordic welfare model: equal rights, universalism, and the central role of the state combined with the responsibility of local governments as service providers. Surprisingly, the influence of other international agencies was almost missing in Estonian family policy. Although the guidelines from the European Union about the employment of women and gender equity were relevant for family policy as well, they hardly shaped the actual policy process.

At the very initial stage of development, the main measures of family policy were related to the labour market. From 1993 to 2003, child benefits became the main policy tool. After the adoption of a “maternity salary” and tax relief in 2004, the role of labour market-related benefits became dominant once again. The real value of child benefits has been in decline since 1993 and only support for families with three or more children has preserved the importance. The other group receiving higher support from the government are single parents. Although Estonia has maintained the universal child

benefit system, income tax relief and income-related parental leaves have shifted the policy more in favour of higher income people.

Child and family policy seem to have an influence on fertility. The intensive rise of family benefits (parental leave benefits) and the general rise in wellbeing have probably encouraged the rise of fertility in 2004 and later. Poverty among 0–15-year-old children is fluctuating but has declined over the years. The share of transfers to poor families is declining, however. So, the slight rise of children out of poverty is a result of general fertility selectivity and the rise in general wealth, rather than public policy.

4. CASE STUDIES ON FAMILY CHANGES AND FAMILY POLICIES IN THE BALTICS

4.1. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN PARTNERSHIP AND CHILDBEARING PATTERNS: EARLY EVIDENCE FROM THE ESTONIAN GGS

4.1.1. INTRODUCTION

Demographic patterns have undergone major shifts over much of Europe since the turn of the 1990s. In many respects, the centre of gravity of these recent changes is in the countries that were sealed off by the Cold War. Following the disappearance of the “iron curtain”, the region has witnessed a swift transformation that involves interlinking changes in several domains, in particular with respect to partnership formation and childbearing. The numerous facets of this transformation include an abrupt decline in marriage and fertility rates, rapid postponement of parenthood, growing popularity of non-marital cohabitation, expansion of out-of-wedlock childbearing, etc. In a broader framework, the shifts in demographic behaviour have progressed in the context of the democratisation of the political system, (re)institution of the market economy, and concurrent ideational changes, with an array of implications for the lives of individuals.

Over the past decade or more, a rapidly growing volume of research has addressed the transformation of family and fertility patterns in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. comparative analyses by Dorbritz and Philipov, 2003; Kucera et al, 2000; Sobotka, 2004; Frejka, 2008). A majority of these comprehensive works have relied mainly on vital registration, while the contribution of survey statistics has been somewhat less conspicuous. Thus, the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) programme of the 1990s, coordinated by the United Nations Economic Commission of Europe, provided event history data on eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia). The FFS provided an in-depth account of the demographic regime during the last decades of state socialism in these countries, but due to the relatively short exposure¹, a detailed analysis of the emerging new patterns had to be postponed until a next round of comparative surveys.

The aim of the present study is to contribute to the aforementioned body of research by analysing family formation and fertility in Estonia based on a new national

¹ In the majority of Central and Eastern European countries, the FFS was completed by 1995 (Cliquet, 2002).

survey carried out in 2004/2005. In doing so, the study complements earlier analyses that drew their evidence from the FFS programme (e.g. Katus, 1997; 2000; Katus, Puur and Sakkeus, 2000, 2005, 2008a; Katus, Puur and Põldma, 2002; Katus et al, 2007; Kulu, 2005; Vikat, 1997). In doing so, the main goal of the study is to document the further advancement of the phenomena that are characteristic of the era of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987). The cohort perspective underlying the study allows one to place the recent changes in the context of longer trends. The added value of such an approach arises from the possibility to speculate about the role of contextual factors in bringing about the shifts in demographic behaviour.

The article is structured in four sections. Following the introduction, the second section briefly introduces the source of data and analytic approach. The third section presents the main results, addressing partnership formation, partnership dissolution, and childbearing. The concluding section provides a summary of the findings and a discussion.

4.1.2. DATA AND ANALYTIC APPROACH

The data for the present study come from a national survey carried out in the context of the Gender and Generations Survey. The programme is coordinated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

Like the FFS, the predecessor of the GGS, the survey builds on the life course approach. Under this approach, family and fertility behaviour are viewed as processes that evolve interdependently of each other and of other processes in the course of individuals' lives and are also shaped by contextual factors. In the GGS, the collection of retrospective life histories is complemented by its panel design. The prospective view allows it to incorporate a wide range of characteristics about the respondent and his/her family that cannot be obtained retrospectively with sufficient accuracy. This relates to subjective dimensions, including values and beliefs that cannot be measured retrospectively with any reliability because of *post hoc* rationalisation. Other characteristics that change quickly and are difficult to measure reliably include living arrangements, social networks, income, and assets. The panel design also allows the investigation of consequences of demographic behaviour in various other domains of life (UNECE, 2005; Vikat et al, 2007).

The programme of the Estonian survey is somewhat different than the general approach of the GGS. In the latter in particular, part of the life history modules were deliberately left to the second or third wave of the survey. In Estonia, the working group had no assurance about the feasibility of the follow-up waves, and so it was decided to pack all the life history modules (partnership formation and dissolution, childbearing, education, employment, residential mobility, and health) in a single questionnaire². The comparability with the FFS was a significant consideration in the design of these modules, and in most cases, the concepts and definitions are comparable between the two surveys. Compared to the GGS core questionnaire, the Estonian survey included

² This decision has proven correct in retrospect as it was not possible to implement a new wave of the survey within the recommended 3-year interval.

fewer questions on subjective items and the characteristics of the respondent and his/her family at the time of the survey (EKDK 2004).

For the survey, a national probability sample was drawn from the 2000 population census. The target population comprised of men and women born in 1924–1983, i.e. 20–79 years old at the beginning of 2004. The Estonian GGS opted for a proportionally larger sample for women. The selection of cases was performed using a one-stage random procedure, without preceding geographic clustering. The data collection started in September 2004 and was completed in late 2005. The interviewers were trained and supervised by the Estonian Interuniversity Population Research Centre. The interviews were conducted in two languages (Estonian or Russian), and as a rule, the interviewers were matched to the respondents according to the mother tongue of the latter. The average duration of the interview was 99 minutes.

Of the 11,197 eligible respondents sampled, 5,034 female respondents and 2,821 male respondents were interviewed. The overall response rate was 70.2 percent, with the response rate for women (73.4 percent) being somewhat higher than it was for males (65.9 percent). Across birth cohorts, response rates were lower in younger generations and increased towards older ones. The most common reasons for non-response were refusals (15.9 percent) and non-location (10.2 percent); all other reasons accounted for 3.7 percent of eligible respondents. Detailed information on the survey procedures, data quality, and results are available in the methodological report and volume of standard tabulations (EKDK, 2009).


This article presents the first results based on the female part of the survey. Following the practice of the FFS, the results refer to the native population (e.g. Katus, Puur and Põldma, 2002; Sobotka, 2004; UNECE, 2000). Such an analytic strategy is required because of the distinct demographic patterns among the native and foreign-origin populations that mirror the characteristic features of long-term population development in Estonia on the one hand, and the regions of the Russian Federation and other parts of the former Soviet Union on the other hand. Historically, the latter areas did not share the experience of the Western European marriage pattern (Hajnal, 1965; Sklar, 1974) and featured a noticeably later timing of demographic transition (Coale, Anderson and Härm, 1979; Coale, 1994; Katus, 1994). Although these facts relate to a rather distant past, analyses have shown that differences between the native and foreign origin populations persist (e.g. Katus, Puur and Sakkeus, 2002; Sakkeus, 2003). The relative size of the foreign-origin population, accounting at present for nearly 30 percent of the total population³, renders the measurements for the total population an aggregate of two rather divergent elements. Therefore, the patterns can be understood better through focusing on each subpopulation separately, and as mentioned above, the present article addresses the developments among the native population.

In the present study, we focus on the observation of the temporal changes in the intensity and timing of partnership formation, and childbearing. The analysis employs descriptive methods and applies 5-year birth cohorts as the main units. The GGS data

³ According to estimates based on the 2000 census, foreign-origin population accounted for 29.7 percent of the total population, with the first generation constituting 15.8 and the second and succeeding generations 13.9 percent [Puur and Rahnu, 2008].

permit us to trace the trends starting with the cohorts born in the late 1920s, but the main interest relates to the experience of younger generations who shaped the nuptial and fertility patterns in the 1990s and the early 2000s (Figure 4.1.1). Given the wide scope of the topics, the following sections paint the picture with a broad brush, leaving the elaboration of details for more specialised analyses to follow. The discussion of the driving forces underlying the observed changes is postponed until the concluding section of the article.

Figure 4.1.1. *Proportion of life course events that occurred after 1990
Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1944–83*



4.1.3. RESULTS

Partnership formation

The start of a first conjugal union can be regarded as one of the key events in the life course of individuals as this is usually the moment when young people become truly independent from their parents. Marriage traditionally signalled the onset of family formation since it was considered a prerequisite when people wanted to have an intimate relationship, live together, and have children. With the growing acceptance of non-marital cohabitation, however, the chain of events has transformed considerably, with increasing proportions of young people starting families outside marriage. Some of these unions are converted into marriage, particularly when couples have a child, while others may split up or continue for an extended duration. These trends have had far-reaching implications for demographic research since it is no longer sufficient to limit the analysis of family formation to marriage. The present study therefore applies a broader concept and focuses on the dynamics of partnerships.

Number of partnerships. Figure 4.1.2 presents an account of the intensity of union formation by means of the total number of partnerships⁴. The data reveal that

⁴ This measure could also be termed the total cohort partnership rate.

unlike many other repeatable events in the course of life, the number of partnerships appears relatively small. Although the data include marriages and consensual unions, the figure is still rather close to one partnership during a lifetime, which can be considered a prevailing norm in the Estonian GGS cohort range. On the average, women interviewed in the survey reported 1.17 partnerships over a lifetime. One-quarter of those who ever entered a union experienced a second partnership later in life and 4 percent progressed to a third partnership⁵.

Figure 4.1.2. Total partnership rate Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83




When comparing the older cohorts that had reached age 50 by the time of the survey, the average number of partnerships gradually increase. Among the native population, it rises from 1.15 partnerships in the 1924–28 birth cohort to 1.29 in the cohorts born in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the life course framework, this can be seen as an indication of the increasing diversity of family trajectories and living arrangements of the population. The main engine behind the observed trend is the increase in the rates of union dissolution, which constitutes a precondition for experiencing more than one partnership in a lifetime. In the 1924–28 birth cohort, 18 percent of women who ever entered a union experienced another partnership. In the cohorts born between the late 1940s and early 1970s, this proportion advances to the level of 28–30 percent. At the same time, the proportion of never-partnered women was low (5–6 percent) in the oldest cohorts, and it underwent only a minor change towards the younger generations. In the context of long-term nuptial trends, this confirms that the dissolution of the Western European marriage pattern was to a large extent complete already in the pre-GGS cohorts in Estonia.

The decline observed in the number of partnerships towards younger generations stems from the fact that these cohorts were less advanced in their family lives at the time

⁵ To this end, it is important to note that these average figures include the youngest respondents, only a small fraction of whom had been exposed to the risk of entering a higher-order partnership.

of data collection. To account for this, Figure 4.1.3 displays the age-cumulative number of partnerships that permits us to draw some conclusions before the process of partnership formation is complete. The data reveal a steady increase in the number of partnerships in the GGS cohort range, and although the gains vary from one cohort to another, a distinct upward trend can be followed at least until the generations born in the early 1970s. The curves for each successive cohort follow a higher trajectory, which allows us to predict that the lifetime number of partnerships will continue to grow in the foreseeable future and are likely to reach an average of 1.4–1.5 in today's younger generations, adding to the diversity of family careers and living arrangements among the population.

Figure 4.1.3. Age-cumulative partnership rate, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83



In the two youngest cohorts, the rise in the number of partnerships seems to have come to a halt. By ages 20 and 25, women born in 1974–78 reported more or less the same number of partnerships as their counterparts born in the early 1970s. At this point, it is perhaps important to emphasise that, notwithstanding the cessation of the upward trend, the GGS results for the youngest generations offer a strong contrast to the account based on marriage registration. As elsewhere in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, marriage rates downsurged in Estonia after the turn of the 1990s. The total first marriage rate for females, which had been fairly stable and close to 0.9 in the 1970s and 1980s, dropped to the level 0.38–0.39 in the matter of less than a decade (ESA, 2008). A moderate recovery in recent years (TFMR was 0.52 in 2007) is not necessarily linked to the rise in marriage intensity, but may rather be a consequence of the slowdown in the pace of marriage postponement. Against the observed retreat of marriage, however, the evidence from the GGS indicates no noticeable decline since the turn of the 1990s in the overall propensity to form partnerships.


Mode of partnership formation. The start of a union in a person's life may be either through marital union or non-marital cohabitation, which may or may not be converted into

marriage at a later stage. The first option represents a traditional pathway of partnership formation, whereas the other mode constitutes the hallmark of modern family initiation and reflects the growing acceptance of partner relations outside marriage. Compared to registered marriage, non-marital cohabitation has usually been regarded as a more flexible form of conjugal life, entailing fewer social and legal obligations for the partners involved (e.g. Hoem and Rennermalm, 1986; Manting, 1994; Mills, 2000).

Although the phenomenon of men and women living together outside marriage was not unknown in earlier times, it was usually socially and statistically less visible, limited to people who could not afford to marry, who were legally not entitled to marry, or who were opposed to church marriages on intellectual grounds (Trost, 1978; Gillis, 1985; Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1991). The form of cohabitation that has come to the fore since the late 1960s could be termed as nubile cohabitation, whereby young people, predominantly in their 20s and early 30s, live together, either as a prelude or a more permanent alternative to marriage. The spread of these new living arrangements began in Sweden and Denmark, followed by other Northern and Western European countries in the 1970s. Later the new trend spread to all parts of the continent, though the mode of partnership formation is currently rather heterogeneous in Europe.

The data presented in Figure 4.1.4 corroborate the previous findings from the FFS that in Estonia, direct marriage had already lost its overwhelming dominance in the earliest generations covered by the survey. In the cohorts born in 1924–38, direct marriage accounted for about 70 percent of the first unions, a proportion that remained fairly stable. Starting with the cohorts born in the 1940s who formed their first partnerships mainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, the proportion began to decrease rapidly, following an almost linear path. In the 1944–53 birth cohorts, it dropped below 50 percent, which means that for the first time ever consensual union had replaced direct marriage as the mainstream route to building a family.

Figure 4.1.4. *Mode of partnership formation, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83*



In the following generations, entry into first partnership through direct marriage has gradually become an exception rather than a rule. For example, in the 1974–78 cohort only

8.7 percent of women started their first conjugal union without preceding cohabitation. In other words, within the GGS cohort range, cohabitation has almost completely replaced marriage as a normative and socially accepted path of partnership formation.

Figure 4.1.4 also sheds some light on the way the described change has occurred. Until the 1949–53 birth cohort, the decrease in the proportion of direct marriage resulted almost entirely from the increase in cohabitation, followed by marriage. In the oldest GGS cohorts, the proportion of unions that started as cohabitation but were converted into marriage at a later stage accounted for more than one-fifth of first partnerships. In the 1949–53 cohort, the corresponding proportion had more than doubled. Starting with the cohorts born in the mid-1950s, the data reveal the beginning of an increase in the proportion of consensual unions that had not been transformed into marriage. From the cohorts born in the early 1960s onwards, the rise in the proportion of non-converted unions steeply accelerates, while the proportion of unions transformed into marriage turned to decline, heralding a new stage in the evolution of family patterns.

From the viewpoint of partnership career, these shifts signal a considerable extension in the duration of consensual unions. Among the native population, the trend towards greater durability started in the second half of the GGS cohort range. Prior to that, 50 percent of the first partnerships that started as consensual unions were either dissolved or converted into marriage within the 1st year, and by the end of the second year, the corresponding proportion accounted for nearly 70 percent. The youngest generations covered by the survey exhibit a markedly different pattern. Among women born in 1974–78, by contrast, 83 percent of consensual unions were still intact and not transformed into marriage by the end of the 1st year, and 54 percent “survived” at least 3 years.

Over a longer run, the observed tendency is expected to translate into a noticeable increase in the proportion of never-married women. Thus, the near universality of marriage—close to 90 percent of women entered marriage in older GGS cohorts—will evidently be replaced by a more diverse pattern, whereby a larger and gradually increasing fraction of women remains unmarried throughout their reproductive years. In the 1964–68 birth cohort, for example, 26 percent of women had never been married by the time of the survey; at that point they had passed the prime years of union formation and reached age of 35–39. As we will show in the following sections, these developments have been paralleled by growing acceptance of consensual unions as the context for childbearing and -rearing.


Timing of partnership formation. Estonia has historically belonged to the Western European marriage pattern (Hajnal, 1965). This pattern of relatively late marriage and high proportion of never marrying became established in Estonia in the 18th century. The family reconstitution studies based on parish registers from Estland and Livland by Heldur Palli indicate the mean age at first marriage at the levels of 24 years for females and 27 years for males towards the end of the 18th century (Palli, 1984, 1988).

An examination of the vital and census statistics for the interwar period shows that this pattern prevailed in the country until the Second World War. In the late 1930s, the mean age at first marriage was over 26 years for females and 29 years for males (RSKB 1937; 1940). The period of the Second World War marked a major break in the nuptial pattern that had prevailed in the areas west of the Hajnal line for about two centuries. The term *marriage boom* was used by contemporaries to emphasise the decrease in the age of marriage and rise in the proportion of those who would marry

during their childbearing years. The same developments were shared by Estonia, although the lack of reliable population statistics for the early post-war decades has prevented a detailed analysis of demographic trends for that period.

Turning to the evidence drawn from the GGS, Figure 4.1.5 presents the entry into first union formation, whether by marriage or non-marital cohabitation, by means of survivorship functions. The data reveal that there has been an extensive shift towards earlier union formation, which got underway already in the pre-GGS cohorts. Among the native population, the shift becomes clearly visible in the 1939–43 cohort, which displays a systematically higher cumulative percentage of women who started their first union throughout the prime years of union formation. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the aforementioned shift did not concern the ultimate proportion of ever-partnered. By age 50, about 95 percent of women had entered a conjugal union, a level that does not vary noticeably across older cohorts.

Figure 4.1.5. Timing of first partnership, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83



In the following generations, the trend towards earlier union formation continued. From the 1939–44 to 1969–73 birth cohorts, the percentage of women who started their first partnership by age 20 almost doubled: from 25 percent to 45 percent. These developments in the timing of union formation can be conveniently summarised by median age, which refers to the point where half of the cohort has experienced the event⁶. In the life course analysis, this measure has an advantage over mean age because it can also be calculated for these generations who have not yet completed family formation. Starting with the oldest cohort, 1924–28, the median age dropped from 23.5 years to 20.2 years among women born in 1969–73. Evidently, such an extensive shift in the timing is related to the general acceptance of non-marital cohabitation, which reduced the threshold for partnership formation (an overwhelming majority of partnerships that started before age 20 are consensual unions).

⁶ In the present study, the calculation procedure considers median as a midpoint where half of the cohort members who enter a partnership have experienced the event.

The two youngest cohorts, 1974–78 and 1979–83, have added important new features to the pattern of partnership formation. Below age 20, women in these generations have followed the pattern of the 1969–73 generation, with very intensive union formation at early stages of the process. Between ages 20 and 25, however, women in the 1974–78 generation have formed partnerships at a lower rate than their counterparts born in the early 1970s and 1960s. As a result, by age 25 the percentage of ever-partnered women in the 1974–78 cohort appears lower than that observed among women born in the late 1940s. The cessation of the long-term trend towards earlier partnership formation is also revealed by the average age at which the transition occurs. Compared to the 1969–73 generation, the median age at first union increased 0.2 years (from 20.2 to 20.4 years) in the 1974–78 birth cohort.

In a broader framework, the developments in the youngest generations could be regarded as a further step towards increasingly heterogeneous family trajectories. On the one hand, a noticeable part of women continue to form their first conjugal unions very early. On the other hand, there is evidence of an emerging postponement of partnership formation among the other part of women. Compared to the rise that can be observed in the age at marriage⁷, but the postponement of partnerships appears rather limited and should not be regarded as a far-reaching rejection of their formation.

Partnership dissolution

As regards partnership dissolution, the main development that has shaped the demographic scene during the post-war decades is the rise of divorce. Unlike today's low-prevalence and late marriage, high rates of divorce lack a precedent in the past. Historically the death of a spouse served as the main reason for the termination of married life. During the demographic transition, the gains from extension of life expectancy significantly reduced the risk of widowhood and contributed to the endurance of marital unions. The rise of divorce has implied the emergence and strengthening of a countervailing effect, although the durability of marital unions is still noticeably higher than it was in pre-modern demographic regime.

The dissolution of marital unions is documented in divorce statistics, which are commonly used to draw conclusions about changes in the stability of relations between couples. In recent decades however, the reliability of divorce statistics has been seriously challenged by the spread of consensual unions – the higher the prevalence of unmarried partnerships, the larger the proportion of *de facto* union dissolutions that go unreported in statistics⁸. Moreover, due to the higher risk of union dissolution characteristic of consensual unions, divorce statistics tend to underestimate rather than overstate the actual rate of partnership dissolution in contemporary societies (e.g. Andersson and Philipov, 2002). In this context, a


⁷ Female mean age at first marriage has increased from the level below 23 years in the early 1990s to 27 years in 2007 (ESA, 2008).

⁸ Even in the case of marital unions, partners may split up without registering the divorce, or they can register the divorce with considerable delay. The extent of such delay and non-registration can be assessed from the GGS. It appears that in 30 per cent of divorces the time lag between separation and divorce was more than a year, and in 13 per cent of cases the formal registration was delayed for at least 3 years. In addition, 11 per cent of broken marital unions were not registered at all (EKDK, 2008a).

particular merit of the GGS relates to its capacity to provide information on the dissolution of consensual unions as well as marriages.

Figure 4.1.6 presents the cumulative proportion of first partnerships dissolved through divorce/separation or death of a spouse, by years that have elapsed since the beginning of the union. In general, the data reveal a strong tendency towards higher rates of union dissolution in the GGS cohort range. In the figure, the oldest cohort, 1924–28, catches the eye for its remarkably high tempo of union dissolution in the early stage of family career. Among this generation, more than 10 percent of unions were dissolved during the first 5 years of conjugal life, a level that was exceeded only by women born a quarter of a century later. Evidently this peculiarity of the oldest cohort represents a period effect caused by the Sovietisation that was accomplished in Estonia by violent means in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the following generations, the curve of union dissolution shifted steadily upwards, reaching noticeably high levels. Among women born in the 1960s, about one-third of partnerships are dissolved during the first 10 years.

Figure 4.1.6. *Dissolution of first partnership, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83*



The experience of the three youngest cohorts reveals a continuation of the trend towards less stable unions. In the 1974–78 cohort, for instance, 20 percent of couples have split up before the end of their 3rd year of partnered life. It can be hypothesised that cohabiting unions, which have become increasingly common and less prone to conversion to marriage, have played a salient role in these shifts that have occurred among the younger generations. Indirectly, this assertion is supported by the fact that recent divorce statistics do not indicate any increase in rates of union dissolution. Leaving aside a short-term fluctuation around 1995 caused by the alteration in registration procedures, divorce statistics actually suggest a relative stability in divorce rates since the early 1980s (ESA, 2008). From the methodological point of view, this once again emphasises the centrality of survey data for analysing contemporary family patterns.


Fertility

Like in its predecessor FFS, fertility behaviour constitutes another area of central interest in the GGS programme. The survey collected information on childbearing histories that support the analysis of reproductive patterns in successive birth cohorts over the longer run. The present section explores in some detail the trends in completed fertility, parity distribution, and timing of childbearing and the changing connection between childbearing and marriage. The analysis of past trends is complemented with an examination of childbearing intentions among women who are currently at reproductive age.

Completed fertility. Cohort data have the advantage of reflecting the lifetime developments that are free from the distortions introduced into period measures by the changes in the tempo of childbearing. But at the same time, definite conclusions about lifetime fertility can be drawn only for the generations who have reached the end of their reproductive life span. In Estonia, like in other contemporary low-fertility countries, childbearing is almost completed by about age 40. Taking this into consideration, women born in 1924–53 had completed their fertility career and cohorts 1954–63 had also practically finished childbearing by the time of the GGS data collection.

For these cohorts, the data presented in Figure 4.1.7 corroborate the main findings of earlier studies (e.g. Katus, 1997, 2000). Among the native population, completed cohort fertility already fell below replacement in the cohorts born around the turn of the 20th century.

Figure 4.1.7. Completed cohort fertility, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–63



Unlike in almost any other country that had reached low fertility prior to the Second World War, however, there are no signs of fertility increase in the cohorts born in the 1920s and 1930s. In other trendsetter countries of the fertility transition, these generations carried the baby boom and brought fertility substantially above replacement for more than a decade, often up to the middle of the 1960s.⁹ In Estonia,

⁹ Among the forerunners of fertility transition, neighbouring Latvia also missed the baby boom (Frejka and Sardon, 2004).

women born in the 1920s and 1930s completed their reproductive careers with an average of 1.8–1.9 children. Underreplacement fertility in these generations translated into one of the lowest levels of period fertility observed in Europe, and hence in the world, between the late 1940s through the 1960s. This peculiarity of the fertility trend has been ascribed to societal discontinuity, which involved armed resistance, arrests, and deportations, in the immediate post-war decades, (Frejka and Sardon, 2004).

From the cohorts of the late 1920s to those born in the early 1960s, the total cohort fertility was gradually increasing. It rose from 1.8 children per woman in the 1929–33 cohort to replacement level in the cohorts born in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the European context, the GGS data confirm one of the most salient features of Estonian fertility: the stability of the fertility level during most of the 20th century, from the late 1920s, when it first dropped below replacement, until the turn of the 1990s. In terms of cohort measures, completed fertility has fluctuated within a relatively narrow interval of 1.8–2.1. In the GGS cohort range, the completed fertility level was somewhat lower for the older cohorts, 1924–43, and was highest for the 1954–63 cohorts.

Completed fertility, which is relatively close to replacement, is also sustained by the 1964–68 birth cohort. As women in this cohort were aged 35–39 at the time of the survey, the CTFR can be expected to slightly increase from the observed level of 1.97. Although it will almost surely fail to reach the level of the cohorts born in the 1950s and early 1960s, the completed fertility of women in the 1964–68 cohort will certainly exceed that of their counterparts born in the late 1920s and 1930s. For women born in the 1970s, it is too early to draw any definite conclusions about their completed fertility. Some speculations about their childbearing careers are offered in the last sections of the article.


Parity progression ratios. In the course of life, childbearing constitutes a sequential process whereby women move from one parity to the next. At the beginning of their reproductive career, childless women enter motherhood. In the following stage, some first-time mothers go on to have a second child, then some women with two children opt for a third child, etc. The examination of the probabilities of these moves, termed as parity progression ratios, can yield additional insight into levels of completed fertility and ultimate family size distribution of the generations.

In this section, parity progression ratios are analysed for transitions from childlessness to having a first child, from the first to a second child, and from the second to a third child. The four family size categories defining these parities—childless women, women with one child, women with two children, and women with three children—account for nearly 95 percent of women in the GGS cohort range. As in the previous section, Figure 4.1.8 presents parity progression ratios for the generations who have completed childbearing or who are very close to the end of their reproductive careers.

In general, against the background of the relative stability of fertility levels, the parity progression ratios disclose several shifts in the pattern of family building. To start with parity 0, the propensity to have a first child has increased considerably in the GGS generations. Thus, the percentage of childless women nearly halved, from the 14 per cent in the 1924–28 cohort to 7–8 percent in the cohorts born after the mid 1940s. In fact, the observed rise in the 0>1 parity progression ratio represents a closing stage of a longer trend

that relates to the disappearance of the Western European marriage pattern. It took start from the levels of childlessness as high as 25 percent in the pre-GGS cohorts who were born at the beginning of the 20th century (Katus, Puur and Põldma, 2002).

Figure 4.1.8. Parity progression ratios, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–63




The propensity to move from the first to a second child has also increased considerably in the GGS generations. Between the 1929–33 and 1959–63 birth cohorts, the 1>2 parity progression ratio rose from 71 to 80 percent. No smaller increase is characteristic of the progression from the second to a third birth. Following the decline in a couple of the oldest generations—this decline represents a tail-end of a longer downward trend that ensues from the demographic transition and reflects the spread of parity-specific family limitation—the probability of having a third child grew by ten percentage points, or in relative terms by about one-third from its lowest level in the 1934–38 birth cohort. Like the progression to a second birth, the 2>3 parity progression ratios peaked among women born at the turn of the 1960s. In these generations, more than two-fifths of women with two children went on to have a third child. Relatively high ratios of progression to second and third births are also revealed by the 1964–68 birth cohort—although declining, they were clearly higher than those characteristic of women born in the 1930s. For women born in the 1970s, again, it is too early to draw any definite conclusions about their progression towards higher parities.

To sum up, the examination of parity progression ratios allows us to conclude that the upward trend in completed fertility in the 1929–63 birth cohorts resulted from the cumulation of several concurrent shifts in parity progression. On the one hand, these cohorts experienced a decrease in the proportions of childless women and women with only one child. At the same time, there was an increase in the relative number of women with three children, and to some extent also for women at higher parities. The outcome of these shifts is mirrored in the ultimate parity distribution of these generations. Thus, for instance, among women born in 1959–63, about 7 percent remained childless, 18 percent had one child, 43 percent had two children, 22 percent had three children, and nearly 10 percent had four or more children.

Timing of childbearing. A salient feature of modern fertility patterns relates to the timing of childbearing. On the micro-level, the age at which young people enter parenthood tends to have lasting implications on their life course and interplay with other careers. On the macro-level, shifts towards earlier or later childbearing have increased their importance for the understanding of fertility patterns in contemporary settings where couples have universal and easy access to efficient methods of family planning. In such circumstances, the changes in the tempo of childbearing have been found to exert major influence on the fertility levels observed (e.g. Frejka and Sobotka, 2008; Philipov and Kohler, 2001; Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2002).

Figure 4.1.9 presents the trend in the timing of childbearing by means of survivorship functions for first births. The data reveal a prolonged shift in the timing of motherhood towards younger ages.

Figure 4.1.9. *Timing of first birth, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83*



This shift began in the pre-GGS cohorts and reflects the disappearance of the European marriage pattern discussed in the previous sections. With respect to the timing, the transformation of the nuptial pattern was accompanied by a marked rejuvenation in all reproductive events, ranging from sexual initiation to childbearing.

At the same time, however, the data reveal that the shift towards earlier childbearing is not evenly distributed across generations. Thus, in the three oldest birth cohorts, 1924–38, only minor changes occurred in the timing of motherhood. Among the native population, the median age at first birth fluctuated around 25 years, without any signs of a secular trend. In these cohorts, the changes were mainly concentrated in the later part of the reproductive life-span and relate to the decrease in ultimate childlessness. A temporary halt in the trend towards earlier motherhood in older GGS cohorts is corroborated by a recent analysis based on vital and census statistics (Katus, Puur and Sakkeus, 2009)¹⁰. It can be hypothesised that the delay observed in the

¹⁰ According to the cohort data from the 2000 census, the shift towards earlier motherhood stopped in the 1917 birth cohort and the mean age at first birth turned to slow increase for another 7–8 years until the 1925

rejuvenation of childbearing shares a common root with the absence of baby boom—the societal discontinuity associated with Sovietisation. It seems that this delay also accounts for the relatively high age at first birth among Estonian women compared to their counterparts in other regions in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s.

In contrast to their immediate predecessors, the generations born in the 1940s introduced a particularly large shift in the timing of motherhood. The median age at first birth dropped from 25 years among women in the 1934–38 birth cohort to 23 years in the 1944–48 cohort. Compared to others, in particular the Western nations that shared the experience of the European marriage pattern, the trend towards earlier parenthood continued noticeably longer in Estonia. Although gradually decelerating, the decrease in the median age at first birth can be traced well into the cohorts born in the early 1960s. In these generations, the median age at first birth reached the lowest point with 22.3 years. Quite likely, women in the 1959–63 birth cohort have experienced the earliest entry ever into motherhood since the formation of the European marriage pattern in the 18th century, with around 70 percent becoming mothers by age 25.

Women in the 1964–68 birth cohorts display a mixed pattern with respect to the timing of childbearing. These women were in the midst of their childbearing at the time when the societal transition started. As their counterparts in the preceding generations, they had started childbearing relatively early and by their mid 20s had already borne a considerable share of the children they were likely to have. However, the median age at first birth reveals no change compared to the previous cohort; at later stages of their reproductive career some women in the birth cohorts of the late 1960s adopted a postponement strategy that appears uncommon in previous generations. At the same time, it is important to note that ultimate childlessness was very little affected (an increase less than two percentage points).


A similar combination of an early start of childbearing and an emerging postponement is also characteristic of women born in 1969–73. In fact, at very early stages, until age 20–21, their fertility was even higher than that of any previous cohort. Compared to their counterparts born a decade earlier, however, starting from the age 22–23, the entry into motherhood gradually begins to slow down. The difference in the cumulative percentage with the 1959–63 cohort reached a maximum around age 29. At that point, the deficit of first births accounted for an average of -0.08. However, at later stages of their reproductive career, the gap described started to narrow, indicating a “catching up” with the preceding cohorts. By age 33 more than half of the deficit was recuperated, and if the GGS data had allowed us to trace the 1969–73 generation until age 40, we would probably witness a further, likely a near to complete, recuperation of the delayed first births.

Figure 4.1.10 indicates that a pronounced shift towards a later onset of childbearing came into being with the cohorts born in the mid 1970s. These generations were starting their reproductive careers after the turn of the 1990s and their behaviour differs significantly from that of their predecessors. Consequently, the 1974–78 birth cohort had noticeably fewer births when in their early twenties; by age 25, slightly less than half had entered motherhood and the median age at first birth rose to 24. Compared

birth cohort. Finally, it was not until women born in 1929 that the mean age at first birth dropped below the level achieved in the 1917 birth cohort.

to the 1959–63 cohort, the maximum first-birth deficit (-0.24) was reached at age 27. Following that age, the gap started to diminish, but censoring at the survey date does not allow us to conclusively determine to what extent the recuperation of the delayed first births will be ultimately achieved.

Figure 4.1.10. *Change in age-cumulative first birth rates, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1959–83*



Women born in 1979–83 are adding further delay to the onset of childbearing, but evidently the corresponding shift will be smaller than the break that was introduced by the 1974–78 cohort. From the perspective of the course of life, the postponement observed implies a “flattening” of the fertility schedules, bringing an end to the strong concentration of childbearing into a few age groups. In other words, the timing patterns are becoming more heterogeneous, reflecting an increasing diversity in childbearing strategies among the population.

Understandably, the postponement of first births exerts an influence on the timing of the subsequent stages of family formation. As the entry into motherhood occurs later in life, second and third births are also drifting towards higher ages. In addition, there seems to be an extension of birth intervals among the younger generations, which makes a further contribution to the postponement of childbearing. Regarding second births, the GGS data indicate that the trend towards shorter birth intervals, which started among women born in the early 1930s, has come to an end. The median duration of the second birth interval reached a minimum (34 months) among women born in 1959–63. In the 1969–73 birth cohort, the median duration has increased to 47 months.


At the time of data collection, the youngest GGS cohorts were still relatively too early in their reproductive careers to allow any conclusions to be drawn about their ultimate progression to second, not to mention third, births. Nonetheless, to cast some light on possible future trends with respect to higher parities, the section following the next one explores the childbearing intentions stated by women in these generations.

Disconnection of childbearing from marriage. Another conspicuous change in fertility patterns relates to the link between childbearing and marriage. Marriage as an

institution has been transformed significantly in the course of demographic transition, but the ordering of events in family formation—first marriage and after some time the first birth—did not change considerably up to the decades following the baby boom era. The latter period has witnessed a remarkable shift away from the unity of reproduction and marriage which until recently used to be the only socially accepted context for childbearing.

Combining life history data on both partnerships and fertility, Figure 4.1.11 provides hindsight on how this transformation has evolved since the birth cohorts of the 1920s. It focuses on the partnership status of the mother (and consequently father) at the birth of the first child and captures the bulk of diversity in the familial arrangements surrounding parenthood. In the oldest GGS generations, the data reveal a relatively strong concentration of childbearing in marital unions, with about four-fifths of first children born to married mothers. On the other hand, however, the level is very different from that observed on the eve of fertility transition, the proportion of extra-marital births among all births being around 2 percent in the late 18th century in Estonia (Palli 2004).

Figure 4.1.11. Partnership status at first birth, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83



Interestingly, against the background of a secular trend towards a wider spread in non-marital childbearing, the oldest GGS generations exhibit a moderate shift in the opposite direction; between the 1924–28 and 1934–38 birth cohorts, the proportion of marital first births increased from 78 to 82.6 percent, the latter being the highest level observed in the GGS generations. This increase is corroborated by vital statistics for the immediate post-war decades. It has been suggested that the temporary reversal in the long-term trend was caused by a gradual normalisation of living conditions for the population following the societal discontinuity of the 1940s and early 1950s (Katus and Puur 2006).

Starting from the 1934–38 birth cohort, the proportion of women in registered marriage at the time of first birth has continuously been declining, although the change in the generations of the 1940s is very small. In these generations however, there was a

major upward shift in the relative number of marital births preceded by a pre-marital conception¹¹. In the three oldest cohorts, the corresponding proportion appears relatively stable at the level of 30 per cent of all marital births, but then, among women born in 1944–48, the corresponding proportion rises to near 50 percent. It seems that in these generations pre-marital sexual relations spread rapidly, but on the other hand, the normative pressures were still strong enough to make the overwhelming majority of couples, with the female partner expecting a child, prefer to register their relationship.

Further, the clear signs of a different behavioural pattern start to emerge in the 1954–58 cohort. Among women who belong to this generation and who entered their peak childbearing years in the late 1970s, the proportion of marital first births begins a progressive decline, decreasing by about one-tenth with each successive 5-year birth cohort. It is important to note that the decline occurred notwithstanding the continued upward trend in the incidence of pre-marital conceptions. The proportion of the latter reached a maximum in the 1964–68 cohort, in which almost two-thirds of marriages can be labelled shotgun marriages, with brides pregnant at the time of registration. In a broader framework, this indicates a fundamental transformation in the relationship between marriage and childbearing. While traditionally marriage signalled the onset of family formation, in the younger GGS generations, pregnancy and the decision to have a baby have become the most important triggers to register a union.

In Estonia, the 1964–68 cohort appears to be the last generation among which marriage outweighed cohabitation as an alternative upon pregnancy. Among women born in 1964–68, who had their first births mainly in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, pre-maritally conceived marital births accounted for 38 percent of all first births, while births to cohabiting partners constituted 28 percent. In the following cohort, 1969–73, these proportions reversed, and for the first time ever in Estonia, a majority of first children were born to unwed mothers. In the two youngest GGS generations, the described majority has further strengthened, with less than 30 percent of first births being marital in the 1979–83 cohort¹². The reduced pressure to marry is also reflected in the proportion of children born from shotgun marriages among all marital births, which started decreasing in the 1964–68 cohort.

Childbearing outside marriage covers various family forms that have different implications for the economic position and well-being of the children. In this context, it is particularly important to make a distinction between children born in consensual unions and those born outside a stable partnership, the latter facing an enhanced risk of sub-standard living conditions (Heuveline, Timberlake and Furstenberg, 2003; Kiernan, 2004). The data provided in Figure 4.1.11 show that in the case of Estonia, the rise in non-marital childbearing is almost entirely attributable to the spread of cohabitation. The proportion of first children born to lone mothers has increased only slightly within the GGS cohort range¹³.

¹¹ Pre-marital conceptions are here defined as conceptions with childbirth following within the first seven months of a marriage.

¹² For the youngest cohort, 1979–83, the decrease is somewhat overstated because the data do not cover children born at higher ages. By the time of the survey, only 35 per cent of women had entered motherhood in that cohort.

¹³ In fact, the proportion of first births to lone mothers in the three youngest GGS generations appears lower than in the 1924–28 cohort.

Finally, the dynamics of the disconnection of childbearing from marriage can be illustrated by the proportion of non-marital conceptions. In the four oldest GGS generations, the corresponding proportion appeared to be rather stable, fluctuating at the levels of 42–45 percent. The break in this stability was introduced by women born in 1944–48. Leaving aside a couple of short-term plateaus associated with the 1949–53 and 1969–73 cohorts, the proportion of non-marital conceptions has climbed steadily upwards and reached a spectacular 88 percent among the youngest generation. Even though the latter number may be slightly exaggerated due to censoring, it confirms the virtually complete reversal in the ordering of family formation events.

Childbearing intentions and fertility prospects in the younger generations. The tradition of asking questions about future childbearing plans has a long and solid record in demographic research. Although the validity of such information has been debated, and most countries do not use fertility expectations explicitly in their population projections, questions concerning prospective fertility plans seem to be routine in all surveys addressing fertility and family issues. The Estonian GGS is no exception and in the survey, all women of reproductive age were asked whether they intended to have a(nother) child in the future. Alongside the definite answers “yes, certainly” and “no, certainly not”, the questionnaire included two intermediate categories, “yes, probably” and “no, probably not”. If the answer to the first question was not definitely negative, the respondents were asked about the number of (additional) children they expected to have and the age at which the first/next child was expected.


In the present study, the operationalisation of childbearing plans follows a relatively conservative approach. Responses concerning prospective childbearing were taken into account only if the respondent gave a definite positive answer (“yes, certainly”) to the question about the intention to have (more) children. If the respondent was uncertain about her/his intentions or answered negatively, the information about intended childbearing was ignored. Figure 4.1.12 presents the number of intended children for the GGS cohorts that belonged to reproductive age groups at the time of data collection. Understandably, the number of children expected is not directly comparable between the cohorts at different stages of their family careers. Young women in their early 20s are usually still childless or have just entered motherhood while older women in their late 30s and early 40s are often not inclined to have more children. In order to overcome this shortcoming, the number of children expected in the future and those already born were combined¹⁴. This manner of presentation also allows for a convenient comparison with earlier generations that have their childbearing careers completed.

By the time of the survey in 2004–2005, women born in the late 1950s and early 1960s had basically finished childbearing, and the number of ultimately expected children is almost entirely determined by the children already born. In the younger cohorts, this number consists of two components with an increasing contribution of the number of children expected in the future. It should however be noted that only in the youngest cohort of 1979–83 does the number of children expected in the future exceed the number of children already born. The highest number of children ultimately

¹⁴ The combined measure is also called *ultimately intended family size*, see Testa (2007)

expected can be found in the 1959–63 birth cohort, in which this figure amounts to 2.2 children. In younger cohorts, this number is declining somewhat but remains above the level of two children per woman. On average, women born in 1974–78 expect to have 2.04 children, while their counterparts in the 1979–83 birth cohort expressed a preference towards an even somewhat higher number.

Figure 4.1.12. Childbearing intentions, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1954–83



Of course, such relatively high levels of intended fertility should be regarded with reservation since numerous studies have documented a tendency of desired fertility often substantially exceeding the observed (period) fertility in post-transitional settings. On the micro-level, this discrepancy may be explained by unrealistic optimism at early stages of the course of life, which gradually decreases towards older age (Noack and Ostby, 2002). On the macro-level, the explanations have pointed to the postponement of childbearing (Bongaarts, 2001) or alternatively to the delayed adjustment of childbearing preferences to contemporary fertility levels (Goldstein, Lutz and Testa, 2003). Nonetheless, as the number of expected children is anchored to the specific life situation of an individual, it may be considered more realistic than the ideal family size, the latter reflecting primarily a normative context in which fertility intentions are formed and expressed (Hagewen and Morgan, 2005).

A further insight into childbearing plans can be obtained from the examination of the intended parity. The data, not shown here in detail, indicate that in the youngest GGS generations, only a small fraction of women (5–6 percent) look forward to remaining permanently childless. This percentage, which appears quite close to the levels actually observed among women born in the 1940s and 1950s, reveals the persistence of fairly strong norms against childlessness. By the same token, the preference towards the one-child model remains at the levels characteristic of previous generations (slightly below 20 percent). On the other hand, the two-child family model seems to be gaining somewhat greater popularity among the younger generations. Thus,

in the 1969–83 birth cohorts, 51–57 percent of women mentioned the two-child target, compared to 40–47 percent among women born in the 1950s and 1960s. The rise in the prevalence of the two-child model occurs at the expense of those women who prefer larger families. In the 1974–78 and 1979–83 birth cohorts, 23 and 20.5 percent of women expect to have three or more children respectively¹⁵. For the sake of comparison, in the 1959–63 cohort the actual share of women with three or more children accounted for 31.5 percent.

All in all, these findings suggest a noticeable continuity of fertility intentions across the GGS generations in Estonia¹⁶. Although the expectations reported in the survey are to a certain extent too optimistic to turn into reality, the observed intentions do not reveal any significant shift towards a greater acceptance of childlessness or a rising preference for one-child families in the younger GGS generations. Although Estonia does not have long data series on fertility intentions, a comparison with the FFS conducted in the mid-1990s provides some additional evidence about the relative stability of childbearing intentions over the past decade.

Alongside the GGS results, for the 1959–63, 1964–68 and 1969–73 birth cohorts Figure 4.1.12 presents the average number of intended children (already born plus expected) as they were reported in the FFS 10 years earlier. The data reveal that the two older cohorts out of the three have achieved their reproductive targets with great accuracy. In 1994, women born in 1959–63 intended to have on average 2.16 children. By the time of the GGS, the average number of children in the same cohort had reached 2.15. In the FFS, women in the 1964–68 cohort stated an intention to have 1.99 children on average, in 2004–05 their achieved parity amounted to 1.97.¹⁷

Compared to previous generations, the 1969–73 cohort demonstrates a different pattern. The comparison of the GGS and FFS reveals a certain decrease in the intended number of children, from 2.17 in 1994 to 2.09 in 2004–05. This reduction of family size intentions can be given different interpretations. On the one hand, it can be regarded as adjustment of intentions in response to various constraints encountered in the course of life. On the other hand, it could also be seen as a part of an emerging shift towards smaller family preferences (Goldstein, Lutz and Testa, 2003). Also, at the time of the interview in 2004–05, the 1969–73 birth cohort was relatively far from their reproductive target (2.17) stated in 1994 (their average parity achieved was 1.65).

One obvious reason behind the latter discrepancy relates to the fact that women born in 1969–73 had not yet completed their family formation. By the time of the GGS, the older members of the cohort had turned 35–36 while younger ones were still 30–31 years old. This translates into an average age of 33, at which the expectation for additional children is well justified. By analogy, women in the 1959–63 cohort, who had

¹⁵ In the calculation of intended parity distribution, we have rounded the answers “one or two children”, “two or three children”, etc downwards. This conservative approach to rounding is partly responsible for the decrease in the proportion of women intending to have large families. In the calculation of the average number of expected children, no rounding was applied (“one or two children” was interpreted as 1.5 children, “two or three children” as 2.5 children, etc).


¹⁶ A similar conclusion can be drawn from the ideal number of children representing norms endorsing fertility decisions (EKDK, 2008a).

¹⁷ It is interesting to note that this corroborates quite closely with the results of Quesnel-Vallee and Morgan (2003) who showed that the US 1959–60 cohorts realised their childbearing intentions almost exactly.

reached the same point in the course of their lives 10 years earlier, at the time of the FFS added on average 0.20 births to the later stages of their childbearing careers. A similar increment would take the completed fertility of the 1969–73 cohort to a level around 1.85.¹⁸ In light of progressive fertility postponement however, the increment expected at the later stages of their reproductive careers could be slightly greater than 0.20 births.

From a complementary angle, an insight into the fertility prospects of the youngest GGS generations can be gained from the observation of the age-cumulative number of children (Figure 4.1.13).

Figure 4.1.13. Age-cumulative fertility rate, Estonia, native population, female birth cohorts 1924–83



Indeed, the data that pertain to successive stages of reproductive careers reveal a gradual reduction in achieved parity towards younger generations. The decline started after the 1959–63 birth cohort, and compared to that cohort, women born in 1974–78 accumulated on average 0.36 births less at age 25. At age 30, the comparison between the 1959–63 and 1969–73 cohorts indicates a reduction by 0.30 births, of which 0.18 is attributable to the age interval 25–29. Put another way, if there were no postponement of childbearing, these reductions would add up to a decrease of completed fertility by more than 0.5 births in the youngest GGS generations. However, the observations based on period fertility rates show that in recent years the contribution of age groups 25–29 and 30–34 has exceeded that of the 20–24 year olds (ESA, 2008). Hence, with somewhat loose extrapolation, this would imply completed cohort fertility of the younger generations around 1.8–1.85, a level rather close to the estimate based on fertility intentions.

Finally, further evidence in support of the expectation above can be drawn from the experience of the older GGS cohorts, particularly those born in 1929–38. Compared to today's younger generations, women in these cohorts featured even lower fertility

¹⁸ This coincides closely with the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate calculated for the total population of Estonia in 2003–2005 (Frejka and Sobotka, 2008).

rates during their early and mid 20s but nevertheless completed their childbearing careers with 1.8–1.85 children. Of course, whether these arguments are valid and whether the aforementioned expectations will turn into reality or not depends on the extent to which childbearing postponement will be counterbalanced by birth recuperation in these generations.

4.1.4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this article, we addressed the recent partnership and childbearing patterns in Estonia, drawing on a national survey conducted in the context of the Gender and Generations programme. Unlike its predecessor, the Family and Fertility Survey, the new survey extends to the period of societal transformation that began with the demise of the state's socialist regime and symbolically came to an interim finish with the eastern enlargement of the European Union. The article sought to document the major shifts in demographic behaviour that have occurred in this timeframe within the context of longer trends, applying the cohort perspective and taking advantage of the newly available life history data. Although the results that are presented can be regarded as descriptive, they form an expedient addition to the evidence derived from the registration of vital events and contribute to the understanding of the recent demographic upheaval.

What facts has our analysis revealed? To start with, the findings underline the salience of the “postponement transition”, as conceptualised by Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002). On the macro-level, the rapid shift towards a later onset of childbearing indeed forms a key to understanding the lowest low period fertility that emerged in Estonia in the early to mid 1990s. On the micro-level, the shift in the timing of parenthood led to the diversification of family formation strategies and restructuring in the temporal patterns of the course of life, in particular in the early adulthood. No less importantly, the analysis revealed that the postponement transition is far from complete and further shifts towards later childbearing are in store for the generations born in the 1980s.

Further, with regard to partnership formation, unmarried cohabitation has almost entirely replaced marriage as a normative path towards partnership formation. Along the same lines, the younger GGS cohorts exhibit a close to complete disconnection of the entry into (first) parenthood and marriage. In the present structure of the course of life, cohabitation, either with or without children, offers a universally accepted alternative to marital union, and marriage usually finishes rather than starts the cycle of family formation.

At the same time, unlike they do for childbearing and marriage, the results do not indicate a major change in the propensity of partnership formation in the younger generations. Neither does the survey suggest a substantial rise in the proportion of individuals who eschew conjugal unions. With regards to the break-up of partnerships, the trend toward ever higher rates of partnership dissolution and possibly toward subsequent re-partnering has not yet reached a climax, adding further to the diversity of living arrangements. This offers an explicit contrast to the stabilisation of divorce rates reported in vital statistics and once again emphasises the centrality of survey data in documenting and analysing contemporary family dynamics.

Finally, a notable portion of uncertainty remains regarding future trends in completed fertility and generation replacement involving the youngest GGS cohorts born in the 1970s and early 1980s. Nonetheless, our analysis allows us to sketch a tentative outline of these trends. Although a gradual downward drift from replacement level is likely to occur, its scale is likely to be much smaller than indicated by period fertility rates in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The evidence drawn from childbearing intentions and age-cumulative fertility rates indicate that among the native population completed fertility may approach 1.80–1.85 in the generations born in the mid-1970s. This constitutes a considerable decline in comparison with the birth cohorts of the late 1950s and early 1960s, who had more than 2.1 children on average, but at the same time it appears on a par with the cohorts born in the late 1920s and 1930s. But understandably, as anything in the future, such an assertion depends on the extent to which the younger generations will recuperate their delayed births, particularly the second births, in their thirties.

What conclusion can we draw then based on these findings? First, the results favour the notion that the role of societal transformation in bringing about the changes in demographic behaviour varies considerably according to the process/characteristic process concerned. The noticeable synchronicity between the fall of the old regime and the *postponement transition* leaves little doubt about the existence of a direct link between the two phenomena. Among others, this is reflected in the delayed onset of fertility postponement in Estonia, as well as the other Baltic states, compared to ex-socialist countries in Central Europe¹⁹. On the other hand, however, the dynamics of partnership formation and dissolution has been much less influenced by the regime change. The shift from registered marriage to cohabitation accelerated during the 1990s but the experience of older cohorts shows that the corresponding shift got underway several decades earlier. And last but not least, the trend towards higher rates of union dissolution has remained almost unaltered by the turbulence of the 1990s.

Second, our results seem to challenge some rather widely accepted views about the driving forces behind the observed demographic changes. For instance, the spread of unmarried cohabitation in the legacy of state socialism can be hardly interpreted as a response to growing uncertainty that surrounds the transition to adulthood (e.g. Blossfeld et al, 2005) or perceived economic deprivation (e.g. Easterlin, 1976). In fact, the present study suggests that certain developments that are often related to the negative contextual influences could manifest themselves under rather stable and secure societal conditions. A similar case could be made for the salient role of efficient contraceptive methods, in particular the pill, the latter being regarded as a catalyst in paving the way towards reproduction that is only loosely linked to marriage (van de Kaa 1994). Evidently, these seeming contradictions could be explained by other factors at work, but delving into these issues would take us beyond the mainly descriptive purpose of the article.

¹⁹ According to vital statistics, in Estonia the mean age of mothers at first birth turned to continuous rise after 1992. The same year denotes the beginning of radical socio-economic reforms, introduction of national currency, re-orientation of trade flows, etc.

An essential merit of the GGS lies with its comparative perspective, but at the present stage comparisons over a broader range of countries are not yet feasible²⁰. Therefore, to place our findings in a broader context, a reference to other sources has to be made (Eurostat, 2008; Council of Europe, 2006). These recent compendia of international statistics corroborate the conclusions drawn earlier from the FFS (e.g. Macura and Klijzing, 1997; Prioux, 2006; Sobotka, 2004, Sobotka and Toulemon, 2008) about the advanced position of Estonia in terms of the spread of new family forms and the disconnection of childbearing from marriage. Thus, with respect to the proportion of non-marital births, since 2001 Estonia has been one of the top two nations in Europe, ranking second after Iceland²¹.

A relatively recent observation pertains to the country's ranking according to the level of fertility. Specifically, since 2005 Estonia has featured the highest period TFR among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the postponement of childbearing strongly in progress (the mean age of women at first birth has reached a mere 25.6 years), the TFR amounted to 1.64 children per woman in 2007²². In a broader framework, it seems quite conceivable that the country's position in the two aforementioned rankings is not a coincidence since it is well known that over the past decade or more in Europe higher fertility goes hand-in-hand with the retreat of marriage and diversity of living arrangements. A few years ago, with reference to the central and eastern parts of the continent, a similar scenario was envisaged by Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002). They noted the possibility "that those countries with the faster rate of transition in household structures will be the first to move to fertility recuperation ... and hence to be the first to recover to more acceptable levels of sub-replacement fertility". The evidence presented in this article for Estonia indicates that the latter assertion is close to becoming a fact of life.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The article has been prepared in the framework of research theme 0132703s05 by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Science and benefited from the support of the Estonian Science Foundation (grant no.7619).

²⁰ At the time of preparing this article, harmonised GGS datasets are available for six countries (Bulgaria, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary and Russia) from the UNECE.

²¹ In 2005–2007, the proportion of non-marital births exceeded 58 per cent in Estonia. The corresponding figure for the native population is estimated at 63 per cent, very close to that in Iceland (65 per cent in 2007).

²² The monthly vital registration reports indicate that the upward trend in TFR has continued through 2008.

4.2. RECONCILIATION OF WORK AND FAMILY LIFE IN LATVIA

INTRODUCTION

Women in Latvia have acquired or are pursuing higher or secondary education more often than men (Table 4.2.1). This raises their desire and possibilities to be active in professional work. A great number of women of reproductive age are engaged in the labour market, are developing and improving their professional skills and careers, and actively participating in public life.

*Table 4.2.1. Educational level of employed men and women in Latvia**

Level of education	Number of employed, thousands				Distribution, percentages			
	1995		2005		1995		2005	
	men	women	men	women	men	women	men	women
Total:	515.2	457.8	534.1	501.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
higher	81.6	98.9	96.0	146.5	15.8	21.6	18.0	29.2
secondary and vocational	344.4	302.3	345.2	308.4	66.9	66.1	64.7	61.4
primary	80.2	50.1	87.1	44.4	15.6	10.9	16.3	8.9
less	9.0	6.5	5.8	2.5	1.7	1.4	1.0	0.5

* Source: Labour force Survey in Latvia – acc. years yearly since 1995.

However, for numerous women with small children, mobility in the labour market and professional development are hindered by the inability to balance employment and child rearing. Limited availability of flexible working arrangements, lack of adequate child-care institutions, unequal distribution of family responsibilities, the family's financial situation, and other factors often force mothers with small children to choose between child rearing and a career or professional development. For this reason, their employment level is lower than that of men, especially in their twenties when most give birth to children (Table 4.2.2). Thus, qualified and often highly qualified labour is not used, and that is a senseless waste of funds invested in education. At the same time, it limits a family's income and accordingly the number of children, and the low birth rate hinders sustainable development in the future.

The best solution would be to provide families, especially women, an opportunity to combine employment, professional development, and child rearing. That would lead to an increased number of births, which, in turn, would facilitate the replacement of generations, provide an adequate, highly qualified labour force and efficient return of resources invested in education, and use skills and knowledge that are acquired.

Balancing work and family life, professional self-realisation, and raising several children, in particular caring for small children, are priorities in several EU countries and their relevant legislation, programmes, and concepts. The need for balance is stressed in EU legislative acts, the *Lisbon Strategy*, the *Framework Strategy for*

Equality between Women and Men, and the *Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men*. Balancing private and work life became particularly topical around 2000 because of the need to facilitate the replacement of generations and to avoid the insufficiency of labour resources caused by Europe's ageing population.

Table 4.2.2. *Employment in Latvia by sex and age**

Age group	Number of employed, thousands				Employment level, percentages			
	1995		2005		1995		2005	
	men	women	men	women	men	women	men	women
Total	515.2	457.8	534.1	501.8	61.5	48.8	62.9	52.0
15–24	75.5	48.8	70.1	47.1	44.2	29.5	38.2	26.7
25–34	140.7	115.4	132.7	110.2	76.1	65.1	82.1	69.2
35–44	131.0	136.0	134.9	135.1	77.1	75.2	84.0	80.5
45–54	101.7	117.4	116.2	128.3	73.0	72.0	78.9	76.3
55–64	57.6	32.4	62.1	67.0	44.6	19.0	55.9	45.1
65+	8.7	7.8	18.1	14.2	18.8	9.6	21.2	9.8
of all: 15–64	506.5	450.0	516.0	487.6	64.0	52.5	67.5	59.5

* *Source:* Labour Force Survey in Latvia—acc. years yearly since 1995.

The aim of the article is to analyse the actual possibility to combine employment and child rearing in Latvia and to discover inhabitants' desires regarding various possibilities set forth in numerous documents and surveys.

4.2.1. SOURCE OF DATA

Data and statistics about families with small children were obtained from research entitled *Gender Equality in the Labour Market*, which was conducted in 2006 within the framework of the National Labour Market Research Programme of the Ministry of Welfare as a project financed by European Structural Funds. Respondents were parents with children, one of whom was under 2 years of age. Stratified random sampling and personal interviews with mothers and fathers were used. Questionnaires were filled in by 600 families (600 women and 500 men).

The data were obtained also from the survey *Children and Quality of Life*, which was commissioned by the Strategic Analysis Committee and conducted in 2006 by the market and public opinion research centre SKDS. Stratified random sampling and personal interviews with persons from 15 to 54 years of age were used for data collection. Responses were received from 888 respondents. The questionnaire contained questions related to family support policy, child-care options, preferences, etc. A total of 190 respondents had children less than 6 years of age, 590 had at least one child, and 476 respondents lived together with children (*Children and Quality of Life*, 2006: 356).

For a more comprehensive analysis, data from the State Social Insurance Agency, as well as various regulatory documents, were used.

4.2.2. NATIONAL POSITION IN THE SPHERE OF CHILD CARE

The *National Lisbon Programme for 2005–2008* (Cabinet of Ministers Order No. 684., 19 October 2005) emphasises that one of the problems characteristic of Latvia's labour market is a higher unemployment level among persons after child-care leave, recently changed from 2 to 1.5 years. The solution to this problem lies in facilitating an inclusive labour market. The main planned measures for including these people in the labour market are the establishment of kindergartens and recreation and development centres, development of nanny services, establishment of day-care centres at places of employment, establishment of a unified information system about nanny services, organisation of events for increasing motivation, and more active involvement of men in child care (*National Lisbon Programme of Latvia*, 2005).

In 2002, an agreement was reached in Barcelona stating that by 2010 member states should ensure child-care facilities for at least 90% of children from three years old to school age, and for at least 33% of children less than three years of age (*Roadmap for Equality Between Women and Men for 2006–2010*, 2006:22). In Latvia no specific level of enrolment were proposed, though various documents propose to increase the availability of the network of child-care institutions and alternative child-care services in order to support families with children and to increase the birth rate (*National Lisbon Programme of Latvia*, 2005:41).

The action plan for implementing the National Family Policy 2004–2013 also contains specific measures for improving the child-care system in pre-school education institutions and elementary schools. The task set for 2004 was to establish eight playgrounds and development centres for short-term child care (up to four hours). Now it is planned as an annual event. In 2005, it was planned to improve the infrastructure of pre-school education institutions (10 institutions annually) and to continue this activity in subsequent years. In 2006, it was planned to establish a unified information system about nanny services in each administrative territory. In 2008, it is planned to develop methodological recommendations for legal entities that establish day-care centres for children in at least three workplaces annually (action plan for the National Family Policy 2004–2013).

However, these practical measures are being implemented too slowly. The unified information system about nanny services is still only a good intention. In September 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers reviewed the project of the Ministry of Economics about the reconstruction and renovation of existing pre-school education institutions and construction of new pre-school education institutions. However, even if all the measures proposed in the plan are implemented, the number of applicants to pre-school education institutions would decrease only by 39% (*Plan for Construction of New Pre-school Education Institutions*).

In recent years, the number of pre-school education institutions has remained virtually unchanged – namely 552 in 2001, 552 in 2002, 550 in 2003, 551 in 2004, and 553 in 2005. Only in 2006 did the number of these institutions increase by four and reach 557. New pre-school education institutions have been opened in towns; however, in rural areas their number has decreased by one. In 2006, there were 387 pre-school education institutions in towns and 170 in rural areas (*Statistical Yearbook of Latvia*, 2007:289).

According to statistical data, in 2006 pre-school education institutions were attended by 53.8% of children from one to six years of age (Fig. 4.2.1). Pre-school education institutions were attended by 84.6% of children from three to six years of age and 16.0% of children from 1 to 3 years of age (Children in Latvia. - yearly). Thus, in order to achieve in the remaining years the goals set in Barcelona, active measures should be taken to provide support for families with children in the youngest age group (under 3) by ensuring appropriate child care. It is not necessary for merely achieving the goals that have been set; it is necessary for improving the indicators that characterise the replacement of generations, which is needed for sustainable development, by facilitating the raising of the desired number of children in a majority of families.

Figure 4.2.1. Pre-school establishment enrollment




Table 4.2.3. Enrolment in pre-school facilities* by age, % in age group

Age	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
0	0.07	0.10	0.03	0.21	0.02
1	7.1	7.5	7.3	6.4	6.8
2	40.7	41.0	44.2	43.7	42.4
3	65.6	65.3	64.7	66.5	70.0
4	65.8	71.2	73.9	72.4	76.9
5	88.3	90.0	95.1	94.9	91.3
6	85.8	87.9	90.3	93.1	92.9
0-4	35.0	36.3	37.4	37.2	38.2
5-6	87.0	88.9	92.8	94.0	92.1

* including pre-school groups in schools and interest education.

Source: Children in Latvia. Riga: CSB – yearly.

In Latvia the demand for child-care services at a very early age has been recognized by the decision of the Constitutional Court (November 2005) that employed parents are entitled to a child-care allowance paid up to the child's first birthday. Of course, such an allowance is paid only if the parents wish to use such a possibility.

4.2.3. PARENTS' OPINIONS ABOUT CHILD CARE OPTIONS

In the survey *Children and Quality of Life*, respondents were asked about the importance of improved child care for small children (under 2) from the perspective of the national family support policy. A total of 86% of respondents believed that this measure is important. The significance of this measure was emphasised more by women than men. Of those respondents who would like to have another child in the next 3 years, 90% believe that improvement of care facilities for small children is essential. A total of 87.9% of respondents with children less than 6 years of age stressed the need to improve child care. This question is important to managers and housewives, as well as professionals and civil servants; it is topical for inhabitants of Riga and those living in the Latgale region, as well as those who are raising one child (*Children and Quality of Life*, 2006:348). (Question 17—*From the perspective of national family support policy, what is your assessment of the importance of the following measures?*—17.6. *Improvement of child care facilities for children under 2 years.* Choices: important; rather important; rather unimportant; unimportant; hard to tell).

This survey also included the following question: *To what extent does your desire to have another child in the following three years depend on the following factors?* These factors include the availability of child-care assistance (Question 13.8). Of the 10 available factors, child-care assistance was ranked eighth. However, that was due to the other mentioned factors: namely, financial situation, one's own and the partner's health, state benefits, presence of a partner, living conditions, and work. With regard to child-care assistance, for 17.7% of respondents it was hard to assess its importance. The distribution of answers shows that the majority of respondents regarded all factors as important. Answers fluctuated in the range between 63% and 48%. On average, availability of child care was important for 52.3% respondents (*Children and Quality of Life*, 2006:24, 242).

Respondents were asked to assess the availability of a pre-school centre or of a person who would take care of a child for certain hours when needed. Answers given by parents who have children under 6 (N = 190) revealed that pre-school centres are more available than a person who would take care of a child. A pre-school centre is available to 68.4% of respondents, while a person who could take care of a child is available to 54.5%. Respondents were surer about the availability of a pre-school centre—a child either attends it or does not—but regarding an individual person women more often than men believed that it would be possible to find such a person, although one in five respondents still did not know whether such a person would be available (Table 4.2.4).

Gender Equality in the Labour Market, a study funded by European Structural Funds, surveyed parents with small children under two years of age (N = 600). One of

the questions was on the availability of pre-school education institutions close to home. For parents with very small children, particularly under four months of age, it was hard to answer this question because they were probably not yet interested in the availability of a local pre-school centre.

Table 4.2.4. Availability of child-care assistance when needed, percentages
(Results of the survey conducted by SKDS in 2006,
N = 190 respondents with children under 6)

Respondents	Pre-school centre			Person who could care for a child for certain hours		
	Available	Not available	Hard to tell	Available	Not available	Hard to tell
On average	68.4	23.5	8.1	54.5	24.8	20.7
including:						
men	71.4	20.1	8.5	50.1	20.6	29.3
women	65.4	27.0	7.7	58.9	29.0	12.1
others living with children under six	67.7	24.9	7.5	55.8	25.1	19.1

Source: Results of a survey Children and Quality of Life, pp. 110, 114.

On average, 13.8% of parents did not know whether there was a vacancy for their child in a pre-school. A total of 20.3% of all families stated that it is possible for them to place a child less than 2 years of age in a pre-school education institution (response “there are groups, there are vacancies”). A total of 23.7% of families responded that there would be vacancies in pre-school education institutions for children more than 2 years of age. Vacancies in pre-school education institutions for children more than 3 were said to be available by 22.3% of families. The study revealed that lack of vacancies in pre-school education institutions is a topical problem, particularly for parents with children under 2 years of age. At the time of the study, pre-school education institutions were attended by 0.5% of children from one to 1.5 years of age, while 6.8% would have liked to have this option. A total of 15.1% of respondents’ children from 1.5 to 2 years of age attended such institutions, while 20.0% of parents would have liked to have this option (Table 4.2.5). The greatest demand for pre-school education institutions is in the area around Riga (*Gender Equality in the Labour Market*, 2006:249).

In the survey conducted by the market and public opinion research centre SKDS, respondents were asked about the most appropriate age at which a child could be turned over to caretakers (nanny, pre-school) so that a parent could return to work. Responses showed that the most appropriate age of a child for a mother to return to work is 1.5 to 3 years (*Children and Quality of Life*, 2006:324). A total of 90.8% of respondents believed that women should not work until a child is a year old (*Children and Quality of Life*, 2006:298).

Assessment of the availability of child-care services warrants the conclusion that they do not meet the demands of parents, especially parents with small children. In such a situation, one solution is the use of flexible working arrangements. For parents with small children, it is easier to balance professional activities with child rearing if they can

have special working arrangements: part-time work, flexible, or aggregate working time and distance work.

*Table 4.2.5. Actual kind of child care and that desired by parents, percentages in certain age groups**

Kind of care		Age groups, months					
carer	actual/desired	0-3	3-6	6-9	9-12	12-18	18-24
Mother	actual	96.6	94.8	91.4	86.2	76.1	69.2
	by women	93.5	91.2	83.6	77.5	66.0	62.2
	by men	92.5	90.2	85.0	77.2	68.2	64.1
Father	actual	10.3	11.5	14.2	14.8	16.1	17.0
	by women	13.7	16.8	19.5	20.7	20.7	20.5
	by men	8.9	9.6	14.2	18.5	20.4	19.7
Parents by change	actual	6.7	8.6	11.2	15.1	17.5	18.2
	by women	12.7	15.2	23.5	29.5	34.8	34.2
	by men	10.9	13.4	19.9	27.7	33.4	34.5
Grandparents	actual	11.8	15.2	20.6	23.5	29.7	31.8
	by women	8.0	11.7	17.5	23.3	32.3	35.8
	by men	5.7	7.5	11.6	19.1	26.1	29.2
Other family members	actual	1.2	1.7	3.0	3.9	5.4	5.8
	by women	1.5	1.8	3.5	4.7	5.7	7.2
	by men	0.4	0.8	1.8	3.3	4.9	6.7
Relatives, neighbours	actual	0.3	0.5	1.5	2.4	4.4	5.1
	by women			0.7	2.3	4.3	5.8
	by men			1.0	2.0	3.5	5.5
Nanny	actual	0.3	0.8	1.5	4.1	9.0	8.7
	by women	0.3	0.5	1.7	4.2	8.8	12.2
	by men	0.6	1.2	1.6	4.1	8.4	10.1
Child-care centre	actual	-	-	-	0.5	5.1	15.1
	by women				0.3	6.8	20.0
	by men				0.6	4.7	16.2
Other	actual	-	-	-	-	-	0.2
	by women					0.3	1.3
	by men	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.0


* several answers were allowed.

Source: *Gender Equality in the Labour Market*, from the national programme entitled Labour Market Research, part of the larger project entitled Research of the Ministry of Welfare, which was financed by European Structural Funds, No.VPD1/ESF/NVA/04/NP/3.1.5.1./0001/0003, Riga, 2006, p. 256. (in Latvian).

4.2.4. PARENTS' OPINIONS ABOUT FLEXIBLE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS


A survey of families with small children contained questions about actual and desired availability of various flexible working arrangements. In the majority of cases, the mother takes care of small children; therefore, flexible working arrangements are particularly topical for women. Women who return to work comparatively soon after the birth of a child often use such arrangements. Women who return to work after the birth of a child often take advantage of the options to choose part-time work or

Figure 4.2.2. Use of flexible working arrangements among women before and after the birth of a child, percentages in each group*



*Before the birth of a child, there were 411 working women; after the birth of a child there were 105.

Figure 4.2.3. Interest of mothers who have small children in using flexible working arrangements, proportion of the total number (N = 600)



flexible working hours (Figure 4.2.2). These working arrangements make it possible to combine employment and child rearing. Those specialists for whom it is feasible often opt for distance work.

The specific requirements of certain professions and spheres, as well as the indifference of employers, keep parents of small children from using a flexible working arrangement, particularly distance work.


In the survey of families with small children, parents were asked whether they would be interested in using any of the flexible working arrangements. Mothers with small children responded that they would prefer to have a part-time job (42.3%). Flexible working hours would be used by 37.8% mothers, while distance work would be chosen by 31.3% of women (Figure 4.2.3). Distance work is more attractive to younger women, particularly those under 20 years of age.

It is not possible in all professions to work off site. More specific answers regarding certain types of flexible working arrangements were given by women who had already returned to work; for others it was hard to answer this question because of the lack of experience. However, use of flexible working arrangements would allow women, specifically those with small children, to combine work and private life, as well as child rearing.

4.2.5. INVOLVEMENT OF FATHERS IN CHILD CARE

Another way to facilitate balancing mothers' employment and child rearing is to urge more active involvement of fathers in child care, especially if both parents are employed. The Social Benefit Law and the Cabinet of Ministers Regulations set forth the possibility for fathers to be actively involved in caring for small children. Child-care leave can now be used by either parent. Furthermore, fathers have the right to take 10-day paternity leave after receiving the paternity benefit. So far fathers have used child-care leave comparatively rarely, and no statistical data are available on the frequency. At the same time, the number of fathers who use the paternity leave (Figure 4.2.4) and the average amount of the benefit (Table 4.2.6) is increasing annually.

Figure 4.2.4. Number of fathers who received paternity benefit in Latvia from 2004 to 2007 (distribution by month)



Source: Number of Pensions (Benefits) per Month [web page www.vsaalv.lv; viewed on 7 February 2008].

Table 4.2.6. Number and average amount of paternity benefits allocated

Indicator	2004	2005	2006	2007
Average number of cases	377	458	550	678
Average amount, LVL	77.47	83.98	103.57	131.93
Beneficiaries, % of newborns	22.2%	25.6%	29.6%	...

Source: Calculation made on the basis of data provided by the State Social Insurance Agency [12, 13].

The survey of parents with small children included questions on parents', particularly fathers', awareness of the options provided by legislation. Approximately one-fifth of the surveyed fathers were not aware of the option to take paternity leave. Fathers from 26 to 30 years of age, fathers with higher education, fathers who had several children, and fathers who had children from 5 to 12 months of age were the best informed.

Paternity leave was used by 38.4% of fathers who participated in the survey for families with small children; child-care leave was used by only 4.4% of fathers (22 of the surveyed fathers). Fathers often use paternity leave, but they seldom use child-care leave.

According to the survey data, only a small part of fathers would be willing to use child-care leave. To the question about whether fathers would consider using child-care leave, 59.5% of fathers would definitely not use or probably not use this option, and 12.1% of fathers were uncertain. Only 8.2% of fathers would definitely be willing to use child-care leave, and 20.3% would probably take advantage of that option.

However, there are considerable possibilities to increase the number of fathers who take child-care leave. Fathers were asked what reasons or conditions would cause them to use child-care leave. Only 3.2% of fathers answered that no conditions could cause them to use this leave. Most sceptical were men under 20 and over 40, as well as those who had only primary education. Of those fathers who had higher education, no one said that there is no reason that they would not take child-care leave under any circumstances.

Use of this leave is mainly (in 66.0% of cases) related to extreme need, namely, the mother's work or health prevents her from taking child-care leave. A significant factor is work; when asked whether they would take child-care leave if the father had problems finding a job or if the wife had lost her job, 27% of men gave an affirmative answer.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to facilitate the ability of people, women in particular, to combine work and family life, it is essential to pay attention to all of the aforementioned aspects – namely, improvement of child-care facilities, the option of using flexible working arrangements, and increased involvement of men. The involvement of men is gradually increasing. There is a demand for flexible working arrangements, but that cannot be used in all professions and spheres. At present, increased attention should be paid to making child-care facilities more available. That would facilitate the use of labour resources and improve the generation replacement indicators in the near future. If parents can combine employment with child rearing, the likelihood that more and more families will raise two or three children and thus ensure the replacement of generations and the sustainability of society increases.

4.3. “DOING A FAMILY”: THE CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILY RELATIONS IN LITHUANIAN TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES

INTRODUCTION

Lithuania entered the age of transnational migration at the beginning of the 1990s and joined the countries sending migrants. Along with a small fraction of highly skilled mobile elites, the majority of Lithuanian transnational migrants are semi-skilled workers. They occupy the bottom positions in the production and service sphere of the first world host countries. Lithuanian females supply a labour force for global care chains (Hochschild, 2003), stepping into first world families and taking care of children, the elderly, household duties, and the other activities involved with “reproductive work”¹ (Parreñas, 2001b: 61).

The flows of Lithuanian transnational migration intensified in the beginning of the 21st century after the country joined the EU and took the advantages of free labour movement². The United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Germany³ became top destinations with the well established networks of Lithuanian migration. Besides the new destinations, the United States, the country with a deep historically rooted Lithuanian Diaspora, remained on the priority list of the migrant community. In the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, transnational migration became a widely accepted household strategy motivated by the material and social demands of the Lithuanian population unprivileged by the discrepancies of social and economic transition.

One social outcome of the process of contemporary international labour migration is the formation of the transnational family⁴. This type of family is completely new for Lithuanian society. The transnational family is distinguished by a family structure that crosses national borders, when one or several family members are spread out across nation states for some or most of the time and “yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely ‘familyhood’” (Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002: 3).

¹ By referring to reproductive work, I rely on the concept developed by Parreñas (Parreñas 2001b). She stated that reproductive labour sustains the productive labour force. Reproductive labour encompasses child-rearing and household duties.

² Despite the shortage of official statistics, the estimated numbers of migrants in Lithuania in the years 2001–2007 reached 1.952 million persons (declared and undeclared migration) (International migration 2008: 8). Lithuania’s net migration per 1000 inhabitants in 2007 was the highest in the EU (-1.5) and was three times higher than Poland’s (-0.5) and five times higher than Latvia’s (-0.3) (ibid: 7).

³ Thirty-three percent of Lithuanian migrants left for the UK, 16 percent for Ireland, 8 percent for Germany, 4 percent for Spain, 3 percent for Denmark, 11 percent for the U.S.A., 7 percent for Russia and 5 percent for Belarus (International Migration of Lithuanian Population, 2008: 9).

⁴ It is estimated that approximately half of the men and women over 18 who emigrated in 2006 were married (Lithuanian Population, 2007:11). Almost the same number had children, but only every second emigrated together with a child/children (ibid, 2007:12).

The formation and functioning of this type of family is well documented in various studies about countries sending migrants: the Philippines and Mexico and other Latin American countries (Kofman, 2004). Nevertheless, the exploration of this phenomenon in the countries of Eastern Europe is very limited, even though some of the countries of this region are highly affected by the process of transnational migration¹. Thus one of the aims of this article is to add to the development of knowledge about the Eastern European transnational family by researching and presenting the Lithuanian case.

In this article, I am interested in the practices, experiences and emotions that help the members of transnational families “do family” (Orellana, Thorne, Chee, Lam, 2001: 585). The main focus of the article is the exploration of partnership and parental relations that have to transgress the limits posed by the spatial separation of the family. How is the partnership transformed in the transnational space and how are these changes perceived? What are the communicative practices that help family to stay connected and maintain the partnership and child-parent relations? What are the outcomes of transnational living for child-parent relations? How are these outcomes perceived by parents? Moreover, is it possible to disclose the specifics and uniformity of the Lithuanian transnational family experiences by comparing them to the transnational families from the countries that are traditionally the source of migrants?

To answer these questions, I will take into account both perspectives: the one of migrant family members and the one of the ones left behind. Most data comes from two sources: a qualitative study involving transnational migrants in the UK and Ireland and the members of the transnational families left behind, and a quantitative survey of family members left in Lithuania.

The article is organized into five sections. It opens with a brief discussion about the concept of the transnational family and follows into a review of the relevant findings on partnership and child-parent relations in the transnational family. The following section is dedicated to the methodological description of the research and the sample. In the next section, I present the results of the study and discuss the relations between couples in the transnational family. The section opens with an analysis of the perceived quality of the partnership and the factors affecting it and continues with an examination of the social meanings the partners attach to the transformation of the partnership. The next section is dedicated to an analysis of transnational childhood and discusses the emotional strains on the children left behind, the coping strategies developed by children and parents, and reported behavioural changes.

4.3.1. TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES

As was stated, a transnational family is a family dispersed across national borders and yet upholding the sense of family as a collective unit (Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002; Parreñas, 2001a; Parreñas, 2001b; Parreñas, 2005a; Dreby, 2006; Dreby, 2007). These two foundational features constitute the structural, social and cultural conditions of the transnational family. In this type of family, some family members live in the home

¹ There are several studies that cover the issue of elderly care and intergenerational grandparents-grandchildren relations in post-communist European societies (see King, Vullnetari, 2009; Zechner, 2005; Nesteruk, Marks, 2008).

country and the others live in the host country. The sense of belonging of family members not living in the same domestic household is socially reproduced by the various communicative practices of family members. The exchange of material goods, information, emotions, values and care flows over national borders, constitutes the net of familial relationships, and secures the fulfilment of family functions in the transnational space. On the cultural level, the family practices accumulate the resources of the two national socio-cultural contexts in which the family members participate and are transmitted within the transnational space.

An important feature of the transnational family is the fluidity of family structure, family functions, and family relations. This requires the family members to adapt and generate the meanings and practices that help them sustain “familyhood”. The process is conceptualized in literature as “relativizing” and refers to the “variety of ways individuals establish, maintain or curtail relational ties with specific family members” (Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002: 14). Members of transnational families in their everyday life have to re-define the meanings attached to the social practices that maintain family relations. They have to re-construct the understanding of care, intimacy, closeness, family identity, family success, and the roles of mother, father or child as their family life flows in the transnational space with the family members separated by spatial, social and cultural divisions. Hence to “do family” demands more deliberate efforts from the members of the transnational family.

Various research results that we will discuss in more detail in the next section prove that the migrant members of transnational families are not abandoning or neglecting the other members of their family. They fulfil their responsibilities and obligations, care for children and the elderly, share feelings and nourish their attachment to family members despite the distance that spatially separates them. Thus, the transnational family challenges the understanding of the family based on the family as a domestic group (Sørensen, 2005).

There are several structural conditions that define the formation and functioning of the transnational family. On the general level, the global inequalities of the market economy regulate the process of international labour migration and the formation of the transnational family. An important additional factor in this process should be attributed to the transnational female migration that is caused by gender restructuring in the labour market in first world societies. As more women of this world entered the professional market, more family carers were needed. The demand for reproductive labour has been fulfilled by migrant women from poorer parts of the world. The under-valued and under-paid care work is taken by them and respectively their family care work back home is assigned to other poorer local women. This global mechanism of care transfer is denoted in the literature as “global care chains” (Hochschild, 2003) or “international transfer of caretaking” (Parreñas, 2001).

The functioning of the transnational family is marked by sustained close bonds with the home country (Lewitt, Glick-Schiller, 2004; Lewitt, De Wind, Vertovec, 2003; Vertovec, 2004). The “suppression of space and time” (Harvey 1989:240 in Parreñas 2005a) enabled by modern technologies and expanding travel industry constitutes the functioning mode of the transnational family. Compared to previous generations of international labour migrants, contemporary migrants have opportunities to share their

feelings and experiences in real time using the internet and cellular telephones, to sent money transfers within minutes, to capitalize on the competition in the travel industry, and to reach their homes for affordable prices more often. Yet, as Parreñas (Parreñas, 2005a: 318) reminds us, transnational communication “is not a uniform condition, but a varied process shaped by class and gender”.

Moreover, the transnational bonds are shaped by the cyclical nature of the economic development in the host and home countries (Lewitt, DeWind, Vertovec, 2003). The economic survival strategy of transnational migrants is to manoeuvre across the countries in a time of economic ups and downs. Relatively secure jobs are the privilege of highly skilled workers, and the majority of the transnational migrants are semi-skilled workers. Additionally, the transnational bonds are promoted by the political powers of home countries as political elites acknowledge the demographic challenges posed by emigration or the country’s dependency on the remittances of migrants (Lewitt, DeWind, Vertovec, 2003).

4.3.2. PARTNERSHIP AND PARENTING IN THE TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY

The transnational family appeared on the research agenda with the discovery of the feminization of contemporary migration (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997; Parreñas, 2001a; Parreñas, 2001b; Sørensen, 2005) and with the formation of new perspectives in migration studies. The overcoming of the economic approach in migration studies, which neglected the role of the family (Kofman, 2004), was an important impulse that catalyzed the study of transnational families. But even if the inquiry into the transnational family is flourishing in US scholarship, Europe is lagging behind (Kofman, 2004). Several authors points to the lack of studies about transnational families (Lewitt, Glick Schiller, 2004; Chamberlain, Leydesdorff, 2004).

The existing body of research includes several thematic lines: transnational motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood; the role of the grandparents and wider kin in transnational families; and care for the elderly. Most attention in the research is given to the transformation of intergenerational child-parent relations, and relatively less documented are the changes in the relations of couples. I will review in more detail findings that concern the main research questions and cover the issues of partnership and child-parent relations.

The effect migration has on couples is mostly associated with the prevailing gender ideology. It is documented that male migration corresponds with the traditional male-breadwinner role model and has no or very limited negative effect on a couple’s relations (Pribilsky, 2004; Sørensen, 2005; Zontini, 2007). Male migration eases the family strains brought by limited opportunities to fulfil the breadwinner role in the home country. Research shows that couples adapt to the changed family structure, and there is some evidence of improvement in the relationship of couples (Pribilsky, 2004). An inverse effect is however observed in couples with migrant women. The adaptation of the family members to the absence of the mother is more painful, and the shift from the mother-carer role to mother-breadwinner role in the family structure introduces pressure that is difficult to resolve. Parreñas demonstrated that in the Philippines in transnational families with a migrant mother the role of the nurturer and carer is not assumed by the

father but transmitted to other women who are kin or from outside the family (Parreñas 2005a). Moreover, female migration can be an exit strategy employed by women in order to change a couple's abusive or destructive relationship (Zontini, 2002; Sørensen, 2005)

Various means of communication serve as the main tool for maintaining family relations. Phone calls, SMS messages, e-mails, Skype, MSN, and other internet-supported conversations constitute the base for the "doing of family" and constructing of transnational intimacy (Wilding 2006). Previous research demonstrates the defining role of class and gender in shaping the opportunities of the transnational families to nourish care, attachment and intimacy (Parreñas, 2005a). The lack of material resources in working class families and underdeveloped IT infrastructure limits the opportunities for family members to maintain family relations. On the other hand, the gender of the migrant parent determines the mode and content of transnational communication.

The pioneering study by Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997) opened the discourse on transnational motherhood that was further expanded by Parreñas (Parreñas, 2001a, 2001b, 2005a, 2005b) and others (Asis, Huang, Yeoh, 2004; Zontini, 2004; Sørensen, 2005; Dreby, 2006; Boehm, 2008; Horton, 2009; Fresnoza-Flot, 2009). These studies focus on the transformed social meanings of motherhood produced by migrant mothers in order to accomplish their motherhood. Transnational mothers experience the dissonance between internalized beliefs about motherhood and their everyday life experience. Migrant mothers have to cope with the emotional strain brought to them by this discrepancy. The "commodification of love" becomes one of the leading strategies developed by migrant mothers to substitute for their absence from their children. As Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila pointed out, "milk, shoes, and schooling — these are the currency of transnational motherhood" (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997 : 548). The other strategies include the repression of emotional strains and the rationalization of distance (Parreñas, 2001a). Yet the replacement of the social meanings of motherhood and attempts to re-organize the practices of motherhood have only a limited effect on the emotional well-being of transnational mothers. The emotional pain imposed by the absence from children becomes an imminent marker of the everyday life of migrant mothers.

Only recently studies on transnational fatherhood have been added to the discourse about the transnational family (Pribilsky, 2004; Dreby, 2006). Research shows that the gendered meanings of motherhood and fatherhood are maintained in the transnational space despite the similarity of the parenting practices of mothers and fathers. Mothers still demonstrate their emotional intimacy from a distance, and fathers embody their fatherhood in their economic success as migrant workers (Dreby, 2006).

There is wide agreement in the literature that children are the worst affected members of the transnational families. Studies show that family members are able to cope with the family separation, but for the children "longing for and resentment of the absent parent(s) however, often does not disappear" (Asis, Huang, Yeoh, 2004). Children with migrant mothers suffer more than children with migrant fathers (Parreñas, 2005b). Research based on in-depth interviews with children left behind proves that children experience a lack of intimacy with their migrant parent (Parreñas, 2005 a, 2005b). There is some evidence that these children demonstrate higher levels of depression than those who migrate together with their parents (Suarez-Orozco,

Todorova & Louie, 2002). Other findings suggest that these kids are the most aggressive and violent if they participate in youth gangs (Smith, 2006). There are rather mixed findings about the effect the migration of parents has on the scholastic achievements of children. Dreby concludes that children with parents abroad do better in school, but on the other hand they demonstrate lower aspirations than children from families with both parents present (Dreby, 2007). Asis, Huang and Yeaoh point out that children left by a migrant mother have more difficulties in school and with social adjustment than children with a migrant father (Asis, Huang and Yeaoh, 2004).

Children of transnational families have to cope with the dual nature of their position in the child-parent relationship. Dreby articulates this as the concurrently powerful and powerless position of children in transnational families (Dreby, 2007). Being left behind gives the children more power to demand rewards from parents for disadvantages they experience in this situation. These children might acquire more power fulfilling the roles of adults as partially organizing material resources, looking after their younger siblings, or fulfilling other familial roles of absent parents. On the other hand, they are powerless because their role in the migratory decisions of the family is very limited. They might feel abandoned and neglected and believe that no one cares about their needs or deeds. Coping with this, they develop several strategies that define their relations with their parents: feigning indifference, not deference to parental authority, behavioural difficulties, or bad behaviour in the school (Dreby, 2007). Along with this, the child-parent relations in transnational families are marked by several conflicts (Parreñas, 2001a, 2005a, 2005b). The first conflict arises from the generational gap in the understanding of “commodities as sufficient markers of love”. Children do not share this view with their migrant mothers. Moreover, they think that parents undervalue and do not fully understand the disadvantages of transnational childhood and do not appreciate the efforts of children to maintain the family. Finally, they do not believe that the care provided by their parents is sufficient. (Parreñas, 2001a, 2005).

4.3.3. METHODOLOGY

This article is based on a larger study about the causes and outcomes of migration for the Lithuanian family. The study “Gender aspects of migrant family separation: case study of Lithuanian labor migrants” was commissioned by the International Organization of Migration, Vilnius Office and carried out in 2007¹.

The design of the study included a qualitative and quantitative survey on transnational families in Lithuania, as well as case-studies with migrant members of transnational families in three foreign countries (the UK, Ireland and Belgium). The sampling unit for the quantitative survey was defined as a family consisting of both parents and children, with one parent temporarily away². The procedure of nationally

¹ The study was financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and carried out at the Institute for Social Research, Lithuania by the team of my colleagues (V. Stankuniene, M. Gedvilaite, I. Knyvaite, J. Ramanauskienė, and I. Mikšytė) and supervised by the author.

² A member of a household was considered to be a migrant if he/she was in the host country for the last 6 months.

representative multistage stratified sampling was applied; sample size included 309 fathers/mothers of transnational families. The respondents were interviewed with a questionnaire covering a wide range of themes, i.e. the social and economic resources of the family before the migration, linkage of the family members to networks of migration, attitudes towards migration, the transformation of the household and child-care roles, satisfaction with the quality of the partnership before and during the migration, the effects of transnational living on children's behaviour and emotional well-being, material rewards from migration and changes in families spending, and family reunification projects. Several themes covered the issues of transnational communication and the living and work conditions of the migrant family member.

The measurements of the quantitative study relevant to this article are partnership satisfaction and reported changes in a child's behaviour and emotional well-being. Partnership satisfaction was measured with an 11-point scale and respondents were asked to evaluate their partnership quality before and after the migration (highest points attributed to the highest evaluation of partnership quality). The child's well-being was measured with a 13-item scale that registered the manifestation of the child's emotional, cognitive and behavioural changes reported by parents. Several independent variables were used for the analysis: the gender of the migrant parent, duration of the partnership, age and number of children, frequency of contacts with the migrant family member, frequency and duration of home visits by the migrant family member, and parental educational attainment.

The quantitative survey of the study included 19 case studies. Six case studies were carried out in Lithuania; three each in the UK, Ireland, and Belgium; and four interviews with experts in Lithuania and the U.S.A. All interviews in Lithuania were conducted with the married women who have their husbands working abroad. The age of respondents varied from 34 to 37, they were living in small towns or rural areas, and one of them had a university degree, three had a college education, and two had vocational training. Five families were raising two children (the majority of them are school-aged teenagers) and one family was raising one teenage child. The group of transnational family members living in the host countries consisted of five females and four males (all male cases were highly skilled migrants and therefore will be not discussed further in this article). The age of the migrants ranged from 27 to 47, and the majority had a university degree and had lived abroad for 2 or 3 years. Two females were unemployed, two worked as cleaning ladies, and one worked in a restaurant. All of them had children, but only one lived with one of her two children together abroad.

4.3.4. COUPLE RELATIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES

Perceived partnership quality

Overall the change in partnership satisfaction before and during the migration was not significantly different (mean values respectively 7.14 and 7.39), and the trend towards the more positive evaluation of partnership quality during the transnational stage was evident. For further analysis, a variable of the grouped values was constructed. The variable included three categories: negative (values 0–3), average (4–6), and

positive (7–10). Partnership quality before the migration was given an assessment of positive by 69.3 percent of respondents, average by 26.9 percent, and negative by 3.9 percent. Current partnership quality was assessed along the same lines: 76.1 percent positive, 19.1 percent average, and 4.9 percent negative.

The gender of the migrant partner, the duration of marriage, age and number of children in the family, perceived partnership quality before the migration, and frequency of contact with the migrant family member are statistically important factors for the current assessment of partnership quality (ANOVA tests, $p < 0,005$). We have not found a statistically significant link between perceived partnership quality and the duration of migration.

In accordance with other research findings, gender seems to be one of the most important factors defining the perception of partnership quality. Of the women with migrant husbands, 81.2 percent positively evaluated their relationship with their spouse (7–10) and 15.1 percent gave them an average (4–6) assessment. Men with a migrant female partner perceived their partnership quality more moderately: 56.3 percent positive, 34.4 percent average, and 9.4 percent negative. That men more negatively assessed partnership quality does not correspond with the results of other studies in Lithuania (Maslauskaitė, 2004) that demonstrate more frequent female dissatisfaction with partnership quality. The dissatisfaction of women is mostly associated with the imbalance of gender roles in household work and child care, as well as with the fact that men fail to respond to the women's emotional needs in the relationship.

The inverse situation in the transnational families could be explained by the interplay of gender culture that socially organizes the expectations and practices of family members and migration. As discussed, male migration complements the traditional ideals of male-breadwinner and female-nurturer and carer roles. As the results from other studies prove, these ideals prevail in the Lithuanian population older than 30 and of lower education (Stankūnienė et al, 2003). Thus for women, the migration of the male partner and the material and symbolic rewards gained from migration correspond with the male-breadwinner role model. Migration becomes a family strategy to fulfil socio-normative gender ideals and thus positively affects the couple's relations. In the families with a migrant mother, however, the situation is the opposite. Men lose the role of breadwinner, which as the result of migration is attributed to the wife, and this situation causes the disruption of the traditional organization of gender in the family and dissatisfaction with the couple's relations.

On the other hand, a more negative evaluation of the partnership observed in the families with a migrant mother is caused by selectiveness, i.e. the fact that in these families the reported relationship quality was worse before the migration compared to the families with a migrant father. In the families with a migrant mother, the relationship before the migration was evaluated as average more often than in the families with a migrant father. In the families with a migrant mother, 42.2 percent of male partners assessed their partnership before the migration as average, whereas in the families with a migrant father the share is 22.9 percent. We might therefore assume that the families with a migrant mother had some special social characteristics even before the migration if compared to the families with a migrant mother. It could be that prolonged joblessness

of the male partner before the migration or socio-destructive behaviour (alcoholism, violence) was the defining force for female migration.

As has been mentioned, statistically there is an important association between the duration of the partnership and the evaluation of the quality of the partnership in the transnational family. The younger the transnational family was, the more positively it evaluated its relationship. Amongst the families living together for up to 5 years, 95.7 percent gave the partnership quality a positive assessment (7–10 points), amongst the families 6–10 years old the proportion reached 80 percent, and with every following group of longer partnerships the proportion of positive assessments of partnership quality gradually decreased. Amongst families with the longest record of partnership (21 years and more), 63.5 percent of the respondents gave a positive assessment to the relationship.

The other factors that affect perceived partnership quality are the age and number of children, and these factors to a great extent are interconnected with the duration of the partnership and the family structure. Families raising younger children more often had a positive perception of their partnership quality than those raising children of school age: 91.3 percent of families raising a pre-school child positively evaluated the relationship, as did the 85 percent of families with more than one child when at least one of the children was pre-school age, but in families raising one or more children of school age the proportion of positive evaluations was respectively 68.5 percent and 70 percent.

The perceived quality of a partnership was interconnected with its perceived quality before the migration: 91 percent of partners who positively evaluated the partnership before the migration gave a positive assessment to the current partnership quality, whereas 48.2 percent of those who gave average evaluations to the relationship earlier still regarded them as average later and 45.8 percent considered them better (7–10 points).

Another factor affecting the current evaluation of the partnership was the frequency of contact with the migrant family member: 87.1 percent of those communicating with the migrant family member on a daily basis or a few times a week positively evaluated their relationship, whereas amongst those who are communicating less often (a few times a month or even less), only 56.6 percent gave positive evaluations.

Thus there are two types of factors that determine the perceived partnership quality in the transnational couples. The first set encompasses family-related factors and the second includes migration-related factors. Among the first set of factors, an important one is the structure of the transnational family. In the families with a migrant mother, the quality of the partnership is perceived more negatively than in the families with a migrant father. As the results of the survey indicate however, it is not the migration of the women that has a more negative impact on the relationship, but rather it is the selectivity of these families. The evaluation of the quality of the relationship is interrelated with general factors of family dynamics: the younger the family (with regards to the duration of the partnership and the age of the children), the more positive the evaluation of the relationship is. The quality of the partnership before the migration is positively associated with the perceived partnership quality during the migration.

Among the second set of factors, i.e. the migration-related factors, the most important is the frequency of contacts with a migrant family members. This factor is definitely interrelated with the assessment of partnership quality. We have not identified an association between the general duration of migration and perceived partnership quality.

Transnational partnership: for better or for worse?

Partnership signifies the form and the quality of relationships. From the perspective of social constructionism and its application to family studies (Berger & Kellner, 1965), partnership as understood in both its dimensions is created and re-created in everyday life interactions. In these interactions, partners define their expectations towards each other, create scripts for their social practices, and develop aspirations for the future. The transnational family is exposed to spatial distance, dispersion of family members across various social contexts, and fluidity of the family structure, and all this creates special preconditions for the social construction of the family and a couple's relations. "Relativizing" is the way transnational couples construct the relationships.

The research proved that life in the transnational space could serve as an impulse for the production of a new generalized understanding of the partnership. The transnational living away from the partner forces a person to reconsider the significance of the relationships in one's life. The wife of a husband that previously gave priority to the social relations outside the family over the partnership and family relations describes the changes as crucial.

Well, yeah, he (the husband) changed for the better. [My husband] started spending more time with the family... Before he used to be like (always used to say) "I've got friends and [do not disturb me]". And now [he says] "I don't care about friends; I've got a family." I feel a stronger connection now. Perhaps it's because we miss each other... It's all for the better, I would say. The distance made it all better somehow (smiling).

Women make a clear distinction when assessing their partner's understanding of the relationship and behaviour before and during the transnational stage. Moreover, the situation is understood as more positive and leading to a higher degree of intimacy among the partners.

The transnational stage not only forces people to reconsider the significance of their relationships, but also catalyzes new modes of behaviour. Spatial distance produces a cognitive distance that provides a chance to acquire an outsider's view of the partnership. Partnership quality therefore becomes an issue that is not taken for granted. The higher degree of reflexivity over the partnership relations helps develop interpersonal communication skills and understand the complexity of the relationship.

Well, I would say that every family needs to be apart for some time. You start appreciating completely different things somehow. In everyday life, you create tension and make a big deal out of small things. And when the person is gone, you start wondering why on earth you said something. And then you start asking yourself: "Did I really have to (fight)?" In some way, every family should be apart for a little bit. And it's not only me who thinks this way, but him too—do we really need to fight.

The generated reflexivity stimulates partners to obtain more control over the partnership and find new modes of behaviour.

Well, I don't know, perhaps we started making compromises more often. Before, I used to say something and leave, slamming the door behind me, and now I am somehow making an effort. Because I know that he will only stay for some time here and I don't want to fight at this time. We are just trying to avoid the tension. Maybe in your head you start thinking about something.... (that does not satisfy you) . But you just try to ignore those thoughts to not start a fight.

The reflexivity is the result of the perception of the new situation in which the family finds itself in the period of transnational migration. The general understanding of the new condition catalyzes the development of new practices and challenges knowledge, which is often taken for granted, about the partnership and the way it has to be maintained.

But the shared social knowledge produced by partners in the transnational stage is not coherent and incorporates both positive and negative knowledge. A female rather openly and negatively evaluated the current situation: “[We] live like gypsies. I wouldn't wish this on anyone.” Later in the interview she spontaneously named the factors causing negative effects. First, she distinguished causes related to the migration itself: uncertainty about the duration of time to be spent abroad which, influenced by the financial benefits brought by migration, often loses its clear time limits.

And even now one of my relatives is going out with a guy; they are planning to get married this summer, but he wants to go to Norway to work. So I told her: “Either you don't let him go, or you should go together with him”. Because it won't be like that: I am going away for 3 months, earn money, come back, and stay. You start getting a sense of a different kind of life and different taste for money, and the longer you do it, the more you want to maintain that style of life.

Second, negative effects on relationships are also caused by the constant burden of responsibility placed on one of the partners for the everyday concerns of the family. The feeling of being overloaded creates dissatisfaction, the experience of asymmetric responsibilities being shouldered by the partners, and doubts concerning the fairness of the situation and certainly creates a negative atmosphere in the relationship.

I have a negative opinion (about living at a great distance apart). My opinion is only negative because I am sick and tired of living apart. If I am faced with some problem, I start blaming him because he is constantly away (laughs).

My opinion is entirely negative and I wouldn't wish a life like this on anyone, no matter how much money can be earned. I am only for being together. Either he is here or we are somewhere else together. I would even say I don't care about money. The important thing is being together.

We can observe that in this definition of the situation the costs of transnational living on the partnership could exceed the material rewards. The transnational stage is understood as non-complementary with the partnership and family life.

Migration can be understood as having an extremely negative effect on a partnership. One woman recalls the situation in the family of her friend:

Well, I have a friend, whose [husband] is working abroad. [She tells me that when] the husband comes home she says, “Geez, I get frustrated when I see his shoes by the door because I am so used to being alone”.

For this couple, transnational migration produces two everyday life worlds that are not interrelated: the family members who stay at home live in one of them and the migrant family member lives in the other. The short co-existence of these two worlds in one physical space, i.e. home, brings extreme emotional stress. The home is symbolically occupied by the non-migrant family members, new rules and modes of action are established, and the returnee is not welcome. The absence from home eliminates the migrant family member from participation in the practices that produce the family world and create the partnership and family relations.

To summarize we could conclude that the understanding of the effects the transnational stage has on the partnership is complex. On the one hand, physical distance increases the reflexivity about the partnership and the production of new knowledge and skills that help to maintain a higher degree of partnership quality. On the other hand, transnational living is understood as the disintegration of the partnership.

4.3.5. THE TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY AND A CHILD'S WELL-BEING

Transnational childhood: emotional stress, coping strategies, consequences

The migration of a parent reshapes a child's condition in the family. The migrant father or mother physically disappears from the child's life and world and this restructures the net of child-parent relationships. The physical absence has social and psychological consequences. The reduction of the child-mother-father triad to dyadic relations requires the child to produce a new understanding of this changed situation, to articulate it, and on the level of everyday practices to generate new adaptive modes of behaviour. The changed situation brings uncertainty that on an emotional level manifests itself through various expressions of emotional stress, i.e. crying, longing, and disruption in the psychological or cognitive development of a child.

Crying is one of the most frequent reactions of children to the departure of a mother/father who migrates to and from host and home country. A mother raising a 5-year-old daughter describes the reaction of her child after her father left to work in Sweden as "very serious" and further explains the parental efforts to help the child overcome the emotional pain.

When he is leaving, she understands it and is about to cry. Then [we] laugh and wave, and everything is OK. Later on she goes off, and tears are falling down her face. She wants her daddy! And when I try to explain to her that he will come back and bring her gifts or we will go and visit him... She somehow starts laughing and wiping her huge tears away. This time (the time of leaving) is very hard for her. And after he has left, he starts calling us, and we get used to it. But at that particular time, it is very hard.

The means proposed by parents to deal with the situation and the emotional stress caused by it are usually material rewards: gifts or visits to the host country. This strategy of material rewards is observed in a majority of cases with slight variations in the amount of rewards that depends on the age of the child and the socio-economic class of the family. Thus the "commodification of love" is the dominant strategy in Lithuanian transnational families, and this is consistent with the findings from research of transnational families from other countries (Parreñas, 2005a).

Crying as an emotional reaction is typical not only of young children but also of older, school-aged children. "I cannot say exactly, but throughout these years it's been very rare for her not to cry when he (the father) had to leave", a mother raising an 11-year-old daughter says.

The trigger of the child's emotional stress is not only the departure, but also the knowledge of it. The fluidity of the family structure causes uncertainty, anxiety and fear. Children understand the migration of a parent as being left behind. They have to cope with a situation in which according to them the father or mother will no longer be in their everyday life. A mother with a 5-year experience of transnational migration remembers that when her daughter of 5 found out about her migration, her daughter called her at work and while crying pleaded for not to go and not to leave her behind.

A part of transnational childhood is the short homecomings of parents that raise the promise of the family reunion. For them the joy of meeting the parent is overwhelming. "I remember when I came back for the first time, she (daughter) started running across the yard and shouting, "Thank God, it is not a dream", a mother of a then 5-year-old daughter recalled.

But the joy of reunion is usually replaced by the despair experienced after the parent leaves home. A mother with a 5-year migration history remembers the emotional ups and downs her 5-year-old daughter experienced:

I stayed at home for 3 months and went away again. I told her that I would be away for 3 months. She could not understand what 3 months meant. You know children; [she] could not imagine how long 3 months were. She waited for a week, 2 weeks, and finally broke down into hysterics.

According to the parents, younger children who lack the perception of time find it hard to understand that the parent will be gone only for a certain period of time. Life for these children happens here and now, and the absence of a parent is equal to the complete loss of that parent.

The emotional pain for younger children can overwhelm their entire world and be devastating. A mother who migrated to Germany to be a care-worker for elderly people and left the care of her 5-year-old daughter to the grandmother and the father of the child recalled the situation as very "heartbreaking". The emotional stress that the child experienced manifested itself through the dominant black colours in paintings and an emotional breakdown.

She (my daughter) was in great distress. My mother told me that she started drawing in black, not using another colours. She was waiting (for me to come back). As later on I was told at home, she went hysterical. The child was sitting on the bench in front of the house and waiting, waiting for me. She was sitting and asking: "When will she come?" One day after another. And she started shouting, crying and shrieking.

The pain that is experienced manifests itself not only on the emotional, but also on the cognitive level. According to a Lithuanian expert who works with transnational migrant families in Lithuania and abroad, children experience not only psychological traumas, but also recession of their intellectual development.

I have heard so many painful stories about the great psychological problems children experience, when the child who is left and is still a toddler stops talking in pre-school; his ability to speak is hampered, and he becomes angry and aggressive. This is not

some kind of generalization, but it is based on the experiences and stories of particular families.

Transnational families develop several strategies that are directed at the management of the emotional strains the children experience because of the migration. Some of these strategies are developed by children, and the others are introduced by parents. Children cope with the situation by employing the strategies of articulated longing, concealment, and rejection or acceptance of the “commodification of love”. From the parent’s side, I observed the strategies of “commodification of love”, introduction of significant rituals, and devaluation. All of them in the eyes of parents serve as markers of care and protection of the children.

For children, articulated longing becomes one of the most accessible strategies to express their feelings. A grandmother raising the children of her daughter who is working in Ireland said that the youngest granddaughter of 9 would always go to sleep with a picture of her mother tucked under her pyjamas. The longing is most often expressed on the phone or in internet-supported conversations. One mother said, “[m]y child is constantly asking on the phone: ‘[w]hen will you come back, Mom, when you will come back?’” Questions like this were expressed in almost all interviews and reflect the inseparable mood of everyday life in transnational families.

The concealment strategy developed by children reveals the attempts of the children to withhold their inner feelings of sadness, longing, or even anger. The concealment strategy is more common in older children and generates emotional distance and the loss of intimacy in intergenerational relations. A mother that went to Ireland with the husband and a younger daughter, leaving behind her teenage daughter to the care of grandparents, explains her despair about the widening distance between her and the child:

If she said something such as Mom, I am sad...; Mom, I miss you; or something of the like (I would talk to her), but she never did... I could only tell from her voice that she missed me.

A similar situation was described by another mother, who said that her 8-year-old boy “doesn’t cry or ask for me much; there is no need to console him. I feel he misses me, but he doesn’t cry and keep asking for me”.

The strategy of “commodification of love” imposed on children by their parents is in some cases rejected by the children. Children may not understand that parents think that the material rewards gained from migration are the appropriate means to still their emotional strains. Material benefits that become the reason for the parents to migrate and that possess a certain value for the parents may be regarded in a completely different way by the children. A mother of a 5-year-old daughter working in the UK recalls that the girl understands the situation as the choice between material rewards and the mother and decides in favour of the latter.

And now she probably misses me. She is already asking: “When will you come home, mommy?” And 2 weeks ago she said, “Mommy, we have enough money, come back home”. She figured it out by herself. She says, “Don’t buy me anything. I have enough. Just come back soon.”

In other families, children accept the strategy of “commodification of love” and construct their relationships with the parents in the light of material rewards that have to be given in exchange for the discomfort of being left behind. They transfer the logic that was used to justify the decision to migrate to intergenerational relations. A

mother living in Ireland said that her 11-year-old son who stays in Lithuania with a grandmother keeps asking:

“Mom, when will you come back? When will you come home? Mom, can you buy me this? Can you buy me that? Mom, can you buy me a computer?” His wishes have grown so much, you know. He wants this, he wants that. He knows that we are earning money, so he started asking for so much more.

From the side of parents, the predominant strategy for dealing with the emotional strains caused by migration is the “commodification of love”. Parents try to compensate for their absence with various material rewards: better clothes, games, PCs and modern gadgets, bigger flats with separate rooms for children, or modern reconstruction of child’s room. “They (our sons) see that we can buy more when their father is away. Before we always counted our money, and there was a long discussion if one of them wanted to have trendy sneakers. And now this is not a problem”, explains the mother of two adolescent boys whose father works in UK.

The other strategy generated by the parents is the invention of significant rituals that are aimed to help children deal with the separation. It could be a marking and counting of days till the homecoming of a parent, a special time allocated for Skype conversations with the migrant parent, or other small but significant rituals. Some parents try to protect their children by hiding the exact time the parent will leave. As one mother said, “[w]e are always trying to keep the bags out of her (daughter’s) sight until the day before he leaves.”

The devaluation strategy encompasses the efforts of parents to disclaim the complexity of the situation that migration brings to the family. Sometimes parents deliberately or not deny that migration poses any challenges to the children and the family. Parents do not recognize the relatedness of the changes in their children with the migration. The mother of an adolescent boy says:

He is still little. I don’t think he understands anything... He is only 12, he wants love, and he has become so affectionate. But I haven’t noticed any other changes in him.

Another mother said that she does not know whether her teenage daughter has any bad feelings about the absence of her father, who has worked abroad more than 10 years. “I don’t know. We have to ask her”, the mother admitted.

The transnational family life transforms the child-parent relations. These changes are marked by the more powerful position of children, uncertainty about parental authority, and emotional distance between children and parents. The dominant coping strategy imposed by parents, “commodification of love”, gives children more power in their relationship with their parents. The disadvantages of being left behind are exchanged for higher material demands. A mother with a teenage daughter left in Lithuania with a grandmother reflects on the situation:

She (our daughter) started taking advantage of the fact that I was feeling sorry for her: “You poor child. You are mistreated; you are abandoned. Can I buy you anything?” I used to ask her. And now she always says, “Yes, buy me something”. We’ve noticed such blackmailing from her.

The absence of a parent in the everyday life of a child degrades parental authority. The parental role and responsibilities towards the child become unclear even to parents. The mother of a child left by both migrant parents in the care of a grandmother told about the uncertainty she experiences in the situations when she has to fulfil her role as a mother to her 10-year-old son.

Rarely did we lecture him, since it is hard to do when we are not around. Sometimes my mom would ask me to lecture him a little bit, and I did. Then the child would all of a sudden burst into tears.

The fluidity of the parent-child hierarchy in transnational families brings uncertainty not only to the parents, but also to the children. In critical situations, parents try to retain their lost authority from a distance, as portrayed in this case, but children may accept it as the sign of the depreciation of their worth to their parents, who have left them.

The absence of one or both parents adds to the emotional distance between the child and the parents. A father or a mother who occasionally returns home may become “a stranger” to the child. This is perfectly reflected in the following excerpt related by a mother of a family with 7 years of experience with the transnational stage.

He (the son) becomes afraid of him (the father), when he (the father) comes back. After a while he gets used to him, and then he goes away again. Then for a month or so he says “good night, daddy” when he goes to sleep. And later on he forgets about him (father). This is not good. It is also hard for the dad because there is no warm relationship between them. It is clear that it is hard for both him and the child.

The emotional reactions of the son observed by the mother reveal the dynamics of the emotional bond between the child and the father. The periods when the father is an insider in the child’s world are interchanged with periods when the father is a stranger in the child’s world. As observed by the mother, this alternation reduces the possibility of emotional closeness.

Behavioural and emotional effects of transnational living on children

Along with the analysis of the social construction of intergenerational relations, the study was directed at measuring the changes in children’s behaviour. Since the anchor respondents of the quantitative survey were parents, the behaviour of children

Table 4.3.1. Reported emotional and behavioural problems of children, percentage

	observed at least once	never
Became more aggressive	17.9	82.1
Does not want to socialize	17.9	82.1
Became more rude	21.6	78.4
Started to be late for school	22.1	77.9
Has more tensions with friends	23.8	76.2
Became anxious	26	74
Became withdrawn	28.2	71.8
Started to get bad marks	29.6	70.4
Experiences outbreaks of crying	30.6	69.4
Is more often angry	34.2	65.8
Became more affectionate	40.2	59.8
Started to get good marks	47.3	52.7
Is more often depressed	48.5	51.5

was measured as reported by parents. We identified two sets of factors that affect the behaviour of children: family-related and migration-related factors.

The results demonstrate that the most frequently noticed change is increased incidence of childhood depression. This was noticed by 48.5 percent of the parents (Table 4.3.1). These emotions reflect the children’s most frequent reactions to the changed situation in the family. A similar proportion of the children started showing

better performance at school. These findings correspond to those reported in other studies (Kandel, Kao, 2001; Gioguli, 2004, reviewed in Debry, 2007). The reasons might be associated with the improvement of material resources in the family and accordingly better structural opportunities for educational performance. Parents reported that 40 percent of the children became affectionate, a possible expression of feelings of longing and anxiety.

Approximately one-third of the children became angrier, experienced outbreaks of crying, became more anxious, became more withdrawn, and their performance at school became worse. Around one-fifth had tensions with peers, started to be late for school, became ruder, lost the willingness to socialize, and became more aggressive. The large number of parents did not report any behavioural and emotional problems of their children. These results might reflect the limits of the research methodology. Parents may have underreported behavioural and emotional problems for several reasons: they might have not recognized them or might have tried to conceal negative information about family members.

For the analysis of the factors affecting the behavioural and emotional problems of children, an index variable was created. The applied cluster analysis identified two clusters: the *unchanged behaviour* group and the *changed behaviour* group (Annex 4.1.1). The first group includes the parents who reported that the behaviour of their children had not changed at all or had not changed significantly as a result of migration. In this group, the reports regarding almost all items measuring changes in behaviour and emotional condition were negative. The *group of changed behaviour* included the parents who reported the observance of behavioural and emotional changes. Of the sample, the first cluster group amounted to 30.4 percent and the second 69.6 percent. As already mentioned, the results do not demonstrate actual changes in the behaviour of children but rather the perception of their parents.

Family-related factors. In families with a migrant mother, changes in the behaviour of children are reported more than in families with a migrant father. Fifty percent of fathers in the families with a migrant mother report negative changes in child's behaviour caused by migration. In families with a migrant father, the share is only 24.9 percent. Thus, the results support the international findings that have determined there is a more negative effect on children in families with migrant mothers (Asis, Huang, Yeoh 2004; Parreñas 2005a).

The structure of the transnational family has an effect on the reported changes in the child's behaviour. For the children living in families with grandparents, behavioural disorders are reported less frequently than for the children living in nuclear families. Reported changes are evident amongst 23.8 percent of children from three generational families, whereas in nuclear families the proportion is higher and reaches 32.2 percent. Thus, we might assume that contact with grandparents has a positive influence on helping children cope with the emotional pain caused by the migration of one or both parents. In Lithuanian transnational families, the relationship with kin therefore plays an important role supporting the child and managing the emotional strains brought by migration.

The younger the children are, the more rarely their parents indicate negative behavioural changes: 17.9 percent of parents raising one child of pre-school age referred to negative changes in behaviour, and 30.8 percent of families raising a child of school age are facing the negative consequences of migration on the behaviour of the child.

The education¹ of the parent who is taking care of the child is another important factor affecting the behaviour of children in transnational families. The mother/father with the highest education less frequently reports negative changes in a child's behaviour: negative aspects in their child's behaviour were observed by 25.3 percent of parents with the highest educational attainment, 30.2 percent of parents with a secondary education, and 36.3 percent of parents with the lowest education. These differences may be influenced by the capacities and skills of the parents to help the children overcome emotional strains. We might assume that parents with a higher education have more skills to support their children during the adaptation to transnational family life.

Factors associated with migration. The overall duration of the migration affects the changes in a child's behaviour. The shorter the time spent by the parent abroad is, the less frequently negative consequences of the migration for the child are reported in the family. In the families with the duration of transnational living up to 1 year or from 1 year to 2 years, respectively 26 percent and 25 percent report negative behavioural changes in children. Those families in which the transnational stage lasts 2 to 3 years or 3 years or more frequently report negative trends in the behaviour of children (respectively 34.7 percent and 36.4 percent).

The more frequently the migrant parent visits the family, the less frequently negative behavioural consequences for the child are reported. In families with the migrant parent returning at least once every 3 months, negative behaviour is reported in 25 percent of the families, whilst amongst those who return once a year or less often, the proportion is 34.1 percent. Therefore, more frequent interaction with the migrant parent mitigates the negative outcomes for children. These results correspond to those in other studies that report on the positive effect constant communication has on intergeneration relations and the well-being of children (Parreñas, 2005a).

The research proved that the frequency of migrants' homecomings is also linked to the duration of visits. Migrant family members who return home more frequently spend much shorter periods of time at home. Therefore, the effect of the time spent by migrant parents at home is negatively associated with the reported bad behaviour of children. Negative changes in behaviour are manifested more frequently in the families in which the migrant parent stays at home longer. Thirty-seven percent of the families in which the migrant parent stays home for a month or longer report negative changes in child behaviour, while amongst the families in which the migrant parent stays 1 week or less, the proportion is 28.9 percent. Thus both the duration of the homecomings and the regularity of the homecomings are important factors for the well-being of children. Shorter periods of absence combined with regular, short homecomings minimize the negative influence that a parent's migration has on children.

The attitudes of families towards migration also affect the changes in the behaviour of children. Negative behaviour of children is recorded less frequently in the families in which the migration is regarded as a positive phenomenon than in those which regard it negatively or have no clear opinion about it. In the families in which the

¹ In the analysis, the education groups were distinguished as follows: "highest education: university, academy, institute (up till 1991) or college", "secondary education: school of higher education or specialised secondary school", "lowest education: secondary non-vocational school, vocational school (together with acquired or not acquired secondary education, basic schooling)".

remaining father/mother is completely satisfied with the transnational living situation, negative behaviour is recorded only in 21.3 percent of the cases. But in the families that have a negative attitude towards the migration, 44.6 percent face negative changes in the behaviour of their children.

The reported changes in the behaviour of children are affected by the family's prospective decision to reunite in the home or host country. Twenty-nine percent of parents that have no plans to reunite in the host country report negative changes in the child behaviour compared to 39.1 percent in families in which the second parent plans to migrate and leave children behind and 35.1 percent in families that have plans to reunite in the host country. Thus it seems that the family's plans to migrate increase the child's powerless position and limit the child's opportunities to influence the family's decisions. The reported behavioural problems might be a protest marker that is used by the child to regain power.

CONCLUSIONS

This article attempts to answer questions about the social construction of relations between spouses and children and parents in Lithuanian transnational families. Based on qualitative and quantitative data, it shows the transformations and continuity of family relations when family members are dispersed in the transnational space. I rely on the concept of "relativizing", which captures the various efforts expressed through the practices and emotions of family members to relate to each other despite the spatial and socio-cultural distance.

The outcomes of "relativizing" in the relations of couples are assessed positively, yet these outcomes are highly influenced by gender ideology. Lithuanian transnational couples report improvement in the perceived quality of their partnership, but this conclusion is more applicable to the couples with a migrant male partner. Thus male migration is complementary with the prevailing traditional gender culture that socially organizes the understanding, practices and assessments of the partnership.

The efforts of the transnational family to overcome the limits posed by the spatial separation and maintain intergenerational relations are not always successful. The research shows that, despite the coping strategies developed by families, children are exposed to emotional strains and behavioural difficulties. "Doing the family" in child-parent relations therefore becomes a more confusing task for the family.

The research revealed that Lithuanian transnational families share some common experience with the families of a similar fate from the other socio-cultural contexts. Many findings of the research correspond to the findings on the life of transnational families from the Philippines, Ecuador or Mexico. The global inequalities that structurally influence the formation of transnational families therefore produce global experiences and practices.

5. HOUSEHOLD, FAMILY AND FERTILITY FROM THE OUTCOMES OF LITHUANIAN POPULATION CENSUS

5.1. LITHUANIAN HOUSEHOLDS AT THE TURN OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Demographic developments in Lithuanian society over the past two decades have been marked by profound changes in fertility, matrimonial behaviour, and demographic ageing. These demographic dynamics are accumulated in households as social entities, whereas demographic behaviour is an outcome of social relations that are formed within a household. The composition, types, and formation trends of households reflect changing behaviour patterns and attitudes towards the living arrangements. Moreover, the household is a place where the social intersects with the individual and consequently, demographic changes take place in the interplay of factors from the macro to the individual level.


This article is dedicated to the analysis of the composition and formation trends of Lithuanian households at the turn of the 21st century and is based on an analysis of the results of the 2001 Population and Housing Census in Lithuania. The article opens with brief methodological notes, where distinctions concerning household types are made. In the second section, I present a comparative view of Lithuanian household size in the context of the other EU societies. The third section is dedicated to a comparative historical analysis of Lithuanian household size and overviews of dynamics in the second half of the 20th century. Later I concentrate on the results of the 2001 Population and Housing Census and discuss the regional diversities of Lithuanian households and the complexity of household types. The main unit of the analysis in this article is the private household, and 99.3 percent of the Lithuanian population live in private households.

5.1.1. HOUSEHOLDS AND THEIR TYPES: THEORETICAL DEFINITION

Households as a category of analysis are well-established in Lithuanian social science, but the general public may find the term rather confusing. This is caused by several reasons: *first*, the variety of subcategories behind the household concept; *second*, the link between household and family concepts; and *third*, the varied perspectives of the analysis of household as an empirical object. In light of these three conditions, it is worthwhile discussing the household concept and various underlying categories as they were used in the 2001 Population and Housing Census.

Two initial types of households are private and institutional households (Fig. 5.1.1). This initial division of households is made according to the subject to which the main functions of the household are attributed. Members of private households carry out these functions themselves, whereas members of institutional households delegate them to respective institutions (army, healthcare or care institutions, prisons, etc.). The nature of the relationships between the members of the household is not taken into consideration at this level of categorization.

Figure 5.1.1. Structure of the household concept



Institutional households are not further divided, but naturally, they can be analysed according to the nature of the institutions implementing the household functions.

Private households include two subcategories: non-family and family households. The main difference between the two subcategories is the nature of the relationship between the household members. Individuals in non-family households have no marital or family relationships. Non-family households are further divided according to the number of individuals living in the household. One-person households are usually analysed in terms of their member's gender.

The family household is defined considering the nature of marital/partnership and/or family links and their interrelations. One-family households, also referred to as nuclear families (Namu, 2003), include people bound in links of partnership or parenthood. Spouses/cohabitants with or without children and single parents with children form this household type. A household of two or more families consists of several nuclear families. Family connections are not essential between the nuclear families of the household. What is called an other family household consists of a nuclear family and other individuals linked or not with the nuclear family by the familial bonds.

The concepts of household and family are therefore not overlapping analytical concepts covering the same types of social relations among individuals. Although some categories of households are based on marital/partnership or family relations, the concept of household includes a greater variety of social relations. Consequently, household is a broader analytical category than family. Moreover, it is methodologically more precise and more easily applicable empirically. Households include specific relations expressed in a defined space and time (Mikulionienė, 1997). A family may incorporate relations that are not ongoing at an actual time and in a space but are meaningful to an individual and might have social consequences (e.g. dead relatives, etc.).


Households may be analyzed in terms of their composition and formation processes. Analysis of the composition of households includes inquiry into the distribution of household types, their size (average size, number of members), and composition of households according to the family statuses of household members. Analysis of household formation records events (e.g. marriage, divorces, etc.) that lead to the formation of households.

5.1.2. LITHUANIAN HOUSEHOLDS IN THE EU CONTEXT¹

Average household size. At the time of the 2001 Census, the average household size in Lithuania was 2.55. In the new EU member states, an average household size similar to that in Lithuania was recorded in Hungary and the Czech Republic and a slightly smaller one was observed in Estonia. Larger households are characteristic of Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Cyprus and Slovenia (Fig. 5.1.2). Compared to the old member states, the average household size in Lithuania is the most similar to that in Luxembourg, France, Austria, the UK, and the Netherlands. The average household size in Lithuania is smaller than that in southern European countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain) and Ireland, but it is larger than in northern European states (Finland and Denmark) and Germany.

Household distribution according to number of members. Comparing Lithuania and other European

*Figure 5.1.2. Average private household size in the EU countries**




Source: Eurostat, epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.

*Eurostat does not provide data from Sweden, Malta, and Belgium. Country codes provided by Eurostat.

¹ At the time of the census, Lithuania was not yet a member of the EU. However, the census of 2001 carried out in the EU member states and candidate countries, is the only source suitable for comparative analysis.

countries according to the number of household members, it is worthwhile to limit the analysis to the new central and eastern EU states since they share a similar history and socio-political development. Therefore, here I will compare eight countries that joined the EU in 2004. Lithuania takes the middle position between two extremes in terms of number of members in a household (Fig. 5.1.3). The two extremes could be distinguished. On the one end are Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland, with a larger share of big households (five or more persons) and slightly less common small households (one or two persons). Estonia and the Czech Republic are on the other end of the continuum. Households consisting of one or two people prevail in these countries, accounting for 59–62 percent of all households. In these countries, the percentage of large households (five or more people) is relatively small. Lithuania occupies a middle position among these countries and stands close to Hungary and Latvia. Small households (with one or two persons) in Lithuania stands at 52.6 percent and households consisting of more than five persons make up 8.2 percent. The percentage of medium-sized households (three or four persons) stands at 37.5.

Figure 5.1.3. Private households by number of household members in CEE countries of the EU, percentages



Source: Eurostat, epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.

Compared to the old EU member states, Lithuania takes an even clearer middle position between northern, western, and southern Europe and Ireland (Annex 5.1.1). Unlike in Lithuania, in the countries of northern and western Europe small households (one or two people) are more common and make up 61–69 percent of all households. Medium-sized households (three or four people) are rarer in these countries (23–29 percent), whereas the percentage of large households (five or more people) is either similar or lower than that in Lithuania.

Opposite trends are revealed when comparing Lithuanian households with those in southern European countries. In Spain, Portugal, and Greece, households of one or

two members are rarer (approx. 45 percent) than in Lithuania and medium-sized households (three or four people) (approx. 40 percent) and large households (five or more people) (approx. 9–10 percent) are slightly more common.

In terms of average household size and the number of members in a household, Lithuania therefore takes a middle position in the EU context. The average household size in Lithuania is smaller than that in southern Europe and some central European countries (Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland), but it is higher than in that northern Europe. Small households are rarer in Lithuania than in Estonia, the Czech Republic, and northern and western European countries and slightly more common than they are in Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and southern Europe.

5.1.3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LITHUANIAN FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS

Analysis of the historical development of households and their types is limited by the changes in the definition of the concept of household. It is not yet well established in scientific literature and varies depending on historical conditions and the level of cultural and economic development of the country (Temple, 1994; Mikulionienė, 1997). This makes in-depth analysis of the historical dynamics of households and their types impossible. The only comparable census data concerns the average size and number of members within family households.

As data of various censuses conducted in the second half of the 20th century in Lithuania shows, the size of family households in Lithuania has been constantly decreasing since the middle of the 20th century (Namų ūkiai, 2003, p. 8). According to the 1959 Census, the average family household contained 3.57 persons and 20 years later (in 1979) the number decreased to 3.28 persons. In 1989 the average family household size was 3.22, and at the time of the 2001 Census it was 3.18 persons. Obviously, the decrease in the average family household size recorded in the 1970s is still ongoing in the 21st century.

Since the end of the 1950s (1959), the number of small households (two persons) has been constantly increasing in Lithuania, whereas the number of large households (five or more people) has been decreasing (Table 5.1.1). The number of the large households almost halved in the period from 1959 to 2001. Slight changes have been observed among medium-sized family households (three or four people). The period between the last two censuses (from 1989 to 2001) recorded no radical changes in family size, although small family households (two persons) have become slightly more numerous.

Table 5.1.1. Changes in family household size, percentages

Number of persons	1959	1970	1979	1989	2001
two persons	27.8	28.9	31.8	33.8	35.7
three persons	28.0	27.9	29.2	28.7	28.2
four persons	21.8	24.5	25.4	25.5	24.5
five and more persons	22.4	18.7	13.6	12.0	11.6

Source: Namų, 2003, p. 9.

of Lithuania, the average family household size is smaller than the country's average. Households of similar size are also observed in the districts of Akmenė and Varėna and Druskininkai municipality. *Second*, larger households are characteristic of western (Klaipėda and Tauragė counties), northern (Telšiai County and parts of Šiauliai County) and southern Lithuania. Larger households are also common in the districts surrounding or neighbouring big cities (Vilnius, Šalčininkai, Kaunas, Šiauliai, Klaipėda and Šilutė districts). *Third*, smaller-than-average households are characteristic of the big cities: Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai, and Panevėžys.

5.1.5. TYPES AND COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS

According to 2001 Census data, there were 1,356,826 households in Lithuania: 29.1 percent of the households were non-family households, 27.4 percent were other family households, 20.1 percent were married family households with children, and 14.9 percent were married family households without children (Table 5.1.2). The percentage of households of single parents with children was 4.8. Households of cohabitants with or without children and those of two or more families are rather rare in the overall household system. The percentage of each of the latter types is slightly lower than 1.5 percent.


Table 5.1.2. Private households by type, number and percentage

Types	Number of households	Percent
Total	1,356,826	100.0
Non-family households	394,203	29.1
Married without children	201,022	14.9
Cohabitants without children	20,709	1.5
Married with children	273,126	20.1
Cohabitants with children	19,243	1.4
Lone mother with children	60,998	4.5
Lone father with children	4,381	0.3
Two or more families household	12,035	0.8
Other families	371,109	27.4

Source: Namų, 2003.

In the analysis of household composition, it is worthwhile considering family relationships within the household and looking into the distribution of two main types: family and non-family households. The majority of registered households were family households (70.9 percent), the presence off and approximately one-third were non-family households (Fig. 5.1.5). As was discussed above, family household is a complex category, and it is therefore important to identify the various subtypes of family household. Nuclear family households prevail among family households. They account for 60.1 percent of family households. Other families make up 38.5 percent of family households. The percentage of households with two or more families is low (1.4 percent). In the following sections, I will analyze the subtypes and composition of non-family and family households.

Figure 5.1.5. Private households by type, percentages




Source: Namų, 2003.

Non-family households and their subtypes

Non-family households account for 29.1 percent of all households. They are slightly more common in urban areas than in rural areas (30.2 percent and 26.6 percent respectively). The majority of non-family households are one-person households (98.6 percent); it is therefore reasonable to present a more precise analysis of only this type of non-family household.

Regional diversity of one-person households. One-person households are least common in the municipalities of Vilnius district (201 of 1000 households) and Šiauliai, Skuodas, and Klaipėda districts and most common in the municipality of the city of Kaunas (333 of 1000 households). This type of household is most characteristic of the big cities (Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai, Panevėžys). Additionally, one-person households are common in the municipalities of north-eastern Lithuania (Anykščiai, Rokiškis, Zarasai, and Ignalina districts). This geographical segment is distinguished by a share of one-person households that is above the country's average. The number of one-person households is also rather high in southern Lithuania (Lazdijai and Varėna districts, municipalities of the towns of Druskininkai and Alytus).

Figure 5.1. 6. One-person households by member's age group and sex in urban and rural areas, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.

The composition of one-person households according to sex and age group. Of one-person households, 64.9 percent consist of women and 35.1 percent consist of men. More often these are elderly people, especially in the case of women (Annex 5.1. 2).

The composition of female one-person households by age group is particularly uneven in rural areas (Fig. 5.1.6). Women aged 65 and over prevail in these households (69.8 percent), and the number of households of women of younger age groups is very low. In urban areas, the percentage of households of women aged over 65 is 39.7 percent; there are more female one-person households of younger age groups in urban areas than there are in rural areas.


The distribution of one-person male households by age group is more even in rural and urban areas. This applies particularly to male households in urban areas. The share of households of men aged 20–24 and 65 and over is equal (14 percent each). In rural areas, the households of men aged 65 and over account for one-fourth (25 percent) of male households.

Socioeconomic characteristics of one-person households. Persons living in one-person households in urban areas more often have acquired higher (36.8 percent) or secondary education (32.1 percent), whereas in rural areas secondary or lower education is more common (67.3 percent) (Annex 5.1. 3). In general 66.9 percent of persons living in this type of household are unemployed, and this trend is evident both in urban and rural areas. There are, however, more employed persons living in this type of household in urban areas than there are in rural areas (39.7 percent and 15.9 percent respectively). Poor education and lower levels of employment among members of one-person households is obviously an outcome of the age structure of the population living in these households and the discrepancies in social and economic development in urban and rural areas.

Formation paths of one-person

households. Almost one-third of one-person households are formed after the death of a partner: 36.5 percent of members of one-person households are widows or widowers. About a third (32.1 percent) of people living in this type of household are never married (Fig. 5.1.7). The formation paths of one-person households in rural and urban areas demonstrate some distinct features. In urban areas, never married people (35.1 percent) and widowers (29.9 percent) constitute the biggest share of those living in one-person households. In rural areas, these households are more often formed after the death of a partner; 53.1 percent of the members of one-person households in rural areas are widowers and 24.5 percent never marry.

Figure 5.1.7. One-person households by member's marital status in urban and rural areas, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.


Composition of nuclear families

General characteristics of nuclear family households. Of family households registered during the census, 60.1 percent (579,000) are nuclear family households. At the moment of the census, 1,689,951 people lived in this type of household. The average size of one-family households in Lithuania is 2.9 persons (2.9 persons in urban areas and 3 persons in rural areas).

Approximately one-half of nuclear family households consist of married parents with children (Fig. 5.1.8), 35 percent of nuclear family households contain spouses without children, and 11 percent of households of this type are incomplete families (single parent [mother or father] with children). The two least common types of nuclear families are those of cohabitants with or without children, accounting for 3 percent and 4 percent respectively.

The distribution of nuclear family household subtypes does not differ greatly in rural and urban areas (Annex 5.1. 4). The share of spouses without children is slightly greater in rural areas (40 percent in rural areas and 32.2 percent in urban areas), whereas

Figure 5.1.8. Subtypes of one-family households, percentages



Source: Namų, 2003.

the number of spouses with children is greater in urban areas (48.4 percent and 44.4 percent respectively). The share of cohabitants with and without children in rural and urban areas is similar and reaches about 3–4 per cent. The share of incomplete family households consisting of one of the parents with children is much bigger in urban areas than it is in rural ones (13 percent in urban areas and 7.6 percent in rural areas). Most incomplete family households consist of mothers with children (93.3 percent), and those consisting of fathers with children account for only 6.7 percent.

Below in separate sections I present the analysis of nuclear families with and without children less than 18 years old.

Nuclear families without children. Couples without children account for 38.2 percent of all one-family households. Among all nuclear family households, childless couples (spouses and cohabitants) are less common in urban areas (35.5 percent) than in rural areas (44.1 percent). The majority of nuclear families without children are spouses (90.6 percent), and cohabitants make up 9.4 percent. These trends are similar in urban and rural areas.

The geographical distribution of nuclear families without children is uneven across Lithuania. The share of cohabitants without children among all nuclear households without children varies from 4.7 percent to 13.3 percent. Contrary to what might be expected, the share of cohabitants without children is greatest not in the big cities in Lithuania but rather in some rural areas: the municipalities of Kazlų Rūda and Pagėgiai (13.3 percent each). Households of this type are more common in northern Lithuania—the districts of Pakruojis, Mažeikiai and Šiauliai (approx. 12 percent each). The percentage of cohabitants without children in the big Lithuanian cities varies from 10.3 percent to 10.9 percent, reaching 10.9 percent in Klaipėda, 10.7 percent in Vilnius, 10.6 percent in Šiauliai, and 10.3 percent in Kaunas. The smallest number of cohabitants without children at the time of the census was registered in the districts of Lazdijai and Utena and in municipality of Druskininkai, with the percentage reaching as low as 4–5 percent.


One-family households with children: general trends. Families with children account for 61.8 percent of all one-family households. Their share is greater in urban areas (64.5 percent) than in rural areas (56 percent). The average household size of couples with children in the country is 3.7 persons. Households of this type are smaller in urban areas (the average size being 3.6) and larger in rural areas (4.0). The average household size of incomplete families is 2.4 persons: 2.3 persons in urban areas and 2.7 persons in rural areas.

The greatest share of nuclear families with children consists of spouses with children (75.1 percent in urban areas and 79.3 percent in rural areas). Incomplete families are more common in urban areas (20.2 percent), with a lower percentage in rural areas (13.5 percent). The percentage of cohabitants with children in urban areas is 4.7 percent, while in rural areas it is higher and reaches 7.2 percent.

Regional distribution. Significant regional differences in the distribution of the various subtypes of nuclear families with children were registered (Fig. 5.1.9). The percentage of incomplete families in the various regions of Lithuania ranges from 11.3 percent to 26.2 percent. The greatest number of incomplete families was recorded in Visaginas (26.2 percent); the big cities of Lithuania: Kaunas (22.4 percent), Vilnius (21.4 percent), Klaipėda (21 percent), Šiauliai (20.8 percent), and Panevėžys (20 percent); and Jonava District (22.6 percent), the town of Palanga (21.7 percent), and Akmenė District (21.2 percent). The lowest number of incomplete families is present in the districts of Skuodas, Šilalė, Kelmė, Šakiai, Lazdijai, Alytus, Vilnius, Molėtai and Panevėžys and in the municipality of Rietavas. The percentage of incomplete families here is lower than 14 percent. The lowest number was recorded in Skuodas District (11.3 percent).

Cohabitants with children and cohabitants without children mostly reside in rural areas in northern Lithuania—Mažeikiai, Akmenė, Šiauliai, Pakruojis and Pasvalys districts—rather than the big cities of Lithuania (Fig. 5.1.10). Households of this type are also common in Kazlų Rūda, Kalvarija, Pagėgiai and Šilutė districts. The percentage of households of cohabitants with children here is 7–11.9 percent, whereas the number of households of this subtype in Vilnius is lower than the country's average and reaches only 3.8 percent. Similar numbers were registered in the towns of Alytus, Kaunas and Panevėžys, the districts of Utena, Molėtai, Šalčininkai, and Lazdijai, and the municipalities of Druskininka and Birštonas.


Figure 5.1.9. Households of single parents with children less than 18 years old by district/municipality



Compositional differences. The composition of one-family households with children depends on the type of family (Annex 5.1. 5). The number of children in cohabiting and incomplete families is lower than that in married families. More than half of cohabiting and incomplete families raise one child (55.7 percent and 64.9 percent respectively), whereas the number of married couples raising one and two children is rather similar (42.4 percent and 46.7 percent).

There are significant differences according to the number of children between one-family households with children in urban and rural areas (Fig. 5.1.11). In urban areas, incomplete and cohabiting families in most cases raise one child. The number of married couples raising one and two children is similar. But unlike in urban areas, in rural areas there are more cohabiting couples with three or more children; 25.3 percent of rural cohabiting couples raise three or more children, whereas the percentage in urban areas is only 7.3 percent. Similar trends are observed among incomplete families in rural and urban areas.


Figure 5.1.10. Households of cohabiting couples with children less than 18 by district/municipality



Social characteristics. The occupational status of parents is one of the socioeconomic features of a family that is important for the evaluation of the quality of life of families with children. Census data provides a possibility to analyze, at least to a certain extent, the link between family type and the occupational status of the parents.

The level of employment in nuclear family households with children is higher in the households in which parents are married than it is in households with cohabiting parents. In 56.6 percent of married families, both parents are employed; in almost one-third of the families (33.6 percent), one of the parents is employed; and in about one-tenth of the families (9.4 percent), neither of the parents is employed. Among households of cohabiting couples with children, there are more cases of both parents being unemployed (26.1 percent); about one-third of families include only one employed parent (39.1 percent); and the number of families in which both parents are employed is 34.3 percent.


Figure 5.1.11. One-family households with children less than 18 years old by number of children and type of household in urban and rural areas, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.

Employment trends of married people in urban and rural areas are similar (Fig. 5.1.12). Families with both parents employed prevail (61.5 percent and 46.2 percent respectively), and one of the married parents is employed in about one-third of families (31.8 percent and 37.8 percent respectively). The percentage of families in which both parents are unemployed is 6.7 percent in urban areas and 16.1 percent in rural areas.

Figure 5.1.12. One-family households with children younger than 18 by parents' occupational status in urban and rural areas, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.

Different trends in occupational status have been registered in cohabiting households in urban and rural areas. For cohabiting couples in urban areas, it is more likely that both or one of the parents is employed, while in rural areas there are more cases

in which neither of the parents is employed or only one is employed. In 41.8 percent of cohabiting families in urban areas, both parents are employed, and in 39.3 percent of cohabiting families one is employed. In rural areas, one of the parents is employed in 38.5 percent of families and neither of the parents is employed in 38.5 percent of families.

Two-or-more-family households and other family households

Households of two or more families. At the time of the census, 12,035 households of two or more nuclear families were registered in Lithuania. Households of this subtype account for a rather insignificant share (1.4 percent) of all family households. The average size of households of this type is 5.4 persons; 85.9 percent of households of this type include children younger than 18.

In the majority of these households, there are one or two children (51.1 percent and 40 percent respectively). In urban areas, one child is raised in more than half of these households, and in rural areas the share of households with one or two children are similar. (Table 5.1.3).

Other family households. Of all family households registered at the time of the census 38.5 percent were attributed to the subtype of other family households. The overall number of these households

is 371,109. The average number of persons living in these households is 3.5. The average size of these households is bigger in rural areas than in urban areas (3.7 and 3.4 respectively). Of these households, 38.2 percent include children. Two-thirds of these households include one child (66.8 percent), 25.2 percent include two children, and 8 percent include three or more children (Table 5.1.3). The number of households of the subtype raising one child aged younger than 18 is lower in urban than in rural areas. The percentage of other family households with one child in rural areas is 54.9 percent, and that of those with two children is 30.5 percent.

Table 5.1.3. *Two-or-more-family households and other family households by number of children younger than 18 in urban and rural areas, percentages*

Number or children	Total	Urban	Rural
<i>Two or more-family households</i>			
One	51.1	56.5	42.9
Two	40.0	37.8	43.3
Three and more	8.9	5.7	13.8
<i>Other family households</i>			
One	66.8	72.9	54.9
Two	25.2	22.4	30.5
Three and more	8.0	4.7	14.6

Source: 2001 Census.

CONCLUSIONS

The data of the 2001 Population and Housing Census provided useful information about the types and composition of Lithuanian households and enabled a comparative analysis of Lithuanian households and those in other EU member states to be conducted. In terms of average size and number of members, Lithuanian households are smaller than those in southern Europe, Poland, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Slovakia but they are larger than those in northern and Western Europe, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. In terms of average size and number of members, Lithuanian households mostly resemble those of Latvia and Hungary.

There are some regional discrepancies in average size of household. Households smaller than average are common in eastern Lithuania and those larger than average are characteristic of western, northern and southern Lithuania. Smaller households are more characteristic of most of the big cities, whereas larger households are more common in the municipalities surrounding them.

Lithuanian family households are becoming smaller, a trend which was registered in previous censuses in Lithuania as well. From 1959 to 2001, the number of large family households consisting of five or more people almost halved and that of family households consisting of two people has increased. No significant household changes were registered between the last two censuses (in 1989 and in 2001).

Non-family households in Lithuania account for 29.1 percent of all households. One-person households constitute the absolute majority among them, women making up more than half of them. These are usually elderly women. This trend is particularly visible in rural areas and is related to the features of male and female mortality.

Family households compose the greatest share in the overall household structure (70.9 percent) with one-family households being the most common among them (60.1 percent). Since households of this type coincide with what scientific literature and popular usage refers to as the nuclear family, census data provided a possibility to evaluate the variety and distribution of Lithuanian families. Most nuclear families consist of spouses with or without a child or children (82 percent) but as many as 11 percent of nuclear families are incomplete (consisting of one parent with a child or children) and 7 percent of nuclear families are not institutionalized (the relationship is not officially registered). Although families of the latter type are usually identified with a modern lifestyle more common in urban areas, the census data shows that opposite trends are observed in Lithuania. Cohabiting couples are more numerous in some rural municipalities than they are in big cities, and northern Lithuania presents a rather solid area with a fairly high number of cohabitants among nuclear families. It may be expected that a more in-depth socioeconomic analysis of these area would provide additional useful information on the preconditions of the transformation of the nuclear family in Lithuania.

5.2. FAMILY STATUS DIFFERENTIALS AND TRENDS OF LITHUANIAN FAMILY DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

One of the leading features of the contemporary family is the process of deinstitutionalization that manifests itself through the phenomena of cohabitation, single parent families, and divorces. In Lithuania this process accelerated remarkably almost 2 decades ago, and some aspects of this process, e.g. cohabitation, were substantially new to society and the family.

The process of family deinstitutionalization brings fundamental challenges to society, to the legal system, and to the system of social policy. It redefines intergenerational relations, the social and cultural norms that organize family life, and the concept of the family itself. Moreover, it affects the demographic processes in society and has a profound impact on fertility. Thus, the examination of family deinstitutionalization is an important issue for family demography and sociology.

Despite the relevance of family deinstitutionalization, there has been a clear shortage of appropriate data that could advance the knowledge of this process in Lithuania. The "Family and Fertility Survey" that was conducted in Lithuania in 1994–95 provided the first reliable socio-demographic information on the proliferation of cohabitation. The findings of the survey were summarized in several publications (Stankuniene, 1997; Stankuniene et al, 1999; Stankuniene et al, 2000). The 2001 Population and Housing Census was the first statistical source of data and provided the opportunity to study some aspects of family deinstitutionalization in Lithuania.

Along with the marital status of a person, the census recorded the family status of all household members. The variable of family status had several categories: child, spouse, cohabitant, single parent, living alone, etc. While marital status indicates a person's legal position within the field of marital relations, family status indicates the actual position within these relations. In a traditional society in which a family was usually based on institutionalized marriage, analysis of family status would have been irrelevant. In contemporary society, this type of analysis gives important information about non-institutionalized family living arrangements.


This article is dedicated to the analysis of socio-demographic and socio-economic differentials of family status of the members of private households. In pursuing this, the article tries to give an answer to the question about the character of the process of family deinstitutionalization in Lithuanian society. The article is organized into three sections. The first one examines the sex, age, and living area differentials of married people, cohabitants, single parents, and people living alone and reveals some important differences among these status groups. The second section discusses the socio-economic characteristics of family status groups and exhibits the relevant differences among married people and cohabitants by employment and education status. The closing section of the article analyzes the segments in the course of life that precede the recorded status of single parent and cohabitant. Thus, this section brings some knowledge about the ways by which the statuses of single parent or cohabitant are acquired.

5.2.1. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENTIALS OF THE FAMILY STATUS

General trends. The largest population group in Lithuanian society has the status of spouse (41.96 percent). The second largest group is children, which compose 23.7 percent of the population. This group is followed by people with the family status of “other”. Since these two family status groups are not related to the family changes that are included in the scope of this article, they will be not analyzed in more detail. People living alone make up 11.2 percent of the population, single parents make up 3.3 percent, and cohabitants make up 3.2 percent. Further analysis will be restrained to those 20 years of age or older.

There are significant age differentials in each family status group (Fig. 5.2.1). The proportion of married people rapidly increases at the ages of 20 to 30. The proportion of married people in the age groups older than 30 reaches 65–70 percent and thereafter stays almost stable but starts to decrease in the oldest age groups. In the oldest age group, the number of those who have the status of spouse drops and the number of single-person households increases. By contrast to married members, the percentage of cohabitants is rather stable in all age groups, reaching 5–6 percent, though it decreases slightly in the oldest age groups. The largest proportion of single parents is observed in the age groups of 25–29 to 40–44. The decrease in the percentage in older age groups results from the adulthood of the children, which leads to changes in female family status within households.

Figure 5.2.1. Members of private households by person's status in the household and age, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.

Persons living alone are very unevenly distributed by sex and age. The number of women living alone in the youngest age group under analysis (20–23 years old) is

somewhat larger than that of men. This suggests that women start an independent life slightly earlier than men. Among people in their late 20s and in their 30s this trend is reversed, however: the number of women living alone is lower than that of men. Once again, the significant differences by sex and age among those living alone start to manifest in the age groups over 50 years old. There are more women than men living alone. The number of women living alone in the oldest age group is 5.4 times higher than that of men (7,400 and 1,300 respectively). The main reason is the differences in female and male mortality (Jasilionis, Stankuniene, Shkolnikov, 2006).

Sex and age differentials are important when analysing married people, cohabitants, and single parents. Women tend to acquire the status of spouse slightly earlier than men. The same is applicable to the formation of cohabitation. The greatest asymmetry by sex is observed among single parents. There are very few men acquiring the status of single father, whereas the number of single mothers is the greatest in the age group of 25 to 45 years old.

Urban and rural differences. Although living alone is more characteristic of the urban population, and this is observed in all age groups except the oldest, there are some important trends to be discussed (Annex 5.2.1). First, the largest urban-rural gap is observed in the 20–24 age group; the share of persons living alone in urban areas is 11 per cent higher than the share in rural areas. It is likely that this is a result of the enrolment of rural youth in educational institutions (colleges and universities), which are mostly located in urban areas. Second, the urban-rural gap narrows in the older age groups.


There are significant differences in the nuptiality level among the female and male urban and rural population (Fig. 5.2.2). The nuptiality level of rural females is higher than that of urban females: rural females enter into marriage earlier and more often than urban females, and this trend is observed in all age groups of females. The proportion of married females in rural areas is 6–11 percent higher than the proportion of married urban females in every age group.

The greatest difference between married rural and urban females is observed among women younger than 40 years old. The difference in the nuptiality level among women aged 40 and over is smaller but remains obvious. For example, in the youngest age groups (20–24 and 25–29 years old) the proportion of married urban females is respectively 25.1 percent and 54 percent, whereas that of rural females is respectively 36.1 percent and 64.8 percent. The share of married urban females in the 50–54 age group is 60 percent, whereas that of rural females is 66.9 percent.

While nuptiality among rural females is higher than that of urban females, the opposite trend is characteristic of the male population. (Fig. 5.2.2). The share of married men in rural and urban areas is almost the same in the age groups under 40 years old. In the older age groups however, nuptiality among the urban male population is higher. These findings suggest that men in urban areas might have more attractive socio-economic marriageable characteristics, and they are therefore more desirable partners in the marriage market than rural males.

As was mentioned, the 2001 Population and Housing Census provided the first statistical data about cohabitation in Lithuania. Even though the overall share of cohabitants in the population is not large, a more in-depth analysis of cohabitants gives very important information on family changes in Lithuanian society.

Figure 5.2.2. Married in private households by sex and age in urban and rural areas, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.


An analysis of cohabitants by age and living area differentials reveals the specific trends in the formation of such living arrangements in rural and urban areas. The general trend is that in the younger age groups the number of cohabitants is similar in rural and urban areas, in the older age groups it increases in rural areas and decreases in urban areas, and in the oldest age groups the number of cohabitants is lowest, with the level of cohabitants still higher in rural than in urban areas.

A more precise look at this trend shows that the share of cohabitants in the 20–24 age group in urban and rural areas is respectively 4.9 percent and 4.7 percent, whereas in the 45–49 age group it is 4.3 percent in urban areas and almost twice as much, i.e. 8 percent, in rural areas (Annex 5.2.1). The share of cohabitants in the 30–54 age groups in rural areas varies around 7 percent and reaches a peak in the 45–49 age group, whereas in urban areas the share of cohabitants decreases with every age group starting from 30 years old and varies at 3–5 per cent. The number of cohabitants in rural areas is higher even in the oldest age groups. Among the persons in the 55–59 age group, the number of cohabitants in rural areas is 5.4 percent, whereas in urban areas it is 2.8 percent. Differences are also observed in the oldest age group, though they are not so significant.

Thus we could state that cohabitation as a form of partnership is similarly adopted throughout the youngest age groups without regard to living area. Most significant differences in urban and rural areas are observed in the age groups over 30. This suggests that the proliferation of cohabitation does not follow a single model and that there are different types of cohabitation that vary according to their role in the process of partnership formation and social meaning that is attached to this form of partnership.

In the comparison of cohabiting men and women in rural and urban areas, several trends are observed. *Firstly*, women in urban and rural areas start to cohabit at an earlier age than men (Fig. 5.2.3). The number of cohabiting women in rural and urban areas in the 20–24 age group amounts to about 6 percent, whereas the indicator for men is 3–4 percent. *Secondly*, the number of cohabiting men and women in rural and urban areas almost evens out at the age of 25–29, but the number of cohabiting men and women in rural areas increases in every later age group older than 30, decreasing only in the oldest age groups (U-type curve); the number of cohabiting men and women over 30 years old in urban areas gradually decreases in every later age group. Cohabitants are the most numerous in rural areas among 45–49-year-old females and males (8.1 percent and 7.9 percent respectively), whereas the percentages among the urban population of the same age are 3.8 percent of women and 4.8 percent of men. The lowest number of cohabitants both in urban and rural areas is in the oldest age groups. The percentages of cohabitants in the 60–64 age group in rural areas are 4.7 percent of men and 3.5 percent of women, whereas in urban areas the percentages are 3 percent of men and 1.6 percent of women. The percentages in the oldest age groups are lower still.

Figure 5.2.3. Cohabitants in private households by sex and age in urban and rural areas, percentages




Source: 2001 Census.

The share of single parents in urban and rural areas is similar in the youngest age groups (3.8 percent and 4.9 percent respectively) but different trends are observed in the older age groups (Annex 5.2.1). The number of single parents in urban areas is about 3 percent higher than the number in rural areas in every age group older than 30–34, reaching about 9–10 percent. The trend is characteristic of individuals aged up to 44, since in older ages the number of single parents in rural and urban areas becomes equal

and decreases gradually. In urban and rural areas, single parents are mostly women. The number of single fathers raising children younger than 18 years old in urban and rural areas is low and almost equal, varying around 1 percent in various age groups.

Figure 5.2.4. Single parents in private households by sex and age in urban and rural areas, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.

The percentage of women raising children alone varies in urban and rural areas depending on age (Fig. 5.2.4). In the youngest age group, there are more women in rural areas who raise children alone, but in every age group older than 25–29 this status is acquired significantly more frequently by women in urban than in rural areas. Almost one-fifth of urban females 30–34 and 35–39 years old raise children alone (17.7 percent and 18.2 percent respectively), whereas in rural areas they make up about one-tenth of residents (12.9 percent and 13.1 percent respectively). The percentage of women 45–49 years old and over who raise children alone becomes more equal and gradually decreases.

The larger share of single mothers in urban areas and of cohabiting women in rural areas may reflect specific structural and cultural preconditions that determine female marital behaviour. Female urbanites have better employment opportunities that are interrelated with higher educational attainment and thus better chances to support a family by themselves. They are therefore under less pressure to form a partnership after a divorce or separation. Moreover, the cultural attitudes towards a single mother are less stigmatizing in urban areas. In rural areas, a lone mother is more constrained to form a partnership after the dissolution of a previous one: they have lower chances to secure the necessary material resources and support the family alone and are more often confronted with negative attitudes towards lone mothers.


5.2.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS OF FAMILY STATUS

In the 2001 Population and Housing Census, several socio-economic characteristics that are important for the analysis of the family changes in Lithuania were recorded. In this section, we will examine the interconnections of educational attainment and the occupational status of persons living alone, married persons, cohabitants, and single parents.

There are three trends that distinguish the family status groups by educational attainment (Fig. 5.2.5). *First*, persons living alone have the lowest educational attainment. *Second*, the married and single parent groups contain the largest share with the highest education. *Third*, to compare married and cohabiting couples, it is evident that married persons more often have a college education or higher, while cohabiting persons more often have a secondary education or lower.

Some of these trends are explained by other demographic and structural characteristics. The educational attainment of persons living alone is determined by the older age structure of this group. In light of the previously discussed characteristics of age and living area, the lower level of education of cohabitants may be explained by the fact that younger cohabitants, who choose this form of partnership as a trial marriage, are still studying and the cohabitants belonging to an older age group are residents of rural areas, where the education level is generally lower. The higher level of educational attainment of single parents could be because this group is more represented in the urban areas, where the level of education is higher.

Figure 5.2.5. Members of private households by person's status in the household and education, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.

The analysis of population groups by family status and employment status reveals several trends: *first*, the employment level is the lowest among persons living alone; *second*, the employment level is the highest among single parents; and *third*, the

employment level in rural areas in all family status groups is lower than in urban areas (Table 5.2.1). The first trend results from the age structure of living alone; the second one could be related to the previously discussed level of education of single parents, and the third trend is determined by general differences in the economic situation in urban and rural areas.

Differences in the employment status of single parents, married persons, and cohabitants in rural and urban areas disclose important information on these types of families. Sixty-five percent of single parents are employed, and this is the highest level of employment compared to other family status groups (Table 5.2.1). The high employment level of this group obviously results from the age structure of this group (predominantly people younger than 50 years old). On the other hand, this could be caused by the household structure, in which one adult has to support children. Moreover, the rather high level of education of the members of this group ensures their mobility and better chances in the labour market. This is partially proved by the differences in the level of employment of this group in rural and urban areas. Although within the group of single parents the level of employment is lower in rural areas than in urban areas, compared to other groups living in rural areas, the employment level of single parents is highest.

Table 5.2.1. *Members of private households by person's status in the household and employment, percentages*

	Employed	Unemployed
Married		
Total	56.2	43.8
Urban	61.0	39.0
Rural	45.8	54.2
Cohabiting		
Total	48.1	51.9
Urban	55.7	44.3
Rural	36.1	63.9
Single parent		
Total	65.0	35.0
Urban	70.5	29.5
Rural	48.1	51.9
Living alone		
Total	33.0	67.0
Urban	39.7	60.3
Rural	15.9	84.1
Other		
Total	35.0	65.0
Urban	37.8	62.2
Rural	29.5	70.5

Source: 2001 Census.

Those who are married demonstrate a rather high level of employment as well (Table 5.2.1). Slightly more than half of them are employed, and the employment level is higher in urban than in rural areas. The total level of employment among cohabitants is lower than that of married people. A comparison of married people and cohabiting people according to level of employment in urban and rural areas provides interesting insights. Both married persons and cohabitants in urban areas are more often employed, whereas in rural areas – due to the lower total level of employment – they are more often unemployed. Nevertheless, the number of unemployed married persons in rural areas is 8 percent higher than it is in urban areas, while the number of unemployed cohabiting persons in rural areas is even 28 percent higher.

How can we interpret these differences and what do they tell us about cohabitation in rural areas in Lithuania? It could be assumed that the low level of employment among rural cohabitants is more a result of selective behaviour than of structural determinants (i.e. age structure,

employment opportunities). As has been discussed previously, cohabitants in rural areas are of working age and jobs, even though insufficient, are present in rural areas (as is shown by the higher level of employment among married people in rural areas). Considering this, we might suggest that rural cohabitants are the social group that reject the normative life course scenarios that prescribe specific marital and economic behaviour. It could be that rural cohabitants are the group that is extremely affected by anomy and that this is reflected in their employment choices and marital behaviour. On the other hand, is hard to identify the interaction between employment status and the choice to cohabit. It is possible that cohabitation is a result of low economic status and material deprivation. This form of partnership is chosen when there is the lack of sufficient material resources for establishing marriage as an emotional and long-term economic union. In this case, cohabitation may be a rational choice as a temporary solution to the situation. This type of cohabitation may be called “marriages of the poor” and resembles the ones that were common to poor industrial workers in several countries of Western Europe at the beginning of the 20th century (Kiernan, 2000).


5.2.3. LIFE COURSE EVENTS AND FAMILY STATUS

The interconnection between an individual’s family status and marital status reveals some segments of individual life course and gives us the modest opportunity to examine the character of family changes in Lithuanian society. Census data recorded only one event in an individual’s matrimonial history that preceded the existing family status, and this limits the scope of our analysis. Nevertheless, examination of the interconnections between the family and marital status sheds light on the process of the de-institutionalization of family in Lithuanian society. In this section, we will discuss the marital status of single parents and cohabitants in more detail, since these two family statuses reflect non traditional family arrangements.

Marital status of single parents. The majority of single parents in Lithuania are divorced (46.3 percent), but as many as one-fifth of single parents identified themselves as married (22.9 percent) (Fig. 5.2.6); 13.9 percent of single parents have never been married, and 16.8 percent are widowers (Fig. 5.2.6).

Almost half of single mothers are divorced (47.5 percent), whereas single fathers identified themselves as married (40.6 percent). One possible explanation for this could be attributed to the

Figure 5.2.6. Members of private households by person’s status in the household and marital status, percentages



Source: 2001 Census.

processes of international labour migration that affected Lithuanian society at the turn of the century.

There are significant differences in how the status of single parent is acquired in rural and urban areas. Although the general trend that almost half of single parents are divorced is sustained when disregarding the living area, there are some relevant differences. In rural areas, children more often live in households where the mother or father has never been married (in rural areas the percentage is 21.4 percent, and in urban areas it is 15.3 percent) or where one of the parents has died (19.8 percent and 11.9 percent respectively) (Annex 5.2.3).

Although divorce is one of the dominant reasons for the formation of single parent households in rural and urban areas, there are significant gender differences. Among single mothers in rural areas, the number of divorcees is lower than it is in urban areas (39.7 percent and 50 percent respectively), and the number of women who have never been married is higher (22.7 percent in rural areas and 16 percent in urban areas) (Annex 5.2.4). Slightly different trends are observed among single fathers. Among fathers, married single fathers prevail in urban areas (44.9 percent) and in rural areas the number of married single fathers equals that of divorced ones or widowers (Annex 5.2.4).

Marital status of cohabitants. Cohabitation has a different social meaning and role in various countries and this depends on the stage of the family transformation process that is in place. The role of cohabitation in the process of family transformation in the second half of the 20th century in industrialized countries shifted from cohabitation as trial marriage to cohabitation as indistinguishable from marriage (Kiernan, 2001; Kiernan, 2004; Heuveline and Timberlike, 2004; Liefbroer and Dourleijn, 2006; Sobotka and Toulemon, 2008).

With the trajectory of family changes in Lithuania in the 1990s in mind, it could be expected that the predominant majority of cohabitants recorded in the 2001 Population and Housing Census will get married. This assumption is supported by the results of studies conducted in the middle of the 1990s. These studies demonstrate that the proliferation of cohabitation in Lithuania started as a prelude to marriage (Stankuniene, 1997). Thus, it could be expected that the start of the proliferation of cohabitation opens the developmental process of cohabitation and that Lithuania with some delays will follow the paths of other industrialized countries.

The assumption that the prevailing role of cohabitations is a prelude to marriage can be proved only partially, however. Census data shows that 34.7 percent of cohabitants have been never married previously, while almost twice as many—65.3 percent—were married at a certain point in their lives (Fig. 5.2.6); 45.5 percent of the latter ones were divorced, and 11.8 percent were widowers (Fig. 5.2.6). Thus, a great part of cohabitants in Lithuania chose cohabitation as a reconstitution of the family after the dissolution of a previous marriage. This proves that at the beginning of the 21st century cohabitation in Lithuania was predominantly chosen not as a trial marriage or a prelude to marriage, but rather as a form of reconstitution of the family.

Moreover these results lead to the important conclusion that very different types of cohabitation coexist in Lithuanian society. We encounter cohabitation as trial marriages, the modern form of cohabitation. Apart from this, historically earlier types of cohabitation are common in Lithuania as well. These types of cohabitation are formed

as a way to reconstitute family after divorce or that death of a partner and were common to industrial societies prior to the family changes of the second half of the 20th century. The coexistence of traditional and modern forms of cohabitation is common in various industrial societies since the traditional forms are not completely replaced by the modern forms (Kiernan, 2002 in Hoem, Hoem, 1988). In light of this, the specifics of Lithuania are that the traditional forms historically were not common and that they have started to proliferate at the same time as the modern ones.

According to family status, cohabitants in rural and urban areas do not differ much and repeat previously discussed general trends (Annex 5.2.3). The share of cohabitation as a trial marriage and cohabitation as reconstitution of the family remains similar in rural and urban areas. Moreover, cohabitation prevails as a form of reconstitution of the family in rural and urban areas. Urban dwellers, however, choose it after divorce more often than rural dwellers (48.1 percent and 41.4 percent respectively), while rural dwellers pick it after the death of partner (9 percent in urban areas and 16.3 percent in rural areas) (Annex 5.2.3). This state is definitely influenced by general trends in divorce and mortality rates in rural and urban areas.

According to marital status, cohabiting men in rural and urban areas do not differ greatly: in urban and rural areas almost half of them are divorced, approximately one-third are single, and less than one-tenth are married. Yet the percentage of cohabiting widowers is significantly larger in rural areas than in urban ones (Annex 5.2.4). Even though women in urban and rural areas share the same general trend of choosing cohabitation as a way to reconstitute the family (the share of divorced women or widows is greater than that of those who have never been married), significant differences exist between rural and urban areas. The percentage of cohabiting women who have never been married in urban areas is 35.4 percent, whereas in rural areas it is 26.9 percent (Annex 5.2.4). Thus, it is possible to assume that cohabitation as a trial marriage is more common among women in urban than in rural areas. The latter prefer cohabitation as a way of reconstituting the family.

CONCLUSIONS

The main aim of this article was to discuss the character of the de-institutionalization of the family in Lithuania on the basis of the socio-demographic and socio-economic differentials of family status recorded in the 2001 Population and Housing Census. It has to be emphasized that the census provided the first statistical information about cohabitants in Lithuania.

Analysis of the population with the status of cohabitant demonstrates the dual character of the process of family de-institutionalization. This process combines traditional and modern features since cohabitation is entered into as a trial marriage and as a way of reconstitution of the family after the dissolution of a previous one. This duality is typical for all societies in which cohabitation was common in earlier historical periods as the reconstitution of family to certain social groups and in which it started to spread as a socially acceptable way of forming a family in the second half of the 20th century. Lithuania differs in that cohabitation was not common in earlier historical periods, and as a consequence traditional forms of cohabitation are spreading in parallel with modern ones.

The next important conclusion could be made on the basis of the socio-demographic and socio-economic analysis of cohabitants. Cohabitation as a way of family reconstitution is more common among middle-aged and elderly people in rural areas than in urban areas. In rural areas, unemployment is more common among cohabitants than among married people. Economic deprivation may be related to the marital behaviour of people in this social group, who choose cohabitation and form a marriage of the poor when faced with insufficient economic resources.

5.3. CHANGING MARITAL STATUS IN LITHUANIA IN 20th CENTURY

With the rapid and fundamental changes in the social, economic and cultural spheres that have been ongoing in Lithuania since the beginning of the 1990s, family is changing as well. The number of marriages has significantly dropped, marriages are postponed for an older age, and the proportion of married people is decreasing, while the proportion of single people who have never married is on the rise. Moreover, an increasing number of couples live in consensual union. As a result, the marital composition of the population is considerably changing.

With the use of population census data, the changes in the composition of the Lithuanian population by marital status and differences by sex, birth cohorts, and education are analyzed in the chapter.

5.3.1. POPULATION BY MARITAL STATUS

Changes in marital status

Population by marital status: general trend of changes. According to 1989 and 2001 census data, over the last decade of the 20th century the number of registered marriages decreased, marriage was postponed to an increasingly older age, and the rate of divorces remained at a high level. Consequently, the proportion of married people decreased considerably and the proportion of never-married and divorced people increased. The percentage of widowed people was also on the rise (Table 5.3.1). This was influenced by the ageing of the population and the corresponding increase in the proportion of elderly people, among which widows are quite numerous. Such a situation was also caused by the rather high mortality of males, which exceeds that of females.

Table 5.3.1. Males and females by marital status, 15 years of age and older, 1989 and 2001 population census data, percentages

Marital status	Males		Females	
	1989	2001	1989	2001
Married	68.0	60.7	58.9	51.6
Never married	24.6	28.2	18.7	21.1
Divorced	4.4	7.8	6.6	10.2
Widowed	2.8	3.2	15.6	17.0
No answer	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1

Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

Although between the 1989 and 2001 censuses the trend in the change in male and female marital status was similar, the compositions by marital status were quite different. In the male population, the share of married and never married is much higher than in the female component, the share of divorced is lower, and the share of widowed is significantly lower (Table 5.3.1). The indicators in table 5.3.1 cover all the population over 15 years of age, however. As we can see from table 5.3.2, the most significant changes in the marital status during the inter-census period are observed among the young males and females. According to the 1989 census, among males aged 20–24,

Table 5.3.2. *Proportion of married by age, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989 and 2001 population census data, percentages*

Age	1959	1970	1979	1989	2001
<i>Males</i>					
20–24	19.4	24.5	30.7	32.8	16.5
25–29	62.7	68.2	73.1	74.4	52.8
30–34	82.5	84.6	83.3	82.9	70.5
35–39	88.0	89.8	86.6	83.6	75.8
40–44	89.7	91.8	88.9	84.1	77.8
45–49	90.0	92.1	90.6	84.6	76.7
<i>Females</i>					
20–24	38.4	48.0	50.4	55.5	32.5
25–29	66.8	76.7	78.5	78.5	63.8
30–34	75.0	82.1	82.3	81.3	71.2
35–39	75.5	82.3	82.3	80.3	72.2
40–44	71.3	79.0	80.3	78.2	71.1
45–49	68.5	74.8	77.2	75.7	68.2

Sources: Pagrindiniai, 1990; Gyventojai, 2003; Demografičeskij, 1990; Itogi, 1971–1973; Itogi, 1975.

Table 5.3.3. *Proportion of people never married, divorced, and widowed by age, 1989 and 2001 population census data, percentages*

Age	Never married		Divorced		Widowed	
	1989	2001	1989	2001	1989	2001
<i>Males</i>						
20–24	65.8	82.4	0.8	0.8	0.1	0.0
25–29	22.2	42.0	3.0	4.9	0.1	0.1
30–34	11.5	19.5	5.2	9.7	0.3	0.2
35–39	8.5	11.8	7.3	11.8	0.5	0.5
40–44	6.6	8.6	8.2	12.6	1.0	0.9
45–49	5.6	7.8	8.1	13.9	1.6	1.6
<i>Females</i>						
20–24	41.8	65.0	2.2	2.1	0.2	0.2
25–29	15.3	26.1	5.5	9.1	0.6	0.9
30–34	9.0	13.1	8.3	13.8	1.3	1.9
35–39	6.3	9.0	10.9	15.6	2.5	3.1
40–44	5.3	7.3	12.0	16.7	4.4	4.8
45–49	5.1	6.3	11.7	17.6	7.5	7.9

Sources: Pagrindiniai, 1990; Gyventojai, 2003

married men accounted for one-third (32.8%), and according to the 2001 census, their share had fallen by half to only one in six (16.5%). The proportion of married women of this age fell from 55.5% to 32.5% correspondingly (Table 5.3.2). The proportions of married 25–29-year-old males and females have decreased significantly as well. Although in older age groups the change was not so pronounced, it was still quite perceptible until the age of 50 (Table 2).


In the last decade of the 20th century, the composition of the population by marital status experienced a significant change: the data of the 1959, 1970, 1979 and 1989 censuses testify to a regular increase in the proportion of married males and females at the age of 20–29 due to the “rejuvenation” of marriage and increase in the nuptiality level practically throughout the entire Soviet period, until the 1990s. An increase in the nuptiality level was observed among the population 30–49 years of age as well, but only until the 1970s (Table 5.3.2).

Over the past decade, a significant decrease in the share of married people under the age of 30 has taken place due to the decrease in marriage and the postponement of it to a later age. In this age group, the proportion of people who have never married increased accordingly. Given the high divorce rates that have persisted since the 1970s, the share of divorced people has increased even in the youngest age groups and has pulled down the percentage of married people. The proportion of married women in the youngest age groups was affected by the increasing mortality of young and middle-aged males that emerged in the mid 1960s and intensified in the 1990s, particularly in the middle of the decade (Table 5.3.2 and 5.3.3).

Population composition by marital status and age: the situation in 2001

Population composition by marital status and age: general trends. Even though the majority of the population is married, in terms of the composition of the Lithuanian population by marital status and employment in the age-sex pyramid, remarkable deformations are evident (Table 5.3.1, Annex 5.3.1). The asymmetry in the age-sex pyramid by marital status is striking: the complete dominance of widows on the right side of the pyramid (female side), as compared to the widowers on the left side of the pyramid (male side), is visible. Already starting from the youngest marriageable age groups, an increasing number of widows is evident, and amongst the females of 60–79 years of age the proportion and number of widows is remarkable: according to the 2001 census, there were 155,000 widows 60–79 years of age in Lithuania, which accounts for 42% of all the females of this age. Starting from the age of 70, widowhood becomes the dominating family situation for women in Lithuania (Table 5.3.1, Annex 5.3.1). According to the 2001 census, there are 258,300 widows living in Lithuania, which accounts for almost 9.2% of the population aged 15 and above (i.e. almost every ten Lithuanians aged 15 and above is a widow), and amongst the Lithuanian females of this age the proportion of widows is 17% (i.e. almost one-fifth of the females of this age).

Figure 5.3.1. Age-sex pyramid by marital status



Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

The left side of the pyramid (male side) is faintly “marked” with widowhood. The share and number of widowers throughout all the age groups are not significant. According to the census data, in 2001 there were 40,500 widowers in Lithuania, which constitutes 1.4% of the population aged 15 and above, or 3.2% of males of this age. Such remarkable differences between the widows and widowers come as a result of the considerable differences in the mortality rates of males and females in Lithuania.

In total, widows and widowers account for 10.7% of the Lithuanian population aged 15 and above.

Divorced people constitute a rather large share of the Lithuanian population. According to the census data, in 2001 there were 155,100 divorced females and 99,400 divorced males, i.e. there are 1.5 times more divorced females than divorced males. Divorced people account for 9.1% of the Lithuanian population (males and females) aged 15 and above. The largest share of divorced people is amongst the females aged 30–54 and the males aged 35–44. Evidently, this is the result of the high divorce rates that have prevailed in Lithuania for already more than 3 decades. The number of divorced people is not large in older age groups (amongst people aged 65 and above) (Table 5.3.1, Annex 5.3.1).

Although there is a widespread opinion concerning the instability of marriage and numerous remarriages, the share of people who do not live in their first marriage is not large and accounts for approximately 7% of all married males and females.

As is evident from the age-sex pyramid according to marital status, males who have never been married are mostly young and middle-aged, while females are mostly 55 years old and above.

Furthermore, the proportions of married males and females in terms of percentage are also very different. Married males account for 60.7% of all males aged 15 and above, and married females account for 51.6% of all females of this age (Annex 5.3.1), whereas amongst the age group of 30 and above, married males account for 76.6%, and married females make up 57.8%, which is almost 20 percentage points less. Males acquire the status of married at an older age, and until very old age it prevails (Annex 5.3.1). Females, on the other hand, get married at an earlier age, and at approximately the age of thirty the majority of them (approximately 70%) are already married. However, gradually, as the years go by, and from the age of 60 the proportion of married females shrinks fast and is replaced by a larger proportion of widows (Annex 5.3.1).

Urban and rural population by marital status. The composition of the urban population according to marital status is slightly more successful than that of the rural population, especially of males. Amongst the urban population aged 15 and above, the share of widowed people is much smaller, the share of married males is considerably larger amongst urban males and the share of people who have never married is smaller. True, there is a much bigger share of divorced females amongst urban females. In general, the urban population has slightly “improved” the overall composition of the population of the country in terms of marital status (Table 5.3.1, Table 5.3.4). Moreover, with the urban population accounting for two-thirds of the Lithuanian population, in principal it forms the age-sex pyramid of the population of the country by marital status. Since the shape of the age-sex pyramid by marital status of the population of the country and that of the urban population are remarkably similar, the age-sex pyramid according to the marital status of the latter is not presented in this article.

Regarding the age-sex pyramid of the rural population according to marital status, it is distinguished by especially large deformations (Fig. 5.3.2, Annex 5.3.2). There is a large number of widows amongst the rural population, in particular females aged 55–89, amounting to 44% of all females of this age (Gyventojai, 2003). A significant share of females who have never been married is pronounced amongst rural females aged 60–79, and especially amongst those aged 70–79.

Table 5.3.4. Urban and rural males and females by marital status, 2001, 15 years and older, percentages

Marital status	Urban		Rural	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Married	61.9	51.1	58.4	52.9
Never married	27.3	22.3	30.0	18.6
Divorced	7.9	11.8	7.5	6.7
Widowed	2.7	14.8	4.0	21.8
No answer	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1

Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

Figure 5.3.2. Age-sex pyramid by marital status in rural areas



Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

The composition of rural males by marital status, compared to urban males, is distinguished by a considerable number of men who have never married,

especially amongst males of an older age. According to the census data, amongst rural males aged 35–64, approximately 12.5% of males indicated the above marital status, while amongst urban males the proportion was accordingly 5.6% (Gyventojai, 2003). It could be assumed that rural males are not much “in demand” in the “marriage market”.

To conclude it can be stated that by marital status males and females, as well as the urban and the rural population, have significant differences in Lithuania. According to marital status, males are in a much more favourable situation than females: there are a considerably larger proportion of married males, a much smaller share of widowers, and a slightly smaller share of divorced males. The composition of the population by marital status is particularly unfavourable in rural areas: there are many widows among rural females and a large number of males who have never married.

Population composition by marital status, education, and birth cohorts

Various factors influence matrimonial behaviour and marital status, education being one of the major ones. However, as the study on the marital status of the population by birth cohort and education revealed, education is responsible for somewhat contrasting effects.


Education affects the marital status of males and females in different ways (Fig. 5.3.3, Annex 5.3.3). For males higher education (partly, post-secondary education, too) brings an advantage in “the marriage market”, whereas for females, the contrary is true. Males with a higher education in all analysed birth cohorts are more likely to get married and less likely to never get married, and a smaller proportion of them are divorced or widowed than males with any other type of education (Fig. 5.3.3, Annex 5.3.3). On the other hand, even though among females with a higher education the largest proportion is married (compared to females with any other type of education), a larger share has never been married. The postponement of marriage to a later age for the sake of education and a higher education correspondingly increase expectations about family life and create higher requirements for a future spouse and are perhaps important reasons accounting for the fact that approximately one-tenth of females with a higher education never marry. On the other hand, females with a higher education are less likely to become widows. Females with a higher education usually marry males with the same level of education, and as a result of the lower mortality rate of these males than males with lower education (Jasilionis et al, 2006), they are at significantly lower risk of becoming widows. Thus, the lower the education is, the larger the proportion of widows is (Annex 5.3.3). This is characteristic of all birth cohorts. In terms of the dependency of the proportion of divorced females on education, it is rather different in all birth cohorts. Even though among females of older birth cohorts (born in 1920–1944) the proportion of the divorced females is not large, the higher their education is, the larger the number of divorced females is. Such dependency is not evident in younger birth cohorts. Among females born in 1950–1969, the largest share of those who are divorced (almost one-fifth) is pronounced among females with secondary or basic education.

The marital status of males and females with a primary education should be analysed separately. Among the oldest birth cohorts, those born before the Second World War in particular, a large proportion of males and females have a primary education, and their low level of education was therefore not a factor differentiating their matrimonial behaviour. Persons belonging to younger birth cohorts usually receive only primary education due to objective reasons, such as health, however (Gečienė, 2006; Tretjakova, 2006). It is this particular factor that limits both their education and matrimonial behaviour.

A large proportion of married males with not just higher education but with any education are also evident among males of the oldest birth cohorts. Among males born in the 1950s and in the following decades (in the 1960s and later) however, the proportion of married males is much smaller than it is among males of older birth cohorts. In every younger birth cohort, the proportion of never married or divorced males (in rural areas, in particular) is gradually increasing. These males belong to the same birth cohorts as the females who have become one step ahead of them in terms of education (Gečienė, 2006). As a result, relations in “the marriage market” have correspondingly changed not in favour of males.

To conclude it can be stated that in terms of marriage, males of all birth cohorts with a higher education are in the most favourable situation, whereas males who have an education lower than secondary and were born in the second half of the 20th century (after 1950) are in the most disadvantaged situation. The marital situation for females in terms of education is less contradictory. A slightly larger proportion of never married females is among those with a higher education and among young females with a lower than secondary education (Fig. 5.3.3, Annex 5.3.3). If not including the oldest females (born in 1920–1929), the majority of which are widows, it could be concluded that in terms of education the most “unsuccessful” females are the ones with secondary and basic education, since they are more likely to divorce or become widowed.

Figure 5.3.3. Continue



Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

5.3.3. TIMING OF FIRST MARRIAGE BY BIRTH COHORTS


Changes in the debut of matrimonial behaviour by birth cohort and age at first marriage. The census data provides the possibility of not only taking a “snapshot” of the population by marital status during the census, but also taking a closer look at it: analyzing the changes in matrimonial behaviour during a specific period in Lithuania, the time and intensity at which the population of the specific birth cohort shifts from being single to married and the nuptiality level that a specific birth cohort reaches at a certain age.

The trajectories of the debut (the first marriage) of the matrimonial behaviour of various birth cohorts can portray Lithuania’s historical fate, its losses and recuperations, and the effect that has on matrimonial behaviour can be assessed.

The information provided in Fig. 5.3.4 and Table 5.3.5 indicates that birth cohorts are considerably different in terms of the debut of matrimonial behaviour: the shift to the status of married differs according to age; a different nuptiality level is reached by the first marriage. As cumulative percentages of the first marriage by age at first marriage show, the trajectories of the matrimonial behaviour of the various cohorts born in 1920–1979 can be classified according to three patterns: *distorted matrimonial behaviour, marriage “rejuvenation”, and marriage “ageing”* (Fig. 5.3.4).

The pattern of deformed matrimonial behaviour. The cohorts born in the 1930s (as Fig. 5.3.4 shows, these are the cohorts born in 1920, 1925 and 1930) have suffered dramatic losses not only in terms of population (deaths during the times of war and post-war, deportations, emigration, etc.) but also in marital life. The trajectories of the debut of matrimonial behaviour of these birth cohorts are inconsistent and much delayed, and the nuptiality level attained by first marriage is much lower than that of the more recent cohorts. The birth cohort of females born in 1920 is still characteristic of an intense “start” of matrimonial behaviour. More than one-fourth (26.2%) of the females of this birth cohort were married by the age of 20 (before the beginning of the Second World War). However, the females of this birth cohort aged 21 and above acquired marital status at a considerably slower pace, which remained rather slow for approximately 10 years until they reached the age of 27–28 (they reached this age during the times of war, post-war resistance, and deportations). Despite the fact that many females of this birth cohort got married at a later age, their nuptiality level reached by the first marriage still remained rather low, i.e. married females aged 34 accounted for 78% (Fig. 5.3.4, Table 5.3.5). On the other hand, males of this birth cohort in general did not started getting married before the Second World War (the proportion of married males who attained the age of 20 was only 4.1%). Subsequently, war and the resistance postponed their matrimonial behaviour to a considerable extent, and even though their nuptiality level reached by the first marriage began increasing as the years went by, it nevertheless remained low by the time they reached 34 years of age (Fig. 5.3.4, Table 5.3.5). It could be that males of this birth cohort were still following the late marriage pattern that had been characteristic in Lithuania, as well as in Western Europe, for a long time (Hajnal, 1965). But it is more likely that the debut of the matrimonial behaviour of this cohort of males was postponed by war and especially the post-war resistance.

Figure 5.3.4. Cumulative percentages of first marriage by age at first marriage and birth cohort



Source: 2001 Census.

Right from the beginning of marriageable age, the matrimonial behaviour of females and males of the 1925 and 1930 birth cohorts was remarkably slowed down (as a result of the obvious consequences of the aforementioned historical events), and although it eventually intensified, the nuptiality level remained low, in particular among females. Certainly, the lower nuptiality level among the females of this birth cohort was also influenced by the disproportion in the numbers of males and females created during the war and post-war years.

Marriage “rejuvenation” pattern. Subsequent birth cohorts are “marked” with marriage “rejuvenation”, i.e. the matrimonial behaviour debut was becoming younger with every younger birth cohort born in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, and the nuptiality level attained by the first marriage was increasing. Curves indicating cumulative percentages of the first marriage form an increasingly higher trajectory (Fig. 5.3.4, Table 5.3.5). This process lasted for approximately 4 decades. Basically, the earliest and highest nuptiality rates are specific to the birth cohorts born in 1960 (Fig. 5.3.4, Table 5).


Table 5.3.5. Cumulative percentages of first marriage by birth cohort at age of 20, 25, 30 and 34

Age	Year of birth						
	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975
	Males						
20	4.1	4.9	4.9	6.8	8.3	9.3	10.3
25	22.9	33.1	45.0	57.4	63.2	54.7	42.3
30	59.9	74.5	75.5	77.7	80.8	69.7	
34	74.4	84.8	83.0	82.4	84.6		
	Females						
20	26.2	16.3	21.9	25.8	27.7	34.6	30.6
25	54.8	51.6	63.1	72.2	73.5	71.0	61.6
30	72.4	75.9	81.5	83.9	85.1	78.7	
34	78.0	82.2	86.2	86.7	87.8		

Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

Marriage “ageing” pattern. The trajectories of the curves indicating the cumulative percentages of first marriage by birth cohorts born in the early and mid 1960s start declining. This indicates the beginning of marriage “ageing” (Fig. 5.3.4, Fig. 5.3.5). These birth cohorts first of all began postponing marriage to an older age in Lithuania in the period of the beginning of political, social, and economic transformations of the 1990s, and later postponement of marriage accelerated due to the start of the Second Demographic Transition in Lithuania as well. The start of marriage “ageing” was quite controversial due to political conditions, however. This is mostly evident in the matrimonial behaviour of birth cohorts born in the period of time mentioned above. A rather large share of people born in the early 1970s got married at a considerably young age, i.e. at the age of 18–21, which is earlier than the age at which the males and females of the preceding birth cohort got married. During the period of Lithuania’s revival and in the first years of independence, before the Soviet troops withdrew from Lithuania, one of the ways for young males to avoid military service in the Soviet Army was to get married and have children (the number of marriages and births increased at that particular time).

Figure 5.3.5. Cumulative percentages of first marriage by age at first marriage and birth cohort. 1960–1980 birth cohorts



Source: 2001 Census.

Thus, the nuptiality rates reached by the first marriage of both males and females of slightly older birth cohorts are noticeably lower (Fig. 5.3.5). With every younger birth cohort born in the 1970s, the males and females are less likely to get married at an early age: the trajectories of cumulative percentages of first marriage trace an increasingly lower line (Fig. 5.3.5). This is characteristic of males, in particular.

CONCLUSIONS

In the past 15 years or more, the number of marriages has significantly dropped, people have been getting married at an older age, and an increasing number of couples have been living in consensual union. Divorce rates have been high and rather unstable over several decades. Characteristics specific to a traditional family are fading away and are increasingly being replaced by the characteristics specific to a modern family. This is evident from the demographic statistical data.

Census data allows taking a closer look at the changes in matrimonial behaviour that have been taking place over the past 5 or 6 decades and reveals differences in the marital status by age, sex, birth cohorts, education, and place of residence in Lithuania.

Research shows that matrimonial behaviour is different depending on birth cohorts. As cumulative percentages of the first marriage by age at first marriage show, the trajectories of the matrimonial behaviour of various birth cohorts (born in 1920–1975) can be classified according to three patterns: *deformed matrimonial behaviour*, *marriage “rejuvenation”*, and *marriage “ageing”*. The pattern of deformed matrimonial behaviour is characteristic of the oldest birth cohorts (born in the 1920s) as a result of the war, post-war resistance, and deportations: the beginning of matrimonial behaviour was postponed especially among males, and a rather large proportion of females never married. Subsequent birth cohorts demonstrate marriage “rejuvenation”, i.e. the debut of matrimonial behaviour became younger with every younger birth cohort born in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, while the nuptiality level attained by the first marriage increased. Marriages in the birth cohorts born in the early and mid 1960s are gradually “getting older”, however. These birth cohorts began postponing marriage to an older age due to recent changes.

Changes in the pattern of matrimonial behaviour, the destabilisation of families, and high differences in the mortality rates of males and females in Lithuania influence the dynamics and the special nature of the composition of the population by marital status. Since throughout Soviet times marriages were “getting younger” and the nuptiality level was rising, the shares of males and females married at a young age was on the increase. However, as a result of the beginning of the family transformation process and the fact that differences in the mortality rate of males and females remain large, between the 1989 and 2001 censuses the number of married persons significantly dropped, while the number of persons who never lived in a marriage or were divorced or widowed increased. Differences in the marital status of males and females have become considerably large: among males there is a much larger proportion of those who are married and those who have never lived in a marriage, a smaller proportion of those who are divorced, and a much smaller proportion of widowed males than females. Married males account for 76.6% of males aged 30 and above, whilst married females

account for 57.8% of the females of this age. Males get married at an older age, and from then until a very advanced age males with such a marital status dominate (Annex 5.3.1). Females, on the other hand, get married at an early age, and at approximately the age of 30 the majority of them (approximately 70%) are already married. However, gradually as the years go by and quickly from the age of 60 the proportion of married women shrinks and is replaced by a proportion of widows. Widows account for 17% of females aged 15 and above in Lithuania.

The composition of the population by marital status is especially unfavourable in rural areas: there is a large number of widows among rural females (widows aged 55 and above account for almost half of rural females), while among rural males there is a large number who have never married (males aged 35–64 who have never married account for 12.5% of rural males).

In terms of marital status, males with a higher education are in a more favourable situation, whereas males who have an education lower than secondary level and were born in the second half of the 20th century (after 1950) are in the most disadvantaged situation. The marital situation for females in terms of education is less contradictory. A slightly larger share of females who have never lived in a marriage include those with a higher education, as well as young females with a lower than secondary education.

5.4. CHILDBEARING IN LITHUANIA: THE CHANGING PATTERNS

A population census provides a lot of additional information on fertility. This information is retrospective and enables us to have better insight into long-term fertility changes and make an evaluation of the childbearing behaviour patterns of different birth cohorts by age at first birth, by number of births, and by the percentage of women who have not given birth. This kind of information is unfortunately rather limited for the birth cohorts of women still in their reproductive age.

This chapter offers a more detailed analysis of the background for the recent fertility changes in Lithuania: an evaluation will be made of the childbearing behaviour of women of different birth cohorts and different educational levels.

5.4.1. FERTILITY CHANGES: A LONG-TERM TREND

As seen from the dynamics of the total fertility rate, actually throughout the whole post-war period a trend towards a decline in fertility was typical for Lithuania (see: chapter 2, fig. 2.1.3). The increase in fertility rates observed in the late 1960 through the early 1970s and in the mid 1980s was not too prominent and did not affect the general trend towards fertility decline. In the post-war period, with Lithuania turning into an industrial country, a shift in the pattern of demographic development which included a decrease of fertility from a high level typical for an agrarian society to the level ensuring a normal replacement of generations (where total fertility rate is close to 2) was taking place. Such a level of fertility was achieved in Lithuania at the beginning of the 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s. Compared with the EU-27, the fertility level of Lithuania in 1990 was still among the high ones. The total fertility rate in Lithuania in 1990 stood at 2.03. At that time, in the “old” EU countries the total fertility rate was higher only in Sweden (2.13) and Ireland (2.11), and in the “new” EU countries it was higher only in Slovenia (2.09), Poland (2.05), and Estonia (2.04) (Recent, 2004).

However, over the last decade of the 20th century, fertility in Lithuania started declining, and the process occurred at a faster rate than in most other countries. The lowest low fertility appeared in the first years of the current century: the total fertility rate of 2002–2005 was below 1.3 (was shifting between 1.24 and 1.27)³. Although a few years later fertility started rising slowly, the total fertility rate nevertheless remained at a very low level (1.35 in 2007). That year in the 27 EU countries slightly lower fertility was registered only in Italy (1.34), Poland (1.27), Malta (1.30), Slovakia (1.25), Romania (1.29), and Hungary (1.32) (Demographic, 2008).

The dynamics of the indicator would suggest that over the last 17 years a transition from a two-child family to a one-child family has occurred, i.e. the one-child

³ Total fertility rate below 1.3 is called *the lowest low fertility* (Kohler et. al, 2002).

family has become the prevalent one. The indicator merely shows, however, the average number of children born to the conventional birth cohort of women. Thus, do first births nowadays usually become the only births? To answer this question and to make an assessment of the actual situation, a more comprehensive study is required. We will therefore proceed with an analysis of the fertility rates of different birth cohorts and different socio-demographic groups based on 2001 population census data.

5.4.2. FERTILITY BY BIRTH COHORT


Population census data provide an opportunity to evaluate the changes in fertility by birth cohort. The most valuable and accurate information in this respect is however available only for the birth cohorts of which the representatives have already completed/are close to completing their fertility practices, i.e. women past reproductive age. For all that however, women aged over forty, as seen from the vital statistics, give birth to slightly less than 2% of each year's infants (Demographic, 2006). Thus along with the evaluation of fertility changes in Lithuania by birth cohort using census data, a more detailed analysis of the childbearing behaviour of the 1920–1959 birth cohort females is made, i.e. the women aged over 41 at the time of the census. Actually, these are birth cohorts of women whose the childbearing behaviour was unaffected by the recent fertility changes. In this chapter, the childbearing behaviour of younger women (born in 1960–1984) is only given partial treatment (on the basis of census data) since these women have not yet finished their childbearing career.

Average number of children born

Average number of children born by birth cohort: overall situation. In each subsequently younger birth cohort, women give birth to fewer children (Fig 5.4.1, Table 5.4.1). The average number of children born to the oldest birth cohort under analysis (born in 1920–1929) is still close to 3 (2.73), while for youngest cohort (born in 1950–1959) it is approaching 2 (2.1), which seemingly demonstrates a transition from a three- to a two-child family. Nevertheless, the census data testify to rather varied practices adopted by women of different socio-demographic groups.

Average number of children born in urban and rural areas. Fertility changes took different paths in urban and rural areas. The average number of children born to all the 1930–1959 birth cohort urban females differs insignificantly and slowly went down, with minor fluctuations, from 2.18 (born in 1930) to 1.89 (born in 1959) (Table 5.4.1, Fig 5.4.1). It could be assumed that fertility rates of even the

Figure 5.4.1. Average number of children born by birth cohort



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

Table 5.4.1. *Average number of children born to women by birth cohort*

Women's birth cohort	Total	Urban	Rural
1920–1929	2.73	2.37	3.19
1930–1939	2.39	2.06	2.90
1940–1949	2.19	1.93	2.71
1950–1959	2.10	1.92	2.59

Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

oldest urban female birth cohorts under analysis (born in 1920–1929) are in fact much lower, and the average number of children born is also close to two and not to 2.37, as testified to by census data (Table 5.4.1, Fig 5.4.1). As a matter of fact, quite a sizeable portion of the elderly rural females (aged 70 and over at the time of the census) had moved to urban localities to stay with their children. It could therefore be assumed that a

considerable share of the women of the oldest cohort identified during the census as urban dwellers were actually rural women who had given birth to a perceivably larger number of children than urban women. The latter circumstance could influence the quite significant increase in the number of children born to the oldest cohort urban dwellers. This leads to the conclusion that the average number of children born to urban women was close to two and equally applicable to all the 1920–1959 birth cohorts.

Meanwhile, in rural areas fertility still remains high, with an average of 2.59 children per woman (Table 5.4.1, Fig 5.4.1), even among the youngest cohorts being analysed (born in 1950–1959) and even though it has been decreasing in each subsequently younger birth cohort, demonstrating that before the decline in fertility in the late 20th century large families still prevailed in rural areas.

As a summary, it could be argued that over the period from the 1940s to the early 1990s, when the women of the 1920–1959 birth cohorts were giving birth, fertility in Lithuania was actually declining due to the reducing fertility practices of rural dwellers. Account should however be taken of the intensive industrialization and urbanisation process in the country, which drastically reduced the proportion of rural population during the period (in 1950 rural residents accounted for 72% of the overall population of Lithuania [Lietuvos, 1991], and in 1990 they accounted for 32% [Demographic, 2006]). Furthermore, against the background of the rapidly increasing urban population and declining rural population of the second half of the 20th century, the drop in fertility of the country was also undoubtedly conditioned by structural factors: from the early 20th century the proportion of rural women noted for higher fertility rates was decreasing and that of urban women, with the average number of children per women being close to two, was rising. Structural elements were therefore important factors in the decline in the total fertility rate in Lithuania in the 1950–1990.

Average number of children born by mother's education. The differences in the fertility rate are even greater by the groups of all the 1930–1959 birth cohort women with different educational levels. The lowest fertility rates are registered for the women with higher education (average number of births is 1.75) and city dwellers (1.71), with particularly low rates demonstrated by Vilnius residents of this education group (1.65), while is the case for women with only primary or even lower education coupled with rural residence (Table 5.4.2). The difference between the average number of children born to the highest-educated (higher) and the lowest-educated (under primary) women is 1.4 children. In cities the difference is considerably lower than in villages (correspondingly 1.09 and 1.37), in Vilnius being only 0.85.

Table 5.4.2. Average number of children born to women aged 15 years and older by education

	Total	Urban	Rural	Vilnius
<i>Total</i>	2.13	1.89	2.62	1.73
Higher	1.75	1.71	2.01	1.65
College ¹	1.91	1.78	2.25	1.66
Secondary	2.00	1.82	2.43	1.69
Basic	2.25	1.98	2.63	1.87
Primary	2.80	2.44	3.11	2.21
Under primary	3.15	2.80	3.38	2.50

¹ Including secondary specialised. Hereinafter college education also covers specialised secondary education.
Source: 2001 Census.

Here two seemingly opposite poles of the fertility patterns are revealed, with higher educated urban women at one end, and lower educated rural women at the other. Still, the data presented in table 5.4.2 show average fertility indicators of all female birth cohorts under analysis (from those born at the beginning of the 20th century to those born at the end of the century) by education, and thus they supply highly approximate information about fertility rates and reflect just an overall trend: the higher the education level of a woman is, the fewer children she has. Such an assertion should be verified by different cohorts.

Average number of children born by education and birth cohort. The differences in the average number of children born to women with different levels of education are significant in all the cohorts, the youngest ones included (Table 5.4.3).

Table 5.4.3. Average number of children born to women by birth cohort and education, women of 1920–1959 birth cohorts

Women's birth cohort	Total	Higher	College ¹	Secondary	Basic	Primary	Under primary
<i>Total</i>							
1920–1959	2.30	1.84	2.00	2.16	2.46	2.78	3.07
1920–1929	2.73	1.87	2.08	2.35	2.43	2.89	3.18
1930–1939	2.39	1.79	1.95	2.18	2.32	2.67	2.97
1940–1949	2.19	1.83	1.98	2.10	2.46	2.79	3.05
1950–1959	2.10	1.87	2.03	2.18	2.80	3.13	3.43
<i>Urban</i>							
1920–1959	2.09	1.80	1.87	1.98	2.14	2.39	2.67
1920–1929	2.37	1.85	2.01	2.13	2.23	2.55	2.86
1930–1939	2.06	1.74	1.85	1.97	2.09	2.29	2.50
1940–1949	1.93	1.78	1.85	1.93	2.11	2.28	2.31
1950–1959	1.92	1.82	1.89	1.98	2.28	2.56	2.77
<i>Rural</i>							
1920–1959	2.75	2.12	2.38	2.66	2.97	3.10	3.31
1920–1929	3.19	2.10	2.42	3.18	2.97	3.20	3.39
1930–1939	2.90	2.11	2.32	2.80	2.79	3.00	3.23
1940–1949	2.71	2.08	2.35	2.55	2.94	3.11	3.36
1950–1959	2.59	2.16	2.42	2.62	3.29	3.52	3.68

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

The average number of children born to higher educated women in all birth cohorts being analysed is the lowest and also the most stable. More pronounced differences are only revealed among the urban and rural dwellers of that level of education. The average number of children born to urban dwellers in all cohorts being analysed is close to 1.8 (inter-cohort fluctuation is between 1.74 and 1.85), while among rural dwellers it is 2.1 (2.08 and 2.16 respectively). Fertility rate differences between different cohorts of college-, basic- and primary-educated women are not much greater, either. These differences are more significant only among women with a secondary education, notably in the countryside. The trend is clear: fertility is dropping with each younger birth cohort. The average number of children born to the urban 1920–1929 cohort women is 2.13, and the average number of children born to the 1940–1959 cohort is 1.93–1.98. In rural areas, these figures are correspondingly 3.18 and 2.55–2.62 (Table 5.4.3).

The childbearing behaviour of the 1950–1959 birth cohort women deserves special consideration. Both in the city and countryside and regardless of educational background, this cohort stands out by higher fertility rates than the preceding birth cohort (of 1940–1949) and disrupts the regular cohort to cohort decreased fertility trend (Table 5.4.3).

The most plausible explanation regarding the number of children born to women of this cohort would be that at the time of the introduction of the family support arrangements of the early 1980s, which started in 1982 (childbirth allowances, paid child care leave until the age of 1 year and unpaid leave until the age of a year and a half, etc.), this group of women were at the peak of their fertility behaviour (aged 23–32). The period total fertility rate, which in 1983–1988 had increased to over 2 (fluctuating between 2.02 and 2.12) must have not only been an effect of the shifting timing of births (Stankūnienė, 1989), but also signified an increase in the fertility level in different socio-demographic groups of women (by education and place of residence). Attention should be paid to the fact, however, that the fertility indicators of the 1950–1959 birth cohort women rose the highest among the rural dwellers with the lowest education level. Since at the same time important structural changes in this group of women were taking place – the proportion of women with the lowest fertility indicators (urban dwellers with a higher education) was increasing and the proportion of the women with still rather high fertility indicators (rural dwellers with a low level of education) was decreasing – the structural changes among these socio-demographic groups were obviously larger in scope than the increase in fertility registered within the groups, and thus the overall fertility rates of the cohort in question were declining further, albeit at a slower pace (Table 5.4.3).

An unrelated analysis of the fertility level of the 1960–1984 birth cohort in which the women were still of fertile age at the time of the census (those who were aged 20–40 and less and whose childbearing career was not yet finished and whose childbearing behaviour was already affected by the changes of the recent years) showed significant differences in childbearing behaviour by education: the lower the education level of the women, the larger the number of children born (Table 5.4.4). Women of the 1960–1974 birth cohorts with basic or primary education have attained a special status of childbearing practices. They differ from the women of other education levels by the substantially larger number of children born. Still in their fertile years, these women

were already raising two, three, or more children (correspondingly by education and cohort, the average number of children born was 2.36–3.30) (Table 5.4.4). This is especially true for rural women. Thus the census shows that less educated women born in 1960–1969 were distinguished by a much larger number of children, and the difference in the number of children born to women with a high and a low level of education is even higher than in older cohorts, notably in the rural areas. In the oldest cohorts (born 1920–1929) the difference was close to one child (Table 5.4.3), and for example in the 1965–1969 birth cohort it was more than 1.5 (Table 5.4.3, Table 5.4.4).

Table 5.4.4. Average number of children born to women by birth cohort and education, women of 1960–1984 birth cohorts

Women's birth cohort	Total	Higher	College ¹	Secondary	Basic	Primary
1960–1964	2.03	1.83	1.98	2.15	2.71	3.22
1965–1969	1.88	1.67	1.85	2.00	2.36	3.30
1970–1974	1.63	1.40	1.60	1.67	1.94	2.22
1975–1979	1.34	1.15	1.21	1.31	1.51	1.69
1980–1984	1.13		1.05	1.08	1.17	1.32

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

It can be seen that education is an even stronger determinant of fertility level than place of residence. The rapidly growing level of education of women is therefore an important factor in the decline of fertility.

Childless women

Childless women by birth cohort and education. Fertility level is also affected by the proportion of women who have never given birth in the total female population. It is usually considered that due to natural reasons about 5% of women remain childless at the end of their childbearing period. The size of this indicator is however usually influenced by various social, economic (economic crises, etc.), or even political (wars, etc.) factors that modify the proportion of childless women.

As seen from the census data, the proportion of childless women among the females of cohorts past their childbearing age (i.e. born in 1920–1959) varies significantly, from 8% to 14.5%. A particularly large percentage of childless women (14.5%) is seen in the birth cohort of 1920–1929 (Table 5.4.6). The best years of fertility behaviour of those women were overshadowed by WWII, the post-war resistance struggle, and the deportations of the Lithuanian population to Siberia (1940–1950). The most pronounced indicators in this respect are for the women born in 1922–1925: over 15% of those women never gave birth. A high proportion of childless 1920–1929 birth cohort women is found among the ones with higher education – more than one in five (Table 5.4.5).

In general, the percentage of childless women by education varies in different cohorts. In the oldest cohort under analysis (1920–1939), the proportion of childless women by education is similar, except that it is slightly higher portion for the ones with no primary education and much higher for those with a higher education (Table 5.4.5).

In the younger cohorts under analysis (born in 1940–1959), the proportion of childless women by education tends to vary quite noticeably: a much larger proportion of such women is seen among those with the lowest level of education, and for those with a higher education the figure is about twice as large as it is for those with other levels of education, e.g. college, secondary or basic, while in the 1940–1949 birth cohort it is also true for women with a primary education. Specifically, this education group of the 1940–1959 cohorts has the lowest percentage of childless women, fluctuating in the range of 5.6–7.7% (Table 5.4.5) and actually at the natural level of infertile women.

Table 5.4.5. Percentage of women who have never given birth

Women's birth cohort	Total	Higher	College ¹	Secondary	Basic	Primary	Less than primary
1920–1929	14.5	21.2	15.0	14.7	14.3	13.5	15.8
1930–1939	10.5	16.0	9.5	9.8	9.5	9.6	12.7
1940–1949	8.0	12.4	7.7	7.0	5.6	6.5	21.9
1950–1959	8.2	12.1	6.9	6.5	6.3	16.3	74.3
1960–1964	8.4	13.0	6.9	6.2	9.7	25.8	89.0
1965–1969	10.4	16.5	8.5	7.8	10.9	24.7	82.4
1970–1974	18.4	32.6	16.6	14.0	13.6	27.1	81.9
1975–1979	47.0	70.5	54.0	43.2	29.5	29.3	83.0
1980–1984	88.8	x	83.7	89.1	89.0	87.1	90.2

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

A much larger proportion in the 1940–1959 birth cohorts of women with primary and lower education who have never given birth is evidently an outcome of growing female education and change in the education scheme (introduction of mandatory basic and later secondary education). Actually all the women of the cohort who had access to schooling acquired at least basic education. Those with a very low level of education were mostly the ones with health problems. This assumption is confirmed by census data: handicapped people have a much lower level of education (Gečienė, 2006; Tretjakova, 2006). Many women in this group do not marry and remain childless. The latter circumstance might be responsible for a slightly higher percentage of women with primary and lower education of older cohort never giving birth (Table 5.4.5).

Among the women still in their childbearing years (born in 1960 and later, which at the time of the census were 40 years of age or less) the proportion of childless women by education varies greatly: moderate among those with a college, secondary or basic education, considerably higher among those with a higher education, and very high among those with primary or less schooling. It is clear that the indicator parameters of the youngest cohort women have been influenced by combination of the trajectories of education attainment, consolidation on labour market and matrimonial and fertility behaviour. Lower-educated women have their children earlier in life than women with higher education, and the chances both for having family and children are rather limited for the lowest-educated women.

As a summary, it could be maintained that, in all birth cohorts, women with a higher education account for the highest percentage of women who have never given birth. These women not only have fewer children, but a considerably larger portion does


not have children at all. Among the women of other education levels, the percentage of childless women is similar, with the exception of those women with the lowest level of education (for whom the proportion of childlessness is much higher), who number very few in the youngest cohorts and whose socio-demographic behaviour is hindered by a health condition.

Territorial variation in percentage of childless women. The proportion of young women of childbearing age who have never given birth is a parameter indicative of postponement of births to an older age. As seen from the data, about 18% of the women aged 25–34 at the time of the census still had not given birth.

The differences of the indicator by territories are great (Fig 5.4.2). At the national level, a high percentage of childless women at the age of 25–34 is evidently predetermined by the extremely high values of the indicator in major cities of Lithuania: in Vilnius women of this age who have never given birth account for almost 28%.

Figure 5.4.2. Percentage of 25–34-year-old women who have never given birth in the overall female population of respective age, by district/municipality

2001 Population and Housing Census data



Besides economic dynamics, the major cities are the sites of most universities and other educational institutions, and thus in pursuit of education and employment goals, a large portion of city dwellers intentionally postpone the debut of fertility practices for an older age.

Singling out the territories with the most clearly pronounced indicators of 25–34-year-old women who have never given birth is not easy, but in figure 5.4.2 it can be seen that for the north-eastern, eastern and central districts a higher percentage of childless women of this age is typical, while in the western part of the country it is lower. A low proportion of women of this age who have never given birth is seen in a compact area covering Tauragė, Šilalė and Šilutė districts and Pagėgiai and Rietavas municipalities.


Changes of first birth trajectory by mother's age and birth cohort

Change in childbearing behaviour debut by mother's age and birth cohort: general trend. Census data provide the opportunity to view the changing debut trajectory of childbearing behaviour (birth of first child) by birth cohort and mother's age at the time of childbirth.

The childbearing behaviour debut stories of women in different birth cohorts between 1920 and 1960 vary a lot (Fig 5.4.3). This is actually a picture of the historical fate of Lithuania and its impact on the fertility behaviour of women by birth cohorts. Despite significant differences in the debut of childbearing behaviour by cohorts, some regularity can be seen. First, as shown by figure 5.4.3, in each cohort younger than the beginning of the 20th century (1920) up to the 1960s, the proportion of women that gave birth to at least one child is increasing. The cumulative percentage of women with one child at the age of 45 increased from 83% (1920 birth cohort) to 90–91% (birth cohort of the 1950s–1960s). In figure 5.4.3, these cohorts are represented by cohorts of women born from 1950 to 1960. Second, a trend toward earlier first childbirth becomes visible in each younger cohort. Third, in each younger cohort of women, the maximum cumulative percentage of first childbirth is reached earlier and earlier in life, i.e. first children were born to women at an increasingly younger age, the debut of childbearing behaviour was taking place earlier, and an increasingly higher proportion of women had the debut, i.e. had at least one childbirth. The debut of childbearing behaviour of each subsequently younger birth cohort between 1920 and 1959 was taking place earlier and becoming more intensive.

In different cohorts however, this trend is not consistent, with deviations from the general trend of change, and even with a hint of a new trend observed. The childbearing behaviour debut trajectories of the 1920, 1925 and 1930 birth cohorts clearly demonstrate what effect the blows of Lithuania's historical fate had on demographic behaviour. Women born in 1920 started childbearing behaviour (had their first births) much earlier and more vigorously than of the subsequent cohorts (1925 and 1930). Later however, when they turned 25 (this began around 1945), the childbearing behaviour slowed down considerably and at the end of the childbearing age of this cohort, the percentage of women who gave birth remained much lower: at the age of 45 the cumulative percentage of women who gave birth equalled 83%. Evidently, the post-war deportations and resistance movement not only postponed but also restricted to a significant extent the childbearing behaviour of women of this cohort.

Figure 5.4.3. Cumulative percentage of women having first live birth by mother's age and birth cohort



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).


Similar reasons might be suspected at work in the fertility behaviour of the cohort of women born in 1925. Actually, the women of this cohort reached the age of 20 in 1945. A considerable portion of women of this cohort postponed their childbearing behaviour for a later period, and the maximum cumulative percentage achieved is at the same level as that of the women of the 1920 birth cohort. Thus the childbearing behaviour of this cohort was also encumbered a great deal.

The trajectory of childbearing behaviour debut of the 1930 birth cohort women is also somewhat retarded, but at the age of 25 (from 1955, when a more peaceful period set in) the debut of the childbearing behaviour of the women of this cohort becomes more active, and by the end of their fertile age considerably more women than in previous cohorts had given birth to at least one child.

In the trajectory of the debut of childbearing behaviour of the later birth cohorts, an evident rejuvenation and intensification is observed (Fig 5.4.3). The trend becomes more conspicuous in the cumulative percentage dynamics of women of the 1950s and 1960s birth cohorts: the childbearing behaviour of the women born in those years is distinguished by rather early first births and by the fact that at the age of 30 approximately 90% of the cohort had already given birth. Among the women of this cohort, the proportion of those never having given birth is the lowest. These are the cohorts in which the fertile age or at least the first childbirth period was finished prior to the latest fertility changes that started at the end of the 20th century.

From the cohort of women born in the 1970s, the trajectory of the debut of fertility behaviour started a definite change (Fig 5.4.3, Fig 5.4.4).

Figure 5.4.4. Cumulative percentage of the first live birth of women by mother's age, women of 1965–1980 birth cohorts



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

In each subsequently younger cohort, the curve of the cumulative percentage of childbearing behaviour has been getting lower and lower, i.e. the debut of childbearing behaviour at a young age is becoming less common, resulting at best in a postponement to an older age, if any at all. Since during the census the childbearing period for these women was not yet finished, drawing final conclusions about childbearing behaviour on the basis of the census is not appropriate.

Debut of childbearing behaviour by mother's age and education. At the national level, the change in the trajectory of the debut of childbearing behaviour by age was affected the most by the changes in childbearing behaviour of women with a secondary education, because the trajectory of the debut of the childbearing behaviour of this group of women experienced the most pronounced changes (Fig 5.4.5). Furthermore, the size of this group grew the most in the overall female population.

The most pronounced changes in the debut of childbearing behaviour by age occurred among women with a secondary education born in the 1940s and 1950s (in Fig 5.4.5 and table 5.4.6, illustrated by cohorts of 1940 and 1950). In these cohorts, the debut of childbearing behaviour started much earlier in life and was more intensive than that of the women born in 1930. For example, the share of women who were born in 1930, gained a secondary education, and had their first child at the age of 25 was 46%. This figure was 62% for those born in 1940 and 77% for those born in 1950. The trajectories of the debut of childbearing behaviour by age of women born later (the 1950s, 1960s, and even 1970s) are quite similar to the ones of those born in 1950 (the vast majority of these women had their first children in 1970–1980, at a time of rather stable fertility rates in Lithuania). The curve of first childbirth by age of women born in 1975 is an illustration of the beginning of the change in the fertility pattern—


postponement of childbirth to an older age—and demonstrates the ongoing changes in fertility of recent years (Fig 5.4.5).

Similar changes in the birth trajectory of first children by mother's age were also taking place among the women with other than higher education. Actually, women with a higher education stand out most conspicuously among other groups of women by their childbearing behaviour.

Figure 5.4.5 and table 5.4.6 show that the trajectories of the debut of childbearing behaviour of different cohort women with a higher education vary to a lesser extent: in each younger cohort of women born before 1970, first childbirth at a young age occurred more frequently, but the rates and scope of the changes were considerably less than they were for women with only a secondary education. Starting with the cohort born in 1970, the trajectory of first childbirth by woman's age acquires the opposite trend, that of ageing fertility.

Differences between the trajectories of childbearing behaviour typical for women with a higher education and those with only a secondary education have been increasing from cohort to cohort (Fig 5.4.5, Table 5.4.6). This is clearly illustrated by comparing the trajectories of the debut of childbearing behaviour by age of women born in 1930 and 1960 (Fig 5.4.5). The differences are strikingly large among the women who were born in the 1970s and started their childbearing career in the 1990s. A much higher percentage of women with a higher education had their children later in life than any other group of women by education (Table 5.4.6).

Figure 5.4.5. Cumulative percentage of the first live birth of women by mother's age, birth cohort, and higher and secondary education




Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

Table 5.4.6. Cumulative percentage of the first live birth of women at age of 20, 25, 30 and 35 years, by women's year of birth and higher and secondary education

Age	Women's birth cohort					
	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1975
Higher education						
20	3.2	5.2	7.4	9.2	9.0	10.2
25	31.4	40.4	50.3	58.1	56.5	43.7
30	68.0	69.3	76.4	78.4	75.8	
35	78.4	79.8	84.1	84.6		
Secondary education						
20	13.1	15.1	29.3	34.5	42.9	39.6
25	45.7	62.1	76.5	78.7	81.6	73.1
30	71.7	82.2	88.1	88.9	88.9	
35	81.4	87.2	91.2	91.0		

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

Figure 5.4.6. Cumulative percentage of the first live birth of women by mother's age, higher and secondary education, women born in 1930 and 1960

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

Number of children born: parity by birth cohort

Demographic picture of childbearing behaviour by women's birth cohort. As seen above, in different cohorts there are a varying percentage of childless women and different childbearing behaviour debut trajectories. The cohorts also differ by the


number of children born. Figure 5.4.7 clearly shows the quantitative characteristics of the demographic picture of childbearing behaviour in different birth cohorts of women (still of childbearing age and past it): the proportion of childless women and the number of children born. Figure 5.4.7 shows that between the birth cohorts of 1920 and 1960, in each younger birth cohort the proportion of women who never gave birth was decreasing; the proportion of women who had third, fourth, fifth, or more births was progressively shrinking; the proportion of women who had a single birth was slightly higher; and the proportion of women who had two births was perceptibly higher.

Demographic portraits of the fertility behaviour of urban and rural women by birth cohort are quite dissimilar (Annex 5.4.1). Furthermore, the differences remain steady up to the birth cohorts of the 1960s. In all the cohorts being analysed, a lower portion of rural dwellers never gave birth; a much higher share had three, four or more births; and correspondingly, a smaller portion had two and, notably, one birth (Annex 5.4.1).

The demographic behaviour portrait of the women of childbearing age at the time of the census (born in 1960 and beyond) has been rapidly changing in each younger cohort (presented in figure 5.4.7 on the right side of the vertical line): the number of childless women has been growing and the number of higher parity children is rapidly decreasing. And this is natural since the childbearing behaviour of these cohorts is not yet finished.

Different fertility behaviour pictures of urban and rural women can also be seen in the cohorts still of childbearing age (Annex 5.4.1): in rural areas, a much higher proportion of women still have higher parity children.


Figure 5.4.7. Portrait of fertility behaviour of women by birth cohort: women by number of children born and women who have never given birth, percentages



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

Number of born children by women's birth cohort: overall situation. The vital demographic statistics provides data on the parity of children born by women of a conventional cohort (that gave birth in a certain year). The census data enables an analysis of the dynamics of the parity indicators by cohort, place of residence, and education to be made. This is highly valuable information that permits the identification of fertility patterns in terms of timing, cohort, and the socio-demographic status of the women. Thus it is feasible, based on the census data, to make an overview of the number of births given by different cohort women (of all that gave birth) and of the differences by place of residence and education.

Figure 5.4.8. Women by number of children born and residence, women of 1920–1959 birth cohorts



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

The ones that did give birth, however, had considerably more children than women in subsequent cohorts. They were still representing the fertility pattern specific of an agrarian society, which is especially true of rural women (Table 5.4.7).

Among the females born in the 4th decade of the 20th century (1930–1939), the number of women who had a large number of children (five or more) was much smaller. They only account for about 6% (nearly a half as many as the women born in the 1920s), and considerably fewer of them gave birth to four children.

It should be noted that alongside the elderly women (at the time of census they were 70–80 years old) who have given birth to four or more children, the ones who did not have any children account for more than 10% (Annex 5.4.1, Fig 5.4.7).


As seen from figure 5.4.9, women of later cohorts (born in the 1940s–1960s) have rapidly moved towards the childbearing behaviour pattern typical of industrial societies. The majority (about three-fourths) of these women gave birth to only a child or two, one in six had three children, and only one in ten or even fewer had more than

Although the general indicators about children born by parity provide rather approximate data, they nevertheless reveal the significant differences that exist between urban and rural residents (Fig 5.4.8).

Information supplied in figure 5.4.9 and table 5.4.7 clearly demonstrates that among the women born in every subsequently younger cohort between 1920 and 1959, an increasingly lower proportion gave birth to three, four, or more children, but a slightly higher proportion had one, and a much higher proportion had two births. Among the women born in the 1930s, one in approximately ten has given birth to five or more children, and one in five has given birth to four or more children. Nearly half of the women of this cohort have given birth to three or more children. These are the women whose debut of childbearing behaviour was seriously disrupted by the upheavals of WWII and the post-war period, among whom there was quite a number who never

three children. Besides, as already noted, they had their first child much earlier than the women of the preceding cohorts.

Figure 5.4.9. Women by number of children born and birth cohort, women of 1920–1959 birth cohorts, percentages



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

Table 5.4.7. Urban and rural women by number of children born and birth cohort, women of 1920–1959 birth cohorts, percentages

Women's birth cohort	Number of children born				
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five or more
Urban					
1920–1929	24.87	40.63	19.61	8.40	6.49
1930–1939	26.91	50.76	15.90	4.08	2.35
1940–1949	28.89	54.93	12.42	2.46	1.31
1950–1959	28.11	56.83	11.81	2.12	1.13
Rural					
1920–1929	14.73	27.28	24.15	15.07	18.77
1930–1939	13.41	34.68	25.78	13.53	12.59
1940–1949	13.57	40.81	25.76	9.83	10.03
1950–1959	14.51	44.20	24.44	8.79	8.05


Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

In the city and countryside, these changes were following similar paths, but the differences in the number of children born to urban and rural women even in the youngest cohorts under analysis (born in 1950–1959) have remained vast. Thus, although the portrait of childbearing behaviour of this cohort of rural women is considerably more contemporary (typical of industrial societies), quite a sizeable

portion of the women (nearly one-fifth) have given birth to four, five, or more children, and one in four have had three children (Annex 5.4.1). Meanwhile, the majority of this cohort of city dwellers has had one or two births (about 85%).

Number of children born by birth cohort and education. As seen from the data supplied, education strongly affects the number of children. This is clearly seen from the information presented in figure 5.4.10: the higher the educational level of a woman is, the bigger the chance that she had one or two children, and the lower the educational level, the higher the percentage of three, four, five, or even more births. The education-specific dependency of the number of children born is plain both in urban and rural areas, with the latter being less distinct. Furthermore, quite a large portion of rural women with a higher education have given birth to three or more children (Annex 5.4.2).

Figure 5.4.10. Women by number of children born and education, women of 1920–1959 birth cohorts, percentages



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

Although the data supplied in figure 5.4.10 and Annex 5.4.2 represent the mean structure of the number of born children to the women of the 1920–1959 birth cohorts, they also give a clear picture about the relationship between childbearing behaviour and the education of women: childbearing behaviour patterns by the number of children born are more education- than cohort-dependent. The structure by parity of all cohorts of the same education level is much alike, with differences only by education (Table 5.4.8).

Table 5.4.8 shows that even among the women with only a primary education born in 1950–1959 who have given birth, the share of women with four or more children (more than one woman in five) or even five or more (one in ten) is relatively high. Census data show that nearly one-fifth of the women of this cohort (18.5%) who

have only a primary education (though their number is very small) and who have given birth had five or more children.

On the basis of the data presented in table 5.4.8, the paradoxical conclusion can be made that until 1990 fertility was actually decreasing mostly not because of the changing fertility behaviour of each younger cohort of women but because in each younger cohort the share of highly educated women (with a higher or college education), who have low fertility rates, was increasing, and the share of women with a low level of education, who have more children, was decreasing.

Table 5.4.8. Women by number of children born, education, and birth cohort, women of 1920–1959 birth cohorts, percentages

Women's birth cohort	One	Two	Three	Four	Five or more
Higher					
1920–1959	30.7	56.7	10.7	1.5	0.5
1920–1929	31.8	52.7	13.0	1.7	0.8
1930–1939	33.9	55.0	9.4	1.2	0.4
1940–1949	31.5	56.6	10.2	1.3	0.5
1950–1959	28.9	57.7	11.1	1.7	0.6
College ¹					
1920–1959	26.0	54.7	14.7	3.2	1.5
1920–1929	27.8	46.7	18.1	5.3	2.0
1930–1939	28.9	53.3	13.6	3.0	1.1
1940–1949	26.4	55.1	14.4	2.7	1.4
1950–1959	24.5	55.6	14.9	3.3	1.7
Secondary					
1920–1959	24.1	50.6	16.9	4.8	3.7
1920–1929	26.0	42.8	17.3	7.3	6.7
1930–1939	24.6	49.6	16.8	5.2	3.8
1940–1949	25.2	51.5	16.5	4.0	2.8
1950–1959	22.9	51.7	17.0	4.7	3.7
Basic					
1920–1959	19.8	44.0	20.7	8.2	7.4
1920–1929	22.9	40.8	20.1	9.5	6.7
1930–1939	21.5	46.5	20.0	7.1	4.9
1940–1949	18.6	45.6	20.8	7.8	7.2
1950–1959	16.7	37.6	22.3	10.1	13.3
Primary					
1920–1959	16.6	35.9	23.9	11.9	11.6
1920–1929	17.8	31.7	23.5	13.1	13.9
1930–1939	16.4	38.9	24.3	11.1	9.3
1940–1949	14.3	38.7	24.1	11.0	11.9

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

Unfortunately, the census data do not allow making well-founded conclusions about the relationship between education and the number of children born to women of

the youngest cohort still in their fertile years. It might be that the new social, economic and cultural environment that has caused overall fertility to drop to a very low level has had a different effect from the one before the recent changes in the fertility behaviour of differently educated women.


Mean age of mother at birth of first child by women's birth cohort

A common feature of women born between 1925 and 1950 is that in each younger cohort women had their first births at a younger age: the mean age at first birth decreased from 26.40 years (for women born in 1925) to 23.95 years (women born in 1950). These were the women who had their first children in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, at the time when so-called fertility rejuvenation was taking place in Lithuania. The phenomenon of fertility rejuvenation was the most pronounced among rural women (Fig 5.4.11).

The indicator is stabilized in the cohort of women born in 1950–1959: the mean age of women at first birth almost remains unchanged, close to 23. According to the vital statistics, the pattern of childbearing behaviour by the age of the woman at the birth of the first child starts changing only in the early 1990s, when the women born in the 1970s had their first births.

Figure 5.4.11 clearly demonstrates the postponement of the debut of fertility behaviour of the 1920–1925 birth cohort referred to above.

Figure 5.4.11. Mean age of women at birth of first child by women's birth cohort



Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

In all cohorts being analysed, women with a higher education had their first children at an older age. In each younger birth cohort of 1920–1959 however, the differences in the mother's mean age at the birth of the first child were increasing among the women with different levels of education. The rejuvenation of fertility was the most intensive among the women with only primary or basic education (Table 5.4.9).

Table 5.4.9. Mean age of women at birth of first child by mother's education and birth cohort

Women's birth cohort	Total	Higher	College ¹	Secondary	Basic	Primary
1920–1959	24.2	25.6	24.0	23.2	23.7	24.7
1920–1929	25.4	27.3	26.5	25.3	25.5	25.3
1930–1939	25.1	26.7	25.4	24.8	24.6	24.9
1940–1949	23.9	25.7	24.2	23.3	23.2	23.0
1950–1959	23.1	25.0	23.2	22.2	21.5	21.8

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

As can be seen, the women with higher education stand out by their childbearing behaviour. They have the fewest births, they have the highest portion of childless women, and they have their first birth at an older age than the women of other levels of education. Furthermore, for 5 decades the childbearing behaviour of these women has been experiencing little change, whereas the proportion of such women in the overall female population has been growing fast. Consequently, the childbearing behaviour of these women has been increasingly influencing the changes in fertility indicators in the country.

CONCLUSIONS

A population census provides a lot of additional information on fertility. Regardless of the rather retrospective character of the information, its combination with vital statistics data provides the chance to better perceive long-term changes in fertility, to make an evaluation of the childbearing behaviour of women of different cohorts, and for improvement of the situation, to take more well-founded decisions.

As seen from vital statistics, fertility, which in Lithuania was declining throughout the post-war period and which in the 1970s and 1980s reached a level close to ensuring a normal replacement of generations (TFR close to 2), started declining steeply in the early 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century reached the lowest low fertility level: in 2002–2005 TFR was below 1.3.

The data of the population census enable us to make a thorough investigation of fertility changes in the cohorts of women who were over 40 years of age at the time of the census (born in 1920–1959), i.e. past or close to the end of childbearing age, and only a partial investigation of the younger cohorts still in their childbearing years.

The women of each successively younger cohort between 1920 and 1959 were having fewer and fewer births and were having children at an increasingly younger age, and an increasingly lower percentage of the women had no children at all. For the women of the oldest cohorts being analysed, the childbearing behaviour pattern typical of agrarian societies, although considerably distorted by historical events of the middle of the 20th

century, was still applicable, while for the birth cohorts of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, the childbearing behaviour pattern of industrial societies is prevalent. Nonetheless, the common trend of change in childbearing behaviour of the women born between 1920 and 1959 is strongly predetermined by place of residence (urban or rural) and education.

According to the census, the average number of children born to urban women of the 1920–1959 birth cohorts remained rather stable, while in the rural segment it was decreasing with each younger cohort. It can therefore be maintained that from the 1940s to the early 1990s, when the women of the 1920–1959 birth cohorts were having children, fertility in Lithuania was actually decreasing due to lowered fertility in rural areas.

Regardless of the pronounced decline in fertility in rural areas, the fertility rates of even the 1950–1959 birth cohorts were still relatively high; the average number of children born to the women of these cohorts is 2.6. This shows that prior to the beginning of the decline in fertility in the late 20th century rather large families were prevalent in the countryside.

The childbearing behaviour of women with a higher education (partly with a college education, too) is the most conspicuous. Compared to any other education group, these women have fewer children, they give birth at an older age, and a much higher proportion of this group have not had any births. Furthermore, the childbearing behaviour of the group has been rather stable for a lengthy period of time: the average number of children born to all women of the 1920–1959 birth cohort with a higher education is almost stable and the lowest of all – close to two. Significant differences are only revealed between the urban and rural dwellers of identically educated women; the average number of children born to urban women of all cohorts is close to 1.8, and to rural women of all cohorts is 2.1.

Among the women with a low level of education (lower than secondary), fertility has remained at a high level (the average number of children born is close to three), and in the cohorts born in 1950–1959 it is even higher than in the oldest cohorts being analysed (born 1920–1929). The trend is particularly apparent among rural women. The most consistent trend of fertility decline is typical for women with a secondary education.

Starting with the cohorts born in the 1970s (and partly 1960s), which should have entered into the most intensive childbearing behaviour period at the beginning of the 1990s, the fertility pattern has been changing again: first, these women have children at an increasingly older age, and second, by the age of 25–30 they have given birth to a much lower number of children than women of earlier cohorts. These women have not yet completed their fertility practices, however. It is therefore not clear how many more children they will have by the end of their fertile age and what proportion of them will stay childless.

A detailed analysis of the census data enables us to make the paradoxical conclusion that until the last decade of the 20th century fertility was actually decreasing mostly not because of the changing fertility behaviour of each younger cohort of women but because in each younger cohort the percentage of highly educated (higher or college) women, whose fertility rates are low, was increasing, and the percentage of women with a low level of education, who give birth to considerably more children, was decreasing, and also because of the growing number of urban women, who have considerably fewer births than rural women.

CONCLUSIONS

An assessment of demographic trends and patterns of the Baltic countries in the context of the European Union countries suggests that the three Baltic countries still face substantial demographic challenges. Lithuania and Latvia are clearly laggard countries in terms of both natural and overall population changes. Persisting low fertility and lack of improvements in male mortality are the key problems predetermining negative trends in the changes in the size of the population in these two countries. This unfavourable situation is additionally complicated by persisting intensive emigration. Over the most recent years, Estonia has been showing signs of improvements in its demographic situation: rising fertility and decreasing mortality. Despite these recent advances, however, there is a need for further progress, especially in the area of male mortality, which is far higher than the EU average.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have undergone extremely rapid family and childbearing behavioural changes, which resulted in the lowest-low fertility levels. One of the major family changes concerns the transformation of family formation model. The newly evolving modern family model has been observed through the postponement of marriage to a later age and the start of partnership through cohabitation. This has resulted in the postponement of the birth of the first child to later ages and the growing prevalence of one-child families. In all three countries, the overall fertility decreases are mostly attributable to drops in first and second births. Further manifestations of the transformations of the family also include the rapidly growing number of children born out of wedlock and the increasing share of single-parent families. It should be noted, however, that the transition to a new family pattern has been much slower in Lithuania than it is in Latvia and especially in Estonia.

A variety of common and specific factors can be associated with the rapid changes in the family and declines in fertility in the three countries. The first group of factors has the same origins as in Western societies: they include individualisation, emancipation, freedom of choice, secularisation, modern contraceptives, and changes in values in general. The second group of factors includes political, economic, and social effects produced by the transition from the totalitarian Soviet regime with a centrally planned economy to democratic societies with fully functioning market economies. Such factors include the negative effects produced by the transition: unemployment, sharp drops in income, the increase in poverty, growing uncertainty, and anomie. The third group of factors concerns those inherited from the Soviet past, such as the orientation towards paternalistic state policies and inadequate supply in the housing market. The fourth group of factors is attributable to the specifics of new family policies introduced after these countries regained their independence.

One of the major demographic issues in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remains unacceptably high mortality, especially, among adult males. Such unfavourable mortality levels can be partly explained by the distorted pattern of age-specific mortality inherited from the period of Soviet rule. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the three countries have been showing divergent trends. Latvia and, in particular, Lithuania have been struggling to achieve major improvements in health. In some areas of public health

such as cardiovascular diseases and alcohol-related mortality, the situation has been alarmingly deteriorating further. This can be explained by several macro-level factors such as failures of health reforms, lack of effective health policies, persisting socio-economic constraints to healthier life styles, high prevalence of psychosocial stress, and extremely high levels of social inequalities in these two countries. These macro-level constraints predetermine the prevalence of unfavourable patterns of health-related lifestyles at the individual level, such as excessive alcohol consumption, smoking, and unhealthy diet. At the same time, over the most recent years Estonia has showed strong improvements in health, especially, in the domains of cardiovascular diseases and some other avoidable causes of death. This suggests certain successes in health reforms, in particular, in the introduction of effective primary health care and treatment and prevention of cardiovascular diseases.

International migration has always been one of the key dimensions of demographic development in the Baltic countries. It should be noted that the major changes in international migration took place in the early 1990s, when immigration from the former republics of the USSR was replaced by massive emigration. The destination of emigration has also changed: at the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of emigrants went to Russia and other former parts of the USSR, whereas since the mid 1990s the trend has shifted towards the West. According to the Lithuanian surveys, both “push” (such as lower salaries and unemployment) and “pull” (such as the demand for cheaper labour force in destination countries) factors have been playing an important role in stimulating emigration. Social security factors such as the lack of protection of workers’ rights, unfavourable criminal situation, and asymmetries in social relations at work and other spheres of life may have also acted as “pushing” factors for emigrants. Finally, political measures adopted to tackle mass emigration are insufficient and ineffective. This is despite the numerous negative consequences of mass emigration such as the growing number of separated families and lone children and brain drain. Other important dimensions of emigration concern movements related to human trafficking, which remains an unresolved problem.

The monograph also reveals country-specific features of the development of family policy and the main factors influencing the changes, goals, and scheme of current family policy measures and give an evaluation of the impact of family policy (likely or actual) on fertility.

The analytic information presented in the chapters on the development of family policy in the Baltic countries discloses a number of important specific features. In the Baltic countries, the family policy changes of the past 20 years have been very intensive and controversial. It has been a period of search and experiments in the transition to a new system of social development. The countries were intensively elaborating the conceptual basics of family policy and the system of measures. Inconsistencies in the development of family policy and contradictions between the conceptual basis and practical steps were typical in all the Baltic countries in this period, however. In the initial period, the goals of the family policy varied and were rather explicit in each country, but following a sharply decline in fertility, they acquired a clearly expressed pronatalistic touch.

Throughout this period, the greatest emphasis in the development of family policy was placed on the extension of parental leave and increase in the benefit paid for

it. This was common for all the Baltic countries and notably for Lithuania, where parental leave has become the longest and best paid in Europe. The development and accessibility of childcare facilities and flexible employment forms have been given inadequate treatment in all the countries, however. In this respect, the situation in Estonia is the most favourable. In Latvia and especially Lithuania, pre-school childcare services were waning during the initial development period of family policy, and in subsequent years expansion has been rather insufficient.

Estonia is distinguished by its rather inconsistent but nevertheless much more targeted striving for family well-being and gender equality in the development of family policy. For Lithuania, shifting ideas and motives of family policy are most typical. Depending on the ruling party, the motives of family policy experience considerable changes: from strictly conservative ones addressed to the preservation of patriarchal attitudes to a social democratic approach advocating the consolidation of gender equality.

The monograph presents in-depth case studies of the principal issues of family and fertility changes and the development of family policy in the Baltic countries.. The first case study is devoted to an analysis of changes in partnership and childbearing behaviour in Estonia and based on the data of the *Generations and Gender Survey* conducted in Estonia in 2004–2005. In the second case study, the genesis, functions and family relationships in transnational families of Lithuania are discussed. This new type of family has become rather widespread in Lithuania due to very intensive temporary emigration to the West when one of the partners/spouses moves abroad usually for a job for a certain time period. The third study concerns one of the most important and effective components of family policy—the reconciliation of family and work. The study is devoted to an assessment of the situation in this field in Latvia. The accessibility of child care facilities, spread of flexible forms of labour, and situation concerning the involvement of men in childcare are discussed.

The final part of the monograph presents an analysis of household composition and changes in childbearing and matrimonial behaviour since the middle of the 20th century. The analysis in this part is based on the data of the 2001 population census in Lithuania and comprises four chapters.

The analyses suggest that in the overall structure of households, family households make up the largest proportion, and among these one-family (nuclear) households make up the largest proportion. Most of the nuclear households are composed of spouses with(out) child(ren), but around one in ten nuclear families are single-parent families, and nearly one-tenth of nuclear families are not institutionalised (cohabiting). In Lithuania, non-family households amount to nearly one-third of all households. Among these an absolute majority are one-person households; more than half of them are inhabited by women, mostly elderly.

The analysis of the structural and processual features of the household status of the Lithuanian population offers an opportunity to assess the specific scope and expansion of family deinstitutionalisation in the country. The conclusion that cohabitation trends in rural and urban areas are following different patterns is proposed.

The long-term changes in the matrimonial and childbearing behaviour of the Lithuanian population have been assessed using the population census data. These data have provided an instrument for deeper insight into the changes in matrimonial

behaviour over a 5–6-decade period and into the current marital status of the Lithuanian population according to age, sex, birth cohort, education and place of residence. The analysis has shown that the rejuvenation of marriage and increase in the nuptiality level continued throughout the Soviet period, until the 1990s. However, the process of family transformation, the persisting broad gap between male and female mortality levels, and high divorce rates resulted in a sharp decrease in marriage and an increase in those who never marry or are divorced or widowed, which was clearly seen from the data of the 1989 and 2001 population censuses.

A retrospective analysis of the changes in childbearing behaviour in Lithuania based on the 2001 population census data has enabled significant differences in fertility changes and level by birth cohort, education, and place of residence to be revealed. The conclusion is made that for the oldest females in the analysis (1920–1929 birth cohorts) the childbearing behaviour pattern of agrarian societies was still typical (although distorted by the historical developments of the middle of the 20th century), the childbearing behaviour of the 1940–1950s birth cohorts represents the fertility pattern of industrial societies, and the youngest cohorts are already following the fertility patterns of post-industrial societies.

BALTIJOS ŠALYS: GYVENTOJAI, ŠEIMA IR ŠEIMOS POLITIKA

Santrauka

Monografijos **pirmoje dalyje** *Demografiniai pokyčiai Baltijos šalyse Europos Sąjungos šalių kontekste* pateikiama lyginamoji Estijos, Latvijos ir Lietuvos demografinės raidos analizė Europos Sąjungos šalių kontekste. Tyrimo rezultatai rodo, kad trys Baltijos šalys iki šiol susiduria su dideliais demografiniais iššūkiais. Pagal natūralaus ir bendrojo gyventojų skaičiaus kitimo kriterijus Lietuva ir Latvija tebėra Europos Sąjungos autsailerės. Išliekantis žemas gimstamumas ir besitęsianti vyrų mirtingumo krizė – vienos svarbiausių gyventojų skaičiaus mažėjimo priežasčių. Nepalankią demografinę situaciją Latvijoje ir Lietuvoje dar labiau komplikuoja itin aukšti emigracijos rodikliai. Estijoje pastaraisiais metais vyksta teigiami demografiniai pokyčiai – sparčiai auga gimstamumo rodikliai (viršijantys ES šalių vidurkį) ir nuosekliai mažėja mirtingumas. Vis dėlto, nepaisant šių teigiamų permainų, dar anksti teigti esant esminį demografinės raidos lūžį, ypač gyventojų mirtingumo srityje (Estijos, kaip ir Latvijos bei Lietuvos, gyventojų mirtingumas tebėra vienas didžiausių Europos Sąjungoje).

Monografijos **antroje dalyje** *Demografiniai pokyčiai ir dabartinė situacija Baltijos šalyse (1989–2008)* pateikiama detali Baltijos šalių demografijos procesų ir jų veiksnių analizė.

Nuo dešimto dešimtmečio pradžios Estija, Latvija ir Lietuva išgyvena fundamentinius šeimos ir gimstamumo modelių pokyčius. Viena svarbiausių tokių transformacijų pasekmių – iki itin žemo lygio sumažėjęs gimstamumas. Pagrindinė šeimos instituto pokyčių dimensija – šeimos (partnerystės) formavimo modelio kaita. Vis labiau įsigalinčio moderniojo šeimos modelio bruožai – santuokų atidėjimas vėlesniam amžiui ir kohabitacijos plitimas. Kitos svarbios šeimos modelio pokyčių dimensijos – sparčiai auganti ne santuokoje gimusių vaikų dalis ir didėjanti vaikų, augančių tik su vienu iš tėvų, dalis. Pažymėtina, kad gimstamumo mažėjimą Estijoje, Latvijoje ir Lietuvoje lėmė panašūs (bendri visoms trims šalims) ir unikalūs specifiniai veiksniai. Pirmajai veiksnių grupei priklauso fundamentalieji veiksniai, būdingi labiau pažengusioms Vakarų visuomenėms. Šie veiksniai pirmiausia susiję su vertybių pokyčiais: emancipacija, didėjančia demografinės elgsenos pasirinkimo laisve, modernių kontracepcijos priemonių plitimu, individualizmu ir sekuliarizacija. Pastarosios vertybinių pokyčių dimensijos siejamos su antruoju demografiniu perėjimu (van de Kaa, 1987). Reikia pažymėti, kad šeimos ir gimstamumo modelio pokyčiai Baltijos šalyse vyko pereinamojo periodo kontekste. Todėl antrajai veiksnių grupei priskiriami politiniai, socialiniai ir ekonominiai veiksniai, susiję su pereinamojo periodo specifika (nedarbo ir skurdo augimu, ateities neapibrėžtumu ir *anomie* reiškiniais). Trečioji veiksnių grupė – iš sovietmečio paveldėti veiksniai, iki šiol veikiantys matrimonialinę elgseną (pvz., orientacija į paternalistinę valstybės politiką ir nepakankamas apsirūpinimas būstu). Ketvirtoji veiksnių grupė susijusi su šeimos politikos ypatumais ir jų specifika kiekvienoje iš trijų šalių.

Viena svarbiausių nepalankios demografinės situacijos dimensijų – aukštas mirtingumo lygis, ypač suaugusių vyrų grupėje. Tokį išsiderinusių mirtingumo pagal amžių

modelį (su būdingu padidėjusiu priešlaikiniu mirtingumu) Baltijos šalys paveldėjo iš sovietmečio. Nuo 2000-ųjų pradžios ėmė formuotis trims Baltijos šalims būdingos savitos gyventojų mirtingumo pokyčių trajektorijos. Latvijai ir ypač Lietuvai iki šiol nepavyko pasiekti esminio persilaužimo gyventojų mirtingumo raidoje. Kai kuriose visuomenės sveikatos srityse šiose šalyse situacija net blogėjo (pvz., mirtingumo dėl kraujotakos sistemos ligų ir mirtingumo dėl su alkoholiu susijusių mirties priežasčių). Šie prieštaringi gyventojų mirtingumo pokyčiai siejami su sveikatos sistemos reformos nesėkmėmis, išliekančiomis didelėmis socioekonominėmis sveikesnės gyvenamosios plėtos kliūtimis, aukštu psichosocialinio streso lygiu bei šiose visuomenėse labai ženklią ir didėjančią socialinę nelygybę. Šie makrolygmens veiksniai lemia nepalankių su sveikata susijusių elgsenos modelių paplitimą individualiu (mikro-) lygmeniu – pasyvumą savo sveikatos atžvilgiu, besaikį alkoholio vartojimą, rūkymą ir neracionalią mitybą. Tuo tarpu Estijai pastaraisiais metais pavyko pasiekti nemažų laimėjimų mažinant gyventojų mirtingumą, ypač dėl kraujotakos sistemos ligų ir kitų mirties priežasčių, išvengiamų taikant medicinos technologijas. Tai rodo, kad šiai šaliai kur kas sėkmingiau (palyginti su Latvija ir Lietuva) pavyko įgyvendinti sveikatos sistemos reformas, ypač kuriant efektyvią pirminę sveikatos sistemos grandį ir diegiant kraujotakos sistemos ligų prevencijos priemones.

Baltijos šalyse visą laiką vienu svarbiausių bendrojo gyventojų skaičiaus kaitos veiksnių buvo tarptautinė migracija. Didelių tarptautinės migracijos pokyčių įvyko jau dešimto dešimtmečio pradžioje, kai imigracijos iš kitų buvusių Sovietų Sąjungos respublikų srautus pakeitė didelio masto emigracija: iš pradžių nuvilnijo intensyvi reemigracijos banga į buvusias Sovietų Sąjungos respublikas, vėliau didžiuliai emigracijos srautai pasuko į Vakarų šalis (ypač iš Latvijos ir Lietuvos). Lietuvos gyventojų migracijos veiksnių tyrimo duomenimis, emigracijos srautų formavimuisi turėjo įtakos tiek „išstumiamieji“ (pvz., mažesni atlyginimai ir bedarbystė), tiek ir „pritraukiamieji“ (pigesnės darbo jėgos poreikis priimančiose šalyse) veiksniai. Šie tyrimai taip pat išryškino ir kitus svarbius „išstumiamuosius“ veiksnis: neefektyvią darbuotojų teisių apsaugą, nepalankią kriminogeninę padėtį, socialinių santykių darbo ir kitose gyvenimo sferose deformacijas. Svarbus didžiulės emigracijos veiksnys tebėra efektyvių politinių priemonių trūkumas. Neadekvatus dėmesys masinės emigracijos problemoms išlieka nepaisant ryškėjančių neigiamų emigracijos pasekmių – gausėja transnacionalinių šeimų ir vaikų, augančių be tėvų, didėja protų nutekėjimo mastas. Vis dar neišspręstos skaudžios ne-deklaruotos emigracijos ir imigracijos, susijusios su prekyba žmonėmis, problemos.

Monografijos **trečia dalis** *Šeimos politika Baltijos šalyse* skirta Estijos, Latvijos ir Lietuvos šeimos politikos transformacijoms per pastaruosius beveik dvidešimt metų aptarti. Kiekvienai šaliai skirtingame skyriuje pristatoma šeimos politikos raida, pagrindiniai veiksniai, darę įtaką jos pokyčiams, tikslai, dabartinės šeimos politikos priemonių sistema, vertinamas šeimos politikos poveikis (tikėtinas ar realus) gimstamumui.

Šios dalies skyriuose pateikta analitinė informacija apie šeimos politikos plėtrą Baltijos šalyse atskleidžia keletą svarbių specifinių požymių. Šeimos politikos pokyčiai Baltijos šalyse per pastaruosius dvidešimt metų buvo labai dideli ir prieštaringi. Tai buvo paieškų ir eksperimentų metas pereinant prie naujos visuomenės raidos sistemos. Visose Baltijos šalyse buvo intensyviai kuriami konceptualūs šeimos politikos pagrindai, plėtojama priemonių sistema. Kartu visoms Baltijos šalims tuo periodu buvo būdingas paramos šeimai sistemos nestabilumas ir prieštaravimai tarp konceptualiųjų pagrindų ir praktinių

žingsnių. Pradiniame etape šeimos politikos tikslai šalyse varijavo ir nebuvo aiškūs, tačiau labai sumažėjus gimstamumui įgavo gana akivaizdų pronatalistinį atspalvį.

Visose Baltijos šalyse plėtojant šeimos politiką labiausiai buvo akcentuojamas vaiko priežiūros atostogų ilginimas ir išmokų jų metų didinimas, ypač Lietuvoje, kur vaiko priežiūros (motinystės/tėvystės) atostogos yra ir ilgiausios, ir labiausiai apmokamos Europoje. Tačiau visose šalyse per mažai dėmesio skirta vaikų priežiūros paslaugų ir prieinamumo, taip pat lanksčių užimtumo formų plėtrai. Šioje srityje geriausia padėtis yra Estijoje. Pradiniame šeimos politikos plėtros etape ikimokyklinės vaikų priežiūros paslaugos Latvijoje ir ypač Lietuvoje buvo gerokai nunykusios, o vėlesnė jų plėtra tebėra nepakankama.

Estija išsiskiria tuo, kad čia, nors ir nenuosekliai, tačiau gerokai aiškiau šeimos politikos sistemoje siekiama šeimos gerovės ir lyčių lygybės. Lietuvai ypač būdinga šeimos politikos idėjų ir motyvų kaita. Šeimos politikos motyvai Lietuvoje labai priklauso nuo valdančios partijos: nuo griežtai konservatyvių, orientuotų į patriarchalinių nuostatų išsaugojimą, iki socialdemokratinėms nuostatom, propaguojančių lyčių lygybės įtvirtinimo idėją.

Monografijos **ketvirtos dalies** *Šeimos ir šeimos politikos pokyčiai Baltijos šalyse* atvejų studijos skirtos labai aktualių Baltijos šalių šeimos, gimstamumo ir svarbiausių šeimos politikos dalių specifinėms ir giluminėms analizėms. Šią monografijos dalį sudaro trys atvejų tyrimai, kiekvienas iš jų skirtas vienai iš Baltijos šalių: pirmas tyrimas – partnerystės, šeimos formavimo ir gimstamumo pokyčių giluminė studija, vykdoma remiantis tarptautinio *Kartų ir lyčių tyrimo*, 2004–2005 m. atlikto Estijoje, duomenimis; antras tyrimas – tai transnacionalinių šeimų Lietuvoje, susiformavusių ir gana plačiai paplitusių dėl labai intensyvios gyventojų emigracijos iš Lietuvos ir ypač gausių laikinosios emigracijos srautų, kai į užsienį tam tikram laikui išvyksta tik vienas iš sutuoktinių/partnerių, genezės, funkcijų, šeiminių santykių studija; ir trečias tyrimas – vienos svarbiausių iš efektyvios šeimos politikos dalių – darbo ir šeimos derinimo Latvijoje studija, kurioje aptariama vaikų priežiūros paslaugų, lanksčių darbo formų ir vyrų įtraukimo į vaikų priežiūrą situacija ir vaidmuo modernizuojant šeimos politiką.

Monografijos **penkta dalis** *Namų ūkis, šeima ir gimstamumas gyventojų surašymo duomenimis* skirta atskleisti gyventojų surašymo informacinio potencialo galimybėms tirti šeimą, namų ūkius, šeiminių ir santuokinių statusą bei gimstamumą. Šią dalį sudaro keturi skyriai.

Pirmame šios dalies skyriuje analizuojama Lietuvos namų ūkių struktūra. Apibendrinant tyrimo rezultatus daromos išvados, kad tarp namų ūkių didžiausią dalį sudaro šeiminiai namų ūkiai, tarp kurių daugiausia yra vienos šeimos branduolinių namų ūkių; daugumą branduolinių namų ūkių sudaro sutuoktiniai, turintys arba neturintys vaiko(-ų), apie dešimtadalį – nepilnos (vieno iš tėvų, turinčių vaiką(-ų)) šeimos ir mažiau nei dešimtadalį – kohabituojančios sąjungos. Nešeiminiai namų ūkiai Lietuvoje sudaro arti trečdalią. Tarp jų absoliuti dauguma – vieno asmens, dažniausiai vyresnio amžiaus moters, namų ūkiai.

Antras skyrius skirtas Lietuvos gyventojų šeiminių statusų analizei, kuri leidžia suprasti šeimos deinstitutionalizacijos procesų Lietuvoje mastą ir raidos ypatumus. Daroma išvada, kad, surašymo duomenimis, tarp vyresnio amžiaus gyventojų kohabituojančios sąjungos (kaip pakartotinės sąjungos) daugiau paplitusios kaime, o tarp jaunesnio amžiaus – panašiai mieste ir kaime. Aptartas nepilnų šeimos paplitimas ir jo priežastys.

Trečias skyrius skirtas ilgalaikių santuokinės elgsenos pokyčių ir dabartinio Lietuvos gyventojų santuokinio statuso pagal amžių, lytį, kartas, išsilavinimą, gyvenamąją vietovę analizei. Daroma išvada, kad, visą sovietmetį „jaunėjant“ santuokoms ir aukštėjant santuokystės lygiui, didėjo jauno amžiaus susituokusių vyrų ir moterų dalys. Tačiau, prasidėjus šeimos transformacijos procesui, taip pat išliekant dideliems vyrų ir moterų mirtingumo skirtumams, tarp 1989 ir 2001 m. gyventojų surašymų labai sumažėjo susituokusiųjų ir padaugėjo niekada negyvenusių santuokoje, išsiskyrusių asmenų ir našlių.

Ketvirtas šios dalies skyrius skirtas gimstamumo analizei. Retrospektyvinė prokreacinės elgsenos pokyčių Lietuvoje analizė, pasitelkus 2001 m. gyventojų surašymo duomenis, leido atskleisti didelius gimstamumo pokyčių ir lygio skirtumus pagal kartas, išsilavinimą, gyvenamąją vietovę. Daroma išvada, kad vyriausioms moterų kartoms (gimusioms 1920–1929 m.) dar buvo būdingas agrarinių visuomenių prokreacinės elgsenos modelis (nors ir gerokai deformuotas XX a. vidurio Lietuvos istorinės raidos – karo, rezistencinių kovų, politinių pertvarkų), 1940–1959 m. gimusioms kartoms – industrinių visuomenių, o pačioms jauniausioms kartoms – postindustrinių visuomenių prokreacinės elgsenos modelis.

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ANNEXES

Annex 2.2.1. Changes in fertility in Latvia, 1989–2007

Years	Number of births, thousand	Per 1000 inhabitants	Per 1000 women 15–49	TFR	Age of mother, years	Age at first birth	% of first births	% of marital births	Induced abortions per 1000 women 15–49	% of Latvian mothers	% of Latvians in population
1989	38.9	14.6	59.55	2.039	26.1	23.4	46.8	84.1	..	53.9	52.0.
1990	37.9	14.2	58.22	1.998	25.9	23.2	47.6	83.1	..	56.5	52.50
1991	34.6	13.1	53.92	1.854	25.8	23.1	49.0	81.6	60	58.1	53.50
1992	31.6	12.1	50.39	1.741	25.7	23.0	49.5	80.4	55	61.5	54.20
1993	26.8	10.4	43.65	1.522	25.6	23.0	50.6	77.0	51	64.5	54.80
1994	24.2	9.6	40.11	1.407	26.0	23.4	50.9	73.6	44	64.8	55.10
1995	21.6	8.7	35.99	1.271	26.0	23.5	52.1	70.1	43	63.7	54.80
1996	19.8	8.1	33.09	1.177	26.2	23.6	51.8	66.9	41	63.4	55.10
1997	18.8	7.7	31.6	1.130	26.6	24.0	51.6	65.2	37	63.7	55.30
1999	19.4	8.1	32.67	1.179	26.9	24.2	50.0	60.9	30	62.7	55.70
2000	20.2	8.5	34.2	1.237	27.3	24.4	49.6	59.7	29	63.3	57.7*
2001	19.7	8.3	33.29	1.207	27.4	24.6	50.6	57.9	26	63.5	57.90
2002	20.0	8.6	33.9	1.232	27.6	24.8	50.2	56.9	25	63.6	58.20
2003	21.0	9.0	35.46	1.286	27.6	24.9	51.4	55.8	24	64.9	58.45
2004	20.3	8.8	34.33	1.240	27.7	25.0	52.6	54.7	23	64.4	58.62
2005	21.5	9.3	36.37	1.309	28.0	25.2	51.2	55.4	22	65.4	58.84
2006	22.3	9.7	37.82	1.353	28.0	25.3	51.7	56.6	20	65.9	59.02
2007	23.3	10.2	39.79	1.412	28.2	25.4	52.2	57.0	20	65.7	59.16

Sources: *Demography, 2007: 21, 65-67, 33, 71; Demography, 2008: 33, 64.-72; Demographic Yearbook 2001: 34, 55; Demographic Yearbook 2002: 49.*

* census data.

Annex 2.2.2. Age-specific fertility rates in Latvia, 1989–2007

Year	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	45–49
1989	44.73	167.05**	107.54	58.90	23.77	5.58	0.29
1990	49.87	163.93	99.58	57.50	23.32	5.25	0.21
1991	50.85	151.24	92.01	50.24	21.18	5.11	0.17
1992	48.59	142.70	87.30	45.86	19.22	4.25	0.27
1993	44.05	123.87	78.45	38.25	15.72	3.90	0.24
1994	34.04	110.73	79.09	37.23	16.01	3.97	0.26
1995	29.94	98.94	72.71	33.49	15.36	3.39	0.29
1996	25.83	90.11	68.05	33.06	14.78	3.35	0.19
1997	21.53	83.90	66.31	34.63	15.13	4.27	0.24
1998	18.96	79.89	67.82	36.74	15.03	4.09	0.20
1999	18.98	79.98	75.54	40.18	16.92	4.03	0.21
2000	18.29	78.68	79.75	46.38	19.31	4.80	0.25
2001	17.17	75.24	76.39	47.10	20.16	5.04	0.29
2002	15.97	72.55	80.32	51.17	21.09	4.93	0.37
2003	16.63	74.15	82.70	55.37	22.42	5.56	0.33
2004	16.07	69.60	78.27	53.20	24.72	5.72	0.33
2005	15.94	67.34*	84.32	60.49	27.74	5.68	0.38
2006	17.69	67.34	86.60	62.48	29.61	6.65	0.34
2007	17.89	67.84	90.39	65.44	33.02	7.44	0.36

Source: Demography, 2007: 67; Demography, 2008: 68.-69.

* minimum in age group

** highest in age group

Annex 3.1.1. *Proportion of children attending nurseries and kindergartens from all children of respective age in Lithuania (percentages)*

Year	Age	
	Under 3 years	3-6 years
1991	9.7	63.9
1992	9.5	39.1
1993	6.0	30.1
1994	10.8	34.5
1995	11.2	36.2
1996	10.9	40.0
1997	12.1	46.9
1998	12.9	49.3
1999	13.4	53.1
2000	13.7	53.3
2001	14.9	55.9
2002	16.5	58.5
2003	17.8	61.8
2004	19.3	64.1
2005	21.3	69.6
2006	23.5	70.0
2007	24.7	72.4

Annex 3.2.1. *Enrolment in pre-school facilities* by age in Latvia, percentage in age group*

Age	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
0	0.07	0.10	0.03	0.21	0.02
1	7.1	7.5	7.3	6.4	6.8
2	40.7	41.0	44.2	43.7	42.4
3	65.6	65.3	64.7	66.5	70.0
4	65.8	71.2	73.9	72.4	76.9
5	88.3	90.0	95.1	94.9	91.3
6	85.8	87.9	90.3	93.1	92.9
0-4	35.0	36.3	37.4	37.2	38.2
5-6	87.0	88.9	92.8	94.0	92.1

* including pre-school groups in schools and interest education

Source: Children in Latvia. Riga: CSB – acc. Years.

Annex 3.2.2. Development of support to families in Latvia in 1989-2006

Kind	Entitled persons	Period	In force from	amount per month					
				RUB 1.07.1990	RUB 1991	RUB/LVL 1993	LVL 1996	LVL 1998	LVL/EUR 2005
A Connected with payment for social insurance									
1. Pregnancy leave and allowance	mother on acc. leave	56(70) days	1984	100% of net wage	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2. Maternity leave and allowance	“	“	“	“	“	“	“	“	“
3. Child-care allowance	mother on child-care leave*	up to child's 1 st year	1984	35	-	-	-	-	70% of wage ³⁾ (100% of net)
		1.5 years	1.07.90	70	100	2400/12.0	12.0	30.0 ¹⁾	-
		3 (2***) years	1.01.91	-	70	1500/7.5	7.5	7.5	-
		1-2 years	1.01.05	-	-	-	-	-	LVL 30/ EUR 43
4. Paternity leave	either of parents on leave		1.06.02	-	-	-	see above	see above	see above
	out of job		1.01.05	-	-	-	-	-	LVL 50
	-“-		1-2 years	-	-	-	-	-	LVL 30
	father		01.01.01	-	-	-	-	-	80% of wage ⁴⁾

Annex 4.1.1. Clusters of groups with reported behaviour, percentage

	<i>Cluster I</i> <i>Unchanged behaviour</i> Child never	<i>Cluster II</i> <i>Changed behaviour</i> Child at least once
Became more aggressive	96.1	50
Does not want to socialize	97	52.4
Became more rude	87	58
Started to be late for school	96	61.1
Has more tensions with friends	88.5	52.4
Became anxious	93.1	70.5
Became withdrawn	90.6	71.6
Started to get bad marks	90	73.4
Experiences outbreaks of crying	88.7	75
Is more often angry	85.8	80.7
Became affectionate	71.9	68.2
Started to get good marks	59.7	62.5
Is more often depressed	70.8	92.1


Annex 5.1.1. Private households by number of household members in the “old” EU countries, percentages*

	FI	DK	DE	AT	NL	FR	UK	LU	IE	IT	IS	GR	PT
1	37.3	36.8	35.8	33.5	33.6	31.0	30.2	29.3	21.6	24.9	20.3	19.7	17.3
2	31.5	33.4	33.8	28.5	32.9	31.1	33.9	28.2	25.9	27.1	25.2	28.1	28.4
3	13.6	12.6	14.5	16.3	13.1	16.2	15.5	17.0	17.7	21.6	21.2	21.1	25.2
4	11.1	11.9	11.5	13.9	13.8	13.8	13.4	16.4	17.3	19.0	21.5	20.5	19.7
5+	6.5	5.2	4.4	7.7	6.6	8.0	7.0	80.9	17.5	70.5	11.9	10.6	90.5

Source: Eurostat, epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.

*Eurostat does not provide data from Sweden and Belgium.

Annex 5.1.2. Members of private households aged 20–74 by sex and marital status in Lithuania



Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.1.3. *One-person households by member's educational and occupational status in urban and rural areas in Lithuania, percentages*

	Urban	Rural
<i>Education</i>		
University	18.2	4.8
College	18.6	10.1
Secondary	32.1	17.8
Lower than secondary	31.1	67.3
<i>Employment status</i>		
Employed	39.7	15.9
Unemployed	60.3	84.1

Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.1.4. *One-family households by family type in urban and rural areas in Lithuania, percentages*

	Urban	Rural
Married without children	32.2	40.0
Married with children	48.4	44.4
Cohabiting without children	3.3	4.1
Cohabiting with children	3.0	4.0
Lone mother/father	13.0	7.6

Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.1.5. *One-family households by family type and number of children younger than 18 in Lithuania, percentages*

Number of children	Married without children	Cohabiting with children	Lone mother/father
One	42.4	55.7	64.9
Two	46.7	30.1	27.9
Three and more	10.9	14.1	7.2

Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.2.1. Members of private households by person's status in the household and age group in urban and rural areas in Lithuania, percentages

	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	70+
Married											
urban	19.7	51.2	63.6	67.4	70.8	67.7	67.6	65.1	62.2	57.8	39.1
rural	24.1	54.3	68.0	71.3	70.0	67.8	67.3	67.4	65.1	60.7	40.7
Cohabitant											
urban	4.9	6.0	5.3	4.8	4.5	4.3	3.7	2.8	2.1	1.6	0.9
rural	4.7	6.4	6.6	6.9	7.6	8.0	7.4	5.4	4.1	2.7	1.4
Single parent											
urban	3.8	7.9	9.8	10.2	8.6	5.3	2.5	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.0
rural	4.9	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.1	4.3	2.6	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.0
Living alone											
urban	17.5	10.8	9.8	10.1	7.6	11.3	13.1	17.8	21.9	25.9	32.9
rural	6.5	4.1	3.7	4.1	5.3	7.5	10.4	13.4	17.4	22.3	33.2
Other											
urban	54.2	24.2	11.5	7.6	8.5	11.5	13.1	13.6	13.7	14.7	27.0
rural	59.8	28.5	15.0	10.9	11.0	12.3	12.2	12.8	13.3	14.2	24.8

Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.2.2. Members of private households by person's status in the household, marital status, and sex in Lithuania, percentages

	Married		Cohabitant		Single parent		Living alone		Other	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Never married	0.1	0.1	37.3	32.1	6.1	17.1	0.1	0.1	37.3	32.1
Married	99.4	99.4	8.1	7.4	40.6	21.5	99.4	99.4	8.1	7.4
Divorced	0.5	0.5	47.7	43.2	30.1	47.5	0.5	0.5	47.7	43.2
Widow/er	0.0	0.0	6.6	17.1	23.0	13.2	0.0	0.0	6.6	17.1
Not reported	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2

Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.2.3. Members of private households by person's status in the household and marital status in urban and rural areas in Lithuania, percentages

	Married		Cohabitant		Single parent		Living alone		Other	
	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural
Never married	0.1	0.1	35.9	32.8	15.3	21.4	0.1	0.1	35.9	32.8
Married	99.3	99.5	6.8	9.2	23.9	19.7	99.3	99.5	6.8	9.2
Divorced	0.5	0.3	48.1	41.4	48.7	39.0	0.5	0.3	48.1	41.4
Widow/er	0.0	0.0	9.0	16.3	11.9	19.8	0.0	0.0	9.0	16.3
Not reported	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3

Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.2.4. Members of private households by sex, person's status in the household, and marital status in urban and rural areas in Lithuania, percentages

	Married		Cohabitant		Single parent		Living alone		Other	
	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural	urban	rural
Males										
Never married	0.1	0.1	36.4	38.7	5.5	7.4	0.1	0.1	36.4	38.7
Married	99.3	99.5	7.4	9.1	44.9	30.6	99.3	99.5	7.4	9.1
Divorced	0.5	0.3	50.6	43.3	29.4	31.9	0.5	0.3	50.6	43.3
Widow/er	0.0	0.0	0.5	8.6	20.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	8.6
Not reported	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3
Female										
Never married	0.1	0.1	35.4	26.9	16.0	22.7	0.1	0.1	35.4	26.9
Married	99.3	95.5	6.1	9.3	22.5	18.6	99.3	95.5	6.1	9.3
Divorced	0.5	0.3	45.7	39.4	50.0	39.7	0.5	0.3	45.7	39.4
Widow/er	0.0	0.1	12.6	24.1	11.4	18.9	0.0	0.1	12.6	24.1
Not reported	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2


Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.3.1. Males and females by marital status and age in Lithuania , 2001, percentages

Age	Never married	Married		Divorced	Widowed	No answer
		Total	Among them: not the first marriage			
Males						
15+	28.2	60.7	6.9	7.8	3.2	0.1
30+	8.7	76.6	7.5	10.2	4.4	0.1
15-19	99.5	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
20-24	82.4	16.5	0.4	0.8	0.0	0.4
25-29	42.0	52.8	1.7	4.9	0.1	0.2
30-34	19.5	70.5	3.5	9.7	0.2	0.1
35-39	11.8	75.8	5.3	11.8	0.5	0.1
40-44	8.6	77.8	7.3	12.6	0.9	0.1
45-49	7.8	76.7	9.0	13.9	1.6	0.1
50-54	6.6	77.8	10.1	12.8	2.7	0.1
55-59	5.4	79.5	9.2	10.8	4.3	0.1
60-64	4.5	80.4	9.1	8.7	6.3	0.1
65-69	3.5	81.3	8.3	6.2	8.9	0.1
70-74	3.0	79.5	8.1	4.0	13.4	0.1
75-79	3.2	74.6	8.2	2.9	19.3	0.1
80-84	2.9	68.1	9.2	2.1	26.8	0.1
85-89	3.5	57.0	12.8	1.7	37.8	0.1
90-94	3.2	47.3	12.0	1.0	48.5	0.0
95-99	2.8	38.9	12.9	1.1	57.1	0.2
100+	1.0	37.0	13.5	0.0	62.0	0.0
No answer	6.8	6.8	8.3	7.4	1.7	77.3
Females						
15+	21.1	51.6	7.0	10.2	17.0	0.1
30+	7.6	57.8	7.9	12.3	22.2	0.1
15-19	97.6	2.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
20-24	65.0	32.5	0.8	2.1	0.2	0.2
25-29	26.1	63.8	2.6	9.1	0.9	0.1
30-34	13.1	71.2	4.8	13.8	1.9	0.1
35-39	9.0	72.2	6.3	15.6	3.1	0.1
40-44	7.3	71.1	8.2	16.7	4.8	0.1
45-49	6.3	68.2	9.5	17.6	7.9	0.1
50-54	5.3	65.9	10.6	16.3	12.5	0.1
55-59	5.0	62.2	9.5	13.6	19.2	0.1
60-64	5.3	56.6	8.7	11.0	27.1	0.1
65-69	6.3	48.4	7.3	7.6	37.6	0.1
70-74	8.0	37.1	6.7	5.4	49.4	0.1
75-79	8.9	25.1	7.8	3.6	62.4	0.1
80-84	8.8	14.0	10.3	1.9	75.2	0.1
85-89	8.6	7.2	9.7	1.2	82.9	0.1
90-94	7.8	5.0	8.1	0.7	86.5	0.0
95-99	8.3	3.5	7.8	0.6	87.5	0.1
100+	6.2	2.4	0.0	0.3	90.8	0.3
No answer	6.6	3.3	0.0	4.6	4.0	81.5

Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

Annex 5.3.2. Males and females by marital status and age in rural areas in Lithuania, percentages



Source: Gyventojai, 2003.

*Annex 5.3.3. Males and females by marital status, education and birth cohort, 1920–1979
birth cohorts in Lithuania, percentages*

Year of birth	Never married	Married	Divorced	Widowed	Never married	Married	Divorced	Widowed
	Males				Females			
Higher								
1920–1924	4.6	74.2	3.4	17.9	14.0	24.0	6.8	55.1
1925–1929	3.0	80.3	5.3	11.4	10.6	38.8	8.4	42.2
1930–1934	2.3	85.1	5.4	7.1	10.3	47.9	10.2	31.7
1935–1939	2.7	85.3	7.4	4.6	8.9	56.2	14.7	20.2
1940–1944	2.3	86.2	8.7	2.7	7.7	61.6	15.4	15.3
1945–1949	3.1	85.3	9.5	2.1	8.0	65.4	16.2	10.4
1950–1954	3.0	86.0	9.5	1.4	8.7	68.8	16.4	6.1
1955–1959	4.0	87.7	7.8	0.5	10.1	71.0	15.4	3.5
1960–1964	6.2	84.9	8.6	0.3	11.6	72.8	13.6	2.0
1965–1969	10.8	82.5	6.6	0.2	14.1	73.0	11.6	1.4
1970–1974	29.6	66.5	3.9	0.0	25.8	66.0	7.5	0.7
1975–1979	67.2	32.1	0.7	0.0	56.6	41.4	1.9	0.1
College (including secondary specialised)								
1920–1924	2.1	76.7	1.7	19.5	8.5	22.9	7.1	61.5
1925–1929	1.8	82.6	4.7	10.9	7.5	36.5	6.8	49.1
1930–1934	1.8	83.0	5.8	9.4	5.6	48.0	8.9	37.5
1935–1939	2.0	85.3	7.2	5.5	4.4	58.1	11.8	25.7
1940–1944	2.6	82.1	10.3	5.0	4.2	63.1	13.7	18.9
1945–1949	2.9	84.0	10.6	2.5	3.9	67.1	15.5	13.5
1950–1954	3.9	82.7	11.9	1.6	4.4	69.5	16.9	9.2
1955–1959	4.0	84.4	10.7	0.9	5.1	72.7	16.2	6.0
1960–1964	5.4	84.1	9.9	0.6	6.1	74.9	15.6	3.4
1965–1969	10.3	80.4	9.1	0.2	8.3	75.1	14.5	2.1
1970–1974	22.4	71.4	6.1	0.1	16.0	72.0	11.0	1.0
1975–1979	59.9	38.6	1.5		46.6	49.8	3.5	0.1
Secondary								
1920–1924	2.2	75.3	3.8	18.7	8.9	22.4	4.6	64.1
1925–1929	4.3	76.7	4.1	14.9	8.8	33.0	5.5	52.7
1930–1934	3.4	80.3	5.9	10.4	6.7	42.4	8.5	42.5
1935–1939	3.7	79.9	10.0	6.4	5.0	52.4	11.9	30.7
1940–1944	3.4	81.2	10.3	5.1	4.8	59.1	14.7	21.4
1945–1949	5.0	79.3	12.5	3.2	3.6	64.0	16.5	15.8
1950–1954	6.5	77.5	13.8	2.2	4.4	65.6	18.6	11.4
1955–1959	8.2	75.5	14.8	1.4	5.1	69.0	18.8	7.1
1960–1964	11.3	74.6	13.3	0.8	6.2	70.7	18.7	4.4
1965–1969	15.7	72.3	11.7	0.3	9.2	71.0	16.8	3.0
1970–1974	29.9	62.6	7.4	0.1	16.1	69.4	12.8	1.6
1975–1979	63.6	34.2	2.1	0.0	43.1	50.9	5.5	0.6

Annex 5.3.3. Continue

Year of birth	Never married	Married	Divorced	Widowed	Never married	Married	Divorced	Widowed
	Males				Females			
Basic								
1920–1924	1.5	72.4	2.8	23.3	9.3	23.6	4.2	63.0
1925–1929	2.0	77.7	3.9	16.4	6.6	33.3	6.0	54.2
1930–1934	2.2	82.2	5.2	10.4	5.1	44.6	7.7	42.6
1935–1939	3.8	81.5	7.8	6.9	3.6	54.4	9.4	32.7
1940–1944	4.7	80.0	9.9	5.4	3.0	61.6	10.8	24.6
1945–1949	7.9	75.3	13.1	3.7	3.5	63.3	13.8	19.5
1950–1954	12.8	67.1	17.2	2.9	4.7	64.4	15.8	15.1
1955–1959	17.4	60.5	20.0	2.1	8.7	61.2	19.1	11.0
1960–1964	22.4	59.8	16.8	1.1	12.3	62.9	18.5	6.3
1965–1969	29.1	56.6	14.1	0.2	17.1	60.0	18.2	4.8
1970–1974	43.9	47.1	8.7	0.2	23.8	59.6	14.2	2.4
1975–1979					38.5	55.1	5.9	0.5
Primary								
1920–1924	2.2	72.8	2.4	22.7	7.8	20.1	2.1	70.0
1925–1929	2.3	79.6	3.0	15.1	7.5	32.5	3.5	56.5
1930–1934	2.8	82.0	4.3	10.9	6.2	44.3	5.1	44.4
1935–1939	4.2	81.0	6.2	8.6	4.6	54.4	6.3	34.8
1940–1944	7.5	75.8	9.8	6.9	4.2	60.2	8.6	27.1
1945–1949	12.1	68.3	13.9	5.7	6.4	59.6	11.8	22.2
1950–1954	28.2	50.3	16.7	4.9	14.3	57.8	13.5	14.3
1955–1959	40.2	41.5	16.7	1.6	25.7	51.4	12.0	10.9
1960–1964	47.0	31.2	20.5	1.3	30.8	45.8	16.7	6.7
1965–1969	57.0	33.1	9.3	0.6	40.0	46.3	11.6	2.1
1970–1974	61.8	27.7	9.4	1.1	44.3	40.7	12.6	2.4
1975–1979	78.7	18.9	2.3	0.1	55.7	39.0	4.8	0.5

Source: Calculations are done using 30% of 2001 Lithuanian population census micro data.

Annex 5.4.1. Women by number of children born and birth cohort in Lithuania, percentages

Women's birth cohort	Number of born children					Childless	No response
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five or more		
Total							
1920	15.98	24.22	18.57	10.99	14.44	14.51	1.29
1930	17.89	34.90	18.79	7.82	7.19	12.34	1.07
1940	21.39	42.61	16.42	5.11	4.26	8.38	1.83
1950	22.27	47.87	13.74	3.69	3.18	7.76	1.48
1960	22.66	49.73	12.84	3.19	2.04	8.27	1.28
Urban							
1920	19.02	27.91	18.24	8.76	9.06	15.63	1.37
1930	21.70	40.33	16.01	4.70	2.99	12.92	1.36
1940	26.08	46.83	11.90	2.30	1.37	9.00	2.53
1950	25.55	50.79	10.27	1.98	1.12	8.42	1.87
1960	26.11	51.48	9.54	1.60	0.71	9.03	1.53
Rural							
1920	12.38	19.84	18.97	13.63	20.81	13.18	1.20
1930	12.50	27.22	22.73	12.24	13.14	11.52	0.66
1940	12.39	34.52	25.10	10.49	9.80	7.20	0.50
1950	13.50	40.07	23.02	8.27	8.69	5.98	0.46
1960	13.50	45.08	21.59	7.42	5.56	6.26	0.60

Source: 2001 Census.

Annex 5.4.2. Women by number of children born, education, and place of residence, women of 1920–1959 birth cohorts in Lithuania, percentages

Education	Number of children born				
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five or more
Urban					
Total	27.6	52.5	14.1	3.6	2.2
Higher	32.7	56.8	9.1	1.1	0.4
College ¹	29.5	56.9	11.2	1.8	0.7
Secondary	27.7	54.1	13.7	2.9	1.6
Basic	24.5	50.1	17.1	5.2	3.0
Primary	21.4	42.6	21.7	8.3	6.1
Less than primary	21.0	34.9	22.6	10.6	10.8
Rural					
Total	14.0	37.0	25.1	11.7	12.1
Higher	19.1	56.2	19.7	3.6	1.4
College ¹	15.6	48.3	24.9	7.2	4.0
Secondary	14.6	41.5	25.1	9.7	9.2
Basic	12.4	34.3	26.3	12.9	14.2
Primary	12.6	30.2	25.8	15.0	16.3
Less than primary	14.0	24.6	24.9	15.5	20.9

Source: Fertility, 2004 (2001 Census).

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